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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.



AN APPEAL

FROM THE

ABSURDITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS

WHICH

PERVADE, AND DEFORM

THE

OLD THEORY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR,

TO THE

TRUE CONSTRUCTIVE PRINCIPLES

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.



BY JAMES BROWN:

THE AUTHOR OF "THE EXEGESIS OF THE TRUE WAY OF ANALIZING WORDS, AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF DIFFICULT RESOLUTIONS," "THE FIRST AND THE SECOND ROUND IN THE LADDER OF EDUCATION," AND AN ENGLISH GRAMMAR, DEVELOPING THE NEW SCIENCE MADE UP OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE PRINCIPLES WHICH FORM A SURE GUIDE IN USING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE; BUT WHICH ARE NOT FOUND IN THE OLD THEORY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

"If you would avoid your own errors, examine those of others."

"Read, not to take for granted, but to weigh—to consider."—BACON.

PHILADELPHIA:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN T. LANGE,
SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF SIXTH AND ARCH STREET.

1850.

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Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1850, by
JAMES BROWN,
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P R E F A C E.

THE English bids fair to be a living Language through time itself. Hence no change, in the *means* by which its principles are developed, calculated to redound to the honour of the present, and to the good of future generations, should be discouraged by the plea of a probable want of longevity in the language itself.

It is composed of materials derived from various sources; and although these sources are rich even to philological luxuries, the English Language is strong even to that persuasion to which reason itself often becomes a sacrifice. Hence considering the tender age of the English Language, perhaps it may be said to surpass every other?

As the English Language is still in its youth, it is yet in a progressive state. In general, men have three distinct objects in their instruments, means, and institutions. And as these are not simultaneous, but successive in their existence, every human means, system, and institution must remain a long time in a state of progression.

A man's *first* object in building, is a house which will provide for his *necessities*.—His second, is a house which will provide for his *convenience*—and his third object is one that will not only provide for his comfort, but which will comport with his *wealth* and *station*.

Now, it is with a nation as it is with an individual; and it is with languages, systems, and institutions as it is with a house. Every thing that relates to man, is matter of progression. Listen to Cowper, singing the *simple stool* into the splendid sofa upon the notes of progressive improvement.

And, if you turn to the stove, you will find that construction designed to answer the demands of necessity, thrown aside by the hands of genius, which has provided for *necessity*, *convenience*, and *taste* in the same thing.

And, as you turn from the stove to *language*, you will find the same hand abridging in some parts, augmenting in others, and adjusting all for *convenience*, *strength*, *perspicuity*, *despatch*, and *euphony*.

Mark, the *orthography* of the italic words.

“*Have* more *then* thou showest,

Speak less *then* thou knowest,

Lend less *then* thou owest,

Ride more *then* thou goest,

Learne more *then* thou trowest.”—LEAR, p. 288.

Have is now *have*—and *then* is now *than*—and *learne* is now *learn*.

“Where shall we *sojourn* till our coronation?

“Where it *thinks* best unto your *royall selfe*.

Richard 3d page 186.

Sojourn, is now *sojourn*—*royall* is now *royal*—*selfe*, is now *self*.

“Men's eyes be obedient unto the *creatour* that they may see *on think*, and yet not another.—Bishop Hooper.

Creatour, is now *Creator*—*on* is now *one*—and *think* is now *thing*.

“The *woman's synne* was *lesse greuous* than Adam's *synne*, and *lesse hurtful* to *mankynde*.”

Dieus and *Pauper*, 6th conn. chap. 10.

“Nor make *warre* upon me *nyght*, nor day.”

Squires Tales, fol. 5, pag. 2, col. 1.

Warre, is now *war*—*nyght* is now *night*.

“Our hope in him is dead: let us *retur*ne,

And use what other *meanes* is left unto us,” &c.

Timon of Athens, page 67.

Returne, is now *return*—and *meanes* is now *means*.

It is here seen that language is an instrument which is continually changed the better to answer the purpose of those for whose use it is intended. And, pray, why, should it not be so? Has not the traveller a right to *trim*, and *smooth* his walking stick? shall he not be permitted to cut it down to a size suitable to his convenience and strength; and eventually, to insert a sword fit for his defence, and to give the whole a polish congenial to his wish, and taste?

Those persons who have concerned themselves with the English language no farther than to learn, and use it as it *now* is, may think that it has already attained to its acme of Excellence. From such, however, the author of this APPEAL very widely differs. Nor is he alone in this opinion.—For, in an ORATION pronounced at Cambridge, August 26, 1824, before the PHI BETA KAPPA Society, by Edward Everett, it is said by this finished scholar that—

“*There is little doubt that the instrument of communication, will receive great improvements; that the written, and spoken language will acquire new force, and power; possibly that forms of address, wholly new, will be struck out to meet the universal demand for new energy.*”

The author of the new system of English grammar proposes no change in the language itself. He proposes a revolution in the means by which its *laws* are *acquired*.

But it may be said by many, that the old system has so long enjoyed the approbation of the learned, that it must be a complete, and accurate expression of the constructive genius of the English language. To those who deduce the perfection of the old theory, from the duration of its existence, it may be replied that the arts, and sciences have ever been *slow* in their progress, and been brought to their present condition by the accumulated efforts of different countries, and successive generations. Even the common mechanic arts, upon which the concurrent experience of all men in every nation, has been constantly acting, have attained to *comparative* excellence only. Great, therefore, as have been the successive efforts of the British grammarians; and much as they deserve approbation for what they have accomplished, the history of the arts, and sciences, in general, and the difficulties of *philological* investigation, in particular, forbid the belief that the old theory of English Grammar, has yet attained to those powers of development, necessary to a *full*, *true*, and *clear* expression of the constructive principles of our language.

Nor, while the author of this APPEAL, has uniformly rendered that respect to the British English grammarians, to which they are so justly entitled from all, has he been surprised to find their whole theory *groaning* under the disease of *error*. This disease has been too *general* to excite any sudden emotion from *novelty*—it has always been the prevailing *epidemic* among *new* systems, plans, and institutions—and, while a few have escaped its attack, the majority has fallen victims to its rage, and been cut down, as by a quick, or slow consumption. In confirmation of this, see theory after theory falling like men in battle—mark the means employed to save them from the state of protracted sleep.—The *dignity* of their *origin* is pleaded—the few services they have rendered, are urged—the *inconvenience* of *change*, is exaggerated—*error* is attempted to be *beautified*—*innovation* is belied, and presented in all the terrors of disorder, dilaceration, and ruin—and the *innovator himself* is held up as a pest to society—an enemy to truth, as some *refractory* spirit seeking distinction in the ruin of those noble fabrics which

have been finished by genius, adorned with learning, tried by time, and admired by the world. But history shows that all these life-saving resorts are vain.—The existence of error cannot be protracted beyond the discovery of *truth*! Whenever *error* can be clearly exposed, and truth fairly made out, the sea of life, which rocks under the jarring interests, and views of men, will rise in anger, and will swallow up that compass, be it constructed by whom it may, which has been *unfaithful* to the mariner, in his voyage for *science, art, or fame*.

The present popular system of English Grammar, is a compilation by Mr. L. Murray.

Mr. Murray was an American—he was born, and educated in the UNITED STATES. His work, however, is a collection of the written opinions, and views of the English literati. The author compiled his Grammar after he became a member of the English community—he designed it as a system of Definitions, Rules and Remarks, for the presentation of the structure of the English language—the work therefore, is in every sense of the word, an English production. But is it the worse for its *national* character? No! Nor is it considered so in the present attack upon it. England is our mother—and, although, while in her family, and under her protection, we received nothing from her hands but persecution in all its forms; yet while we would receive her literary gifts with the affection of children; we would employ them with the minds of *men*.

The ties between England, and America, are amity, and affection. These national ligatures can never be strengthened by oblations upon the altar of science, for the sins of the parent upon the heads of the *children*. FREEDOM is the source whence these chords have sprung; and INDEPENDENCE is the power which must continue their tension. Political independence hath given us wings—and literary freedom will enable us to soar to fame. Does England say that this APPEAL is an attack upon her? the appellant *denies the charge*; it is an attack upon her erroneous opinions with an application to her best judgment to renounce them. Nor is the attack intended *for* her any farther than she is disposed to render it subservient to her interest. If she thinks proper to approve, well. But, if she undertakes to repel this attack, she is arrayed against TRUTH which is no sooner known, than it finds advocates in every land, and clime! TRUTH has never suffered for a want of *advocates*. It sometimes lies long concealed under *methodical, and pampered error*. But as this loathsome garb is torn off, and truth exhibited in its native beauty, and form, it is led forth by its numerous friends, and made to strengthen the mind; to adorn art and science, and to beautify nature herself.

Nor does TRUTH ever become so degraded by the comparative value of the system, art, or science in which it may be found, that it falls below the favourable notice, and ready patronage of the wisest, and best man. True, individuals may be found, who say, “O, the old theory answers all *practical* purposes—and farther than this, we are *indifferent*.”

But this is not the general sentiment of the human race. The erroneous theory of astronomy was sufficient to answer all “practical purposes” — yet because this theory shut out the TRUTH, it was exploded, and the *true* one adopted. It was a *love of truth*, which induced men to reject the old astronomical theory, and to receive the new, and *true* one. For surely, those master spirits who arrayed themselves against error, neither expected, by the introduction of the true system, to enrich the soil of the earth, nor to bring more brilliant, and lasting light from the heavens. No—it was the *lustre of truth*, which attracted their attention—it was the *brilliancy* of this *diamond*, which enlisted these soldiers of science in the war of *innovation*. And it was not until the termination of this war, that the splendour of creation was known, or the greatness of its Maker seen.

Man is so constituted that *truth* renders him happy, while *error* makes him miserable. Truth has an effect upon the mind as much as fire upon the flesh, or

food upon the palate. The criminal is made happy, or miserable, by *truth*. If *truth* fixes the crime, the culprit is condemned, though *acquitted*; but, if *falsehood* fixes it, he is acquitted although *condemned*.

If a theory is founded in *truth*, no higher recommendation is necessary — indeed it would be an insult upon the nature, and dignity of man, to attempt any *stronger*, or *higher* encomium.

If a man rejects *truth* upon the ground that *error* may answer all *practical purposes*, he forms an *exception*—he falls below the dignity of his species. The man who says that *error* will answer as well as *truth*, might also say that *vice* will answer as well as *virtue*, that a *falsehood* is as commendable as the *truth*; in short, that *sin* is as worthy as *holiness itself*!

Truth even in the abstract, has claims upon man for his approbation—and man from his very nature, rejoices in paying the demand.

The author has proceeded thus far upon the ground that an *erroneous* theory will answer all *practical purposes*. But he now denies the correctness of the position; and he pities them who have the weakness to take it. Was this position reversed they who take it, would appear more gracious—for systems may answer in theory, which are by no means competent in *practice*. The British system of English Grammar, may answer all the purposes of theory—but, it cannot answer even half of the purposes of *practice*. The purposes of a grammar in practice, are the just solution, and proper use of the language whose construction it professes to teach. These purposes are not answered by the old English Grammar, which in the course of this work, will be clearly demonstrated. And it is upon this firm ground that the present petition is made to the AMERICAN PEOPLE to abandon that theory for one, conceived in *truth*, born of the English language, dressed in simplicity, skilful, and strong even to all the pretended *eccentricities*, *anomalies*, and *idioms* with which our language is said to abound.

But the petitioner does not even hope to escape opposition—he craves investigation—he trembles not under the dread of defeat—*truth* against error, is *omnipotent*.

The author of the new system of English grammar, is not insensible that even the American people will listen to his petition with a jealous diffidence. They will revert with logical caution to the numerous attempts to improve the voluminous compilations of the worthy Mr. Murray, upon this science. The stubborn animosity of those who have been disappointed in a Gould Brown; the virulence of them that have not realized their high expectations in a Bullions; and the execrations of the many, who say Murray is the very acme of grammatical excellence, will entrench themselves against the prosperity of this undertaking. Nor will the opposing force stop here; some of the many who have devoted so much time to the study of this science, by the old plan, will, from *mere pride* of opinion, exert their influence to retard the march of this improvement. The last class of anti-improvers, may be known by the character of the argument which they adopt. They tell the community that it is not possible that so learned a man as Mr. Murray, should so far overlook the genius of our language, that he can form an erroneous system for the development of its principles. They even convert the worth, and elevated standing of the man into a kind of arch which they throw over his works to defend them from the *pressure* of criticism. This arch I greatly admire; and I would even plead the dignity of its materials as a superinducement for my attack upon its tenants. When a country so idolizes its great men that it trembles at an appeal from their *erroneous* decisions, the avenues to improvement are closed,—national reputation sickens,—the *expiring* rattle is heard in the larynx of genius,—and the cold sweat of death covers the public body.

A REPUBLIC must advance, or it must retrograde. This is emphatically true with the *American* community. The rapid increase of its population, brings along with it new views, new interests, new jealousies, and new *ambition*.

Politics have become the highway to fame,—hence the *broad road to destruction*. The crowds that enter, seem resolved on distinction, and power. Every act which seems important to self-aggrandizement, must be *pushed* into being; and every chief magistrate whose reign appears hurtful to the opposite party, must be hurled from his seat by the *constitution* of the Union.

All the leading politicians have fixed their eyes upon some exalted posts—and to attain to these, they rely upon the various views which may be taken of this glorious instrument—an instrument which would be sufficient to guide a WASHINGTON; but which is altogether incompetent to control one bent upon power, and dominion.

This Republic is not to be saved from the attacks of ambition, by a *Junius* brandishing the crimson steel. The guardian power of America, must be sought for in her *constitution*. This is the *ark* in which her liberties,—her rights,—her very *vitals* are deposited.

The defects in the construction of this ark, have already served the purposes of political partizans who will always be dangerous to American liberty in proportion to the philological defectiveness of that sacred depository in which it has been placed by those whose lives were devoted to procure it, and whose spirits are invoked to preserve it.

Too little attention is paid to the means employed in teaching children. Youth is the progressive state of both mind and body; and, if either is neglected here, it never attains to that height in excellence to which our species is capable of ascending. The proper nourishment for both, while in this state, is *logical* and *liberal* action,—and, in exact proportion to the use of this, will be the strength of the body, and the capability of the soul.

The subject of *truth*, and *definition* is generally kept out of our Seminaries of learning—hence it is, that lax phraseology, unmeaning description, and obscure expression pervade, and deform the works of our great men.

A knowledge of the *science* of *thought*, is the only information which can render a man fully competent to discharge the various duties which devolve upon him in the journey of life. As astronomy does not respect the relation of ideas in general, a knowledge of this science cannot render the mind skilful in other things. A man's knowledge of the relations of the celestial bodies which roll in the firmament upon *God's will* as their *axle*, does not give so much capability to acquire other sciences, as does his knowledge of the *more celestial* bodies which revolve in constellations in the mind, round God as their centre!

As language is the great medium through which the student gains access to art, and science, he should endeavour to make himself perfectly acquainted with this medium as soon as his age will enable him to study it. And, as language is nothing but *thought* embodied in tabernacles of sounds, and characters, the student must here study the science of thought, or remain ignorant of language. Language is the only thing in which thought is presented as a *science*. And, although it is said again, and again, that the pupil may attend to the *philosophy* of language after he shall have acquired the *grammar* of it, yet it is a truth which can not be controverted, that the constructive *philosophy*, and the *grammar* of a language, are the same thing!

I do not intend to say that the jargon which is presented by Murray, *Goold Brown*, *Bullions*, &c. &c. as *English grammar*, is the *philosophy* of the English language. But I mean to say that *English grammar* is the *constructive philosophy* of the English language.

No, no,—I should not like to impose upon myself the task of showing that the silly rules, ridiculous notes, and *nickname* definitions which disgrace their authors, and harm their students, are the *philosophy* of the English language!

The following definition of *person* is given by a recent *mender* of Murray—

"Person, in grammar, is the *relation* of a noun or pronoun to what is said in discourse."

"There are three persons, *first*, *second*, and *third*. The first *person* denotes the *speaker*, or *writer*;— as *I Paul* have written it. The second *person* denotes the person addressed; as *Thou God* seest me;—the third *person* denotes the person or thing spoken of; as, *Truth* is mighty."—*P. Bullions' English Grammar*.

Now, as *person* is *relation*, the *first person* is the *first relation*. The *second person* is the *second relation*—and the *third person* is the *third relation*!! The practical philosophy of the thing, then, is this—

The *first relation* denotes the *speaker*, or *writer*; as, *I Paul* have written it! Is the speaker denoted here by a *relation*? Is he not denoted by the word *Paul*!! Is this proper noun a *relation*?

The *second relation* denotes the person addressed; as, "*Thou, God*, seest me!"

The *third relation* denotes the person, or thing spoken of; as, *Truth* is mighty!

Is it not remarkably singular that a man who defines *person* to be a *relation*, and thus compels himself to say in the application of this false doctrine, that the speaker is denoted by a *relation*, should know any thing of *truth*? "*Truth is mighty*."

But it is mighty in the hands of those only, who love it. The man who can employ the word, *truth*, in illustration of the gross *error* which precedes, would be likely to treat *truth* as *hag-born*!

But *truth* is *mighty* in every thing in which it is found—and, upon every thing to which it is applied. *Truth* in science acts as compost upon the mind of the student—*truth* in science draws out the affections of the student for the study of the science—*truth* in science falls upon the mind of the student like the dew-drop upon the grass. But that system from which liquid error is constantly drizzling into the mind of the student, renders the brain dropsical, and consequently, the whole mind feeble.

Youth is the season allotted by nature to the exercise, and expansion of the soul—but man, *lazy* man, has contradicted this, and thus brought himself to a state so feeble that he can hardly protect his rights, hardly enjoy his freedom. Even the *Constitution* of the *United States*, although drawn up by the united talents of profound men, cannot be understood by any two impartial statesmen in the *same way*. The SENATE cannot ascertain by this instrument, whether the Vice-President should control the senatorial body, or whether this body should control him! Thousands have already been expended to determine this point from the language of the constitution, without the least success.

As great a scholar, and as profound a statesman as has ever presided over this nation, understands the constitution of the Union to give the President power to send certain ministers, and other officers, from this, to foreign countries, without the consent of the Senate. But a Senate in no respect inferior to any which has ever adorned this Republic, understands this same instrument to require him to consult the Senate upon the subject of *all* foreign missions. Thus the same instrument is made to sustain conflicting measures whenever it pleases the contending parties to sanction deeds which are favourable to themselves.

In the United States, the people are divided into two parties upon the constitutionality of a national bank. Yes, ever since the government of these States has had an existence, one party has averred that the constitution sanctions a national bank, while the other has as long averred that it interdicts every thing of the kind. Thus, while the affirmative party has been erecting a national bank with this instrument, the negative one has been demolishing it with the same means!

I have ever been very much disposed to ascribe these individual, and national misfortunes to a want of *skill* in language. These sparrings which tax a nation's wealth, these concussions in the political elements, which carry *horror in their vibrations*, these *eddies* which sometimes whirl in amazement, nation after nation,

these adverse winds which give being, and energy to faction, are the storms which ambition directs by riding upon the clouds of the *constitution*. It is in these clouds that ambition lurks—it is from these that the thunder of eloquence will burst—it is from these, that the lightning of genius will play, first to the consternation, then to the *destruction* of our political EDEN.

He that has attended with common observation to what passes daily in society in general, has found that most of the difficulties which distract neighbourhoods, and array even brother against brother, and carry both before a *judge*, and *jury*, arise from a want of *clearly* defining the conditions of their contracts. It becomes every man therefore to understand the language of his own country—he should consider it as an instrument employed in the transaction of business—as a means used for the preservation of peace,—as a high qualification in social hours,—and an invaluable blessing through life.

Is it too late to begin a *reform*? If not, let it be commenced in our *primary* schools—let our language be understood by the teacher, and by him, let it be taught to the pupil—let the *absurd, parrot-like* mode of teaching it be ridiculed out of use, and out of being—let children learn to *think*—and let parents employ the teachers who will *enable* their children to think.

Let the institutions in which our youth complete their education, give attention to our *own* language—too much time is devoted to the *dead* languages.

American statesmen must be acquainted with their *own* language, or this Republic is of short duration.

This republic came into being by political revolution—and it must attain to its destined rank, and sway by *literary innovation*.

The greatest freedom to which a nation can aspire is complete emancipation from literary thralldom—few nations, however, arrive at this commanding eminence. Rome once possessed it; and she was the glory, and admiration of the world.

In times of innovation, however, every caution should be enlivened with fear—yet tempered with reason. The enraged genius of one individual has sometimes drawn whole nations from the bosom of their laws, and from the inmost recesses of their salutary habits. But injury has rarely resulted from the feats of genius directed to the improvement of art, or science. Even where the primary object is not accomplished, good often results from the *exertions* of the disappointed. Was the philosopher's stone discovered—was the elixir of life procured? Yet the falacious attempts of the disappointed, prepared the way for discoveries of great importance to the human race. And, although the great minds that pursued these objects, did enlarge the circle of science, they were severely punished for their *crimes* with sneers, ridicule and persecution!

Attempts to improve the arts, and sciences rarely escape the consequences common to virulence, prejudice, and ambition. The race of genius has generally been converted into detestable war, and the ground of improvement turned into a field of battle. And while the bones of some have remained bleaching as a memento to the folly, and cruelty of man, the fate of others has been long, and dismal incarceration. But in modern days, few are immured within the gloomy walls of the *criminal's* prison: *innovators, inventors, and improvers, the distinguished benefactors of the human race*, are now subjected to torture upon the *rack* of the public press!

And a thousand minor means are always employed to aid in the chastisement of the greatly useful men, as well as in the *misrepresentation* of the most salutary measures. He whose reflections have never been sufficient to *undecieve* his *own* mind, has not unfrequently *prated* to the *temporary* detriment of real improvement. The literary *fox*, and the scientific *coxcomb*, have striven with the credulous, and ignorant; who, for a while, have withheld their support from important discoveries. And the *envious*, who *pin*es under the success of another, has too often convened all his *malign* passions, held a *caucus* with himself to devise means for defeat, and disgrace.

When did ENVY emit her infuriated flame, and wrap the invaluable Linnæus in a fiery sheet of slander? It was when reason, as though endowed with religion, was patient—it was when the genius, and industry of Linnæus produced that botanical system which adorns the present age—it was when the former theories upon this science were converted into fortifications to save their votaries, and defeat the march of truth.

Where are those who *ridiculed* a Newton for years? *Disappointment* is their historian; and shame is the theme of his pen. And, while the services of our own Clinton, couple him with the great of other times, the connection has been confirmed by the sanction of similar persecutions. The tongues, of prejudice, which his CANAL ENTERPRIZE raised, hold a numeral competition with the particles of earth, thrown out in the excavation. But while the *shame* of thousands is seen *blushing* through the waters of the Western canal, the praise of its projector is heard rippling under its boats.—And as long as the note of merit is sweet to any, *America* will be charmed by the music of the voice which utters the name of CLINTON.

The new system of English grammar presents a new scene to the minds of men; and the grand problem is, whether it deserves their fostering care, or their frowns, and reprehensions.

Perhaps there is no middle point upon which men can place this undertaking—they can hardly justify a neutral ground. And it comes to this nation with increased claim to attention, as America is *now* the great theatre of glorious enterprise, and useful discovery.

What it may be inquired is this new system? It is a plan of instruction calculated to rouse the mind of the pupil, and to employ his perceptive powers. It is a system of grammar calculated to shorten the distance from youth to manhood by accelerating the progress of the mind. The new theory is a system of teaching, which smooths the rugged road to knowledge, over which the *old Grammatical* vehicle has for ages rumbled. It is a system obviously differing from all others: it is a species of INNOVATION which must meet, and withstand the *usual* opposition. Yes, the work of innovation is a *Herculean* task: it is an enterprise opposed by the pride of some, the virulence of others, and the habits of *all*. Few, however, are so bewildered by pride of opinion, that, sooner or later, they do not yield their assent to the introduction of real improvement. But there always will be some, who, led captive, by prejudice, will exert their utmost strength to oppose the tide of improvement. In the variegated machinery of human compacts, and associations, however, these are by no means, useless—yet while I value them as important in the race of improvement, I pity their condition, and rejoice that it is not my *own*.

The Americans, as a people, though various in descent, are *one* in purpose. And it is by this *unique* character, that the influence of a difference in pedigree, is met, and subdued. It is not *birth*; nor is it *residence*, but coincidence in *views*, and *purpose*, which makes one an AMERICAN. And *he*, and *he alone*, is an American, born *here*, or *elsewhere*, whether of Irish, or German descent, whose conduct accords with the spirit of *American* laws, whose eye is upon *our* constitution, as the ARK in which his *liberty* is deposited,—and who couples, with his *own* advancement, the promotion of the *whole*. And it is to the Americans that this enterprise is addressed. It is to a people, liberal, according to their means, beyond any other; it is to a people, willing, beyond any other, to try all things, and hold *fast* that which is *good*—it is to a people needy, from the nature of their government, beyond any other, of *general*, *early*, and *correct* information. In a country like this, where equal rights are the life of the government, and general intelligence the lungs through which she respires, the means of education rise in importance above almost every other topic of national, or individual reflection. Let America, then, not tremble at innovation—let her continue to use the burnisher of genius till the *glitter* of the spires, ascending from her *Temples* of science, shall light even her *mother* to fame.

AN APPEAL FROM ERROR TO TRUTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE OLD DEFINITION OF A NOUN.

WE have devoted several years to the subject of grammar—and the main part of our attention, has been given to four points; namely, *truth*, and *error* in the science itself, and *right*, and *wrong* in the means of communicating it to others. And although we have read many books which professedly treat on this subject, we cannot bestow a very high encomium upon any. How much we have been benefitted by giving them a share of our attention for a few years, we cannot tell. But, while we are constrained to say that the advantage which we have derived, is too small to be considered a fair compensation for our labour, we cannot withhold the expression of our surprise, and even astonishment, at the introduction of these works into our schools.

All the books through which we have *plodded*, seem to us to be founded upon detached principles of various sciences which are entirely unconnected with the subject of grammar. For example—*action*, yes, *motion* itself, is employed as one of the parts of these conflicting systems! *Action*, *motion*, however, is not a *grammatical* principle! Nor does the absurdity stop here, for even *actors* themselves have been brought into them, and been made to play no inconsiderable part in the grammar *farce*! And *being*, as though these systems could hardly even *exist* without it, figures as a star of the first magnitude.

Now *action*, *agents*, and *being*, may hold a conspicuous place in a system of *metaphysics*, but how they can become parts of a system of grammar, is not very clear to us. But what is as much of a curiosity as any thing which these *grammar kaleidoscopes* present, is the fact that their authors, after making *action*, *actors*, and *objects* the very foundation of their systems, proceed upon the ground that language is an *abstract nothing*, and a sentence, the mere child of the imagination! Whereas, language considered in its true light, seems to be as tangible as a clock, and a sentence as much a piece of mechanism as a watch. A sentence, indeed, is a *frame-work* of words! A word is a house, a temple, constructed of *sound*, *ink*, *paint*, *metal*, or other matter, which is occupied by the *meaning*, the *signification* itself!

Thus a sentence is a little village, a cluster of buildings various in their shape, size, and occupants. Thus, too, while a chapter is a whole ward

of a verbal city, and a sentence one block of houses, a whole book is the entire city, peopled by those significant citizens that are engaged exclusively in the commerce of ideas. Language, then, is a frame-work, and grammar the architectural principles upon which this frame-work is formed. Hence he who desires to make a book to be used in teaching grammar, should confine himself to *constructive* principles. To say what the word must mean to be of any particular class, is to leave the frame-work of the house, and attempt to say something of its occupant. Remember this—the mere grammarian is not to teach the nature of the liquid, but the entire construction of the vessel. Or, it is not the province of the mere grammarian to describe the fruit, but the frame-work of the basket which contains the fruit!

“A SUBSTANTIVE or NOUN is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have any notion; as, *London*, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*.” (MURRAY.)

That Mr. Murray should have given the above as a definition of a noun, is really astonishing! If we compare it with his definition of words in general, we shall find the two to be the same in substance, and nearly the same in expression! Mark the universality of the above attempt at the noun's definition:

“A noun is the name of any thing that exists!”

One is here led to ask, what are the names of things which do *not exist*, called?!

“Or a noun is the name of that thing of which we have any notion.”

The name of the thing of which we have an idea, a notion, is a *noun*! But the name of the thing of which we have no idea, no notion, is *not* a *noun*!

By this definition things are divided into four distinct classes, viz.

1. Things which exist!
2. Things which exist not!
3. Things of which we have some idea!
4. Things of which we have no idea!

Every one who reads this definition of a noun with care, must see that it supposes things to be divided in this way. A noun is the name of any thing which *exists*, or of any thing of which we *have* a *notion*.

This definition of the noun compels the pupil to anticipate that the next part of speech will be defined as follows:

An adjective is the name of a thing which does not exist, or of a thing of which we have no notion!

The old school grammarians define words as follows:

"Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas."

Here they hold that all words are *signs*; and, as *signs* are neither more, nor less than *names*, they inadvertently say that all words are nouns! This truth, however, they deny when they come to the process of parsing.

1. "John writes letters accurately."

John, a noun.
writes, a verb!
letters, a noun.
accurately, an adverb!

All the words in this sentence are *signs*, *names*; yet only two of them are parsed as nouns!!

To say that *writes* is a *verb* is to affirm that *writes* is not a *sign*, not a name, of any thing!

But who can not see that "*writes*" is as much the name of the action as is "*John*" the sign of the actor!? If, then, "*John*" is a noun because it is a *sign*, a name, is not "*writes*" a noun?

By saying that "*accurately*" is an adverb, it is declared that this word is not a *sign*, not a name. But is there a child who can read English, that can not see that "*accurately*" is as much the name of the manner of writing as is "*letters*" the sign of the things written!?

2. "John put his hand behind his head."

John, a noun.
put, a verb!
his, a pronoun!
hand, a noun.
behind, a preposition!
his, a pronoun!
head, a noun.

1. Is not *put* the *sign*, the name of the action? why, then, is not this word a noun?

2. Is not *his* the *sign* of an idea!? why, then, is *his* employed? Does not *his* express the same idea which "*John's*" would express was *John's* used in the place of *his*? And, would not *John's* be called a *noun*!! Why, then, is not "*his*" a noun!?! "*John's*" is the sign, the name, of John, in his *possessive* relation to the hand—and, as *his* is the sign, the name, of the same thing, why is not "*his*" as clearly a noun as is *John's*!?! "*Behind*" is the sign, the name of the place where John put his hand. And, as a noun is the name of any person, *place*, or thing, why is not this preposition a noun!?! Will it be said that *behind* is not the name of a *place*!?! Reader, is not *behind* the sign, the name of the place in which it is said that John placed his hand? "*Head*" is the name of the thing—and "*behind*" is the name of a *place* which belongs to that thing!

The true sense of the definition of a noun as given by the old school grammarians, is that,

A noun is the name of any thing whatever.

And to this idea all grammarians have adhered. —A word is what? A word is the *sign* of any thing *whatever*. Hence, there is no difference between the definition of a noun, and the definition of all words. *Sign*, and *name* are the same in idea.

1. Words are articulate sounds, used by common consent as the *names* of our ideas.

2. A noun is the *sign* of any thing of which we have a notion; as, *man*, *London*, *virtue*, *vice*, *behind*, *under*, *red*, *high*, *in*, *out*, *at*, *with*, *near*, *on*.

If, therefore, the definition which the old school grammarians give of words, embraces all words, the definition which they give of a *noun*, includes all words!

"A noun is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have a notion."

We ask who can reconcile this definition to the constructive genius of any language?

The practice under this definition proceeds upon the absurd ground that all *verbs*, all *adjectives*, all *articles*, all *prepositions*, all *conjunctions*, all *adverbs*, and all *interjections*, are not signs of ideas. Yes, it is the bold, the *inconsistent*, ground of this definition of a noun, that all these classes of words are *redundant* parts of that glorious production whose beauty, power, and usefulness, are admired by man, and ascribed to God himself!

1. "Henry purchased *leather* in shoes."

2. "John purchased *leather* shoes."

As Henry purchased *leather* in shoes, he must have purchased *leather* shoes." Or,

"As Henry purchased *leather* which was made into shoes, he must have purchased *leather* shoes."

1. "*Leather*" before *in* or *which*, is a noun.

2. "*Leather*" before *shoes* is not a noun, but an *adjective*.

Is not the word, "*leather*" a *sign*, a name, in both places? This word is not only a *sign*, a name in both instances; but in both, it is the name of the same thing! Yes, here is a word which is the name of the very same thing, (the material of which the shoes are made) in both instances—yet in one the word is parsed as a *sign*, a name, a noun, while in the other it is parsed as an adjective!!!!

Still the perplexed pupil is unblushingly told both by teacher, and author, that the name of a thing is a *noun*!!

What is the difference between "*virtue*," and *virtuous*?"

1. "A woman of *virtue*."

2. "A *virtuous* woman."

A woman of *virtue* is a *virtuous* woman—and a *virtuous* woman is a woman of *virtue*. Yet *virtue* is called a noun—and *virtuous* an adjective! But why this difference in the manner of parsing these two forms of the same word? Does the definition of a noun answer this question?

"A noun is the name of something."

which exists, or of which we have a notion. But a slight attention to the following illustration, will show that these words are the signs of things that exist, and of which, we have notions not less clear than those which we form of "*London, man, virtue, vice.*"

From :	Beginning.
Through :	Door.
To :	End.
For :	Cause.

From is synonymous with *beginning*, *through* with *door*, *to* with *end*, *for* with *cause*.

from through

John rode *beginning* Philadelphia, *door* New Jersey

to for

end New York, *cause* his brother.

Now as these prepositions are evidently the names of things which exist, and of which we have a clear notion, we trust, that the friends to the old theory, will abandon this definition of a noun, or consent to call these prepositions, nouns.

Further,—“He writes *ACCURATELY.*”

“The pupil writes with *ACCURACY.*”

ACCURATELY is styled an *adverb*. This word, however, should, from the old definition of a noun, be called a *noun*. The word is the *name* of the *manner* of writing: and it follows that the mind has no idea of this *manner*, or that the word, *accurately*, is inaccurately named!

Waiving the misnomer in this case, let us examine the classification of the word which denotes the *same* thing, in the following instance:

The pupil writes with *accuracy*.

Here, the term, *accuracy*, is the sign of that for which the word, *accurately* stands in the first instance. But is *accuracy* called an *adverb*? *Accuracy* is denominated a *noun*? Were we to take these solutions with the definition of the noun, as a rule of judging, must we not say that in the first instance, the mind has no idea of the *manner* of writing, but that in the last, it has a clear, a distinct notion of it?

The definition of the noun, includes too much to comport with the solution of the language. By the definition, *all* words are nouns; but in the solution of the language, a small part comes under the denomination of *noun*.

Accuracy, and *accurately* are two forms of the same word. The import of the word, is the same under both modifications. *Accuracy* differs from *accurately* only in its degree of *constructive* importance in the mono. *Accuracy* is employed as the foundation of the mono, and is that to which the word *with* is appended.

Accurately in point of construction, is employed as a *branch* part of the mono, and is two *constructive* degrees from the foundation of the mono to which it belongs. *Accuracy* is the *independent* form; that is, a form in which the name is when it is used without requiring, or implying, a *con-*

structive dependence upon any other word. *Accurately* is the *social*, or dependent form, and implies, and requires *constructive* dependence upon another word of higher rank.

In the spirit of Mr. Murray's definition, both *accuracy*, and *accurately* are nouns; because, *his* definition is founded on the capacity of a word to denote *some idea*!

The definition in the new system, being founded on *constructive* importance, or mechanical *independence*, *accuracy* only, can become a noun. All the words denominated *nouns* in parsing the language, are exalted, and linked together by their high *constructive* rank,—by their power to stand *alone*, and thus brought into the same family; hence, a definition of a noun, to include all those words denominated nouns in the solution of the language, without embracing *any* more, *must* be founded on this *constructive* importance. A definition, founded on this, is a Hercules against the sophist, and a blazing torch in the hand of the learner.

We will fancy that the *common* definition of a noun is presented to a child; and, after he has fairly perused it, let it be supposed that the following period is placed before him, and that he is requested to select the nouns which it contains:

“Stephen built the red house; but Samuel, the yellow house.”

Now, then, as a noun is the name of any thing which we can see, feel, taste, or discourse of, would not the child be as likely to call *red*, and *yellow* nouns as *house*? Or, will it be said that these adjectives are the names, the signs, of things which do not *exist*, of things that we cannot *see*? Perhaps, too, it may be replied, that these colors are *not things*: hence, *yellow*, and *red* cannot be nouns! We would ask those who reason thus, whether *virtue*, *vice*, *necessity*, *sweetness*, &c., are things? We would ask, too, whether a *man* is a thing? and whether *London* is a thing? The names, *London*, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*, &c., are nouns.

“A noun is the *name* of any person, place, or thing; as, *man*, *London*, *virtue*, *vice.*”

As *man*, *London*, *virtue*, and *vice* are nouns, they are *names*. But what renders these words *names*? The definition of words gives these four signs nothing which it does not bestow upon all other words. How, then, can these four words be any more *names* than *in*, *red*, *black*, *green*, *walks*, *writes*, *here*, &c.?

It is the *sign* trait of character, which renders *man* *London*, *virtue*, and *vice*, names. And have not all words this very trait? Why, then, are not all words rendered *names* by it? If the *sign* trait can render *man*, *London*, *virtue*, and *vice*, names, can it not render all other words names? Why, then, are not all other words as much nouns as these four?

Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas. MURRAY.

A noun is the name of any person, place, or

thing, any thing which exists, any thing of which you can have a notion. MURRAY.

Read the following with care:

1. If *all* words are signs, *under, over, &c.*, are signs: all words are signs; therefore *under, over, &c.*, are signs.

2. If *all* signs are names, *under, over, &c.*, are names: all signs are names; therefore *under, over, &c.*, are names.

3. If *all* names are nouns, *under, over, &c.*, are nouns: all names are nouns; therefore *under, over, &c.*, are nouns!

The Substitute.

A DENOMINATION OF WORDS.

A denomination of words is a number of verbal signs, which have the same *characteristic* mark.

[The word, *noun*, means but one word, as *John* is a noun. But the words, *noun denomination*, mean an entire *class* of words, the whole family of nouns.]

It seems perfectly inconsistent with philosophy, that a *system* of Grammar should not contain *class* names.

The word, *book*, is a *noun*; but this word is not a *class* of words! The word, *walks*, is a *verb*; but as the word *walks*, is not a class of words, how can it be said that the word *verb*, is the name of a *class* of words?

To supply this deficiency, it seems necessary to have a technical term which means a *class* of words. Therefore I have employed the word, *denomination*, in the sense of a *class* of words.

Characteristic.

In Grammar, a *characteristic* is the *property* by which a word is thrown into a particular denomination.

Under *Classiology*, the words of the English Language, are divided into ten *denominations*. But, as in analyzing words, it is convenient to speak of them *singly*, each member of a *denomination*, receives, as its *individual* name, the particular *distinctive* epithet which designates its own denomination.

In English, there are ten denominations of words, viz.:

1. *Noun* denomination.
2. *Pronoun* denomination.
3. *Verb* denomination.
4. *Preposition* denomination.
5. *Conjunction* denomination.
6. *Adjective* denomination.
7. *Subadjective* denomination.
8. *Adverb* denomination.
9. *Subadverb* denomination.
10. *Interjection* denomination.

There is certainly a serious objection to the following language which is used by the old school grammarians:

"There are ten parts of speech."

As every word in a language is a *part* of it, there must be as many *parts* of speech as there are words in a language. Every verb is a *part* of a *language*. Hence if there are ten thousand verbs in the English language, the *verbs alone* make ten thousand parts of speech!!

1. THE NOUN DENOMINATION,

Is a class of *trunk* words which are the *regular, fixed* names of the things that hold a *trunk* rank in the *collocation*, or *presentation*, of the objects of thought; as, *Ring, gold, leather, cloth, book, pen, paper, virtue, vice*.

The word, *trunk*, expresses not only an *ability* to stand *alone*, but a *capacity* to sustain *branch* matter.

Now, whether an object becomes *trunklike* from the circumstance that it is taken *alone*, or from the consideration that it is taken with *branch* matter which it is made to *sustain*, the *regular fixed* name by which it is presented, is a *noun*; as, *ring, large gold ring*.

In the first, the ring is taken *alone*—it is able to stand by itself—hence the ring, in this isolated state, resembles a trunk without a *branch*.

In the second instance, the ring is taken in connection with *branch* matter which cannot sustain *itself*, for the *size*, and *kind* cannot stand without the aid of the *ring* to which they naturally belong, and on which, they as naturally depend as do the *branches* upon the *trunk*.

In the following, the ring is presented by the word, *it*—and, as this little word is not the *regular, fixed* name of any object, the word, *it*, is not of the *noun* denomination.

That is a beautiful ring—may I examine it.

Additional Illustrations.

1. Gold *ring*.
2. Ring *dove*.
3. Leather *shoe*.
4. Shoe *leather*.
5. Pie *apples*.
6. Apple *pie*.
7. *John* is here.
8. John *Adams* was there.
9. Where is the *man*?
10. Where is the man *servant*?
11. Call the servant *maid*.
12. Tell the maid *servant* to come here.
13. Joseph bought a good *peach*.
14. Joseph *Brown* has peach *brandy*.
15. Brass *rules* are made of brass.

QUESTIONS.

1. Why is *ring*, in the first syllabane, a *noun*?

Because it is a *trunk* word which is a *regular, fixed* name of an object that holds a *trunk* rank in the *mind's* own collocation of the two things named in the syllabane. [The *material*, and the thing made.]

2. Why is not *ring*, in the second syllabane, a noun?

Ring here, is not even a *trunk* word. *Ring*, in the second instance, is not only not a *trunk* word, but it is not the name of an object which holds a *trunk* rank in the *mind's* collocation of the two things mentioned in the syllabane. *Ring*, in the second instance, is a *branch* word, and is the name of a distinctive mark which holds a *branch* rank in the *mind's* collocation, or disposition of it in respect to the dove.

REMARK.

What the *trunk* is to the branch parts in the framework of a tree, the *noun* is to the *branch words* in the framework of a syllabane; as, *Good gold*, *Moses* smote the *rock*. *Gold*, *Moses*, and *rock* are nouns.

It is curious to see the course which the formers of the old theory of grammar, have taken to *appear* to be *consistent*. In their definition of a *noun*, they *affect* to think that *all* words are not *signs*, not *names*! They start out with the position that there are *ten* parts of speech. And then they construct their definition of a noun in a way which implies that there is but *one* class of words that are *signs* of our ideas.

"Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs*, the *names*, of our ideas."

"There are *ten*, or there are *nine* parts of speech in English; namely, *noun*, *article*, *verb*, *adjective*, *conjunction*, *preposition*, *adverb*, *participle*, *pronoun*, and *interjection*."

1. "Any word which is the *sign* of an idea, is a noun; as, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*."

But, says the objector, this is not the exact phraseology of the *old* definition of a noun. We quote the *sense*, not the words. The old school grammarians having defined *all* the words to be *signs*, they select a certain class which they define by substituting *name* for *sign*! And it is really amusing to observe the great pains which they have taken to *avoid* the use of both *sign*, and *name*, in defining the other classes of words! In defining the article, they do not say *in so many words*, that an article is the *name* of the *extent* of a noun's signification. But, instead of saying that an article is the *name* of the noun's *extent* of signification, by the direct use of the word, *name*, they say it in the following way:

"An article is a word placed before nouns to *point* them out, and *show how far* their signification *extends*!"

To *show* the extent! That is, to *name*, to *signify*, to *express*, the noun's *extent* of application, by being the *sign*, or *name*, of this extent! There is no other way in which an article can show a noun's *extent* of application.

2. In defining the *conjunction*, they use the following phraseology:

"A conjunction is a part of speech that is chiefly used to *connect* sentences."

But in what way does a conjunction *connect* sentences? Why, by *expressing*, by *signifying*, by *pointing out*, that which *produces* the connection. That which produces the connection between sentences, may be the *cause*, the *effect*, the *opposition*, the *similarity*, &c., &c., which exist in any certain cases. For instance: "It was a cold day,—*therefore* I remained in the house."

My remaining within is an effect of which the conjunction, *therefore*, is the sign, or name.

"Again: "He came home, *because* he wished to see his friends."

His wish to see his friends was the *cause* of his coming home; and, of this cause the conjunction *because*, is the name, or sign. We do not mean to be understood to say, that *because* is the name of wishing as an *action*, but as a *cause*. The word, *wished*, is the name of this event of the mind, as an action. But this action has a *causative* relation, or connection with the action of *returning*; and *because* is the name, the sign, of this *causative connection*. Let us, then, say that,

A conjunction is the sign, or name of those relative circumstances which produce a connection between sentences; as, John is good, *therefore* he is happy. But his brother is unhappy, *because* he is bad."

3. They tell us that an adjective is a part of speech which *expresses* some quality of a noun; as, *Red* cloth, *Blue* eyes, *Great* minds.

But why not say at once that,

An adjective is the *name* of the quality of a noun; as, *Round* table, *Square* timber?

But they choose to say that an adjective is a part of speech which *expresses* some quality! How can a word *express* a quality unless it is the *name*, or *sign*, of quality!?

4. "A verb is a word which *signifies* being, action, or suffering; as, I *am*, I *walk*, my head *aches*."

Why not say at once,

A verb is the *name* of *being*, *action*, or *suffering*? Because this way of expressing the idea, would lay the axe at the very root of their definition of a noun. A noun is the *name*. No other signs are to be *called* names!! To avoid the use of "*name*," they choose to say that a verb *signifies* by being a *name*!

5. "An adverb is a word joined to verbs, adjectives, participles, and to *other* adverbs, to *express* some quality, or circumstance respecting it."

To *express* some quality. That is, to *express* some quality by being the *sign*, or *name* of it! Why not say, then, that,

An adverb is the *name* of some quality, or circumstance of the verb, adjective, participle, or adverb? (This question we have already answered.)

6. "A preposition serves to connect words with one another, and to *show* a relation between them."

What we have said upon the *conjunction*, is applicable to the *preposition* also.

A *preposition* is the *name* of the relative circumstances which connect one word with another.

7. "A pronoun is a word which is used to avoid the too frequent repetition of a noun."

A pronoun is a *secondary name*, and is used to prevent the too frequent repetition of a noun, the *primary name*; as, Jane lost the *book*, and Charles found *it*. (*Book*, the primary, and *it* the secondary name.)

8. An interjection is the *name* of some sudden emotion of joy, fear, dislike, &c.

We have thus demonstrated that each class of words can be defined by the use of *name*. Having done this, we would remark that we believe that the definitions in which we have used the word, *name*, are just as unsound in *principle*, as those from which the old school grammarians have carefully excluded this word. In the *above* definitions, we have built upon the principles on which the old school authors have.

Ye, that are opposed to a revolution in grammatical system answer these arguments—and do it in a *public, candid* manner.

CHAPTER II.

CASE IN ENGLISH.

In some languages there are certain *endings*, or *terminations* which are called *case*. These terminations are as significant as the words to which they belong; each pointing out, not only a *particular* relation, but also the *particular* words between which this relation exists. But, upon the nouns in our language, no such endings are to be found.

It is possible, however, that the *caseless* condition of a few nouns in the Latin, may be resorted to, to justify the use of *case* in English; and to meet this circumstance in advance, we shall make a few remarks upon this point. And first, if the principles of another language, are to be seized as a *rule* by which to try our position with respect to case in English, we shall take the *general* principles, not the *idiomatic eccentricities* of that language. The Latin, so far as it respects cases, proceeds on the principle of *terminations*. And the fact that *cases* is applied in *some few* instances where the noun has no *termination*, certainly never can be taken as ground for deciding the broad principle of case in our own language. Were case terminations in the Latin, a mere deviation from the *general* principles of that language, *case* would be improperly used in its grammatical solution. But, as there are few instances in which there is not a *case* termination, the *general case* principles of Latin nouns involve terminations: hence *case* may be considered somewhat applicable to the nouns in that language.

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In English no *noun* has a case form. The *noun* in the *possessive* case, is nothing but an *adjective*, as, *John's* hat. The part which is called the *case*, ('s) is as much an adjective affix, as is *ic, al, ine, &c.* Among the pronouns, there are only three, or four which vary in their *form* as they pass, and re-pass from the *nominative* to the *adjective*.

In every regular language, the nouns have certain forms, or inflections which are called the *cases* of this class of words.

A regular language, however, is very different from ours. A regular language is rich in terminations; ours is an irregular one, and is lean, poor, in grammatical *trappings*. The genius of the English language does not afford our nouns these significant terminations. And as our language is without the terminations, let our *Grammar* be without their *name*. *Case* is the name of these terminations; and did the forms pertain to our nouns, their name *might* be a proper part of our Grammar. But, as it is, to give to youth the term, *case*, as means to enable them to understand any of the principles of the English language, is to hand a child a phial, and to bid him fill it with a very particular medicine, when but a *mere speck* of such an article has ever existed in the whole *materia medica*!

But, in reply, it will be said, that the desideratum is to enable the learner to acquire a knowledge of that relation which exists between the *verb*, and the nouns that are parsed with it: and, because this is effected by the present theory of *cases*, the end is completely answered. To this it may be replied, that even without *any* fixed *case* theory, the same knowledge could be acquired. But does the possibility of accomplishing without instruments, do away their use? or does the certainty of success with *imperfect* means, destroy the importance of those that are perfect? If so, because D. can dig with his *hands*, to him a *spade* is of no use!

The pronoun *me*, is said to be the objective case of *I*. But case means *form, shape termination*. The word, *me*, however, is a distinct, a new, a different word! Was *me*, a mere affix, and placed thus,—*Ime, me*, might then be said to be the *case* of *I*.

The only pronouns in our language, which have the nominative case, are *they, thou, he, and who*. For, *they, and them*, may be considered the same word in different cases, or forms. *Thou, and thee*, are different cases of the same word. *He, and him*, are different forms, or cases of the same word. *Who, and whom* are different cases of the same word.

But *she, and her*, are two different words. *We, and us*, are different words; and not different cases, or forms of the same word.

The pronouns, *which, it, you, what, as, mine, yours, &c.*, are nominative, and objectives without

any variation in form—hence they have nothing at all, which can be called *case*! Why, then, the question recurs, have we imported the term, *case*, this useless, this worse than useless commodity, from *Rome* to *America*? We have as much use for it as a man who is without a horse, would have for a *saddle*! Why should a country that has no grain to grind, erect mills to make flour! Why should the people of *America* attach a *fanciful* property to their language? Why, merely for the sake of using a *Roman* instrument in handling this property!! This *case* theory, in the English language, is an *artificial* hue which hides the *native* colour from the eye of the child.

The word, *case*, however, is not applicable to the terminations of which we have spoken in this chapter.

"*Case*" is made from the Latin, *casus* which is from *cado*, to fall. But there is nothing about these terminations which can be denominated *falling*. Grammarians have generally attempted to illustrate the five cases by the following diagram :



The nominative as well as the vocative has been uniformly denominated the *straight*, the *perpendicular*, case. These are represented in the straight line. The *genitive*, the *dative*, and the *accusative*, has been uniformly styled the *falling*, the *obliquing*, cases. These are represented by the three lines which fall off from the nominative, or straight line. It really seems that grammarians have ever been distinguished by gross absurdity. The ancient grammarians started with the idea that the *genitive*, the *dative*, and the *accusative*, might be considered as *falling* out of the nominative—and, as "*casus*" means *falling*, they presumed that *case* could be applied with marked propriety. But, as the *nominative*, and *vocative*, do not *fall* from any thing, how can the word, *case*, be applicable to these!? This subject may be rendered perfectly clear even to the child. From the fact that *case* means a *falling*, grammarians have applied it to the different changes which some words undergo in their variation from the primitives ; as,

CASE.
writes.
writeth.
writest.
wrote.
wrotest.
writing.
written.

These different modifications are called *case*

because they are considered to *fall from*. But from what do these cases fall? from *write*.

What is *write* called? *Write* also is a *case*!!! Well, from what does *write* fall? from nothing at all!!!

Write is called the *straight*, the *perpendicular*, case!! That is, *write* is *fall* no *fall*!!

CASE.	CASE.
write!!	writest.
	writes.
	writeth.
	wrote.
	wrotest.
	written.
	writing.

This illustration, however, gives the old school grammarians much more than they are justly entitled to. *Writest*, *writes*, *writeth*, &c., are really *variations*, from *write*. But the fallings to which the old school grammarians apply the word, *case*, are *fancied* into being! This is obvious from the following which we have taken from the *Greek Grammar* of PROFESSOR CROSBY:

Case is made from *casus*, from *cado*, to fall out, to happen.

"From this *fancied* falling off," says PROFESSOR CROSBY in his *Greek Grammar*, "came the word, *case*, which was at length applied as a general term to all the five variations."

The reader will observe that PROFESSOR CROSBY calls it a *fancied* falling off; and we presume that one moment's attention to the subject as presented in the following examples, will satisfy the reader that the Professor is happy in the selection of the epithet, *fancied*!

1.

1. *Trees* grow among *trees*.

Trees number 1, is in the *nominative case*.

2.

Trees, number 2, is the *objective case*!

Does *trees*, number 2, vary, deviate, from *trees*, number 1? Has not *trees*, number 2—the same letters which constitute *trees*, number 1? Where, then, is this falling off? In the *imagination* only! It is surely a *fancied* falling off!

The word, *case*, is not only inappropriate because of its inability to express the true idea, but because of its absolute want of a *technical* character. "*Case*" is a word in very common use—and, as it is applied to almost every thing in some way, or other, it has no *technical* character whatever. Besides, we have no use for the word in grammar. The true idea which the old school grammarians attempt in vain to express by the word, *case*, may be well denoted by *cordictive*, and *uncordictive*, nouns.

We will now give a few of the numerous applications of *case*, which Dr. Bullions, and many others, affirm *disqualify*, a word for *technical* use.

1. Book *case*, Knife *case*, Watch *case*.

2. A printer's *case* should be in the *genitive case*.

3. "Henry purchased a *case* of crown glass."
4. Can you *case* this hat?
- That is, cover it with some sort of *case* which will preserve it.
5. Have you made his *case* your own?
6. His *case* is desperate.
7. This is clearly a *case* of the yellow fever.
8. "My old horse is in a better *case* than my colt."
9. The lawyer stated the *case*.
10. This *case* will never be tried.
11. This was an action on the *case*.
12. In *case* he gains his *case*, will he be in the *nominative*, or *vocative case*?

Having shown that *case* in *English* is nothing but the *imagination* of the old school grammarians, we shall pass on to the next branch of this subject, namely, the *three cases* which these scholars have contrived to form from *no case*!

The cases are three, viz,

1. The *nominative*,
2. The *possessive*, and
3. The *objective*.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE NOMINATIVE CASE.

ALTHOUGH we consider the different definitions of the NOMINATIVE CASE to be much the same, both in phraseology, and *substance*, yet we feel bound to examine them all. But before we commence the examination, we invite the reader's attention to the very *particular* manner which some have adopted to *slide* over this subject, with as little parade as possible!

Mr. MURRAY, in treating of the NOUN, gives a definition of the noun itself, and then divides this part of speech into common and proper. In treating of NUMBER, the same author gives a definition of *number itself*, and then makes the subdivision, into *singular* and *plural*. When he arrives at the GENDER, he gives a definition of *gender*, and then, adds that there are three genders; namely, MASCULINE, FEMININE, and NEUTER. But when Mr. Murray comes to CASE, he gives no *definition* of it whatever!! This author introduces the subject of NUMBER as follows.

"SECTION 3. Of Number.

"NUMBER is the consideration of an object, as one or more."

"SUBSTANTIVES are of two numbers, the *singular* and the *plural*."

Now mark the difference, reader—

"SECTION 4. Of Case."

"In English, substantives have three cases, the *nominative*, the *possessive*, and the *objective*."

Here we find Mr. Murray informing the pupil how many cases substantives have; yes even

before he attempts to tell him what *case itself* is!! Mr. Murray could find nothing in our language which can be denominated, *case*—hence he has made no attempt to define *case*.

The next work which we shall notice, is a production, entitled, "ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, &c. By AUSTIN OSGOOD HUBBARD, A. B." This book was published in 1827. The manner of treating the subject of *case* as presented by Mr. Hubbard, follows:

"CASE."

"CASES show the relations of nouns and pronouns to other words."

Mr. Hubbard here attempts to define *case*—but instead of telling what *case* is, he informs the pupil what it does!! The subject of *case* comes before Mr. Hubbard in this light—"What is *case*?" But Mr. Hubbard evades the question by attempting to say, not what *case* is, but what *case does*!

He continues—

"The *nominative case* is the *subject* of the verb; as, *I read, we write*."

But is it this *case itself* which is the subject of the verb? So declares our author! If, therefore, CASE is a "*showing*," and the NOMINATIVE CASE is the SUBJECT of the verb, *I*, and *we* have no allusion to PERSONS as is generally thought, but to this "*SHOWING*" of which Mr. Hubbard speaks!! Enough of this, however,—we have a question for Mr. Hubbard's "*patient and accurate research*," to solve. It is this—"Is the word, '*I*,' the subject of the verb, '*read*,' or is the PERSON HIMSELF the SUBJECT?"

We have another,—"*Is the word, 'we,' the SUBJECT of the verb, 'write,' or are the PERSONS THEMSELVES the SUBJECT?*"

Now, if the word itself is the subject of the verb, then, indeed does Mr. Murray's definition of the nominative case seem altogether *unintelligible*; for he says that the "*nominative case* simply expresses the SUBJECT of the verb."

If the word itself is the subject of the verb, then Mr. Murray has said in his definition, nothing more than this: namely, the nominative case simply expresses *itself*! Or, in other words—the noun in the nominative case, simply expresses, or signifies itself! To say, then, that "*John*," is in the nominative case, is to assert nothing more than that this noun denotes, not the person, but *its own self*!!

If, however, the *real person* is the subject of the verb, Mr. Murray recovers from *insanity*; and Mr. Hubbard is struck *blind*! Mr. Hubbard says that the NOMINATIVE CASE is the SUBJECT of the verb: and if the real person, or the real thing, is the *subject* of the verb, then, indeed, it follows that CASE belongs not to *nouns*, and *pronouns*, but to men, women, and children!! Thus, we see that *cases* have been *shaken off of nouns*, and fixed upon those persons, things, and animals, that the

nouns represent!! According to Mr. Hubbard, the verb may be in America, and its *nominative* case in *England*!!

Let us now return to Mr. Murray. This author says, that,

"The verb agrees with its nominative case in number and person."

This rule favors the doctrine of Mr. Hubbard. Have we said it? But, hold—we cannot now say what it favors. Let us first examine. Does Mr. Murray mean that the verb agrees with the noun itself, or with the subject denoted by the noun? We think that he intends to say that the verb agrees with the *noun itself*. The *noun itself* is the nominative case; but the subject of the verb is the *real person*, the *real thing*, the *real animal*, denoted by the nominative case.

How does Mr. Comly define case?

"CASE,"

"CASE is a *change* or *difference* in the *termination* or situation of a noun or pronoun."

"Nouns and pronouns have three cases; the *nominative*, the *possessive*, and the *objective*."

"The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun or pronoun when it denotes the *subject* of a verb; as, *I walk*."

In this definition there are two *principal* things; and no one can say upon *which* the author means to rest his definition of this case. First—"the *NOMINATIVE CASE* is *simply* the *NAME* of a thing!" Secondly—"The *NOMINATIVE CASE* is the *STATE* of a noun or pronoun," when the *noun*, or the *pronoun* is the *SUBJECT* of a verb!!

The first reflection which we shall make upon this definition of the "*nominative case*," is that, the author's definition of *CASE*, in general, destroys it. The author in his definition of case, says that, case is a *change*, a *difference*—yet, in his definition of the *nominative* case, he excludes every *change*, and every *difference*! For he declares the *nominative* case to be "*simply* the name of a thing." Now, one would think that as *case itself* consists in *changes*, and *differences*, of termination, and that as there are different cases, the *nominative* case ought to comprise *some one*, or *more* of these *changes*. But, so far from this, we are informed, that the nominative case is the *mere*, *simple*, *naked*, name!!

SECOND BRANCH OF HIS DEFINITION.

"Or, the state of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb."

When *what* is the subject of the verb? The *noun* or *pronoun*! What work this is!! First, *case* itself is a *change*—then the *nominative* case is neither one item more, nor less than the *bare* name—and, after this, the nominative case is the *state*—but, *what state*? a very peculiar state, indeed—yes the state of a noun which is made the *subject* of a verb. Does not this particular state,

then, make the *nominative case* something more than a *naked* name? Besides the name, the *nominative* includes *this state*!!

"The *nominative case* is *simply* the name of a thing, or the state of a noun, or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb."

JOHN COMLY.

Mr. Comly introduces the word, *subject*, very often, indeed—but has he even *attempted* to show the pupil any kind of distinctive mark by which a subject may be known? Will this author, or his friends, pretend that this point has the character of an *axiom*? Or, will they contend that children distinguish *subjects*, from objects by a kind of *instinct*?

Let us grant that the subject is the central point of conversation, the thing to which the attention of the speaker, or writer, is principally turned; that the object is a thing which is taken up with a view to help out with the account, history or narrative of the subject; as, the *man* was found ten *days* ago at *Frederick*.

Now, we ask who, or what is the subject in the above instance? Is it the word, "*man*?" Or, is it the *real man*, the *man himself*? We are not speaking in the above instance of the noun, *man*, but of the individual himself. The person, then, becomes the subject, and not his name! But the word itself may become the subject; as, the word, *man*, has three letters.

In this instance the noun itself is truly the *subject*. Yet not the subject of the verb—but the subject of *attention*, the subject of *thought*. We have yet to learn that the mere *mechanical* connection of a noun with a verb, renders the noun, a *subject* of the verb! What renders a thing a subject? Is it not the degree of attention which is bestowed upon it? Does the verb set about *thinking*, and *reflecting*, upon the noun to which it may be joined? And when a verb is connected with two nouns, does it bestow so much thought upon one noun as to render it its *subject*, and so *little* upon the other as to degrade it to a mere *object*?

If so, the difference between a verb's subject, and its object, is easily made out! That noun is the subject of the verb, upon which the verb bestows the highest degree of reflection, or attention. That noun is the object of the verb, upon which the verb bestows a degree of attention less than that which it pays to the subject!!

"The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb."

JOHN COMLY.

We would here ask, *what state* can be pointed out which at all times, may be the *state* of the *subject*? What constitutes this state? Is it the local condition of the noun, or pronoun? *Certainly not*!

"The *nominative case* simply expresses the name of a thing, or the subject of a verb"

MURRAY.

This is much encumbered—the phraseology is *ambiguous*, and the facts upon which it rests, are concealed even from the *philosopher*. “*The subject of a verb*,” is introduced as though the pupil is *familiarly* acquainted with the difference between a *subject*, and an *object*. “The nominative case ‘expresses’ the subject of a verb.”

Ah! But what, asks the pupil in his own mind, is the *subject* of a verb? Here is the *rub*!! If D. says to B. “An apple tree is a tree which bears *apples*,” how will B. know from this, what an apple tree is, unless he is also instructed what an *apple* is? Yes, replies B.—You tell me that an apple tree is a tree which bears apples! But, as I do not know what an *apple* is, your telling is to me no instruction! The nominative case expresses the *subject* of the verb—but what the *subject* is, will be as difficult for the pupil to find out, as it would be to find what the *nominative case* is without any aid from Mr. Murray’s Grammar! Has Mr. M. already defined the *subject*?—he has informed the pupil that the nominative case expresses the *subject*, which gives the pupil the *liberty* of inferring that, the *subject* is not the nominative case, but something denoted by this case. But in this, Mr. Murray’s *simplifiers* contradict him—for they say that, the *nominative case* is the *subject itself*! !

Let us now repeat the definition, and try it in practice:

“The nominative case simply expresses the name of a thing, or the subject of a verb;” as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher.

This is not the example by which Mr. Murray illustrates his definition—yet the word, *Jane*, is in the nominative case—hence, if his definition is *correct*, this example is as happy an illustration of his definition as the instance chosen by himself.

“*Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher.”

Jane, in this instance, is parsed by Mr. Murray’s own grammar, as a noun in the *nominative case independent of the verb*! Observe, it is independent of the verb.—Hence this noun cannot be in the nominative case upon the principle contained in the second clause of Mr. Murray’s definition of the *nominative case*—

“Or it expresses the *subject* of the *verb*.”

As this noun has no verb, how can it be the subject of a verb!? How, then, can it be in the nominative case? If this noun is in the nominative by any thing which may be found in Mr. Murray’s definition of this case, it is by the authority derived from the first clause in it:—“*The nominative case simply expresses the name of a thing.*”

But the noun, *Jane*, expresses more than this—it signifies the *object* acted upon! Yes, this noun which is parsed in the nominative case even without being described in the *definition* of this *case*, most happily illustrates the definition which Mr. Murray has given of the *objective case*! The objective

case, says Mr. Murray, “expresses the object of an action, or of a relation;” as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher!

If we here ask, *who* was punished—*who* was acted upon, what must the answer be? Surely, *Jane* was acted upon. Let us change the order of the sentence—(but not the facts; we shall retain the same facts without the *least* addition—)

“The teacher punished *Jane*.”

Here, the noun, *Jane*, is parsed in the objective case—Why? Because it expresses the object acted upon. Yet in the first order of this sentence, the same word, denoting the *same* object, is parsed in the *nominative case*. *Jane*, thou wast punished by the teacher!!

The nominative case expresses simply the name of a thing, or the subject of “the verb;” as, *John*, dost thou know that *I* am very sick!

The reader has probably asked *why* this exclamation point? We answer that we feel a high degree of surprise at the fact, that “*John*,” “*thou*,” and “*I*,” are all *excluded* from the *very case* into which the British grammarians intend to put them.

Let us now present the definition of a *subject* as given by the British grammarians:

“The subject is the thing principally spoken of.” MURRAY.

We must ask the reader to keep the two following definitions together in his mind:

1. “The nominative case is the *subject*.”
2. “The subject is the thing principally spoken of.”

“*John* thou wast punished by thy teacher.”

The word, *John*, is a proper noun, *second* person, singular number, and in the nominative case.

But is *John* spoken of? *John* is of the *second* person: and the *second* person, it will be admitted, is the person spoken to! In what way, we ask, is it to be shown that “*John*” is in the nominative case? Let the British grammarians answer—let them speak through Mr. Murray—

The *nominative case* is the *subject*; and the *subject* is the thing principally spoken of!

But *John* happens to be the *thing* spoken to! How, then, we beg to be informed, can any authority be found for casting this noun into the nominative case?

Let us now take the word, “*thou*.”

“*John*, thou wast punished by thy teacher.”

Thou is a pronoun, *second* person, singular, and in the nominative—but stay! How can the *second* person be the *subject*, when the *second* person is the person spoken to, and the *subject* the person spoken of? And, as the *second* person cannot be the subject, how, yes, how can a pronoun of the *second* person be put into the nominative case!!! The British philologists have shut the door against *thou*, and against every other word of the *second* person, yea, and of the *first* person also!! No,

not even the *ghost* of a word which is either of the *second*, or *first* person, can enter their nominative case!! They have shut the door, and *bolted* it with the following *bar* :

"The subject is the thing spoken of!" And "The *nominative* case is the *subject*!"

Having with these definitions, shut, and barred, the door against these *thousands* of words, may they not now as well tie up the knocker, and say we are *sick*, we are *dead*!!

"Shut, shut the door, good *John*, tie up the knocker; say *I* am sick, *I* am dead."

Indeed their own Pope, in this sentence, does shut their door, and tie up their knocker too, for out of the ten nouns which are either expressed, or understood three only, can be parsed!

Rendered plenary.—Shut *thou* the door, shut *thou* the door, good *John*, tie *thou* up the knocker—say *thou* *I* am sick, *I* am dead,

Now, *thou*, *thou*, *John*, *thou*, *thou*, *I*, and *I*, are excluded from the nominative case, unless indeed it can be shown that these words are of the *third* person!! But what is the third person? "The third person is the thing spoken of!"

The third person, then, and the subject, are the same thing—no word can be parsed in the nominative case unless it is of the third person!!!!

Let us hear Mr. *Ingersoll*. Mr. *Ingersoll* is one among the many who have been employed for years in the all important business of *mending* Mr. Murray. Mark, gentle reader, the manner in which Mr. *Ingersoll* proceeds to help Mr. Murray out of the above dilemma:

"At present," says Mr. *Ingersoll*, "I will explain to you, only the nominative case: the others will be explained hereafter."

"A noun which denotes an animal, or thing that does an action, is in the nominative case;" as, Jane, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*!??

The word, *teacher*, is a noun, and denotes an

* Some few years since, we published a small work in which we claimed that part of Mr. *Ingersoll*'s grammar, which we thought, belonged, of *right*, to us. In this little work, we made some reflections upon Mr. *Ingersoll*'s definition of the nominative case. Since that period we find that he has made another attempt at defining the nominative case.

It is as follows:—"The nominative case, then, denotes the person or thing, of which some *affirmation* is made."

Now this definition includes no nouns except those which happen to stand in the *affirmative* sentences; as, *John* is writing letters.

The moment we change the cordiction of the sentence—"Is *John* writing letters?" Mr. *Ingersoll*'s definition ceases to apply! Nor will his definition apply in even one half of the instances where the noun is in the nominative; as, If *he* is a good *boy*, &c.

Now, here is no affirmation!

N. B.—We have quoted the above definition from *memory*—but we have the exact sense, if not the exact words.

animal that does an action; and, consequently, it must be in the *nominative case*! Strange, indeed, that men should thus trifle with themselves, and impose upon the *tender child*! Let us parse the word, *teacher*, as presented in the above illustration of Mr. *Ingersoll*'s definition of the *nominative* case; "Jane, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*."

"*Teacher*," is a common noun, third person, singular, and in the *OBJECTIVE* case after *by*!! In the *objective*!? What then becomes of Mr. *INGERSOLL*? He has gone to the place to which we will now send Mr. *KIRKHAM*. Mr. *Kirkham*! Who is *he*? Who is *he*! Let him describe *himself*! Hear, hear—"The nominative case is the *actor* or subject of the verb;" as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*!

Now, *teacher*, is a noun in the *objective* case—and, although *Jane* is a noun in the *nominative* case, yet, it is *independent* of the *verb*!! We find, then, that, although the *nominative* case *must* be the subject of the verb, words are put into the *nominative* case, which have no verb at all! And we find, also, that, although the *nominative* case is the *actor*, yet the *actor* in this instance, is not the *nominative* case, but the *objective*!

Let each man speak for himself. Mr. *Kirkham*, upon the subject of his book, remarks—"It has been *my* object, by *clear* and *familiar illustrations* to *disperse* those CLOUDS of *OBSCURITY*, that are so often cast around the *young* student's *BEWILDERED* imagination, and to *smooth* his way by *removing* those *OBSTACLES* that generally retard his progress!!"

Let teachers *examine* before they encourage—let them *know*, before they *adopt*. Let them throw off all *disguise*—let them *despise* the principle of *recommending* books upon the ground of *friendship*, of *local ties*, of *pity*, &c. Teachers stand at the *HEAD* of the *NATION*—let them honor their calling, and make our *REPUBLIC* *sure*.

Shall we now hear Mr. *Greenleaf*'s case?

"The *nominative* case is the *actor*, or subject of the verb;" as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*. *John*, the apples were eaten by *me*!!

The nouns, "*Jane*," and "*John*," are *independent* of the verbs! Hence they cannot be in the *nominative* case upon the ground that they are the *subjects* of the *verbs*!!

The pronoun, "*me*," and the noun, "*teacher*," denote the *actors*—yet these words are in the *objective* case after *by*!! It will be sufficient to add that Mr. *GREENLEAF*, is one of Mr. *Murray*'s *menders*!!

Cardell's *matter* and *thought* grammar, page 54:

"POSITION OR CASE."

"Nouns stand in different relations to other words; as, Henry conquered *Richard*; *Richard* conquered *Henry*."

The *compiler* begins by saying that "nouns stand in different relations to *other words*." He then gives two examples in illustration; and upon

these two examples, he comments in the following manner :

"The first noun denotes the agent or actor ; and the second the object *whom* the action affects !"

But, pray does this remark explain the *mechanical* relations which these nouns bear to the verb, "*conquered*?" The *compiler's* remark is not to the point in any *respect whatever* ! Does this *compiler* fancy that in telling what the noun, "*Henry*," denotes, he explains its *constructive* relation to the verb, "*conquered*?" "*Henry*" does certainly denote the actor—but what of all this !!! The fact that a noun denotes the actor, does not settle its relation to the verb ! For, if we say, "*Richard was conquered by Henry*," the relation of the noun, "*Henry*," to the verb, is *entirely changed* ; yet *Henry* is still the actor !!!

1. "*Henry* conquered *Richard*."

2. "*Richard* was conquered by *Henry* !"

So much for the *compiler's* attempt to explain the relations of nouns to verbs, by telling *what they denote* !!

The *compiler* proceeds :

"The nominative case is the performer of an action," as "*Richard was conquered by Henry* !"

"*Henry*," is a proper noun, third person, singular, and in the *objective* case, after *by* ! Yet, Mr. Cardell's definition of the nominative case, forces this noun from the *objective*, and places it in the *nominative* !!

As an illustration of the *accuracy* of the *compiler's* definition of the nominative case, he instances the *bull*, and *boat*, which, it is said, were once the foundation of a very *interesting* law suit ! The great question was, whether the *boat* was carried off by the *bull*, or the *bull* by the *boat* ! Now, says this *grave compiler*—

"either it ran away with him,
or he ran away with it."

"Whichever did the action of running away with the other, is the agent or nominative word ; and the one run away with, is the object !"

Let us now see how the *compiler* comes out with this dignified illustration !

1. The boat was carried off by the *bull* !

2. The bull was carried off by the *boat* !!

From this representation the name of the actor, is in the *objective* case—yes, whether the *bull* carried off the *boat* ; or whether the *boat* carried off the *bull* !! The *compiler's* illustration proves that *bulls* may be found in *books* as well as in *boats* !!

"The nominative case is the performer of an action." (Reader *keep* this in mind.)

"Whichever did the action, is the agent, or nominative word, and the one run away with, is the object *suffering* by the action." (Reader, bear this too in mind.)

Now, says Mr. Cardell, *all* verbs express *action*. The object, therefore, in this *bull*, and *boat* affair, is in fact the *nominative*—the nominative case is

the performer ! The *object* is the performer of that action which is denoted by the verb, *suffers* ! Hence, the very object, be it either *BULL* or *BOAT*, is in the *nominative* !!

That *bulls* should run away with *boats*, and *boats* with *bulls*, is all reasonable enough ! But that Mr. Cardell should so far run away with *himself*, as to run off with J. HORNE TOOKE, is neither reasonable, nor *honest* !!!

The learned *compiler* says, that *whichever performs the action, is the nominative*. Hence, where two, or more persons are named, and it is uncertain which performed the action specified, it is *impossible* to ascertain the *nominative* word ; as, either "*John, James, or Stephen*, went to church."

Now, whichever *went* "is the performer of the action, therefore, the *nominative* !" But which did perform this action ? This point cannot be decided—hence, by Mr. Cardell's grammar, neither of these nouns can be parsed !!

AGAIN. "Neither *John, James*, nor *Stephen* went to church !"

Here there is *no action performed*—hence, there is *no performer*—and, consequently, there is *no* nominative case to the verb, "*went* !!"

Further.—"The paper is extinct. Nothing came into the room."

Now, the noun, *paper*, is in the *nominative* case—but does this noun denote the actor, or performer ? There is nothing to act—there is no agent in being !!

"*Nothing* came into the room."

Nothing is the performer ! !

Who, it may be asked, is this Mr. Cardell ? He is the man that defines *gender* to be a *difference* !

He is the compiler of a book made up of *antiquated* errors, *obsolete* deformities, and of the monumental wreck of other men's plans, and schemes ! He is the man that presents this book as a mass of *original miraculous* truth ! He is the deeply skilled philologist who has given the preceding definition of the *nominative* case—and he is the author of the following sentence which is given in commendation of that definition :

"It will be found a very useful practice in schools, for pupils to adduce examples for themselves, in addition to those which their lessons may contain."

Can it be that it would be *useful* for pupils to give examples adapted to Mr. Cardell's definition of the *nominative* case ? Yet, the sentence in question, has a direct allusion to that definition ! Yes, the examples adduced, are to be tried by his *inconsistent* attempt at a definition of the *nominative* case ! We fancy that he would recommend them to draw their examples from *bulls*, and *boats* ! "This (continues he) will not only show their *knowledge* of the subject, but by exercising their *inventive* faculties, will *increase* their *interest* for *ulterior* progress."

What will exercise their *inventive* faculties ?

Why, to adduce examples of the nominative case—but by what rule? By this—

"The nominative case denotes the *performer* of an action; as, the boat was carried off by the *bull*!!"

"Will increase their interest for ulterior progress."

What will *increase* their *interest*? Why, to find such a *consistency* between Mr. Cardell's definition of the nominative case, and the examples adduced!!

We should take our leave for the present, of Mr. Cardell, was it not that he has severely *impugned* all the literary men who preceded himself upon this science. And, indeed, had Mr. Cardell corrected, even *one* of the ten thousand errors which deform the old system of English grammar, we should have passed him by in *silence*, and *pity*. But as he has lampooned the learned men of all nations, without *correcting*, or *finding*, even one of their numerous errors, we feel bound to speak of him in such terms as will render him a better scholar, and a *better man*!

In the INTRODUCTION, we have attempted to show that Mr. Cardell, is altogether incapable of writing our language with propriety. And believing ourselves successful in that attempt, we do not make any additional strictures upon his language for the reader's satisfaction, but for Mr. Cardell's instruction. We shall now repeat the sentence which we quoted above; and we ask attention to the italic words:

"It will be found a very useful practice, *in schools*, for pupils to adduce examples for themselves, *in addition to those which their lessons may contain*."

The word, "*adduce*," signifies to *add*—hence, the sentence in sense, is as follows:

It will be found a very useful practice *in schools* for pupils to *add* examples for themselves *in addition* to those which their lessons may contain. (To *add* in *addition*!)

"*In schools*," is redundant; and, as the sentence should end at themselves, the syllabane, "*in addition to those which their lessons may contain*," is useless.

It will be found a useful practice for pupils to adduce examples for themselves.

The sentence in its original form, comprises 26 words. But in its improved form, it contains only 13, which shows a redundancy of 13 words!

To this sentence the compiler subjoins the following:

"*This will not only show their knowledge of the subject, but by exercising their inventive faculties, will increase their interest for ulterior progress*."

"Interest for" is not English! We say interest *in* but *desire for*.

In idea, however, both sentences are a *unit*—hence it should be expressed in one sentence.

A substitute for both.

That the pupil may show his own knowledge of this subject, and be somewhat instrumental in adding to it, he should adduce instances of the nominative case, for himself. (59 words.)

Before we close this CHAPTER, we deem it somewhat important to show in what way PETER BULLIONS, and GOULD BROWN have mended Murray upon the subject of the cases.

To do these compilers justice, it is necessary to give the reader their respective definitions of *case* itself.

"II. OF THE CASE OF NOUNS."

CASE is the *state*, or *condition*, of a noun with respect to other words in a sentence!! P. BULLIONS.

Let us suppose that A., of Boston, attempts, in a letter, to describe his *state* or *condition* to his friends in Philadelphia. His friends receive his letter, dated, Boston, June, 2, 1844.

The letter, which is long, is read with great care by his Philadelphia friends. But all they can glean from it, which relates to A.'s condition, is the following sentence:

"The *condition* of your friend A., is the state of a man *with respect to the other persons in Boston*!!"

The *case* of a noun is its condition with respect to the *other words* in a sentence!

This definition affords about as much light as a piece of chalk in a dark room.

Even if the child could ascertain what the condition of a noun is with respect to the other words in the sentence, he would be wonderfully enlightened upon the subject of *case*!

"Case is the *state*, or *condition*, of a noun with respect to the other words in a sentence."

It seems, then, that a noun is in a particular case with respect to *all* the other words in the sentence!! To the other words in a sentence.

"*Truth* and *candor* possesses a powerful *charm*." (BULLIONS, p. 73.)

Truth is a noun in the nominative case with respect to *and*, to *candor*, to *possess*, to *a*, to *powerful*, and to *charm*!!!

Under page 73, Mr. Bullions parses this sentence. In his solution we find the noun, *truth*, disposed of in the following way:

"*Truth*," "A noun, neuter, singular, the *nominative*,"

That is, *truth* is the nominative to *and*, to *candor*, to *possess*, to *a*, to *powerful*, and to *charm*! If this is not so what does this definition of case mean:

"Case is the *state*, or *condition*, of a noun *with respect to the other words* in a sentence."

Nouns have three cases, viz.—the *nominative*, *possessive* and *objective*.

1. "The nominative case expresses that of

which something is said or declared;" as, John, thou wast punished by thy teacher.

Nothing is here said of John—hence his name is not in the nominative case by virtue of this definition of the nominative. *John* is a proper noun, of the *second* person—and, as the *second* person is not the spoken of, but to, how can "*John*," or "*thou*," be in the *nominative*!?

The nominative case expresses that of which something is said, or declared.

Nothing is said of *John*—nothing is said of *thou*!! Yet, strange as it may, indeed as it *must*, seem, these two words are the only ones which are parsed in the *nominative* case!!!!!!

"Teacher" is of the *third* person—and, as the *third* person is the one of which something is said, "*teacher*," which is in the *objective* case, and governed by *by*, is the only word which can be parsed in the *nominative* by virtue of Mr. Bullion's definition of this case!

Mr. Bullions himself says the teacher is the only person mentioned in the sentence of whom any thing is said! He himself parses *John*, and *thou*, of the *second* person—by this, he declares that nothing is said of them! He parses *teacher*, as of the *third* person—by this he declares that something is said of the teacher! Book II, p. xi.)

Case, says Mr. Bullions, is "*state*, or *condition*." The *nominative* case of a noun, then, is the *nominative condition* of it!

And, as the *nominative* case expresses that thing of which something is said, it follows that the thing of which something is said, is expressed, not by the noun, but by the *nominative condition* of the noun!!! Hence in the following sentence the thing of which we speak, is not expressed, denoted, by the word, *book*, but by the *nominative condition* of the word, *book*!!

The *book* is new.

This certainly does improve *Murray*!

"The *nominative* case expresses that of which something is said, or declared;" as, the *rock* was smitten by *Moses*.

Is it not here declared of *Moses* that he smote the rock!? Is not this proper noun which Mr. Bullions parses in the *objective* case, actually in the *nominative* case!!?

Is it not as clearly said of *Moses* that he smote the rock, as it is of the rock, that it was smitten?

Can we be told that the nouns in the following instances, in italic characters, denote beings of which nothing is said? If nothing is said of them, how can their names be of the *third* person!?

(The *third* person is *spoken of*.)

1. "The world is sustained by *God*."

2. "His son was taught by *Jacob*."

3. The fire was extinguished by *John*.

4. The horse was stolen by *Joseph*."

Let us now hear what Mr. Gould Brown says of the *nominative* case.

"The *nominative* case is that *form* or *state* of a

noun or a pronoun, which denotes the subject of a verb, as, '*John*, go to school.'"

Appended to Mr. Brown's Grammar, is a KEY which we have perused with great care to enable us to ascertain what is meant by this definition. But, to us, this definition is still under lock and key! the KEY which he furnishes, does not suit the lock, which prevents us from opening this mysterious *verbal box*!

"The *nominative* case is that *form* or *state*."

Are the words, *form*, and *state*, as here used, synonymous? Do both words, as here used, mean the same thing?

From the definition which Mr. Brown gives of *case* itself, we infer that he intends to use *form* and *state*, as meaning the same thing.

"CASE."

"Cases are *modifications* that distinguish the relations of nouns and pronouns to other words."

GOULD BROWN.

"As "*state*" is not used in this definition, we conclude that it is used in the other, merely to improve the *euphony* of the sentence!

"Cases are *modifications* which distinguish the relations of nouns and pronouns to other words."

What are the relations which nouns, and pronouns bear to other words, which the *case modifications* "*distinguish*?" If *case*, in general, is a *modification* which expresses the different relations that nouns and pronouns bear to other words, the *nominative* case must express one, or more, of those relations. But does Mr. Brown, even mention the word, *relation*, in his definition of the *nominative case*!? Does he even use a word in this definition, which conveys the least allusion to a relation of *nouns*, and *pronouns*, to other words?

"The *nominative* case is the *form* or *state* of a noun which denotes the subject of a verb."

Does the word, *subject*, convey any allusion to a relation of one word to another!? The word, *subject*, alludes to the object, or thing on which the mind acts.

"Subject,—that on which some mental or material operation, is performed." JOHNSON.

What says *Murray*? "The subject is the thing principally *spoken of*."

Why has not Mr. Brown told *what this relation* is of which he speaks in his definition of *case*? Simply, because he *does not know what it is*!!

If *cases* are *modifications* of nouns, and pronouns, *why* does not Mr. Brown tell us what *modification* constitutes the *nominative case*!? Simply, because there is *no modification* which constitutes *this case*!

What is it which denotes the subject of the verb? The definition of the *nominative case*, as given by Mr. Brown, does not answer this question:

"The *nominative* case is the *form* or *state* of a

noun or pronoun, *which* denotes the subject of a verb."

Does "*which*" represent *form* or *state*, or *noun*, or *pronoun*? No one can decide from the sentence!

We will now give some attention to an illustration of this definition of the nominative case.

Boys, you were punished by the teacher.

Has the word, *boys*, a *form* which enables it to denote the *subject*? Has the word, *boys*, a *state* which enables it to denote the *subject*?

"The nominative case is the *form* or *state* of a noun or pronoun, *which* denotes the subject of a verb; as, *Boys, you were punished by the teacher.*"

How can the word, *boys*, denote the *subject* of a verb, when it is absolutely *independent* of all verbs!?

Again—as the subject is the thing principally spoken of, how can *boys* be parsed in the nominative case!?! This noun does not denote *what* is spoken of, but *what* is spoken *to*. *Boys* is a noun of the *second* person!

"*You*" is a pronoun—but has no form which is peculiar to it when it denotes the subject—"you" has the same form in the *objective*, which it has in the nominative: *you were punished*. Here "*you*" is *nominative*. "Of *you*." Here "*you*" is *objective*!

With respect to *state*, we have already demonstrated that it is a mere *bubble*!

Does "*you*" denote the *subject*!?! How, then, can "*you*" be of the *second* person!?! The subject is the object spoken of. "*You*" denotes the person spoken *to*!?! How, therefore, can *you* be in the nominative case by virtue of the definition which follows:

"The nominative case is the *form* or *state* of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the *subject* of a verb." Gould Brown's "*finished labours*!!"

If the nominative case denotes the subject, and the subject is the thing spoken of, how can any word of the *first* or the *second* person, be in the nominative case!?

1. "*I* was at school in London."

2. "*We* will call on them soon."

3. [*I* (*who* am now reading,) understand this matter!"]

If *I*, *we*, and *who*, are not of *third* person, they can not be *subjects*—and, if not *subjects*, they are not in the *nominative* case!

The *third* person, and the subject are defined in the same way! The *third* person is the thing spoken of; and a *subject* is the thing spoken of. But these *pronouns I, we, who*, denote the *speakers*—hence, they are of the *first* person—and, consequently, they can not denote *subject*; and, as they do not denote *subjects*, they can not be in the *nominative* case!

"*John* is a boy of truth."

John is a name in the *name* case to *is*! Or—

John is a noun, in the *noun* case to *is*! Or,—

John is a *sign*, in the *sign* case to *is*! Or,—

John is a *nominative*, in the *nominative* case to *is*!

As *sign*, *name*, *noun*, and *nominative*, mean the same thing, either of these methods of parsing, is synonymous with the following:

John is a *noun*, in the *nominative* case to *is*.

Let us now enquire what is meant by the words, "*nominative case to is*?"

John is in the *nominative case to is*!

When we say, *John went to the door*, we understand the import of *to*. But when we say that the word, *John*, is in the nominative case to "*is*," we speak of something of which we know nothing!

Before we pursue this point farther, it may be well to devote a few minutes to the words, "*in the nominative case after is*."

"*John* is a *boy* of truth."

Boy is a noun in the nominative case *after is*.

Is the word, *after*, employed to express any *nominative relation* which the word, *boy*, bears to *is*? Or, is *after* used to denote the *position* of *boy* in reference to *is*. That *boy* comes *after is*, is obvious. But if *after* is employed merely to express the place of *boy* in reference to *is*, why not use *before* to express the place of *John* in reference to *is*!?

"*John* is a *boy* of truth."

John is a noun in the nominative case *before is*.

Boy is a noun in the nominative case *after is*.

But, no, *John* is in the nominative case to *is*—and *boy*, in the nominative case *after is*!?! Reconcile this method with good sense if you can!

"Is it *they*?"

It, is a pronoun, in the nominative case *to is*.

They is a pronoun, in the nominative case *after is*!!

When it is said that "*they*" is in the nominative case, is it not meant that it is in the nominative case in relation to some verb? Or is this pronoun in the nominative case independent of all verbs!?! The old school grammarians do not pretend that *they* is in the nominative case independent of all verbs. In relation, then, to what verb is *they* in the nominative case? Is this pronoun in the nominative case to *is*!?! *Is they*, is not English! Nor is, *they is* English! What! Can a pronoun be in the nominative case to a verb when at the same time the putting of the pronoun with the verb, produces a gross infraction of the rules of grammar!!

["*It is* (*they*)."]

1. What is the meaning of, *in the nominative to is*!?

2. What is the meaning of, *in the nominative case after is*!?

"*John* is a boy of truth."

Is the word *John*, *nominative* in relation to *is*!?! Surely not—the word, *John*, is *nominative* in relation to the person himself. "*John*" is the name of the real person! This word, then, is in the *nominative* case in relation to the person—and not in relation to the verb, *is*! Is *is* the subject!?! No, no!

If the *nominative* case is the mere name of the subject, and if *John* is the subject, is not the word, the name, the sign, *John*, *nominative* in relation to *John* himself!?! Preposterous! *John* bear a name, a noun, a *nominative*, relation to *is*! Then of course "*John*" is the *name* of *is*!!

"*John* is a boy of truth."

John, a noun, in the *nominative* case to *John* himself!

If the *nominative* case is the name of the subject, this is the only rational parsing which can be given. We deny that a noun bears a *nominative* relation to the verb. The noun bears a *nominative* relation to the subject, to the object, to the thing of which it is the name, and to nothing else!

CHAPTER IV.

THE POSSESSIVE CASE.

WE intend to dispose of this case in a very summary way.

The termination which is called the *possessive* case, is a mere *adjective* affix and, as such, it converts the noun to which it is affixed into an adjective; as,

1. "He brought Jane's book, and her paper."
2. "Goold Brown's definitions are unsound."
3. "Peter Bullion's Latin Grammar."

As, *al*, *ic*, *iv*, *ous*, *ine*, &c., are affixes which translate nouns into adjectives, so are the affixes which are called the *possessive* case, suffixes that convert nouns into adjectives.

NOUNS.

1. Mode
2. Jane
3. Virtue
4. Philosophy

ADJECTIVES.

- modal. *al*.
- Jane's. 's.
- virtuous. *ous*.
- philosophic. *ic*.

The *pronouns* which are supplemental to the nouns in the *possessive* case, are called *adjectives*, or *adjective* pronouns:

"John saw her with *his* book."

To *his*, the old theory applies the word, *adjective*.

But is *his* any thing more, or less than *John's*?

John saw her with *John's* book.

If *his*, the true representative of *John's*, can be called an *adjective*, can not *John's* be styled an *adjective* also?

It is said that there are four sorts of *adjective* pronouns, viz. the *possessive*, distributive, demonstrative, and indefinite. The *possessive adjective* pronouns are, *my*, *thy*, *his*, *her*, *our*, *your*, *their*, *its*, *own*." (*Bullions's Grammar*, p. 26.)

But what is the *possessive* case?

Mr. *Bullions* says, that

"The *possessive* case denotes that to which something belongs; as,"

1. The fan of the *lady*!
2. The hat of *John*!

The nouns, *lady*, and *John*, are in the *possessive* case, governed by the preposition, *of*!!!!

"Truth and *candor* possess a powerful charm."

"*Truth*," a common noun, third person, singular, in the *possessive* case!!

"*Candor*," a noun, of the third person, singular, in the *possessive* case!!

Under the thirty-ninth page of *Bullions's English Grammar*, we find the above sentence.

Under the same page we find *truth*, and *candor*, parsed in the *nominative* case. But, if the *possessive* case is what Mr. *Bullions* defines it to be, who can not see that *truth*, and *candor* demand that we put *truth*, and "*candor*" into the *possessive* case!!!

The *possessive* case, says Mr. *Bullions*, denotes that to which something belongs.

"*Truth* and *candor* possess powerful charms."

Does not a powerful charm belong to *truth*, and *candor*? Are not *truth*, and *candor*, then, in the *possessive* case!!!!

Every noun as well as every pronoun in italic characters, in the following sentences, is in the *possessive* case.

1. *I* have a book.
2. "This is the knife of *Samuel*."
3. "A portrait of the *king* is here."
4. *He* is a *man* of much property.
5. Have *you* boy's hats for sale?

As the *boys* are not spoken of as *possessing* hats, the word, *boys*, does not denote any thing to which something belongs. But, as the persons, called *you*, are spoken to as having hats, "*you*" is in the *possessive* case!! What work, what work, what work! Oh! these *Murray menders*!!

Kirkham, under page 48, says that

"The *possessive* case denotes the *possessor* of something!!"

1. *I* have a book!!!
2. *John* is the *owner* of a book!!
3. This is the house of *Stephen*!

Under page 41, this same Mr. *Kirkham* says,

"Now *five* grains of *common* sense" will enable any one to comprehend what is meant by case!!

In a work entitled, *Book Instructor, designed to TEACH the science of English Grammar without a TEACHER*, we find the following definition of the *possessive* case:

"The *possessive* case denotes the *possessor* or *owner* of property!!"

1. "*Durand* has a horse!"
2. "*Davidson* owns a house?"
3. This is the land of *James*!
4. This is the book of *Sarah*!
5. *I* have a pen!
2. *Thou* hast an inkstand!

We must congratulate Mr. *ELLS* upon his remarkable success in this attempt to give a definition of the *possessive* case!

Under page 26, *Goold Brown* says,

The *possessive* case is that *form*, or *state* of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the relation of *property*; as, *boy's* hats, *my* hat. GOOLD BROWN.

Let us see with what ease this definition can be applied to the following:

2. *John's* uncle!
2. *Nancy's* friend!

Is the uncle the *property* of *John*!!!? Is the friend the *property* of *Nancy*!!!?

"*Henry* has *boys'* hats for sale."

Is it to be presumed that these hats which belong to *Henry* are the *property* of the *boys*!!!?

"How the definition vanishes before the test!!"

But is this *relation of property* mentioned in *Brown's* definition of the *possessive* case, the same relation to which he refers in his definition of case

itself!!? In his definition of *case* itself he speaks of a relation of nouns, and pronouns to other words! But in his definition of the *possessive* case, he says nothing of this sort of relation!! The relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words, must be very different from the relation of property to its owner!!

"CASES."

"Cases, are modifications that distinguish the relation of nouns and pronouns to other words!" GOULD BROWN.

The *possessive* case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the relation of property; as "boy's hat, my hat."

Now, as the *boy* is not the *property*, but the *proprietor*, would not Mr. Brown's definition be much improved by the substitution of *proprietor* for *property*?

The *possessive* case is that form, or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the relation of *proprietor*; as, *John's* book!

But we will call the attention of the reader once more to the obvious difference between the two relations of which Mr Brown speaks, and close our reflections upon his wonderful definition of the cases.

The relation of which he speaks in his definition of case itself, is that of nouns and pronouns, to other words. But the relation of which he speaks in his definition of the *possessive*, case is that which exists between the *proprietor* and his *property*!!!! The definition of case itself, is Mr. Brown's guide—it is his *constitutional* definition, out of which he can not travel without subjecting himself to the charge of inconsistency. Has he founded his definition of the *possessive* case upon the relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words? No, no! He has built this definition, not upon the relation of nouns and pronouns to other words, but upon the relation which a house and lot, a horse and wagon, a hat and book, bear to him who happens to be the proprietor of them!!! The relation of *property*!!

But the definition is *false* in theory, and *false* in practice:

1. *Jane's* uncle!
2. *Sarah's* friend!
3. Have you boys' hats for sale!

Here "*you*," the *nominative* is the *possessive*! Are not the hats spoken of as the property of you?

And how is the word, *boys'*, parsed? In the *possessive* case! But are the hats spoken of as the property of the *boys*? Nothing like it! The hats are the property of you! The hats, then, bear the relation of *property* to the *nominative* case!!!!

Has Mr. Brown founded his definition of the

nominative case upon the relation of which he speaks in his definition of case itself? No, no.—He has founded his definition, not upon a relation of nouns and pronouns to other words, but upon the relation which the real object, the real thing, bears to the mind of the speaker, or writer—he founds it upon the subject!

Under the first page of the Preface to Mr. Brown's Grammar, we find the following, which we submit without comment:

"To embody, in a convenient form, the true principles of the English Language, and to express them in a simple and *perspicuous* style, adapted to the capacity of *youth*, are the objects of the following work!"

Let us now hear what Mr. Murray says on the *possessive* case.

The *possessive* case expresses the relation of property or possession; and has an *apostrophe* with the letter *s* following it; as, the scholar's duty, my father's house.—MURRAY.

"And has an *apostrophe* with the letter *s*, following it."

What has an *apostrophe* with the letter, *s*? the *possessive* case!

"The *possessive* case expresses the relation of property or possession; and has an *apostrophe* with the letter, *s*, following it."

Following what? following the *possessive* case? The pronoun, *it*, stands for "*possessive* case."

"The *possessive* case has an *apostrophe* with the letter, *s*, following it; as, the scholar's duty."

As the *apostrophe*, and *s* are the *possessive* case, where is the propriety of saying that the *possessive* case is followed by an "*apostrophe*, and *s*!?"

According to Mr. Murray, the *possessive* case of *scholar*, is this—'*s*'! Scholar's duty!!

"The *scholar's* duty."

Does this expression convey an allusion to the relation of *property*? Is a man's duty his *property*!?

"The *possessive* case expresses the relation of *property* or possession; as, the *scholar's* duty.

The scholar, then, is the owner, the proprietor, of this duty!!! We do not believe any such idea is intended by the language used.

The truth is that *scholar* is thrown into an adjective form to express a distinction which could not be made in any other way with as much brevity.

"Get *John's* horse."

John is rendered an adjective to express *what* horse. But the old school grammarians say that *John* is rendered an adjective to express that *John* is the owner, the *possessor*, of the horse! This, however, is not so.

1. Call at Mr. Brown's drug store, and get a bottle of *Swaim's* panacea."

Is it here expressed that this panacea is the *property* of *Swaim*? Nothing like it.

2. "I have one of *Rogers's* knives."

Is it here expressed that *Rogers* is the owner of these knives!?

3. "We eat *baker's* bread altogether."

Does this mean that the bread which we eat, is the *property* of the baker!?

4. "Get a copy of *Murray's* Grammar."

Does this mean that *Murray* is the *owner* of this book!?

5. "*Lea's* pills are a good medicine."

Does this import that *Lea* is the *owner* of these pills, or, does it mean that he is the maker, inventor, or, of them?

6. "John has *boys's* hats for sale."

The hats belong not to the *boys*, but to John! Yet *boys* is in the case which the old school grammarians say expresses the relation of *property*, *possession*!!

7. "They read all *David's* psalms."

Is *David* here represented as the *owner*, or as the *author*, of the psalms!?

8. "Joseph lives with *John's* friend."

What! Is the friend with whom *Joseph* lives, the *property* of John!?

9. "We followed *John's* directions."

Is it here meant that these directions are the *property* of John, or that they come from him!?

10. "The *wind's* music was sweet."

Is it here meant that the wind is the *owner*, the *author*, or the maker, of the music!?

11. "*Earth's* productions are numerous."

Is it here meant that the earth is the *proprietor*, *owner*, or giver of these productions!?

12. "The *trunk's* branches were small."

What is the true idea here? Is it that the trunk is the mere *owner* of the branches? Or is it that the trunk is the *author*, the *giver*, of the branches? Can branches which are *engrafted* into the trunk, be said to be the *trunk's* branches? The branches which are merely engrafted into the trunk, are not the *trunk's* branches.

Where a child bears the relation of adoption to Mr. Webster, can it be said to be Mr. Webster's child!?

"Mr. Webster's child," means a child of which Mr. Webster is the *father*.

13. "Webster's son."

Here, Webster's is parsed in the *possessive* case. This, however, is a misnomer: the true case of this noun is *no* case. And the true relation of Webster to the son, is clearly expressed by *parent*, *origin*, *source*. "Webster's," then, is a noun in the *source* deflection, the *origin form*, the *parent modification*.

Significant technicals are well calculated to expose error in false theories. The word, *possessive*, is almost the only technical, in the old theory, which has any meaning. Hence, in general, it requires great care to demonstrate the errors which pervade, and deform it. But where there is a technical which

is expressive of a distinct idea, a very short *cross* examination will expose the work of error, even to the mere child.

"The *possessive* case expresses the relation of *property* or *possession*."

1. *Murray's* Grammar!

2. *Baker's* Bread.

3. *Webster's* son.

4. *John's* friend.

5. *Goodness's* sake.

6. John has *boys's* hats for sale.

The relations between the things expressed by nouns in the *possessive* case, and the noun on which this *possessive* noun depends, are too numerous to be comprehended by even a hundred distinctive names. That the relation of *property* may exist is admitted. But these relations have nothing to do with grammar—hence grammars should have nothing to do with them. Grammar is a science which treats of the relation of *words*. *Metaphysics* is a science which treats of the relation of *things*. Let the grammarian, then, abandon *metaphysics*, and give the relation, not of the *real* horses, *real* oxen, *real* men, and *real* children, but of the *words* which denote these real beings!

A remarkable book in the form of an English Grammar, has recently appeared under the following imposing title:

"An improved Grammar of the English Language, on the *Inductive* system; by Reverend BRADFORD FRAZEE, late principal of Washington Female Academy. Washington, Miss."

Under page 26, we find the following definition of the *possessive* case:

"The *possessive* case denotes ownership;" as,

1. *Baker's* bread is not so cheap as domestic.

Does not *baker's* indicate the *kind* of bread!?

Does the word, *baker's*, denote *ownership*!?

2. *Brewer's* yeast is better than *baker's* yeast.

Do *brewer's*, and *baker's* express *ownership*!?!—or do they express the *kinds* of yeast!?

3. He studies Bradford Frazee's Grammar.

Do we here mean that Bradford Frazee is the *owner* of this book!?! Nothing like it.

4. "John's friend was shot, and burnt, for the crime of desertion."

What does *John* own!?! Does he possess the annihilated friend!?

5. "James saw John's friend."

Is this friend the *property* of John!?! If not, where is the *ownership*!?

Under page 25, Mr. Frazee gives the following definition of case itself:

"CASE."

Case means the *position* of the name in the sentence with respect to other words.

But is this principle found in the following definition of the *possessive* case?

"The possessive case denotes *ownership*!"

What a vast difference there is between *position*, *place*, and *ownership*!!

As *case* signifies *place*, *position*, and as the *possessive* case is involved in the idea of *case*, why not define the *possessive* case by a description of its *position*!?

In the title page, Mr. Frazee styles his work an *improved Grammar of the English Language*! And in his Preface, he virtually adopts the following language—

"I am *the door*, by me if any man enter in, he is saved from his *grammatical* sins—he shall go in and out, and find *pasture*!" Yes, if that which has been masticated, chewed, almost to *annihilation*, is *pasture*, he will find *pasture* enough!! But, if he does not meet with a little *stubble* in going in, and out, we shall conclude that he has neither *eyes*, nor *palate*!!

[We have examined several English Grammars of more recent publication than those on whose definitions of the *possessive* case we have here commented. But as they contain nothing new, we can not consent to make them the subject of additional reflections. Chandler, Welds, &c., &c., are mere copyists.]

CHAPTER V.

OF THE OBJECTIVE CASE.

We shall commence this chapter by giving Mr. MURRAY on the OBJECTIVE CASE. After having given his definition of this case, and made some few comments upon it, we shall examine the definitions which they who have been laboring to SIMPLIFY his works, have given of the same case.

"The objective case expresses the OBJECT of an ACTION or of a RELATION;" as, *Jane*, THOU wast punished by thy *teacher*, in the *school house*!!

The word, *Jane*, is a proper noun, second person singular—and in *what case*? "*Jane*" is in the *nominative* case! Who was punished? *JANE* was punished. Was not *Jane*, then, the object acted upon? Yes. This noun, therefore, *must* be in the *objective* case. By what rule? Why by the clearest rule possible—the *very definition* of the *objective case*! Can any one say that this noun is in the *objective* case!? Surely it is not in the *possessive*—nor is it in the *nominative*: for it is neither the *subject* of a VERB, nor the *actor*! Why not the *subject* of a *verb*? Because it is *independent* of the *verb*. "When an address is made, the noun is in the *nominative case independent*."

The word, *thou*, is a pronoun, second person, singular, and in the *nominative* case to *wast punished*. Yet this pronoun expresses the object acted upon! Who was punished? *Thou* wast punished.

How, then, can this pronoun be in the *nominative* case? "Easily enough," says Mr. Ingersoll! "The *nominative* case is that word which denotes the animal, or the thing, which does an action!!"

"Ah! and does the pronoun, *thou*, denote an animal that does an action? Or does this pronoun denote an *animal* to *whom* an action is *done*?"

What is Mr. Ingersoll's definition of the *objective case*?

"The *objective case*," says Mr. Ingersoll, "denotes the object of an action; as, *Caroline* broke the *glass*."

Here the action is done *by Caroline*, and *to the glass*. The word, *glass*, is presented by Mr. Ingersoll as the *objective case*. How is it in the instance before us. *Thou* denotes the person to whom the action is done; and by Mr. Murray, as well as by Mr. Ingersoll, is a pronoun in the *objective case*! But this pronoun, the same word, is in the *objective*, and in the *nominative* at the same time!! *Thou* expresses the object of an *action*;—hence in the *objective*—*thou*, is parsed in the *nominative*! So it is—and it cannot be helped!!

Let us now repeat the definition:

"The *objective case* expresses the object of an action or of a relation; as, *JANE*, THOU wast punished by thy *TEACHER*, in the *SCHOOL HOUSE*."

The word, *teacher*, is a common noun, third person, singular, and in the *objective case* after *by*. Yet the word, *teacher*, denotes the very *actor himself*! But what is the *objective case*? "The *objective case* expresses the *object* of an *action*." How, *how*, then, we beg to be informed, can the noun which expresses, not the *object*, but the very *ACTOR HIMSELF*, be parsed in the *objective case*? The word, *teacher*, is Mr. Ingersoll's, Mr. Greenleaf's Mr. KIRKHAM's, and Mr. Cardell's, *nominative case* is the *actor*!! Mr. Murray, however, says,

"The *nominative case* simply expresses the name of a thing, or the subject of a verb."

Mr. Murray, and all his SIMPLIFIERS, are grossly *absurd*.

If the *nominative case* is the *actor*, then, indeed, the *nominative case*, in the example before us, is the *objective case*! Nor are constructions of this description, rare; our language abounds with them.

"*Jane*, *thou* wast punished by thy *teacher* in the *school house*."

Mr. Murray's definition of the *objective case* seems not to describe the character of the word, *teacher*. Yet this noun is not entirely lost—for the *simplifiers*, and the *cloud-dispersers* of Mr. Murray's grammar, have caught, *most happily* caught, this *objective case* in their definition of the *nominative*!! They intend their definition for the *nominative case*—but, as it seems not to suit the *nominative*, let it not be lost, let it be applied to the *objective case*!!

We now come to the word, *house*, which is a

common noun, third person, singular, and in the objective case, governed by the preposition, *in*.

House is not the object of an action: hence, if it is in the objective case by virtue of Mr. Murray's definition of this case, it comes under the last clause—

"The OBJECT of a RELATION."

There is a relation between *Jane*, and the *house*: for *Jane*, as says the sentence, was *in* the house.

"*Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher in the school *house*." Or, *Jane*, thou, *in* the school *house*, wast punished by thy teacher.

The preposition, *in*, shows the relation which exists between the *real house*, and the *real person*. And the word, *house*, is put into the *objective case*—because of *what*? because of this relation. Now, was the house *nearer* to *Jane* than she was to the house? Surely *Jane* being as near the house, as the house was to her, the noun, *Jane*, ought also to be put into the objective case on account of this curiously *objective* relation! Yes—before Mr. Murray put the noun, *house*, into the *objective*, because of this relation, he should have found the extent of the principle. The thing which partakes of the relation to the higher, or highest degree, ought to be considered the *object* of the relation. But, if you examine, you will find that the things which are related, ever partake of the relation existing between them, in an *equal degree*! If *James* is my brother, I am his brother. But, if *James* could be my brother, and I bear no relation to *him*, Mr. Murray's principle might answer. Yes, if it could be proved that the ear has no relation with the head, then, indeed, the *head* might be considered as the object of the relation which it bears to the ear, without taking the ear into the account. But, as it is, if we say, "the EAR is on the HEAD," it is absurd to view the head as the only object of this relation. The ear is as near to the head as the head is to the ear. If, therefore, in parsing the following instance, the word, *head*, is parsed in the objective on account of the relation, we contend that the word, *ear*, also should be parsed in the objective:

"The EAR is on the HEAD."

Ear is in the *nominative case*—but *head* is the object of a relation, hence in the *objective case*!!

Let us now attend to the instructions of Mr. Comly upon the *object*—

"The objective case is the *state* of a noun, or pronoun when it is the object of a verb, or preposition."

This definition appears well enough, till one tries to understand it. But the first attempt which one makes to comprehend its import, involves it in great *obscurity*. In the definition before us, we find this *state* lugged in again—and to what effect? It is not *explanation*; but on the contrary, it is a point which requires much explanation. If Mr. Comly knew *what state* it is of which he speaks so much, why did he not employ Mr. Murray's *defi-*

nite article, or some other descriptive word, and point out the kind of state he means!?

"The objective case is a *STATE* of the noun or pronoun, *when* it is the OBJECT of the transitive verb, participle, or preposition."

Let us use the only word which Mr. Comly could have employed for the description of this state:

The objective case is the *objective state* of a noun, or pronoun when it is the object of a transitive verb, participle or preposition. More than this, Mr. Comly does not mean. But even this he cannot sustain. If he means what we have supposed him to mean, his definition is made out at the word, *pronoun*—"The objective case is an *objective state* of a noun or pronoun." Is there any *such state*? As what? As an *objective state* of a noun. We contend that there is not. If there is such a state, it can be found; yet he has not condescended to define it. If he ever comprehended the *true character* of this *state*, we are *surprised* to find that he has not told in *what* it consists—and, if he never knew its true character, we are *astonished* that he should *talk so much about it*!! This *objective state* must consist in the position of the noun—or it cannot exist in our language. Let us, then, see whether the objective noun has any *fixed* place in the sentence: "*John* is a good *pupil*; and such *pupils* all teachers admire."

John, the first nominative, stands *before* the verb—the noun, *pupil*, the second nominative, stands *after* the verb! "*Admire*" is a transitive verb, and *pupils*, a noun in the *objective case*, and is placed *before* this verb!!

"All thorough teachers will enable their *pupils* to think."

Here we find the word, *pupils*, still in the *objective case*—yet it here stands *after* the verb!

"This is not the thing *which* he thinks of."

The objective case of *of* is found in *which*, *before* he!

"This is not the thing *of which* he thinks."

Here the objective case is found in *which*, and is placed *after* *of*!

Hence we find that there is no certain place which can be claimed as the position of the objective case. But even if there was, yet, as this place could not be called a *state*, Mr. Comly's definition of the objective would be *no* definition at all! What, then, has Mr. Comly done? Has he attempted to distinguish two things by their color, which have the same color! Yes, he has done worse—he has undertaken to distinguish two things by color, when at the same time, neither of the things, has any kind of color!! He has attempted to distinguished the nominative case by a *state* which the noun derives from the fact that it is the *subject* of the verb—the noun, however, derives no state from this source!!

He has attempted to distinguish the objective case by a *state* which the noun derives from the

fact that it is the object of a transitive verb, or a preposition—but the noun derives *no state* from this source!!

To give a clearer view of this point, it may be well to call the attention of the reader to the definition of case itself, as given by Mr. Comly.

"Case is a *change* or *difference* in the termination or *situation* of a noun or pronoun."

Now, there are three particular cases; and each should have its proper portion of *case itself*! The three special cases he defines in the following manner:

1. "The nominative case is simply the name of a thing or the *state* of a noun or pronoun, when it is the subject of a verb; as, *I walk*."

2. "The possessive case denotes property or possession; as, *thy book*."

3. The objective case is the *state* of a noun or pronoun, when it is the object of a transitive verb, participle or preposition; as, *I taught her*."

Let us now repeat the author's definition of case itself.

"Case is a difference or change in the termination or situation of a noun or pronoun."

This definition should be properly distributed among the three definitions of the special cases. Has this distribution been made? We undertake to say that it has *not*. In each of the particular definitions, there is a *new* principle which forms the basis of the special definition. "The nominative case is simply the name of a thing."

The generic, or parent definition of *case*, speaks of no principle like that which is denominated in the clause,

"Is simply the name of a thing!"

The generic definition says that,

"Case is a *change* or *difference*!"

Hence the nominative case must be something more than a *mere* name of a thing!

Let us now examine the second clause of Mr. Comly's definition of the nominative:

"Or a *state* of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb."

Here we admit that Mr. Comly includes *indirectly* one fact which he has presented in his *generic* definition of case. In the definition of case itself, the author says,

"A difference in the condition of a noun or pronoun."

And in his definition of the nominative, he says,

"*State* of a noun or pronoun."

But what state is this to which the author alludes? *No state at all!* What then? It is something which the peculiar state of Mr. Comly compelled him to *fancy* into being! The reader sees that this *state* is the very point which we have already discussed. And he well knows that in this discussion, it is proved by examples, that the noun and pronoun derive *no state* from the fact that they are the signs of the *subjects* of verbs!

1. "The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb; as *I am he*."

2. "THE POSSESSIVE CASE.—The *possessive* case denotes property or possession; as *thy book*."

Now this definition recognises no one principle contained in the definition of case itself. The generic definition gives no intimation of *possession*.

3. "The objective case is a *state* of a noun or pronoun when it is the object of a transitive verb, participle or preposition."

This definition is founded upon a *state* of a noun or pronoun—and in this respect, it bears an *indirect* resemblance to the generic definition of case. The generic definition speaks of a difference in the *condition* of a noun or pronoun; and from this analogous phraseology, some resemblance in idea may be inferred. But it will be recollected, that the state upon which this definition of the objective case is founded does not *exist*! This state is just *nothing at all*! Does Mr. Comly even attempt to define it? No—he informs the pupil *when* it exists. Ah!—yes—and at what time does it exist? *never*! For there is nothing to exist! But Mr. Comly *says* that it exists at the very *instant* the noun or pronoun is the object of a transitive verb, participle or preposition!

"The objective case is the *state* of a noun or pronoun *when* it is the object of a transitive verb, participle or preposition!"

"The *objective* case is the state of a noun or pronoun."

But *what* state of a noun or pronoun? This question is too severe! O, no! says Mr. Comly—I can answer the question with *ease*! "It is that *particular* state which a noun or a pronoun derives from the fact that it is the *object* of a transitive verb, participle or preposition!"

But, Mr. Comly, we have already shown that nouns and pronouns derive *no fixed*, *no certain*, *no particular* state from the fact that they are the objects of these parts of speech! Does this state consist in *place*, *position*? No—for the nominative case can occupy the same position which the objective can.

Does this state consist in *length*? No—for the noun is *no longer*, when in the objective case, than it is when in the nominative!

We ask again.—Can this state consist in the position of the word? No! The nominative case may come *before* as well as *after* the verb—and so may the objective; as,

nom. nom. nom.

"JOHN is a good PUPIL." "THEY teach this ob.
PUPIL."

ob.

["That book she *purchased*."] [That is] (the ob. nom.

pen) (WHICH I made.)

In the preceding instances, the objective is placed before as well as after, the verb. The *objective*, then, in point of position, has nothing different from the nominative!

"Case is a change or difference in the termination or condition of a noun or pronoun."

This definition is a mere *nothing*—it does not apply to our nouns, and pronouns which are in the nominative, and objective case. For instance, *I* and *me*, are not different terminations of the *same* word—these are two different words! So it is with *she*, and *her*, *he*, and *him*. What is meant by *changes* in the termination of words, may be seen from the different endings of "write;" as,

s, th, st. Writes, writeth, writest.

Perhaps, however, it may be said that, Mr. Comly's definition of case, suits *who*, and *whom*, *thou*, and *thee*.

It may apply also to the nouns, and pronouns, which are in the possessive case; as, *my* hat, *John's* glove. But his definition applies to no noun which is parsed either in the nominative, or the objective case: for the noun undergoes *no* change with a view to fit it for either of these cases. For example—

"John saw John."

The first "*John*" is in the nominative case—the second, in the objective.

2. "These *lads* hurt those *lads*."

The first noun is in the nominative case—the second, in the objective.

But it is the intention of Mr. Comly to secure these nouns by the *following* phraseology:

"A difference in the *condition* of a noun or pronoun."

In this, however, the author is completely defeated—for we have more than once shown that these nouns derive *no* condition from the fact that they are the subjects, or objects of verbs! The objective noun may be placed *before* the verb which governs it; or it may be placed *after* the verb which governs it. To support this position, we have already given many instances—but to give the subject all that attention which it deserves, and to aid them who require clear, and frequent illustration, we shall adduce a few other examples:

1. "This is the book *which* he purchased."
2. "*Which* did he purchase?"
3. "These are fine pupils—and such *children* all people must admire."
4. "It is nothing *which* he desires."
5. "It is a fact *which* I know nothing of."

Now, if Mr. Comly cannot derive this difference in the condition of a noun, and pronoun, from the *place* of the noun, and pronoun, he cannot sustain his definition of *case*! But he may say that this condition is the position itself. If so, his objective case is neither more, nor less than an objective *position*! Hence *case* would mean nothing but the place on the paper, in which the noun or the

pronoun stands. But as there is no certain place in which the objective noun stands, in relation to the verb that governs it, there can be no *objective* position; hence, when we give Mr. Comly all, yea more than he seems to claim, his *objective case is nothing at all*!

Mr. Comly first gives a definition of case itself—he then proceeds to give definitions of the three different cases, by introducing principles entirely different from those contained in the definition of case itself! Yes, so widely does he depart from his first, or general definition of case, that his particular definitions have nothing in them having a *direct* resemblance to *case* itself!

But Mr. Comly's definition of case itself, is *narrow, illiberal, ill constructed*, and altogether *incompetent*! It speaks of nothing which can be found in the grammatical principles of the English language! It is founded upon a *difference* in the condition of nouns—but what *this* condition *is*, is yet to be made out! For the author has not thought proper even to attempt to define it!! Mr. Comly's definition speaks of "a *difference* in the condition of a noun"—but would it not be well for him to make out *the existence* of the *condition itself*, before he attempts to show a *difference* in it! This prating about the *difference* in the condition of nouns, is disputing about the division of an estate, where in fact there is *no estate* for distribution!!

In giving a definition of the nominative case, Mr. Comly employs the word, "*subject*." But this instructor of little *children* gives no kind of explanation of what *he* means by the phrase, "*nominative case*!!"

"The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun, or pronoun, when it is the *subject* of a verb!"—as, "John saw John."

Now, the first "*John*" is in the nominative case. But can the pupil see that the first "*John*" is any more the subject of the verb than the second?

"John, this John hurt that John."

The first *John* is not the subject of the verb; for it stands *independent* of the verb—yet the first "*John*" is in the nominative case!! "*Subject of a verb*" is much like the "*difference in a condition*!"

In point of fact there is nothing which is a *subject of a verb*. Things, perhaps, may be divided into subjects, and objects—but not upon the mere circumstance, or fact of having their names *mechanically* connected with *verbs*! As well might it be said that one's ears are subjects, because they are connected with his head, as that nouns are subjects, because they are connected with verbs! But to say that one noun is converted into a subject through the magic of this connection, while the other is degraded to a mere object of the same connection, is queer, indeed! Why, has the noun in the nominative case any closer connection with the verb than the noun in the objective?—

"John, this John hurt that John."

The first "John" has no sort of connection with the verb "*hurt*,"—yet it is in the *nominative* case!

The last "John" has a close connection with this verb; yet it is in the *objective* case!!

How, then, does Mr. Comly support his definition of the *nominative* case?

The distinction between a subject, and an object is a very *important* point—a point which we think Mr. Comly should have understood, before making the above use of the word, "*subject*."

"The *nominative* case is the subject of a verb;" as "John is John, John hurt John!"

Now, what great difference is there between the two "Johns,"—one following *is*, and the other *hurt*? That which follows "*is*," is in the *nominative* case—that which follows "*hurt*," is in the *objective*!

Has Mr. Murray, or Mr. Comly, or has any other writer upon this science, explained the difference between a *subject*, and an *object*? Not one—nor do we believe that the authors of the vast numbers of English grammars, that have distracted this science, and blinded the public vision, have ever understood the principle upon which a distinction may be made, that will justify the use of the words, "*subject*," and "*object*" in a system of grammar.

1. "The *subject* of a verb."

2. "The *nominative* case is the *subject* of a verb."

Absurd as it may appear, they who have written our English Grammars, have used the phraseology,

"Subjects of verbs," and objects of verbs, as though these were points which the learner instinctively comprehends!

We put the following question to all the friends to, and foes of, the British system of English grammar:

Is the *noun itself* the subject of the verb, or is the *person*, or *thing* denoted by the noun, the subject of the verb?

If they tell us that it is the *noun itself*, then, indeed, the *subjective* character of a noun depends entirely upon the noun's *frame-work* relation to the verb! And as the *objective* noun is as closely connected with the verb as the *subjective*, it follows that *all* nouns having a frame-work relation with verbs, are the subjects of verbs—hence, *all* nouns are in the *nominative* case! "John saw John," "John hurt himself."

But, if they tell us, as does Mr. Murray, that the subject is not the *noun*, but the thing denoted by the noun, then, indeed, all the words, in the same sentence, denoting the same thing, are subjects of verbs. For instance—*John hurt himself*.

Here *John*, and *himself*, mean the same person. And, if the word, *John*, is put into the *nominative* because the real person is the subject, what be-

comes of the word *himself*? Does not *himself* denote the subject as clearly as does the word "*John*?" Does not *himself* allude to the same being to whom *John* refers? What, then, becomes of the doctrine that a word is in the *nominative* case because it refers to the person, or thing that is "*principally spoken of*!?"

MATTER and THOUGHT GRAMMAR—p. 54. Mr. Cardell remarks—

"Nouns stand in different relations to other words; as, Henry conquered *Richard*—Richard conquered *Henry*."

The compiler observes, under the same page, that,

"The *nominative* case denotes the *performer* of an action; and the *objective*, the object which receives its effects; as,

"They sent a letter to him."

"He sent an answer to them."

This epistolary correspondence is nearly equal to the *bull*, and *boat* illustration! "The *nominative* case denotes the *performer*;" as, a letter was sent by him to *them*!! A letter was sent to them by *him*!! They were written to by *him*!! He was written to by *them*!

Now, let it be observed, that the compiler's position is, that the one who writes to the other, is the *nominative*—and that the one who is written to, is the *objective*.

1. "A letter was sent to him by *them*!!

2. "A letter was written to them by *him*!!

Them, and *him*, consequently, are *objective* pronouns in the *nominative* case, and governed by the preposition *by*!!!

"*Whichever* did the action is the *nominative*, the other is the *objective*."—CARDELL.

1. *He* was written to by *them*!

2. *They* were written to by *him*!

As Mr. Cardell says, that the one who does not write, or that does not do the action, is in the *objective*, it follows that *he*, and *they* are in the *objective* case to the verbs "*was written*," and "*were written*." Hence the old rule should read thus,

The verb must agree with the *objective* case in number and person!

"*Whichever* did the action is the *nominative*, the other is the *objective*."

That is, if the *bull* carried off the *boat*, then, the *bull* is the *nominative*, and the *boat* is the *object*; as, "the *boat* was carried off by the *bull*!!"

But, if the *boat* carried off the *bull*, then, the *boat* is the *nominative*, and the *bull* is the *object*; as, The *bull* was carried off by the *boat*!

So much for Mr. Cardell's attempt to form a grammar for the English language, according to the laws of "*matter and thought*." But this *polyglot* grammarian will be able to mend the rigging of this boat, launch it *de novo*, and shoot away by his compass of "*matter and thought*!" We admit that we pay very little respect to Mr. Cardell's

matter and *thought* grammar. But it may not be proper, in this place, to give our reason for this want of respect. To proceed—

"The objective case expresses the *object* of an action or of a relation; as, Saul persecuted the Christians in every synagogue."

The word, *Saul*, is in the nominative case to the verb, *persecuted*; the word, *Christians*, is in the objective case, governed by *persecuted*; the word *synagogue*, is in the *objective* case, governed by *in*.

Let us now ascertain whether this manner of *casing* comports with the *definition* of the cases.

The *objective* case, according to the definition, is that into which the words are put, that are the *names of things* acted upon. If so, the word, *Christians*, is doubtless in the objective, as the example now stands.

Invert the order of these words, and view this matter—"The *Christians* were persecuted by Saul in every Synagogue."

As the sentence first stands, the word, *Christians*, is truly in the *objective case*. But, as it here stands, we are told that the same word is not in the *objective*, but in the *nominative case*! Now, does it appear from the *definition* of the *objective case*, that a mere change in the collocation of words, is to wrest the same *noun* from the *objective*, and put it into the *nominative case*? What says the definition? It asserts as decidedly as words can declare that the name of the *thing* acted upon, is in the objective case. But we ask whether any one can pretend, when the preceding example reads thus:

The *Christians* were persecuted by Saul—"

That the word, *Christians*, is not the *name* of the persons acted upon, equally as much as when the example stands in the following order:

"Saul persecuted the Christians."

Does the new collocation of the words so entirely change the fact affirmed? If not, the word, *Christians*, is in the objective case just as much when the example reads thus:

"The *Christians* were persecuted by Saul—" as it is when the assertion is made with the words in this order:

"Saul persecuted the *Christians*."

But we are told that this point is made logical by calling, *was persecuted*, a *passive verb*; therefore let us set aside the error for a moment, and consider the grounds of its justification. The verb, *persecuted*, is the name of an action by which persons harass each other. The word, *passive*, alludes to the state of whatever is acted upon. Now, then, we ask whether the *action*, performed by Saul, in this scene, was *passive*, or whether the *Christians* were *passive*? Was the *action* of Saul, affected; or were the *Christians* affected? How would the *Christians* themselves answer this question? Would they say they suffered nothing in this scene,—that Saul's action did not terminate

upon them, but upon *itself*? If so, the *name* of his *action*, must be *passive*, instead of the word, *Christians*, the name of the persons really acted upon!!

If the sentence stands thus:

"The Christians were *persecuted* by Saul."

The verb, *persecuted*, is a *passive verb*, because it is acted upon!

But, if it stands in this manner:

"Saul *persecuted* the Christians."

Then, the *Christians* themselves are acted upon, and, consequently, the word, *Christians*, is put into the *objective case*! Strange reasoning this!

We can perceive no difference between *persecuted*, and an *active verb*. An *active verb*, says the old theory, "expresses an action that passes" from the *actor*, and terminates upon some *object*! Now, the word, *persecuted*, does express an action which did terminate upon the *Christians*.

And we are told that the verb, *persecuted*, in the following arrangement, is in fact an *active verb*: "Saul *persecuted* the Christians." But does this verb signify any less *passion* or *suffering* in this collocation than in the following?:

"The Christians were *persecuted* by Saul."

The truth is, that according to the definition of a *passive verb*, *persecuted* is a *passive verb* in one order as much as in the other, since it does express in both, what constitutes a *passive verb*—and according to the character of an *active verb*, *persecuted* is an *active verb* in both constructions!!

Having taken a cursory view of the ground upon which the word, *Christians*, is wrested from the objective case, we will now proceed to consider the manner in which the noun, *Saul*, is parsed with the words in the following order:

"The Christians were persecuted by *Saul*."

Here, it is manifest, that *Saul himself* was the *actor*; and the question now is in what *case* is the noun, *Saul*?

By the old system this name is parsed thus:

Saul is a proper *noun*, third person, singular number, in the *objective case*, governed by the preposition, *by*.

But the word, *Saul*, is not the name of the person acted upon; it is the name of the *actor*; therefore it cannot be in the objective case.

It is pretended, however, that there are *objects of relation*; hence it is our duty to see whether the noun, *Saul*, can be put into the *objective case* upon this principle.

The definition first asserts that the *objective case* is the name of the *object* of an *action*, and then puts in the clause "of a *relation*."

James sits by *John*.

For one moment, let us say, that because the real person called *James*, sits near the person denominated *John*, the noun *James*, should be parsed in the *objective case*. Now, how, on this principle, can we avoid finding *John* in the *objective*

case likewise? Is not *John* as near to *James*, as *James* is to *John*? Must not, consequently both *John* and *James* be equally the *objects* of this *objective relation*!!?

Before the noun, *John*, can be put into the *nominative*, and the word, *James*, into the *objective* case, let it appear that *James* is nearer to *John*, than *John* is to *James*!!

"Let us," says Mr. Murray, "have a *comprehensive objective* case; one that will include all the *objects of action* as well as those of *relation*."

His *objective* case not only includes both these; but unfortunately, it extends to the *nominative* and *possessive* case also. If the relation of words, or of things, is a foundation for an *objective* case, all words which have a *relation*, are in the *objective* case; hence *conjunctions*, *adverbs*, *verbs*, *adjectives*, and even *prepositions* themselves must be in the *objective* case, or they have no relation with other words!! But if these parts of speech have no relation with other words, on what, we ask, are the rules founded, that *adverbs* qualify *verbs*; that *adjectives* qualify *nouns*; that *articles* limit *nouns*; that *prepositions* govern *nouns*, &c.? Will it be said that all these parts of speech are in the *objective* case? This must be done, or the *objective* case, founded upon *relation*, must be set aside!

But what is the particular use of the *objective* case? The question is answered by the theory of which this case itself is a fair sample. One of the grounds upon which the *objective* case is considered advantageous, is *convenience* in grammatical solution; another is the importance that it can be said, we have no nouns that cannot be *cased*—but the last, and that most particularly depended upon, is its use by way of *distinction* between the *actor*, and the *object* of the action.

But, is it true that the *name* of the *object* is always in the *objective*? or, rather, is it not true that the *name* of the *actor* is as often in the *objective* as in the *nominative*; and is it not true, that the *name* of the *object* is as often in the *nominative* as in the *objective*?

EXAMPLE.

"The *Christians* were persecuted by *Saul*."

Will it be said that in this sentence, the *name* of the *object* has the *OBJECTIVE case*? and must it not be admitted that *Saul*, the *name* of the *actor*, is parsed in the *objective* case?

But the absurdity does not end here: for, in many sentences, the *name* of the *thing* which neither acts, nor is acted upon, is put into the *objective* case. "The *Christians* were persecuted by *Saul* in every *synagogue*."

It is said that the *OBJECTIVE case* is the *name* of the *object*: but the word, *Saul*, is the *name* of the *actor*; yet it is in the *OBJECTIVE*; hence contradiction. The word, *Christians*, which is the *name* of the *persons* acted upon, is in the *nominative*

case instead of the *objective*; hence absurdity. But the noun, *synagogue*, is *neither* the *name* of the *actor*, nor the *name* of an *object*; and yet this noun is said to be in the *OBJECTIVE case*;—and here, too, is absurdity!

Can the old system, inform the learner, that the *name* of the *actor* is in the *nominative* case, or that the *name* of the *object* is in the *objective*, when in truth the *name* of the *actor* is as often in the *objective* as in the *nominative*, and the *name* of the *object* as often in the *nominative* as in the *objective*!! And what is still more perplexing, is, that the *name* of what neither acts, nor is acted upon, is parsed, in two-thirds of the instances, in the *objective* case!!

DOCTOR Bullions defines the *objective* case as follows,

"The *objective* case denotes the *object* of some action or relation; as, *James* assists *Thomas*; they live in *Albany*."

"*Thomas*," and "*Albany*" are in the *objective* case.

What is an *object* of an action?

We understand that an *object* of an action, is the thing on which an action terminates; as,

1. *Thomas* was assisted by *James*. (*Thomas*.)
2. "*Apples* were eaten by me." (*Apples*.)
3. The *eye* is affected by the light." (*Eye*.)

Yet, astonishing as it must appear, the nouns, *Thomas*, *apples*, and *eye*, are in the *nominative* case!!!

"They live in *Albany*."

As the word *Albany*, is employed by Mr. Bullions to illustrate the part of his definition of the *objective* case, which is founded upon *relation*, it may be well to inquire what is an *object of relation*."

"The *objective* case denotes the *object* of some action or relation."

That is, the *objective* case denotes an *object* of some action; or it denotes an *object* of some *relation*.

"An *object of relation*."

What does this language mean?

We are honest—we do not intend to quibble; we declare that we can *not* comprehend this language.

Why has not Mr. Bullions explained what he means by "*an object of some relation*?" The only way in which we can understand this language, is, that where different things bear a relation to one another, they are *objects of relation*. No other meaning can we give to this phraseology:

"The *object* of a relation."

But of all the *names* of the *objects* of relation, which one is to be in the *objective* case?

"*They* live in *Albany*."

They bear a relation to *Albany*—and *Albany* bears a relation to them! Which, then, is the *object* of this local relation? Both are *objects* of this

relation! Why, then, is not "*they*" as much in the objective case as "*Albany*!?

"John is with his uncle."

These two persons are together—hence they are both the objects of this common relation. Yet, while "*uncle*" is parsed in the objective case upon the ground of the relation which the uncle himself bears to John, "*John*" is parsed, not in the objective case at all, but in the nominative!!! It is so—question it who may.

"John is with his *uncle*."

How much nearer is the uncle to John than John is to the uncle!? We fancy that we hear Mr. Bullions himself say, "they are *equally* near."

Yet John is not the object of the relation which he bears to the uncle! How, then, can the uncle be the object of the relation which he bears to John!?

In an English Grammar by PARDON DAVIS, we find the following under page 37—

"PREPOSITION."

Any word showing the *relative* position of two persons or things, is a preposition; as, He is *near* Philadelphia. The book is *on* the table.—PARDON DAVIS.

Here it is openly said that all the things bear a relation—and it is most clearly proved to be so by the very examples which are employed to illustrate the doctrine.

1. "*He* is near Philadelphia."

2. "*John* is near Philadelphia."

Can it be said that *Philadelphia* is in the objective case on the ground of the relation which this city bears to John? It must be, said, then, that *John* is in the objective case, on the ground of the relation which he bears to this city!

Goold Brown says,—

The *objective* case is that *form*, or *state*, of a noun or pronoun which denotes the object of a verb, participle, or preposition; as, I know the *boy*.—GOOLD BROWN.

"I know the *boy*."

Here *boy* is in the objective case.

The *boy* is known by me.

Here *boy* is in the *nominative* case!! But, has the word, *boy*, changed its form? It is *boy* in the *objective*; and it is *boy* in the *nominative*!!

But it may be said that the word, *boy*, has changed its *state*!!

1. "I know the *boy*."

2. "The *boy* is known by me."

In both instances this noun denotes the person who is known. How, then, has it changed its state?

But let us inquire what is the meaning of the language—

"The *object* of a *verb*, *participle* or *preposition*."

Has Mr. Brown told us what the object of a verb is!? Has he told us what the object of a preposition is!? Has he told us what the object of a participle is!? Not a word is said upon these points in his whole book! Let us, then, see if we can devise what an *object* of a *verb* is:

The object of a verb is the word which the *meaning* of the verb suggests to the mind as a proper word to be used with the verb. For instance—the verb, *drinks*, suggests the use of the words, *water*, *milk*, *tea*, *coffee*, *cider*, *wine*, &c.

"Henry drinks *tea* out of a cup."

As we do not drink *cups*, the word which *drinks* suggests, is *tea*. The word, *tea*, then, may be considered the object of *drinks*.

DRINKS.

But the meaning of *drinks* not only suggests a word denoting something which we drink—as *water*, *wine*, but it suggests a word denoting some being that drinks,—as, *man*, *boy*, *girl*, *ox*, *horse*.

Let us, then, supply these two suggested words:

Henry drinks *wine*.

The meaning of *drinks* requires both words,—*Henry* and *wine*. Which, then, is the object!? Is not the thing after which D. reaches with his left hand, as much an object as that after which he reaches with his right hand!?

"John saw the bird fly."

The word, *saw*, reaches, after *John* as much as it does after *bird*. Which noun, then, is the object of *saw*!?

What is the object after which *fly* reaches? Does the meaning of the word, *fly*, suggest *John* or *bird*, or both? *Fly* reaches toward *bird*. *Bird*, then, is the object of *fly*.

"The bird was seen to fly by John."

Let us now see whether "*the*" has not an *objective* case!

1. *The*—*the* what? *The*, but *the* what? *The* surely reaches after some sign, some *objective* word. "*The bird*." *Bird*, then, is the objective word of *the*! But *bird* is in the *nominative* case! *Bird* in the *nominative* case!? Why, *was* is constantly reaching after *bird*. *Was*—but was what? *What* was? *Bird* was. "*Bird*," then, is the objective word of *was*!

2. *Seen* also reaches for some word to sustain itself. *Was seen*.—What was *seen*? *Bird* was *seen*. "*Bird*," then, is an object of *seen*.

But *seen* is not perfectly satisfied yet. *Seen* still reaches for some word which denotes the being who saw. The bird was *seen*—hence some being must have *seen* it. *Seen*, then, makes sense with *bird*, and *John*, after which words it constantly reaches!

3. *To*—*to* what? This preposition, like every other *branch* word, reaches after some *super*, some *basis* word to sustain it in the connection in which

it stands in this verbal frame-work. *To what?* is constantly addressed to the mind. The answer to this standing interrogation, is, *fly*. *To fly*. The verb *fly*, then, is in the objective case after *to*!!

4. *By—by* what? *By John*. *John*, then, is the object of *by*.

Let us repeat Mr. Brown's definition of the objective case:

"The *objective case* is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the object of a verb, participle or preposition; as, I know the boy."

This definition is founded, not upon the object of *action*, and *relation*, but upon the object of a *reference* to, a pointing to, a reaching after. The words in a sentence, which can not stand alone, reach after some other words in the verbal frame-work to sustain them. The *arms* by which these words reach, are the significations, and the *branch* character of the words. And, as whatever is pursued, referred to, or reached after, becomes an *object*, the words to which the referring words relate, or after which the reaching words, reach, may be called the objects of the referring, of the reaching, words.

"I know the boy."

The word, *know*, refers directly to *I* and *boy*. I know *boy*.

Hence "*I*," and "*boy*," are the objects to which "*know*" points—and after which it actually reaches.

"*The*" refers, not to "*I*," but to "*boy*." *The I* does not give the idea—not the true sense. *The boy* expresses the true sense, and connection. The object of "*the*," then, is "*boy*."

The change, therefore, which *Goold Brown* has made in the basis of the objective case, is certainly a striking improvement upon *MURRAY*!!

"The objective case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the object of a verb, participle or preposition; as, I know the boy."

But will the boy ever know the *objective case*!!?

Mr. Brown remarks in his Preface, that,

He has not labored to *overthrow* the general system of grammar, received from time immemorial, but to *improve* upon it, in its present application to our tongue.—*GOOLD BROWN*.

That Mr. Brown has improved upon Mr. *Murray*'s absurdities there can be no doubt!

The objective case expresses the object of an action or of a relation.—*MURRAY*.

This definition places the nominative case in the objective—and the objective in the nominative. But it does not like that given by *Goold Brown*, place *verbs* in the objective case—nor does it like Mr. B.'s, give *articles*, *adjectives*, *conjunctions*, and *adverbs* the objective case!!!

MR. BRADFORD FRAZEE, says,

"Case means the *position* in the name of the sentence, with respect to other words." (Page 25.)

Under page 26, he says,

"The nominative case is the *NAMING case*!!"

Under page 27, he says,

"The *nominative case* does something—the *possessive case* owns something—the *objective case* has something done to it!!"

Let us illustrate these golden principles:

"The nominative case is the *naming case*."

"*He* is not *thou*."

"*He*" is in the nominative case—but is "*he*" a *name*!!? If the word, *he*, is a *name*, why is not this word a noun!?

"*Thou*" is in the *naming case*! But Mr. Frazee says that *thou* is not a noun, because it is not a *name*!!

If the *nominative case* is the *naming case*, why is not every *name* in the *nominative case*!!!?

"*He* purchased a book of *Johnson*."

1. "*He*," although not a *name*, is in the *naming case*!

2. But *book*, although a *name*, is not in the *naming case*, but in the *objective*!!!

And "*Johnson*," the *name* of the person of whom he made the purchase, is not in the *nominative*, but in the *objective case*!!!

1. "The nominative case does something;" as, The rock was smitten by *Moses*!!

2. "The possessive case owns something:" as, *Henry* owns *Bradford Frazee's Grammar*!!!

3. "The *objective case* has something done to it;" as,

The rock was smitten by *Moses*!!?

Yes, yes,—the objective case has something done to it; it has been *murdered*!!?

Let us examine the manner in which the nouns, and pronouns are disposed of in constructions like the following:

"I am the lad."

"It is *they*."

"He is *I*."

"He is not *I*."

"This pupil is not *John Foster*."

"*John Foster* is not the pupil whom I taught."

1. "I am the lad."

The pronoun, *I*, is in the nominative case to *am*. The noun, *lad*, is also in the nominative case to *am*! But how very *different* is that relation which the pronoun, *I*, bears to *am*, from that which the noun, *lad*, bears to this verb! Can we say—*The lad am*? Now, if the nominative case is *any thing*, and *lad* bears a *nominative case relation* to *am*, why is it that we cannot say—*The lad am*? Has *lad* no relation with *am*? Is it not meant that *lad* is in the nominative case with respect to *am*? If *lad* is not in the nominative case with respect to *am*, in respect to what *verb* is it in the nominative case!!? Is *lad* in the nominative case!!? Is *lad* in the nominative case without reference to any verb!!? Is this noun in the nominative case *independent of all verbs*!!? Are we told that this noun is in the nominative

case after *am*? But does the word, *after*, show the relation of *lad* to *am*—or does it merely point out on which *side of am* this noun stands? Why, the pronoun, *I*, may stand *after* the verb:

"*Am I* not free?"

"*I am the lad*?"

I, and *lad* are both parsed in the nominative case—and they are both parsed in the nominative in reference to this one verb, *am*! But how different are the relations which these two nominatives bear to this verb!!

It may not be amiss to cite the rule which the British grammarians apply in instances like the one before us—

The verb to *be* through all its variations has the same case after it which it has before it.—MURRAY.

The propriety of the rule is obvious, for both nouns express the same thing.—MURRAY.

Now, according to this doctrine, *I* and *myself*, as used in the following instance, are both in the same case:

I hurt myself.

The two pronouns, in this sentence, mean the same person; and if identity in thing, or person throws both nouns into the same case, the word, *myself*, is not in the *objective* case, as the British grammarians say, but in the nominative after the verb *hurt*!!

Again. ["*I am not*] (the *lad*) (whom you taught.)"

As *lad*, and *I* mean different persons, what is to become of the noun, *lad*? Is it in the nominative case after *am*, upon the ground that it denotes the same person denoted by *I*? Here it is seen, that, while the solution of *myself*, in the first example, distracts Mr. Murray's rule, the solution of *lad*, in the second, saps its very foundation—identity!

In what way will the words in italics be disposed of according to the old school grammars?

1. "*I am the lad.*"
2. "*I am not the lad.*"
3. "*It is they.*"
4. "*It is not I.*"
5. "*I am the lad whom you taught.*"

How, we ask, is *whom* to be parsed? We ask, because *I*, *lad*, and *whom* mean the same person! Is *whom* in the nominative case after *am*? If the doctrine of identity is sound, it must be parsed in this way! And if this doctrine is unsound, how are the nouns in italics, in the following sentences, to be parsed?

1. *I am not the lad.*
2. *It is not John.*
3. *This is not the boy for whom you search.*
4. *Truth is not falsehood.*
5. [*Falsehood is not truth*] (except in GRAMMAR!)

Finally, let us exhibit an instance, in which the three cases assemble in the same word:

Yours were punished! "*Hers* were acquitted."
Yours denotes the *subject* of the verb; it denotes

the *object* of the action also; and *all* our grammars give it as the *possessive* case of *you*. Yes, within the orthographical boundaries of one short word, we find this *triplicate* group of cases, floating upon liquid error, ebbing and flowing before the influence of habit and education!

Let no man say, that to introduce the NOUN, a *letter*, or *two* must be severed from the PRONOUN; thus: *your* children were punished.

These examples are *purely* good English, as they *now* stand: and our system of CASES should enable us to parse them without *collision* or *diminution*!

Thus, we have traced the cases through alternate succession of error, and mystery till they have convened in *one short* word! And here we leave the convention in the shape of a GRAMMATICAL JUBILEE, celebrating the day even in advance, of their dissolution, and final departure from the English tongue.

But has the "new system" a remedy? None at all!! The disease of the *old* is *constitutional*, and is past a cure. *Constitutional*?! Yes—the disease is constitutional, and consists in the very *want* of a CONSTITUTION!! The new system is presented, not as a *remedy* for the *old apparatus*, but as a *SUBSTITUTE* for it. The substitute is built upon a new *bottom*, constructed upon *new principles*, and composed of *new materials*. Yes—it has left the old structure groaning under the weight of incurable disease—it has left it to fall into one massive pile of monumental glory to the name of *Murray*—it has left it to tumble, and to crush those who have tinkered it into contortions, and themselves into authors!

RECAPITULATION.

"Johnson is with his brother."

Which is the *nearer*, the brother to Johnson, or Johnson to the brother!? As the word, *brother*, only, is parsed in the *objective*, it is to be presumed that the brother is much nearer to Johnson than Johnson is to him!!

It is said by Murray, and others, that the nominative case is the *subject* of the verb. A subject, says Johnson, "is that on which any mental, or material operation is performed." Hence the surgeon denominates the dead body which he dissects, his *subject*. Let us, then, say

"*Smith* dissected that body with great skill," and we shall see with what adroitness Mr. Murray turns the *subject* into an *object*, and the operator himself into a *subject*! "*Smith* dissected that body."

Here, says Murray, *Smith* is the *subject*, and the dead *body* the *object*! But is *Smith* operated upon by the dead body? Which, then, is the *subject*?

Again,—"*Johnson*, thou hast been punished with just severity."

Here the word, *Johnson*, is in the nominative case *independent of the verb*! How can this word be the *subject of the verb*, and yet be *independent of the verb*? How can A be the *subject of a king*, and yet be *independent of that king*? How can A, be connected with D, and yet have no *connection with D*? Further—*Johnson* is not only not the subject (except under the true definition of *subject*, which Mr. Murray clearly rejects) but he is, in truth, the *object*, of the action!

The word, *thou*, is parsed as a pronoun, second person, singular number, and in the *nominative* case. But who that can read English can not see that "*thou*" denotes the object of the action, denominated *punished*. Look at the instance again:

"*Johnson, thou* hast been punished with just severity."

Let the old school grammarians attach whatever character they please to *subjects*, and *objects*, it is clear, that both *Johnson*, and *thou* denote the *object* acted upon.

Having given the true meaning of the word, *subject*, it may be well enough to give that of the word, *object*,

The word, *object*, says Webster, "means that about which any *power*, or any *faculty* is employed."

Now, is there not *power*, and is there not some *faculty* employed in *punishing Johnson*? Is not *Johnson*, then, an *object*? But let us hear Dr. Webster further upon an object. In his fourth definition he says,

4. "In *Grammar*, that which is produced, influenced, acted on by something else; as,

1. "God created the *world*."
2. "Light affects the *eye*."
3. "Instruction directs the *mind*."

These are Mr. Webster's own examples which he has given in illustration of his fourth definition of an object. And it will be seen that he has been careful to collocate the words in each in a way which places the three nouns that denote the objects, in the *objective* case. But from the arrangement which we shall take the liberty to make of the words in his instances of illustration, that distinguished grammarian may learn that we may have objects in the *nominative* case as well as in the *objective*. We shall first repeat his instances in the order in which he has given them:

1. "God created the *world*."
2. "The light affects the *eye*."
3. "Instruction directs the *mind*."
1. The *world* was created by God!
2. The *eye* is affected by the light!
3. The *mind* is directed by instruction!

Thus we find Dr. Webster's objects, *world*, *eye*, and *mind*, all in the *nominative* case! Nor is this the only curiosity which this new arrangement has produced, for we find his actors, *God*, *light*,

and *instruction*, all snugly boxed up in the *objective* case!

Why do *God*, *light*, and *instruction*, become *objects*? Will it be replied that they become objects because, "some faculty of the mind is employed about them?" The mind which has introduced them into these sentences, must have thought of them, otherwise it could not have brought them into sentences. Why, then, are they not objects in the first set of sentences as well as in the second?

1. "God created the world."
2. "The light affects the eye."
3. "Instruction directs the mind."

Is not the faculty of thought employed about *God*, the *light*, and *instruction*, in the above sentences? If not, how could the mind of Dr. Webster bring them into these sentences? And, if this faculty is employed about them in the above instances, why are they not objects in the above as much as is in the following:

1. The world was created by *God*!
2. The eye is affected by the *light*!
3. The mind is directed by *instruction*!

Now, if these three *agents* are made *objects* upon the ground that some mental faculty is employed about them, in *one instance*, why not in two, and if in two, why not in *all*? Unless something plausible can be shown to the contrary, one is bound to concede the point. These three *agents*, then, become objects as much under Dr. Webster's arrangement as under ours; consequently, each is in the *nominative*, and each in the *objective* case, at the same time! *God* is the performer of the act of creating; hence in the *nominative*. *God* is the object about which the faculty of thought is employed, both by the author, and the reader, of the sentence; hence in the *objective*.

The new system proposes to reject the *relative* character of *things*, and the *dictionary* import of *words*, as having nothing to do with the formation of a system of grammar. The character of the thing is not infused into the *thing's name*! Was it otherwise, the word, *clergyman*, would be clothed with sacerdotal robes! If the *character* of the thing sprang from the thing into the *name* of the thing, the word *sugar*, would have become a *sweet* noun, and the word, *vinegar*, a *sour* substantive long ago! If the doctrine of the old system is true, the word, *arsenic*, would have slain more than the sword!! No, no, this *word* is not *ratsbane*, though it means that virulent poison which rats so much dread! What, are we told that this course is *ridiculous*? Ridiculous as you may think it, it is that which the old school grammarians have pursued in the formation of the old theory of English grammar! They say that real *action*, real *being*, or real *suffering* infuses into words the *verb* character. The new school grammarians say that the *verb* character is not derived

from the *thing* which the word may happen to denote; the *verb* character is that *innate cordictive* attribute, that *innate sentence-forming* power which is *connate* with the word itself. If *action*, *being*, or *suffering*, is necessary to the giving of the *verb* character, how is it that "*resembles*" is a *verb*? Why, too, if *action* infuses into the word the *verb* character, is not every word which signifies *action*, a *verb*!?

The old school grammarians say that quality gives the word denoting it, the *adjective* character. But the new say that the *innate capacity* of the word to be conjoined both to the *nominative*, and to the *objective* case, is the *adjective* character. If *quality* gives the *adjective* character, why do not all nouns which denote *qualities* turn into *adjectives*? Why, too, do not all *verbs* which denote *action* turn into *adjectives*? Who does not know that every *action* is a *quality*!?

The old school grammarians say that the *actor* gives the *nominative case* character.

The new school grammarians say that the noun has an *innate sentence-forming* power, a power which the noun has in itself: they say that this *sentence-forming* power is not *derived*—but that it is an attribute which the noun has, independent of the *relative character* of the thing signified. The old school grammarians say that the *nominative case* is known from the fact that the noun denotes the *actor*! The new school grammarians say that the *nominative case* is known, not by the thing which the noun signifies, but from the exertion of an *innate sentence-forming* power in bringing that innate *sentential* spirit which distinguishes the *verb*, and which lies, while untouched by the noun, coiled up in the *verb*, into a full *cordiction*, a full sentence character. The new reject the word, *nominative* as *unmeaning*, and employ the words, *cordictive* nouns. The phrase, *cordictive noun*, signifies that *foundation fixed* name which aids the *verb* to form, to create, the *cordiction* of the sentence; as, *Moses smote* the rock.

Here by the joint exertion of the noun, *Moses*, and the *verb*, *smote*, the *cordiction*, the affirmation, is created.

The old school grammarians say that the object denoted by the noun, gives the noun the *objective case* character. The new school reject the word, *objective*, as irrelevant, vague, and perplexing. They also reject the *entire doctrine* of objects, as leading to *confusion*, and *error*. Instead of instituting any distinction among nouns, upon the ground of their denoting *actors*, and *objects*, the new system founds the distinction upon the *innate sentence-forming* influence which some nouns exert in the production of the *sentence* character, and upon a *want*, a *destitution*; of this *innate sentence-forming* influence in others. Hence nouns are divided into *cordictive*, and *uncordictive*.

1. "*God created the world.*"

2. "*The world was created by God.*"

Why is *God* in the *nominative* in the first, but *objective* in the second? Is it because *God* is the agent? Surely not, for he is the agent in both.

The word, *God*, is *cordictive* in the first, because it aids the *verb*, *created*, to form the *cordiction*, the affirmation, of the sentence. The word, *God*, is *uncordictive* in the second, because it renders no aid in forming the *cordiction* of the sentence. The words, *the world was created*, is as much a sentence as are the words, *the world was created by God*.

We have undertaken to show that the theory of cases, which is founded upon *ACTORS*, *SUBJECTS*, and *OBJECTS*, is a *delusion*. We think that we have met with complete success in our attempt. But if we have not, we trust, and hope that the friends of this theory, will demonstrate to the world our failure. We hold ourselves bound to reply to any *candid*, *cogent*, attack which the old school grammarians may make upon what we have advanced against their doctrine. We hesitate not to declare that neither *man* nor *angel*, can support one item of the ground on which this theory of cases is constructed. If we are *wrong*, let us *know* it!

CHAPTER VI.

PRONOUN.

1. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word.—MURRAY.

2. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun.—BULLIONS.

3. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun.—GOULD BROWN.

4. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun, and generally to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word.—KIRKHAM.

5. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word.—BRADFORD FRAZEE.

6. A Pronoun is a word used instead of a noun.—PARDON DAVIS.

7. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun.—CALEB FARNUM.

8. A pronoun is a word which supplies the place of a noun.—JOHN FROST.

1. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word.—MURRAY.

"John saw *me who* am your friend."

The word, *who*, is not used instead of a noun—*who* is used instead of *me*! And, as *me* is not a noun, *who* can not be a *pronoun*!

The word, *me*, is not used to avoid the repetition of any word whatever—hence *me* is not a pronoun!!

2. “*I* am he *whom* John called.”

Is the word, *I*, used to avoid the repetition of another word!? “*I*” is used for my name—but, as my name has not been used at all, how can it be said that “*I*” is used to avoid its too frequent repetition!!?

Whom is used, not instead of a noun, but instead of the word, *he*—hence *whom* is not a pronoun.

3. “We told *thee* to come to *us*, *which* thou didst.”

“*We*” is not used to prevent the repetition of any word—hence, *we* is not a pronoun.

“*Thee*” is not used to prevent the repetition of another word—hence, *thee* is not a pronoun.

“*Us*” is not used to prevent the repetition of another word—hence, *us* is not a pronoun.

“*Which*” is used instead of a verb—hence, *which* is much more a *pro-verb* than *pronoun*!

We have shown that this definition does not embrace the pronouns. Let us now show that it does embrace nouns.

1. “This machine is ingenious; it is an *engine* powerful in operation, and useful in effect.”

The word, *engine*, is used to prevent the repetition of the word, *machine*. Hence this common noun is a *pronoun*!

2. A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun.—BULLIONS.

1. “I saw him *whom* John called.”

For what noun does *whom* stand!? Why, *whom* is used for the pronoun *him*!!

2. “And to furnish a test whether he is sufficiently prepared for recitation, *which* he can not be, unless he can furnish a correct and prompt answer to the questions proposed.” (*Bullion's English Grammar*, p. 7.)

Is “*which*” used instead of a noun!? Is not *which* used for “*he is sufficiently prepared*?”

Which, then, is here a *pro-clause*!

“It snows. I know *it*.”

Does not the last “*it*” represent the sentence—“*It snows*.”

Here, then, the word, *it*, is a *pro-sentence*!!

“He returned to the city, *which* was known to me and others.”

Which here stands for *returned*; and, as *returned* is a verb, *which*, is a *pro-verb*!

Goold Brown, Bullions, Farnum, John Frost, Comly, Davis, John S. Hart, and others, have rejected the last part of Murray's definition of a pronoun:

“To avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word,”

This rejection lets all nouns which are used in the place of other nouns for any purpose whatever, into the family of pronouns:

A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun; as, Thomas has learned *his* lesson; *he* is a good scholar.—FARNUM.

Mr. Farnum marks *his*, and *he*, as pronouns. Why is not the common noun, *scholar*, a pronoun? Is not the word, *scholar*, used instead of the word, *Thomas*!?

Thomas has learned his lesson; he is a good *Thomas*.

We shall be gravely told that this is not the sense which is intended to be expressed. We admit this. Still we contend that *scholar* is used for *Thomas*. “*Scholar*” is used instead of *Thomas*, to express a particular sense. And it must be borne in mind that these improvers of MURRAY, say nothing about the purpose for which the word is used instead of another. Murray is well guarded in this particular: he says that the word must be used “to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word,”

We admit that *scholar* is not used instead of *Thomas* to avoid the repetition of *Thomas*. But it is enough for us that *scholar* is used instead of *Thomas* for any purpose whatever. Now, *scholar* is used instead of *Thomas* to express an idea which the word *Thomas* could not express. By Mr. Murray, *scholar* is not a pronoun—but by his *menders* “*scholar*” is a pronoun!

A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word. MURRAY in rags.

“A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun.”

This is Murray mended up by Goold Brown, Peter Bullions, John Frost, Caleb Farnum, Pardon Davis, John S. Hart, and others, who believe that “a stitch in time saves nine.”

Mr. WEBSTER has attempted to improve the definition given by MURRAY. But we are not favorably impressed with Mr. Webster's change. This author objects, not only to the usual definition of a pronoun, but to the word, *pronoun*. He recommends the use of “*substitute*.” The use of this name would afford little, or no relief. Besides, the words which are called pronouns, are not *substitutes*. They are *auxiliary* to, and not *substitutes for*, other words. In short, the true character of these words is not understood at all by the old school grammarians. These words are never used *instead* of a noun—nor are they ever used to avoid the repetition of another word. We can not make a display of the true character, and great beauty of these words here. They who wish to understand them are referred to Book II. p. 113.

CLASSIFICATION OF PRONOUNS.

1. The utility of arrangement, of judicious method, in presenting any art, or science, will be conceded by all. But, the propriety of perplexing the juvenile mind, with a copious technicality, or even oppressing the intellect with *too* many philosophic distinctions, is unsupported in theory at least; and we believe, without affirmative decision in practice. We would not, however, be understood as discarding nice distinctions; for, it is from these only that the mind acquires *accuracy* in judgment, and *acuteness* in perception. We object to the making of distinctions upon mere *possibilities*. The *possibility* of a *division* line, is no *reason* for drawing it. The *reason* for drawing the line, must be sought in the *advantages* derived from it. Distinctions should be made, if at all, purely to promote the good of the pupil, and the *convenience* of the teacher. Let us ask, whether the *numerous* divisions of pronouns, into *PERSONAL*, *RELATIVE*, *INTERROGATIVE*, *DEMONSTRATIVE*, *ADJECTIVE*, &c., can be conducive to the end proposed in classification. *What possible good* can result from teaching a pupil to say *he* is a *personal* pronoun,—*especially* in instances in which *he* represents the name of a dumb beast; as, the lads saw the horse when *he* eat the grass.

But some of our late *COMMENTATORS*, wise in grammar, have attempted to remove this absurdity, by placing this distinction upon the fact that these pronouns are styled *personal*, because they carry the sign, the indication, with them, of their own person. Now, even if this reasoning was just, which, indeed, is so *simple* as to be *foolish*, so long as no utility results from the division, the term should be given up, and the distinction repealed.

If this distinction which has already obtained, is continued, for no better reason than that of compelling the pupil to recollect *in advance*, that these pronouns distinguish their persons, why may we not extend the principle, and say that because these words carry their *sexual*, and *numeral* properties, *they* shall be called *sexual*, *numeral*, *personal* pronouns!!

2. But, we have *relative* pronouns. Yes, notwithstanding *all* pronouns *relate* to the nouns which they represent, yet this distinctive appellation is confined to a few. *Which*, *who*, &c., are styled *relative* pronouns. But, as all the *personal* pronouns *relate*, they too are entitled to this *nice* distinction. For example: James saw Jane when *he* passed *her*.

Does not *he* relate to *James*, and *her* to *Jane*?

Finally, where is the advantage resulting from this very *learned partition*? We answer, that the principal good is *confusion*, and *absurdity*!! What! seize the *generic* character as ground for a specific classification! Why more than insinuate that *all* pronouns are not *relatives* by ascribing

the character of *relative* to three, or four. An innocent deception, indeed! It is for no better reason than to fetter the pupil by perplexing the machinery of grammar.

But *my*, and *our*, are called *possessive adjective* pronouns! Yet these pronouns always allude to *persons*!

Who and *whom* are always applied to persons—yet these words are thrown out of the class of *personal* pronouns! The word, *he*, however, which as often denotes a *dog*, an *ox*, &c., as a person, is *uniformly* styled a *personal* pronoun!!

3. We have also the sublime distinction of *interrogative* pronouns. Could one be allowed the rule of *common sense*, in this case, he would conclude that this class of pronouns, is those that ask questions. And, indeed, this use of them, is the reason *assigned* for the distinction. But we are bold in declaring that no pronoun is even *tributary* to interrogation. Interrogation is effected, not by any *pronoun*, but by the *position* of the verb in relation to the noun or pronouns. For example: *Is he well*, presents a question. But, *he is well*, changes the question into a declaration.

Again—*whom* do you see?

In this instance the *interrogative* character is derived, not from *whom*, but from the position of *do*. And the example is as *clearly interrogative* without *whom* as it is with it; as, *do you see*?

Further: *what will* you send me to-morrow?

The question is raised, not by *what*, but by *will*; as, *will you* send to-morrow?

Finally, if pronouns ask questions, the verb does not. For, it would confuse to have two questions in the same *mono*, in the same breath. But, if the verb does not ask, why move it from its declaratory position? The pronoun denotes the thing concerning which the question is put; as, *whom* did you see? *did you see whom*?

Are we asked why *whom* comes before the verb? We answer, that it comes *before* the verb, not because *it* asks the question which is put; but because it is in accordance with the genius of the language so far as it respects *whom*. Even in *declaratory* sentences, *whom* must fall before the verb; as *he* is the lad *whom* I saw.

What did you read?

What alludes to *identity*. And so far as the *interrogative* character of the sentence might be affected by a change in the position of *what*, *what* might receive a *post* position; as, *did you read what*?

We are told that *interrogative* pronouns are those which are used in asking. The assertion is wrong. This implies that there are certain pronouns which are *mere* means of asking, or interrogating. The most that can be said of pronouns in connection with the subject of interrogation, is that *they*, as well as nouns, may be used when questions are asked. But as one pronoun may be used, so far as the *interrogative* character

is concerned, as well as another, either *all*, or *no* pronouns should be styled interrogative. Is *he* well? *Whom* or *what* did you see?

But admitting our position to be fallacious; granting the existence of a class of pronouns, which actually gives the interrogative cast; yet as no advantage can be derived from the division, let this distinction be repealed.

Why should these *pin-pointed* non-essentials which commenced in ancient *fancy*, logical *spleen*, and literary *reveries*, be forced into the heart of grammatical science, to the burden of the teacher, to the perplexity of the learner, and to the disgrace of *modern* intellection?

"COMPOUND RELATIVE PRONOUNS."

"Henry purchased *what* he wanted."

That, and *which* can be substituted for *what*—hence *what* is a *compound* pronoun!! We deny, however, that *which*, and *that* can be substituted for *what*. Is the parsing of *that*, and *which*, a solution of *what*!!!

"Henry got *what* he wanted."

Henry got *that which* he wanted.

In what way is *what* parsed? Why, *what* is not parsed at all—it is rejected, banished from the sentence, and excluded from the process of solution! *That*, and *which*, are parsed—but poor *what*, is exiled for the crime of a compound character!! If the parsing of *that*, and *which* is the parsing of *what*, the parsing of a word is entirely different from our notions of parsing! D. agrees to board M. for six months. And, to comply with his engagement, he kicks M. out of his house, and takes in S. and T. whom he says, he has substituted for M.!!!! This is certainly according to *grammar*, if not to law and logic!!

No, no—we want you to *parse* the word, *what*, not to throw it out of the sentence in which it is grammatically used!! Can you do it? You can not.

The word, *what*, is never a *pronoun*. It is generally an adjective, not a pronoun. This is demonstrated by rendering the sentences in which *what* occurs, *plenary*.

"Henry purchased *what* he wanted."

That is, Henry purchased *what thing* it was *which* he wanted.

2. "But they understood not *what* he spake unto them."

Here *that*, and *which* are parsed, and *what* thrown out!

But the *plenary* state of this sentence is a sure preventive against this course: *that*, and *which* cannot be substituted for *what*.

But they understood not what *things* they were *which* he spake unto them.—*John* x. 6.

Here *what* must be parsed as an *adjective*. Why? because it is an adjective. Here the translator has rendered the sentence *plenary*, which

shows the true character of "*what*" in every instance except in those in which it is used in the sense of *partly*, where it is an adverb; as, "*what* with the fire, and *what* with the cloak, we keep ourselves warm."

That is, *partly* with the fire, and *partly* with the cloak, we keep ourselves warm.

We shall say nothing of *compound personal* pronouns!!

For Pronouns see Book II., page 113.

CHAPTER VII.

NUMBER, PERSON, AND GENDER.

Number is the consideration of an object; as, one or more.—MURRAY.

Numbers are modifications that distinguish unity from plurality.—GOULD BROWN.

Mr. Murray says that *number* is a consideration of an object. Now, if *number* is a consideration of an object, it follows that a *consideration of an object is number*! The same author says that there are two numbers; *singular*, and *plural*. As *number* is a *consideration of an object*, the singular number is *one consideration of an object*; as, *book*. And the plural number is *two, or more, considerations*; as, *book, book, book*!!

Number, says Gould Brown, are *modifications* which distinguish *unity* from *plurality*; as, *sheep, deer, swine, which, that, mine yours, hers*!!

Have the nouns, and pronouns, here presented, any *modifications* which distinguish unity from plurality? But will it be said that these words have no *number*? "*A sheep* came to us."

Sheep is a noun in the singular number; but has it any form by which it distinguishes unity from plurality!?

"The six *sheep* came to us."

Here *sheep* is plural number, and that too without any *new modification*!!

The fact that a definition includes a majority of the kind, or race, is no proof of its soundness. A definition to be good, must embrace all which is intended, without any thing more. What a suitable shoe is to a foot, a definition is to a thing, or class of things. If the shoe is too large it is not a *fit*; if it is too small it is not a *fit*. So with a definition—if it does not include all the kind, it is not a proper definition; and, if it includes too many, it is not a proper definition. Mr. G. B.'s shoe seems to be rather *small* for the foot for which it has been made—there are several toes which cannot be got into it!! As the work of an apprentice, the fit would be decent; as that of a journeyman, it would speak no praise, but as the production of the *master workman himself*, it is contemptible! But, however bad the fit, no hopes of improvement, or change, can be entertained—the

shoe is taken from the last, the apron dislodged, and the *cobbler* has risen from his bench with the valedictory—"his finished labors!"

The number belongs not to the noun, but to the things denoted by the noun. The expression of the number is made by the noun. In the *new system*, this expression is denominated *numeration*. (*Numeros*, number, and *dictio*, speech, expression. Book II. p. 130.)

II. PERSON.

As the word, *person*, is generally applied to a human being, it seems improper to employ it as the British grammarians use it in their system of grammar. "A mad dog followed a lady some distance last evening."

Here the *lady*, *dog*, *distance*, and *evening*, are all persons together! And they are all of the same family, for each is *third person*!! What do grammarians mean by *person*? We know what common people mean by *person*—but what do grammarians mean by it?

Mr. Murray has objected to the question—and though he has been a long time upon the stand, nothing has ever been drawn from him respecting this point! Mr. Gould Brown, however, in drawing his "*First Lines of English Grammar*," has run out one of his lines to this very point! "*persons in grammar*," says he, "*are modifications that distinguish the speaker, the hearer, and the person, or thing merely spoken of.*"

(*Jane*), [we say that] (the teacher punished *Jane*) (last evening.)

Now, *Jane*, in the first mono, is second person, but has this noun any form indicating that it denotes the hearer? *Jane*, in the third mono, is of the third person—but has this noun any form which shows that this female is here spoken of! Both nouns have the same form.

Teacher is third person—but has this noun any modification indicating that the teacher is merely spoken of—just touched! But this definition of person, is to be sustained by *we*! We has no modification, no form, which denotes that it means the *speakers*! We surely has a form; so has every other word—no word can be found which has not some modification! But, it is not the form of *we*, but the signification, the very meaning of *we*, which expresses the fact that the persons alluded to, are the *speakers*! We seems to us to be the plural form of *I*, as *I* is the singular form of *we*! Do we change from *I* to *we* to express the first person, or do we do it to denote plurality?

The old school grammarians say that there are three persons; namely, *first*, *second* and *third*. The first person, say they, denotes the *speaker*. The *second*, the person spoken to, and the *third*, the person spoken of.

Now, let us see in what way these persons will

appear when called into actual service. A man may be a brave soldier if we judge of his courage merely from his appearance as derived from his *martial* equipage. So too, principles may appear quite philosophic when judged of from the verbal garb only, in which they are presented. But, as the field of battle is the only place for testing a man's *martial* prowess, so examples are the only one for ascertaining a principle's philosophic application.

1. "I am quite sick this evening."
2. "Thou art quite a stranger."
3. "They have just called on us."

I is a pronoun in the *nominative* case—to *am*. Why, because *I* is the subject of *am*! And what is the subject of a verb defined to be! "The subject is the thing principally spoken of!" It follows, then, if *I* is the subject of the verb, that it is of the *third person*!!!

1. "The subject is the thing spoken of!"
2. "The *third person* is the thing spoken of!"

When a man says—"I am quite sick," does he not make this affirmation respecting *himself*—does he not speak of *himself*? "I am quite sick this evening."

Evening is a noun, *third person*, singular number, and in the objective case after *on* understood.

This we say is the manner in which "*evening*" is parsed. But, that the parsing of this word may comport with the rules laid down by the old school grammarians, it should be parsed in the *nominative* case. These philosophers tell us that "*evening*" is of the *third person*—they also inform us that the *third person* is the thing spoken of—they also inform us that the thing spoken of is the *subject*—and they also say that the *subject* is the *nominative* case!! Which of the two words denotes what is principally spoken of! is it *I*, or is it *evening*? if it is *I*, why is not this pronoun of the *third person*? If *I* does not denote what is spoken of, *I* is not the *subject*—and, if not the subject, why, *why*, *how*, *how*, is it in the *nominative* case!? But, if it is not "*evening*," why, *how*, is "*evening*" *third person*? and, as "*evening*" is *third person*, (the subject) *how* is it in the objective, since the name of the *third person* is in the *nominative* case!!

2. *Thou* art made into a *stranger* "by long absence."

Thou denotes the person spoken to, and on this account this pronoun is *second person*.

"*Stranger*" is of the *third person*! But do not *stranger*, and *thou* mean the same being, the same individual? If, then, *thou*, is the *second person*, because it denotes the person spoken to, by parity of reasoning is not *stranger* the *second*, also!?

In what case is *thou*? In the *nominative*. But is not *stranger* more particularly the *subject* than *thou*? "Why so?" Because *stranger* is of the

third person—the *third* person is spoken of—the *subject* is spoken of, not to; and the *subject* is the nominative case!! “How! what! the *subject* is the thing spoken of, not to, and the *subject* is the *nominative* case. How, then, can *thou* be in the nominative case!?” ‘This is something which *we* cannot solve! There is a man, however, who has turned, not grammar *maker*, but grammar *mender*—*him*, we will take the liberty of introducing to you again. We ought, perhaps, to beg the pardon of Goold Brown for omitting hitherto to say that he is a *firm orthodox* old school grammarian. But while he gives his sanction to the *principles*, and the *materials* of the old system, he thinks that the *arrangement* of the materials, is somewhat *faulty*. That is, he believes that the British scholars have constructed the calf upon the true principles of *animal life*; and from genuine *animal matter*, but from some defect in the arrangement of the creature’s *legs* he has been a sort of cripple from his birth!

We extract from his *First Lines* :

“RULE II.—THE NOMINATIVE.”

“A noun, or pronoun which is the *subject* of a verb, must be in the nominative case: as, *I* know, *thou* sayest it: says thy *life* the same.”

Here we have the authority of a *fixed formal rule*, making the *subject*, the thing spoken of, the *nominative* case! And strange to tell, in this very rule, *I* and *thou*, which the author parses one of the first, and the other of the *second* person, we find introduced as an illustration of a *subject*, which all have defined to be the thing spoken of!!!!

“There are three persons,” says G. B.; “the *first*, the *second*, and the *third*.”

1. “The first person is that which denotes the *speaker*; as, *I*, *Paul*, have written it.”

2. “The second person is that which denotes the *hearer*; as, *Robert*, who did this?”

3. “The *third* person is that which denotes the person, or thing that is *merely* spoken of? as, *James* loves his *book*.” “GOOLD BROWN’S *First Lines*.”

Now, the above *lines* seem so completely to run into each other that it is not an easy task to distinguish them.

Line First.—The *first* person is that which denotes the *speaker*; as, *I*, *Paul*, have written it.

Mr. Murray says—The first person is the *speaker*. But our compiler, G. B., says that the first person is *not* the *speaker*!! But we must defer making any reflections upon the verbal inaccuracies of our author. It is not our intention to prove that he is *actually crazy*, but we think, without intending to *reciprocate* the charge of *insanity*, however, that we shall not find it difficult, though disagreeable, to satisfy our readers, in general, that the use of the *straight jacket* might

exert a very salutary influence upon his *future lines*!

The first person denotes the *speaker*; as, *I*, *Paul*, have written it.

Now, the compiler commences this *line* in the following definition—

“Persons, in grammar, are *modifications* that distinguish the *speaker*, the *hearer*, and the person or thing merely spoken of.” But where is the *modification* which enables the noun, *Paul*, to distinguish the *speaker*!? This *distinguishing* modification of the noun, happens to be the pronoun, *I*!! That our author should give the word, *Paul*, in illustration of the *first* person, can be passed off without any great prejudice against his *right reason*. The *proximity* of the words, *I* and *Paul*, so much confused his local vision, that his *mental* was led off in a wrong direction; and he happened to run his *line*, in this case, somewhat *crooked*!

“*I am Paul*.”

Here our author says that *Paul* is of the third person!! And we presume that this noun has a *form* in this construction which indicates that *Paul* himself is here *merely* spoken of! The word, however, has the same appearance in this case which it has in the first! But, then, what signifies the frame-work appearance of this, or any other word!?—It is not the external form of which our author means to speak—he alludes to the *modification* of the word!! But, what *modification*? O, one of his own *creation*, of course! What better proof than this that our author is a fit subject for the kind of garment we have mentioned? The same word having but one form, without the least change whatever, is represented as having three distinct *significant* forms, and that one of these forms is employed to distinguish the *speaker*, another the *hearer*, and the third the thing *merely* spoken of.

1st.

1. *I*, *Paul*, have written it. (First form—*Paul*.)

2d.

2. *Paul*, thou art beside thyself—much learning has made thee mad. (Second form—*Paul*.)

3d.

3. “*I am Paul*.” (Third form—*Paul*.)

Festus attempted to account for madness which he ascribed to *Paul*.—But we attempt a very different task.—We attempt to account for our author’s giving this great man’s name three *separate, distinct, significant, differential, personal* forms in the above instances—and we ascribe it to that kind of *madness* which Festus attempted in vain to fix upon him whose name has appeared so *multiform* in our author’s quixotic vision, while at the same time in that of every other person, this word constantly appears perfectly *moniform*!

3. The third person is that which denotes the

person, or thing *merely* spoken of; as, *James* loves his *book*.—GOULD BROWN.

We can see clearly that *book* falls under this definition. The book is "*merely spoken of*." But how it is that *James* who is *principally, mainly, and particularly* spoken of, is to be brought within the scope of this definition, is not so clear.

James is more than "*merely spoken of*." He is made the *central* point of thought. Where is our author's definition which is to give the third person to a noun, or pronoun that is in the nominative case!? Every noun, and every pronoun in the nominative case is deprived of the *third* person! This is the work of Gould Brown, but it is not that of *right reason*! Our author presumed that by the use of *merely* he could exclude *I*, and *we*, from the *third* person. And we are almost ready to admit that he has done this. For, without the word, *merely*, our author's definition of the third person, like that of Murray, and others, must embrace *I*, and *we*, since *I*, and *we*, ever denote the central point of thought; as, *I* have written it, [*I*, (who am Paul,) have written it.] *I* have seen him. *We* are to return to the city.

But, what has our author done in his successful essay to exclude *I*, and *we* from the third person? He has robbed *he*, *she*, *it*, *they*, and thousands, and thousands of other words of the *third person*!!! Thus, to enable two trees to stand firmly in one place, he has let in a stream, a flood, which in its fury has destroyed *whole forests* by sapping the terrene foundation upon which his predecessors had placed them!! Now, this may not be *insanity*—but it looks like giving too much for the *whistle*!

We will now illustrate our author's definitions by other examples:

1. "The first person denotes the *speaker*; as, *He* spake unto them by parables!"

2. The second person is that which denotes the *hearer*; as, *He* spake unto *them* by parables, *He* said to *me*, come, and see!"

3. "The third person is that which denotes the person or thing that is *merely* spoken of; as, *He* was punished by *me*."

Here, by the word, *me*, the speaker speaks of himself! Will it be pretended that a word can denote a person, or thing, principle, or fact without speaking of him, or it!? Thus in the following—*thou* denotes the individual who is spoken of, and that, too, as the central point of thought—

"*Thou* art sick,"

Of what do we make this affirmation? of *nothing*? This is an affirmation to a person, and it is an affirmation of a person. Therefore, *thou* is of the second, and of the *third* person, at the same time!

The use of the word, *person*, in grammar, is bad. Farmers do not attempt to plough with an

axe—nor do they essay to cut grass with a *cart*. They employ instruments that are adapted to the nature of the operations which they wish to perform. Why do not grammarians imitate the farmer? For this simple reason—the farmer knows *what* he is about, but the grammarians are ignorant of what they are at. When a farmer wishes to cut grass, he takes his *scythe*. But if the farmer did not know what he wanted to do, he would be as likely to take an improper instrument into his field as a proper one. Grammarians have taken the words, *first person*, *second person*, and *third person*, because they do not know what they wish to express! "Ah! how does it happen, then, that they have made these distinctions?" These distinctions have not been made to express any just principles which make a part or parcel, of the constructive philosophy of our language; they have been made that grammarians might have a foundation upon which to place two or three false rules for correcting bad English. What is *person*? Hear, hear! "Persons, in grammar, are *modifications* of nouns, which distinguish the speaker, hearer, and thing that is *merely* spoken of." Now, this we have shown to be a mere farce!

Let us give a moment's attention to the etymology of the word, *person*. The word, *person*, is made from the Latin, *persono*, to sound through. But what has "*to sound through*," to do with any part of grammar!?

Let us spend a short time with the *origin* of the application of the word, *person*, to grammar.

In ancient times the dramatic performers wore *masks*. Each actor had a mask suited to the particular character of the part which he took. The voice of the wearer of the mask, was sent through the mouth of the mask, which was so constructed that it became louder on its passage through it. These masks were denominated *persona*, from *persono*, to sound through.

The word, *persona*, which is from *persono*, to sound through, being applied to the mask from the circumstance that *persono* meant to sound through, was next applied to the wearer of the mask.

In ancient drama, three persons only, were permitted to take part in the dialogue at the same time. Hence the origin of *three* persons in grammar!!! Had the laws of ancient drama allowed four, or six persons, to participate at the same time, the old theory of English grammar would have had *four*, or six persons!!!!

But how came the distinctions of *first person*, *second person*, and *third person*, a portion of the old theory of grammar? These distinctions were introduced through the influence exerted by the rules of the ancient drama also, over the modern art of English grammar!

The ancients fancied that the speaker in the dialogue, held the most important place—hence they denominated him *first person*!

2. They *imagined* the individual addressed, to be next in importance to the *speaker*—hence he was called *second* person !

3. And every other thing or being that was introduced, they called *third* person !

First—It is *persono*, to sound through ! !

Secondly—It is *persona*, a mask, or that through which the sound was sent !

Thirdly—*Persona* is applied to the man, woman, or boy, who sent the sound through ! !

Hence, *fourthly*,—this *persono persona* system is applied to the old theory of English grammar ;

That the ancients had no good ground on which to apply *persona* either to the *mask*, or to the *actor* who sent the sound through its mouth, is obvious. But as the ancients set the example, it was but natural that the writers of the old theory should apply this word (*persona*, *person*,) to their grammar *mask* ! ! The whole theory is a *mask*, so fixed upon the English language, that no one can perceive its true construction. But is it not somewhat singular that the ancients applied the word, *persona*, to *all* the masks ? Had they restricted *persona* to the mask of the *speaker*, we could see a little philosophy in their course. *Persona* is from *persono*, to sound through. Did the second person send a sound through his mask ! ? Did the third person send a sound through his mask ! ! ?

Again. Upon what ground can the speaker be considered of more importance than the audience ? In Divine worship, is the clergyman more important than his *audience*—and is an audience, or clergyman more important than God, of whom the preacher speaks to his hearers ! ! ?

Is it not as important to have a *theme* as it is to have a *speaker* ? Is it not as important to have a *hearer* as it is to have a *speaker* ? The distinction made by the ancients of *first*, *second*, and *third*, was a matter of *fancy*, and not of *philosophy*. As the ancients have the sole credit of this part of the *mask* theory, let them have the sole benefit of it. Let us strip these *masks* from our language, whose true genius they have so long hid.

But who can account for the application of *persono* to *verbs* ?

Did the *actions* expressed by the verbs, wear masks ! ? Did the *actions*, and actors also wear masks in ancient drama ! ! ?

Can any one account for the application of *first*, *second*, and *third*, to the *person* of *verbs* ! ? Was one action considered so much more important than the others that it was distinguished by the phrase, *first* person ! ? Reladictive inflections, Book II. p. 182.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

All the things, mentioned, or *implied*, in a sentence, fall under two general denominations, viz :—

Prosochists, and Themes. [objects.]

1. *Prosochist* is compounded of the Greek, *prosochaia*, attention, and *ist*, one who applies in practice what is mentioned in the principal part of the word of which *ist*, is a suffix.

The *prosochist* is that person whom the *noun* itself designates by means of an *audient* intonation, an *audient* indication or an *audient comma*, as the *particular individual* to whose notice the *par-e-theme* presents the different objects mentioned or implied, in the sentence ; as, *Master, I have brought unto thee my son.* (*Master.*)

2. *Theme* is made from the Greek, *thema* ; and, as, *thema* is made from *tithemi*, to sit, or place, *theme* may properly be defined to mean whatever is *presented* to the *notice* of a person. In this system of grammar, *theme* means any thing which is presented to the *notice* of the *prosochist* ; as, *Master, I have brought my son unto thee.* [*I, son, thee.*]

The themes presented to the notice of the *prosochist*, are divided into

1. *Par-e-theme*,
2. *Pros-o-theme*, and
3. *Pan-ta-theme*.

1. PAR-E-THEME.

The *par-e-theme* is the person who is designated, or distinguished by a *pronoun*, as the *particular individual* who presents the different themes in the sentence, to the *notice* of the *prosochist* : as,

1. *Master, I have brought unto thee my son which hath a dumb spirit.* (*I.*)
2. *Master, my son has been brought unto thee by me.* (*Me.*)

[The prefix part of *par-e-theme*, is made from the Greek, *par-e-cho*, to exhibit.]

2. PROS-O-THEME.

The *pros-o-theme* is the *prosochist* presented to his own notice, which is always done by means of a *pronoun* ; as,

Master, I have brought unto thee my son. (*Thee.*)

[The prefix part of *pros-o-theme*, is the first part of *prosochaia*, and signifies, in this abridged state, that the *pros-o-theme* is made out of the *pros-ochist*.]

Master, I have brought unto thee my son. [*Thee.*]

Thee is not used for the purpose of addressing the *Master*, the *second* time : *thee* is used by the *par-e-theme* to call the attention of the *Master* to himself as the person to whom the father had brought the son.

3. PANTA-THEME.

The *panta-theme* is an object which is presented

to the *prosochist* in no light, in no character except that of a *theme*; as,

Master, I have brought unto thee my son which hath a dumb spirit. (*Son, which, spirit.*) [*Panta, all.*]

The *panta-theme* is all theme. In the *par-e-theme*, there is a *presenter*—an *exhibiter*: in the *pros-o-theme*, there is a *pros-o-chist*—an *attentionist*. But in the *pant-a-theme*, there is nothing but a *theme*: hence, whatever is presented to the *prosochist*, as a mere theme, is a *panta-theme*; as,

Master, I have brought unto thee my son which hath a dumb spirit.

The son and the spirit exhibit nothing to the Master, the *prosochist* of the sentence. Neither the son nor the spirit is in any way, an *attentionist*: indeed, neither is any thing but a theme.

Master, I have brought my son unto thee.

The relation of the things which are introduced into a sentence either by direct expression, or by obvious implication, must secure the admiration of all. Nothing is more simple than this *speech* relation; yet nothing is more philosophic: and, although the whole lies within the grasp of a mere child, Grammar makers do not understand it.

In an English Grammar, compiled by GOULD BROWN, I find the following sentence:—

“The distinction of persons, is founded on the different relations which the objects mentioned bear to the discourse itself.”

“Moses smote the rock with his rod.”

I should be much pleased to learn what relation Moses, the rock, and the rod bear to this sentence!

That the *former* of a sentence bears a relation to it, is obvious—and, perhaps, in vocal instances, the person also to whom the sentence is addressed, bears a relation to the sentence; as,

Master, I have brought unto thee my son.

It is obvious that the Master bore an *audience* relation to this sentence when it was addressed to him. Nor is it at all difficult to see that the father, who styles himself *I*, bore a *formative* relation to this sentence when he addressed it to the Master. But it requires more penetration than falls to the lot of most persons, to see what *possible relation* the son bore to this sentence! The son did not *form* the sentence—nor is there any intimation in it that he gave audience to it.

“Moses smote the rock with his rod.”

What possible relation do Moses, the rock, and the rod bear to this sentence?

Moses had been dead years before the sentence was formed. I have just constructed the sentence. And is it possible, that Moses, who departed this life years, yea, centuries, ago, has found his way back from mother dust, and, in some mysterious manner attached himself to this proposition?

Whether the rock from which Moses brought the copious stream, has decayed out of being, I will not pretend to say; but even if it is yet in

existence, it can hardly be supposed to have left its terrene bed for a place in this verbal framework.

I will not pretend that the rod, employed by Moses in performing this standing miracle, was *perishable*. But, if it has found its way from the *streaming rock* into this sentence which I have just formed, it is obvious that the *days of miracles*, are not yet over.

The distinction of persons, is not founded upon relation of any kind, but upon an *ancient dramatic* practice among the Greeks, and Romans. Of this practice, and the distinction of the three persons in the old Grammars founded upon it, I have already spoken.

Although the distinction of persons, could have been founded upon what may be called the *speech* relation which one *thing* bears to another, it never could have been founded upon any relation which the things mentioned in a sentence, bear to the *sentence itself*.

The *speech* relation on which the distinction of persons, could have been founded, is so simple that it is illustrated by almost every business transaction among men. For instance, take a scene in buying, and selling dry goods.

1. There are goods to be *shown*.
2. There is a person to examine them—to give attention to them.
3. There is a person to show them.

Master, I have brought unto thee my son

1. The Master is called on to give attention to me. Master, look on me. Master, *I*, have done so and so. *I*, then, am the first theme, the first object, the first article of goods to which the attention of the Master, is directed: I show myself first.

2. The Master is next directed to look upon himself.

Master, I have brought unto thee.

That is, Master, look on me as the bringer, and on *thymself* as the person to whom I bring. Now, as the master directs his attention to me, I bear an *objective* relation, not to the *sentence*, but the Master himself. And, as he turns his attention to himself as the person to whom I bring the son, he bears an *objective* relation to *himself*: he becomes the theme or object of his own attention.

Having called the attention of the Master to myself as the bringer, and to *himself* as the person to whom I had brought, I next exhibit to him the son as the person whom I brought. Hence the son becomes an object, or a theme of the Master's attention, or notice.

The general relation of the Master to *me*, *himself*, and the *son*, is that of an *examiner*—of an *attentionist*. Hence he is denominated the *prosochist*—the *attentionist*. And, as every thing to which he gives attention, must bear an objective,

a *thematic*, relation to him, *I, himself*, and the *son*, are objects, or themes of his notice.

Wherever speech is, there are these four relations, viz:—

1. The *Prosochistic*—*Master*,
2. The *Par-e-themic*—*I*,
3. The *Pros-o-themic*—*thee*,
4. The *Panta-themic*—*son*.

No sentence can be formed without a *prosochist*; nor can any sentence be constructed without a *par-e-theme*.

These characters, however, are not always mentioned. For instance:—

I Paul beseech you.

Here, the *prosochist* is not mentioned; but as the sentence is addressed to somebody, the *prosochist* must exist in idea; as,

Corinthians, I Paul beseech you.

In the following, the *prosochist* is not named:—

——, I have brought my son unto *thee*.


In the following, the *par-e-theme* is not expressed:—

Master, this son has been brought unto *thee*, ——.

In the following, the implied *par-e-theme* is expressed:—

Master, this son has been brought unto *thee* by *me*.

A DIAGRAMMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE FOUR SPEECH RELATIONS WHICH THE THINGS MENTIONED, OR IMPLIED IN A SENTENCE, BEAR TO EACH OTHER.



III. GENDER.

Gender belongs, not to words, but to the beings

denoted by words. Hence it is ridiculous to speak of words as *he* nouns, and *she* nouns!

Gender is the distinction of sex.—MURRAY.

Gender is the distinction of sex.—JOHN S. HART.

Gender is a distinction of nouns with regard to sex.—BULLIONS.

Some say gender is a distinction of *sex*.

Others say that gender is a distinction of *nouns*, Which is right?

Genders are *modifications* that distinguish objects in regard to sex.—GOULD BROWN.

Modifications of what? Modifications of nouns, or of *animals*?

From the *nature* of the case, we presume that Mr. Brown means to say, that genders are the *sexual modifications* of animals! But from the following statement which we find under the nineteenth page of his Grammar, it is obvious that we are wrong in our presumption:

"Nouns have modifications of four kinds; namely, Persons, Numbers, Genders, and Cases."

Hence Mr. Brown also makes *he* nouns, and, *she* nouns!

"There are three genders, the *masculine*, the *feminine*, and the *neuter*."

The *masculine* distinguishes *male* animals; the *feminine*, females; the *neuter*, things *destitute* of sex.—JOHN FROST.

Would not the following be more in accordance with nature?

The *masculine* gender belongs to *males*—the *feminine*, to *females*, and the *neuter* to nothing at all!!!

Gender is a modification of the nouns to distinguish the sexes.—FRAZEE.

Names have two genders, the *masculine*, and *feminine*.—FRAZEE.

That is, names have two *sexes*. A *name* of the *masculine sex*, denotes a being of the *masculine sex*; as, *John*.

A *noun* of the *female sex* denotes a being of the *female sex*; as, *Jane*!!

Mr. Frazee, too, divides nouns into *he* names, and *she* names!

Is there any difference between the words, *gender*, and *sex*? Does not *gender* mean *sex*? How often have we been made to feel for young ladies, who in their parsing process, have been compelled to give the sex of nouns!

The gender belongs to the animals themselves—hence it should not be treated of as though it belongs to the *words* denoting the animals.

The *diction*, the *expression*, the *indication*, of the gender, belongs to the words. This indication is denominated,

Genediction.

The *genediction* of a noun, or pronoun is the *expression* of the gender of the being which these words denote. (Book II., p. 130.)

CHAPTER VIII.

NOUNS COMMON AND PROPER.

The phrase, "*common noun*," suggests the idea of an *uncommon* one—and the syllabane, "*proper noun*," suggests the idea of an *improper* one!!

If "*city*" is a *common noun*, "*Philadelphia*" is an *uncommon noun*!! And, if "*Philadelphia*" is a *proper noun*, "*city*" is an *improper noun*!!

What is a *proper noun*?

A *proper noun* is the name applied to an individual; as, *Washington, Albany, Hudson.—BULLIONS.*

A *common noun* is the name applied to all things of the same sort; as, *man, chair, table, book.—BULLIONS.*

Does not the word *Washington*, apply to *all* *Washingtons*!? Why, then, is not *Washington* *common*?

Is there a *Washington* in being to whom the word, *Washington*, does not apply? Not one—hence "*Washington*" is a *common noun*! A *common noun* applies to *all*.

Is there a *Hudson* to which the word, *Hudson*, does not apply? Not one—"*Hudson*," then is a *common noun*!!

Does not the word, *Albany*, apply to all *Albanies*!? "*Albany*," then, is a *common noun*!

The word, *John*, is denominated a *proper noun*. But does not this word apply to *all* *Johns*!? Let it be granted that there are five thousand *Johns* in the world. Does not the word, "*John*," apply to *all* the *Johns*!? Why, then, is not this *proper noun* a *common one*!?

What is the meaning of the word, *proper*? *Proper* means *appropriated*. *Proper* is made from the Latin, *proprius*, which signifies *appropriated*.

His conduct is *proper*. That is, his conduct is that which is *appropriated* to these occasions.

Let us now see if Mr. Bullions's *common nouns* are not *proper nouns*.

"*Man, chair, table, book.*"

Is not "*man*" *appropriated*? That is, is not this word applied, fixed, to a particular race? Surely. This *common noun*, then, is a *proper noun*! The word, *man*, not applicable to books, to trees, to houses, to rivers. Why! Because this word is already *appropriated* to the human race. The noun which has not a fixed application is the one which can be called *common*. For instance, if it is supposed that *morphit* is a word, and that it may be applied to *every* thing in the universe, even to the universe itself, *morphit* gives the true idea of a *common sign*, a *common noun*. As "*morphit*" would not be *appropriated*, it would be *common*, applicable to *all*. But is "*man*" a *common noun*, a *universal name*? nothing like it.

"*Chair*," a *common name*! Is not this name *appropriated* already? Does *chair* mean a table? No. Does *chair* mean a house? No. This word is *appropriated*, fixed in its application! *Chair*, then, is a *proper noun*!!

And is not "*book*" fixed, *appropriated*, in its application.—Or is this word *common* to *all* things? *Book*, is *appropriated*, fixed in its application. *Book*, then, is a *proper noun*, an *appropriated name*.

Proper names are the names *appropriated* to individuals; as, *George*. MURRAY.

A *proper name*, then, is an *appropriated name*. But, say the old school grammarians, it is a name *appropriated* to an *individual*.

There is no name in the English language, which is *appropriated*, fixed, *confined*, to an individual. The word, *George*, is not *appropriated* to an *individual*: this name is applied to *thousands*—to all the *Georges* in being!

1. If any noun is *appropriated*, fixed, to an individual is not the word, *glove*, in the following instance *appropriated* to an individual.

My glove.

Is this word, as here used, applied to all *gloves*?

2. Is not the *common noun*, *son*, in the following instance, *appropriated* to an individual?

"Thou art my *son* in whom I am well pleased."

Does the word, *son*, here mean *all sons*!?

We have attempted to show that the terms in the old theory, are neither *technical* in their character, nor correct in their application,—that the *thinking* is far from just, and the *reasoning* far from sound; and that the *definitions*, and *classifications*, are *unnatural*, *arbitrary*. And who that examines the subject can say that the *formers*, and *menders*, of this theory, have not *subverted the truth*, *diverted technical means*. and even *inverted the natural mode of using these means*.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE ADJECTIVE.

1. An adjective is a word added to a substantive to express its quality; as, An *industrious man*, A *virtuous woman*.—MURRAY.

This definition is founded upon two things, namely, *addition*, and *quality*.

2. An adjective is a word used to express some quality or property of a noun, or to show the extent of its signification; as, *good, wise, this, that, one, two*.—COMLY.

This definition is not founded upon *addition*; but upon the fact that a word is used to express some quality of a noun, or to show the extent of the noun's signification.

3. An adjective is a word *added* to a noun or

pronoun, to express its quality; as, a *good* man, a *pleasant* day.—HUBBARD.

This definition is placed on the same pillars which tremble under Murray's, viz. *addition*, and *quality*.

4. An adjective is a word added to a noun to express its quality; as, a *good* boy.—BULLIONS.

The *keystone* in this frame-work, is *addition*, and *quality*.

5. An adjective is a word added to a noun, or pronoun, and generally expresses quality; as, a *wise* man; a *new* book,—you *two* are *diligent*—GOULD BROWN.

According to this definition, the fact that a word is *added* to a noun or pronoun, renders it an *adjective*.

6. An adjective is a word added to a noun to express its quality or kind, or to restrict its meaning; as, a *good* man, a *bad* man, a *free* man, an *unfortunate* man, *one* man, *forty* men.—KIRKHAM.

This definition is placed upon three things, viz. *addition*, *quality*, and *restriction*.

7. An *adname* (*adjective*) is a word added to a name or substantive, to show the *quality*, *kind*, *class* or *condition* of the object which the name or substitute represents. (No example.)—PIERCE.

8. An adjective is a word which expresses the quality of a noun; as, a *good* boy.—LENNIE.

This definition is placed upon one pillar, viz. *quality*.

9. An adjective is a describing, or a defining word, used to qualify a substantive; as, *good* book, *many* boys, I am *happy*.—FARNUM.

It is not easy to say upon what this definition is placed.

10. An adjective is a word which qualifies a noun; as *good*, *tall*.—JOHN FROST.

This definition rests upon the simple fact that the word which is called an *adjective*, qualifies a noun.

11. An adjective is a word which expresses or alludes to some *quality*, or inherent property of the thing represented by the noun; as, a *wise* man, a *straight* line.—PARDON DAVIS.

It is hard to say on what this definition is placed.

12. An adjective is a word added to a noun to describe, qualify, or limit it; as, a *good* man, a *virtuous* woman, *twenty* dollars.—JOHN COSBURY.

Three items constitute the basis of this definition, viz. *description*, *qualification*, and *limitation*.

13. Adjectives are words added to nouns, and some other words, to qualify or define their meaning; as, *good* boy, *honest* men, *splendid* house, *fine* horse, dark clouds.—BRADFORD FRAZEE.

An Adjective is a word used to qualify a Noun; as, *good* man.—JOHN S. HART.

We can not discuss each of these conflicting definitions *separately*. We shall, however, endeavor to do them all ample justice.

1. An adjective is a word *added* to a substan-

tive, to express its quality; as, an *industrious* man, a *virtuous* woman.—MURRAY.

The first thing which deserves attention in this definition, is the idea expressed by the word, "*added*."

To *add* is to join something to that which was before.—WALKER.

1. To set or put together, join or unite, as one thing or sum to another, in an aggregate; as, add *three* to *four*, the sum is seven.—WEBSTER.

2. To unite in idea or consideration, to subjoin. To what has been alleged, let this argument be *added*.—WEBSTER.

3. To increase the number. Thou shalt *add* three cities more of refuge.—WEBSTER.

4. To augment. Rehoboam said, I will *add* to your yoke.—WEBSTER.

Ye shall not *add* to the word which I command you.

Add three to four.

1. How can you add three units to four, unless you already have the four to which you can *add* the three?

2. To what has been already advanced, let this argument be *added*.

That which is first advanced, is that to which this argument is to be *added*.

3. Thou shalt *add* three cities more of refuge.

The original cities of refuge are they to which three more are to be *added*.

To *add* is to join something to that which was before.—WALKER.

In this sense *add* is used by all. One can not even *think* of *adding* unless there is something already placed to which he may *add*. No man talks about building an *additional* house, unless he has one *already*. Under this view of the subject, let us inquire which are the *added* words in the following sentences:

1. He is a *good* boy.

2. They are *fine* children.

In the vocal, and in the written, form, *is*, *a*, *good*, *boy*, would be *added* words; for, in speaking, and in writing, these words would be introduced after the formation of *he*—hence in *addition* to *he*! *Is*, then, is added to *he*—*a* is added to *is*—*good* is added to *a*—and *boy* is added to *good*!

Therefore, in the vocal, or in the written form, the words in the following sentences, are divided into *Added*, and *Unadded*:

He is a *good* boy.

In the second sentence also, the words when spoken, or written, must be divided into *added*, and *unadded*. *They* is the unadded word, while *are*, *fine*, and *children*, are the *added* ones. But as the words of a *printed* sentence, are all presented at the same point of time, a printed sentence can have no adjective! What! can one of two

houses which have been erected at the same time, be denominated an *additional* house? It cannot be; the distinction is without sense.

The word, *added*, not only indicates a state; but it implies the manner in which the state is produced. When the state of connection is produced in any manner different from that which the word, *add*, indicates, the state is expressed, not by *add*, but by some other word; as, *junction*, *conjunction*, *connection*, *conjection*, &c.

Hence, when the right hand is put upon the left, the right hand is the *added* one. And this state of connection may be denominated adjection. But, when both hands start from given points, and come in contact, the state of connection thus produced, cannot be denominated adjection.

"*Small* apple."

The only proof that *small* is an adjective, is derived from juxtaposition, nearness. And is not the word, *apple*, as near to the word, *small*, as *small* is to *apple*? If, then, juxtaposition constitutes *small*, an adjective, both words are adjectives. As both words are presented, printed, at the same time, and one is as near to the other as the other is to it, what can render one an *added* word more than the other? Is it replied that *small* is more an adjective than *apple*, because *small* expresses a quality? The answer is, that *small* does not fall within the *first* part of the definition of an adjective; for *small* is not an *added* word—hence, unless the mere fact of expressing quality, renders a word an adjective, how can *small* be an adjective? And, if a word is an adjective merely from the fact that it expresses *quality*, then the italic nouns in the following instances, are all *adjectives*.

He is a man of *virtue*.

This is a man of great *strength*.

The *roundness* of the ball.

The *smoothness* of the paper.

Does not the noun, *virtue*, express a quality of the man? Does not *strength* also denote a quality of the man? Does not *roundness* denote a quality of the ball? And does not *smoothness* signify a quality of the paper? What, then, becomes of the definition of an adjective, which is founded upon the expression of a quality?

Watts, who has written much upon the subject of qualities, says—"Motion, shape, quantity, weight, &c., &c., are properties or modes of bodies and that *wit*, *folly*, *love*, *doubting*, *judging*, &c., &c., are modes, or qualities of the mind."

Again says Watts—"The term, *mode*, extends to all attributes whatever, including the most essential, and inward properties, and reaches even to *actions* themselves as well as the *manner* of action."

A quality is defined by Watts, and others, as follows:—

"A mode, or quality is that property which cannot exist in, and of, itself, but is always esteemed

as belonging to, and as subsisting by, the help of some substance which, for this reason is called its subject."

Thus the words, *solidity*, *brightness*, *similarity*, *roundness*, *softness*, *accuracy*, *action*, *thinking*, *thought*, to *think*, *motion*, &c., all denote qualities of some subject, upon which they depend for their existence.

But let it be conceded that *small*, in the phrase *small* apple, comes within the first part of the definition of an adjective. That is, grant that *small* is an *added* word; and what follows? why, that all words which are added to nouns to express qualities, are adjectives. Now, all *verbs* are as much *added* to nouns as *small*, or any other adjective. All verbs too express quality—therefore all verbs are adjectives!

Blair says, "The verb is so far of the same nature with the *adjective*, that it expresses, like the adjective, an attribute or property of some person or thing—thus, when I say the sun shines, *shining* is the attribute ascribed to the sun."—*Blair's Lectures*.

The same doctrine is taught by *Beattie*—who says—"The verb, and adjective agree in this—both express, qualities or attributes."

Thus it is asserted by these British oracles in English philology, that *verbs* do express *qualities*, and that they are in this respect perfect adjectives.

Nor is Murray himself less clear in his expression of this doctrine. For, in etymology, he tells us that an adjective expresses the quality of a noun; and in syntax he informs us that the verb expresses the quality of a noun:

The principal parts of a simple sentence, are the *attribute*, and the *object*; as, a wise man *governs* his passions. Here, *a wise man* is the subject; *governs* the *attribute*; and *his passions*, the *object*.—MURRAY.

The only difference between the definition of an adjective, and that of a verb, arises from generalizing in one case, and particularizing in the other. In defining an adjective, grammarians make it express *all* qualities; as, *good*, *bad*, *high*, *run*, *walk*, &c., &c.

But in defining a verb, they particularize *being*, *action*, and *passion*, and that too in a way which interdicts the idea that *being*, *action*, and *passion* are qualities. Thus, after including *all* animals in one definition, they define a horse in a way which indicates that he is not an animal of any kind!

But to all this it may be said "*that little, or no importance is attached to the idea expressed by add, in this definition of an adjective.*"

Indeed, "*little or no importance is attached to the idea expressed by add!*"

What! When we have demonstrated that the foundation, of a certain house, is mere *sand*, do the builders, and owners of it turn upon us with

the language that "*little or no importance is attached to the foundation of the building*," by them!? Is not the principle of *adjection* the foundation of this definition of an adjective? Not only have the old school grammarians built their definition of an adjective, upon the idea of *addition*, but they have selected their *part of speech* name for this class of words in direct reference to this principle! Do these distinguished philologists know that their word, *adjective*, is the word, *add*, in another form!?

The words which the old school grammarians denominate *adjectives*, can not be defined upon the principle of *adjection*. Nor can these words be classed upon the union of *adjection*, and *quality*. Verbs express quality; as, *John walks*.

The only basis on which these words can be classed is the *branch* relation which they bear to nouns, and pronouns.

In Book I. they are called *clades* to denote their branch relation. (*Klados*, a branch.)

In Book II. they are called *adjectives*, to distinguish them from other *clades*, which in Book II. are called prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, &c.

These branch words have something which distinguishes them from all other clades—viz: the capacity to be used both with the *cordictive*, and the *uncordictive* noun; as,

Good men do good deeds.

Good, an adjective.

men, a cordictive noun.

do, a verb.

good, an adjective.

deeds, an uncordictive noun.

An adjective is a word *added* to a substantive to express its quality.—MURRAY.

1. "Henry purchased *brewer's* yeast."

That the word, *brewer's*, is here used to show the particular *kind* of yeast, is obvious. If, then, a word which expresses the *kind*, denotes a *quality*, this noun which is in the *possessive* case, is really an adjective!!

2. "*Baker's* bread is generally raised with *brewer's* yeast."

Baker's is here used to express the *kind* of bread—hence *baker's* is an adjective!!

But it may be said that although *baker's* does express the *kind* of bread, it does not express a *quality*.

Do not *carving*, *pen*, *public*, *Indian*, *ground*, and *gray*, denote *kinds* in the following instances—and are not these words *adjectives*?

1. *Carving* knife.

2. *Pen* knife.

3. *Public* house.

4. *Indian* corn.

5. *Ground* squirrel.

6. A *gray* squirrel.

1. He drank a glass of *French* brandy.

Does not *French* express the *kind* of brandy? And is not *French* an adjective!?

What kind of hats do you want?

I want *boys'* hats.

"*Boys*," then is an adjective!!

We presume that this word will be parsed by the next mender as a noun *adjective*, in the *possessive* case!!

MR. COMLY, says,

An adjective is a word used to express some quality or property of a noun, or pronoun, or to show the extent of its signification; as, *good*, *wise*, *this*, *that*, *one*, *two*.—COMLY.

1. A *wise* man.

2. A man of *wisdom*.

Mr. Comly founds his definition upon the fact that the word expresses a quality, or property, or limits the noun's extent of signification. Hence, *wise* is an adjective. But *wise* is not more an adjective than *wisdom*! *Wise*, and *wisdom*, are two forms of one word—and, as both forms express a quality, both are adjectives!!

The word, *property*, is synonymous with *quality*. Hence this addition to Mr. Murray's definition, must be considered as a mere *ornament*!

1. John has *boy's* hats for sale.

2. Have you any of *Comly's* Grammars?

3. Give us some *baker's* bread.

4. Have you seen *my* glove?

5. *John's* hat is new.

6. *This lady's* fan.

1. Will it be denied that *boys'* limits the noun *hats* to the hats of boys?

2. Surely Mr. *Comly* himself, must see that the word *Comly's* limits the noun, *Grammars*, to his own book!

Was Mr. *Comly* to call for *baker's* bread, and be served with *domestic*, he might be displeased!

4. "*My*," certainly shows that the "*glove*" applies to mine only.

6. And *lady's* confines the noun, *fan*, to the one which belongs to herself!

Boys', *Comly's*, *bakers*, *my*, *John's* and *lady's* must be *adjectives*!!

MR. HUBBARD, says,

"An adjective is a word *added* to a noun or pronoun to express its quality; as, a *good* man, a *pleasant* day."

As our reflections upon the definition given by Mr. Murray, apply to this, we shall merely ask the reader to transfer our remarks on Murray's, to this.

MR. BULLIONS, says,

"An adjective is a word *added* to a noun, to express its quality; as, a *good* boy."

As this definition of an adjective is nothing but Murray's, the arsenic which we have administered to Murray's, will extend its work of destruction through this also!

MR. GOULD BROWN, says,

"An adjective is a word *added* to a noun, or

proun, and generally expresses quality; as, a wise man, a new book—you two are diligent."

By this definition, a word which is added to a noun or proun, is an adjective! The author expressly says, that the expression of quality, is not essential to the adjective character of the word. Hence *a*, and *the*, *my*, and *its*, *John's* and *Stephen's*, are all adjectives:

1. *A* man. *A* is added to *man*.
2. *The* man. *The* is added to *man*.
3. *My* book. *My* is added to *book*.
4. *Its* length. *Its* is added to *length*.
5. *John's* book. *John's* is added to *book*.
6. *Stephen's* book. *Stephen's* is added to *book*.

Let us now see if verbs are not adjectives by virtue of this definition of an adjective:

1. John walks.
2. Joseph trembles.
3. James can walk
4. Jane resembles him.

Every action is a quality—and, as *walks* expresses an action and is added to *John*, this neuter verb is an adjective.

3. "James can walk."

Can is added to *James*, and expresses a quality—hence this auxiliary verb is an adjective! Will it be pretended that, *can*, does not express a quality? *Can*, expresses something which belongs to *James*—*can*, expresses something which can not exist, "in, and of, itself."

Watts says,

"A quality is that property which can not exist in, and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and as subsisting by the help of some substance which, for this reason is called its subject."

Does not the ability, the power, the faculty, to walk, which is expressed by *can*, belong to *James*? Can this power, which is expressed by *can*, exist alone? O, no. *Can*, then, does denote a quality—hence, *can*, is an adjective!

Let us hear. BLAIR:

The verb is so far of the same nature with the adjective that it expresses, like the adjective, an attribute or property of some person or thing—thus, when I say the sun shines, *shines* is the attribute ascribed to the sun.—BLAIR'S LECTURES.

The same doctrine is taught by Beattie—who says:

"The verb, and adjective agree in this, both express qualities, or attributes."

Thus it is asserted by these British oracles in English philology, that verbs do express qualities, and that they are in this respect perfect adjectives.

Nor is Murray himself, less clear in his expression of this doctrine. For, in Etymology, he tells us that an adjective expresses the quality of a noun; and in Syntax, he informs us that the verb expresses the quality of a noun:

The principal parts of a simple sentence, are the

attribute, the subject, and the object; as, a wise man governs his passions. Here, a wise man is the subject; governs the attribute; and his passions, the object—MURRAY.

It is admitted, then, by the old school grammarians themselves, that the verb expresses qualities. But they seem to take it for granted that, while the verb is an adjective in this respect, it is not an adjective in respect to adjection! Hence they appear to think that there is a wide difference between a verb and an adjective. Verbs, however, are as much added to nouns as are adjectives!

1. "A wise man governs his passions."

Man governs passions. What! can it be said that *governs* is not added to *man*, and *passions*!? Is there no adjective relation between *man*, and *governs*? Then there is no adjective relation between *wise*, and *man*!

Can the old school grammarians show that verbs are not added words!? The fact that they cannot show this proves that they are added words. Verbs, then, are adjectives.

Let us now attempt to demonstrate that prepositions are adjectives!

An adjective is a word added to a noun, or proun, and generally expresses quality.—GOOLD BROWN.

Under the table.

Over the new table.

Does not *under* express a quality? Does not *under* express something which belongs to the table? *Under*, denotes a place—and does not this place belong to the table? This place is the table's under.

Over the table.

There is a place which belongs to the table that is denominated, *over*. Either this place can exist in its *over* character, without the table, or this place is a quality of the table. *Under*, and *over*, then expresses two local places, qualities, of the table—hence these prepositions in this respect, are perfect adjectives.

Let us now ask whether these prepositions are not added to the noun, *table*? These prepositions are said to belong to *table*—but how can they belong to *table*, if they have no frame-work connection with *table*?

Under new tables.

Under, a preposition, belonging to tables.

New, an adjective, belonging to tables.

Why is "belonging to," applied to *under*, and *new*, if both words do not bear the same relation to *tables*!?

Having demonstrated that the prepositions are adjectives, we should be glad to show that adverbs and conjunctions, are adjectives. But we have no space for further comment.

CLASSIFICATION OF ADJECTIVES.

Goold Brown, classes adjectives as follows:—

"Adjectives may be divided into six classes; namely, "*common, proper, numeral, pronominal, participial, and compound.*"

This array of technical armament is hideous indeed; it strikes the student with *appalment*! But slavish and dreadful as the scene may appear from the above presentation, the half of this compiler's huge moulds of technical verbiage, unfounded divisions, and almost innumerable useless subdivisions, could not be presented, and *properly exposed*, in a volume of fewer than five hundred pages! Even the page of terror, from which we have taken his six classes of *one* part of speech, attempts a *subdivision* :—

"Numeral adjectives are of two kinds; namely,"

1. Cardinal; as, *one, two, three,*
2. Ordinal; as, *first, second, third.*

The compiler makes *ten* parts of speech; each of which he has so multiplied by subdivision, that his book contains nearly one *hundred parts* of speech! :

The work from which we have made our extracts, is an abridgement of the author's full work, or as he calls it, "*finished labors*!" This small work is entitled, "*The First Lines of English Grammar*!"

That is, the first lines of his *finished labors*! Now, if all his lines are as crooked as his *first*, it is to be wished for his own good, that his *first lines* should be his *last* lines! The compiler, it seems has been able to say, "*my labor is finished*!" But will the child that studies his grammar, ever be able to adopt the author's expressive language?

We would remark, in conclusion, that if adjectives are to be divided into classes upon the principle pursued by our compiler, Mr. G. B., we may have as many classes as adjectives have meanings. He, and the British grammarians whom he *apes*, inform us that *six* should be called a *numeral* adjective because it denotes *number*!

If this principle should be carried out, we should have,

1. *Wooden* adjectives; as, a *wooden* dish.
2. *Iron* adjectives; as, an *iron* bar.
3. *Cloth* adjectives; as, *cloth* shoes.

These, to run the *parallel*, must be subdivided into smaller classes; as,

1. *Maple* wooden adjectives!
2. *Oak* wooden adjectives!
3. *Pine* wooden adjectives,—a *pine* table.
4. *Hemlock* wooden adjectives!

These again must be subdivided into—

1. *Rock maple* wooden adjectives!
2. *Curled maple* wooden adjectives, and so on

till earth's entire forest is methodically fixed out in fanciful rows, according to the *first lines* of *Goold Brown's grammar*!

So, too, we may put all the cloths into "*first rate order*," by following "*The first lines of Goold Brown's grammar*!" Thus—

1. *Black cloth* adjectives
2. *Black broad cloth* adjectives!!
3. *Snuff-colored broad cloth* adjectives!!!

Let us now urge our author to resume his *finished labors*, carry out his plan,—put nature, art, and science into fascinating system, by his lines of grammar!

DEGREES OF COMPARISON.

"*Good*" is an adjective of the positive degree of *comparison*? But *good* is not a word which suggests *comparison* in any degree whatever: *good* carries the idea of *contrast* instead of *comparison*! Joseph is a *good* boy; but Stephen is a *bad* one.

"*Better*" is said to be of the *comparative* degree of *comparison*! Why, is not *every* degree of *comparison* a *comparative* degree? When it is said, Mr. Jones is the *best* man of the six, is there no *comparison*? Why, then, is not *best* of the *comparative* degree of *comparison*! :

But we deny the soundness of the doctrine of the superlative degree taught by the old school grammarians.

I think that Mr. JOSEPH R. CHANDLER has advanced the idea that the *tri-derivative* ratiodiction (superlative degree) may be applied where there are but *two* objects mentioned; as,

That tree is the highest of the two; Jane is the oldest of the two girls.

I must *dissent* from the doctrine of this position *altogether*. I have given considerable attention to the subject of the *tri-derivative* ratiodiction, and have come to the conclusion that it cannot be sustained in *any* case.

True, the world has started with this form of expression—but it is founded in *philological* error, and in an *unphilosophical* principle. He who examines the *tri-derivative* form of expression, will arrive at the conclusion that it is very analogous to the following which is ridiculously wrong :—

1. The Bible is better than any book.
2. Methuselah was older than any man.

1. As the Bible is a book, and as the Bible is better than *any* book, it follows that the Bible is better than itself!

2. As Methuselah was a man, and as he was older than *any* man, it follows that Methuselah was actually older than himself!

Let it be presumed that there are three books before us; and that the Bible is one of the three. Let the following proposition be made in relation to the Bible :—

1. The Bible is the best book of the three.

This proposition is exactly synonymous with the following :—

2. The Bible is better than any *one* of the three books.

Now, as the Bible is one of the three, is it not

clearly said here that the Bible is better than itself?

The Bible is the best book of the three.

That is, of all the books which belong to this triplicate group of books, the *Bible* is the best. Now, if the Bible actually belongs to this group of books, is it not clearly represented to be better than itself?

But what is the exact idea to be expressed? It is that the Bible is better than either of the *other* two books.

The idea, however, which is expressed, is that the Bible is better than any one of the three books. And, as the Bible is one of the three, it follows that the *superlative degree*, as they call it, clearly expresses that the Bible is actually better than itself!

She is the *handsomest* lady in the room.

Now, if the lady is in the room, she is *handsomer* than herself!

Should the plausibility of my position have a tendency to invalidate Mr. Chandler's, that the superlative degree may be used where there are but two things, let him console himself with the reflection that he is the *greatest* grammarian in the world. That is, he is *greater* than himself!

That I may be clearly understood on the subject of the use of the *superlative degree* of comparison, it may be well to say—

1. The *superlative degree*, in *any* instance, is against *sound philosophy*.

2. The *superlative degree* cannot be used where all the objects do not fall under the *same* denomination.

3. The *superlative degree* can be used where there are but two things, if both fall under the same denomination, with as much *philosophic propriety* as it can where there are three, or more.

4. Some *mono, expressed* or *understood*, which begins with *of*, must *invariably* follow the superlative degree; as, She is the *handsomest* lady in the room.

That is, she is the *handsomest* lady of all the ladies in the room.

HART'S GRAMMAR.

Some may think that the Grammar compiled by JOHN S. HART, merits more attention from us than it has hitherto received. That we have paid very little attention to this book, is true. Our want of attention to it, however, proceeds, not from a conviction that the work is *invulnerable*; but from a dread to assail the productions of a *colossal* who stands with *one foot* in the PHILADELPHIA HIGH SCHOOL, and the other in the AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.

Mr Hart says, (p. 48.) that

"An ADJECTIVE is a word used to qualify a noun; as, *good man*."

It is not easy to see that *good* qualifies *man*.

Under this same page (48) the compiler says, that, "adjectives denote some *substance quality* or *property* just as truly as *nouns* do." In illustration of this fact he remarks that *brazen*, in the expression, *brazen tube*, denotes the same substance that the noun *brass*, does.

Now, if *brazen* denotes the substance of brass, this adjective is not used to qualify the noun, *tube*.

This adjective is used to express the *material* out of which the tube is formed. If the word, *brazen*, should give the noun, *tube*, a particular *form*, or any way change its dictionary meaning, it might be said to *qualify* this noun. But the noun, *tube*, has the same meaning and the same *form* with *brazen* which it has without *brazen*.

The noun, *tube*, means a pipe, a hollow cylinder, &c. But a tube may be made of *wood, metal, or glass*; as, a *metal tube, wooden tube, glass tube*.

Now, it is obvious, that *brass, wooden, and glass* are used, not to *change* the meaning of the noun, *tube*, but to denote the different *materials* of which the three tubes are formed. *Glass* is the name of the *material*, and *tube* that of the thing formed out of the material. But, if the word, *glass*, should actually change the meaning of the word, *tube*, by causing this noun to mean a fish, a bird, a hat, or any object at all, but a tube, *glass* might be said to *qualify tube*.

"*Good man*."

Here the adjective, *good*, is used, not to qualify the meaning of the noun, *man*, but to denote the *moral* character of the real man. Did the word, *good*, cause the word, *man*, to mean a *girl, a lady, an angel, or a bird*, we could say that *good* qualifies *man*.

Mr. Hart's Grammar is a *patchwork*, and resembles tufa formed by the concretion of loose volcanic dust, or cinders, which, from the very slight cohesion, to each other, seem to be cemented by mere *water*.

We do not wish to despoil Mr. Hart of the honor of re-forming Mr. Murray's Grammar. The book is already in being, and in use. But, although we have nothing to urge against the mode in which it crept into being, we could say much against the manner in which it has been *forced* into use!

Boys who present themselves as candidates for admission into the PHILADELPHIA HIGH school, are required to pass an examination in *Hart's Grammar*—Hence the teachers of the boys' Grammar schools, are *forced* to use Hart's Grammar, or suffer the painful mortification of having the young gentlemen whom they send up as candidates for admission into the HIGH SCHOOL, rejected by the *principal* of said school, for not understanding Murray as the said principal has presented him!!!

THE ADJECTIVE DENOMINATION

Is a large class of *uncordictive branch* words, applicable both to *cordictive*, and *uncordictive* nouns, and employed *merely to suggest, or fully to express*, something which the nouns do not include; as, *What man came? Any man, No man, John's man, Brewers' yeast, Murray's Grammar, Boy's hats.*

The general meaning of adjectives may be acquired to some extent, from the following

ILLUSTRATIONS.

Adjectives are employed,

1. [To allude to particularity.]
 1. *What man will come?*
 2. *Which man shall I call?*
 3. *Which one went?*
2. [To express vagueness.]
 1. *Any man may come.*
 2. *Some one will come.*
3. [To express totality.]
 1. *All men will not come.*
 2. *The whole company came.*
 3. *They all will come.*
4. [To express negation.]
 1. *No man will come.*
 2. *No one will come.*
 3. *Neither man will come.*
5. [To express particularity.]
 1. *Certain men will come.*
 2. *Particular ones have come.*
6. [To express severality.]
 1. *Each man will come.*
 2. *Every one will come.*
 3. *Either man may go.*
 4. *Neither man will come.*
7. [To express number.]
 1. *One man will come.*
 2. *Six men will come.*
8. [To express identity.]
 1. *Same men*
 2. *Very ones.*
 3. *Identical man.*
 4. *Aforesaid man.*
 1. *Well men can come.*
 2. *Sick men cannot come.*
 3. *Broken dishes.*
9. [To express state.]
 4. *Whole dishes.*
 5. *They are anxious.*
 6. *Thou art rich.*
 7. *Ye are angry.*
10. [To express quality.]
 1. *Large men will come.*
 2. *Strong men will come.*
 3. *Tall ones will come.*
 4. *Short ones will come.*
 1. *Carving knife.*
 2. *Writing desk.*
 3. *Shoe leather.*
11. [To express the use.]
 4. *Tea pot.*
 5. *Tooth pick.*
 6. *Razor strop.*
 7. *Bake pan.*
 8. *Cheese press.*
 9. *Wash bowl.*

12. [To indicate that the things mentioned, are not well known, 1. *A man will come, or that they are not* 2. *An Indian will come, distinguished from* 3. *A man of that company, distinguished by distinctive circumstances.]*

Here *a* indicates that the man who will come, is not distinguished from the other men of the company by any distinctive circumstances.

13. [To indicate either that the things mentioned, are there, well known, or that they are distinguished from all other things of the same kind by distinctive circumstances, expressed, or implied.]
1. *The man who stands there.*
 2. *The sun has risen.*
 3. *The lion is a noble animal.*
 4. *Thou art the man.*
 5. *The Legislature of Pennsylvania, is in session.*

COMMENTS.

1. *The man who stands yonder, will come.*

The clause, *who stands yonder*, expresses the distinctive circumstance which is indicated by *the*, in *The man, &c.*

2. *The sun has risen.*

Here, *the* indicates that the sun is *well known*. The sun. What sun? The *well known* sun which is the great source of *heat, and light*.

3. *The lion is noble.*

Here, too, *the* indicates that the lion is *well known*.

4. *Thou art the man.*

What man? *The man that had been described by Nathan before this application of the to the word, man.*

"And David's anger was greatly kindled against the man—and he said to Nathan, as the Lord liveth, *The man that hath done this thing, shall surely die.*"

* *That hath done this thing.*"

5. *The Legislature of Pennsylvania is now in session.*

The description to which *the* points, is of *Pennsylvania*.

In the Grammar these instances of illustration are extended to one hundred; and they might be to *ten thousands*! What, then, becomes of the common definition, An *Adjective* is a word added to a noun to express its *quality*; as *what man came, any book will answer, some man came in!*

Adjectives which express *qualities*, are few indeed!

* The finger is the word, *the*, which directs the attention of David to the description—"that hath done this thing;"

CHAPTER X.

VERB.

A VERB is a word which signifies to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*; as, I *am*, I *rule*, I *am ruled*.—MURRAY.

Mr. Murray has illustrated his definition by "*am*, *rule*, and *am ruled*." But we shall illustrate it by *nouns*!

"A verb is a word which signifies *being*, *action*, or, *suffering*; as,

1. The *existence* of these papers is not disputed. (*Existence* denotes *being*.)

2. The great *race* was run last week. (*Race* signifies *action*.)

3. John is in *pain*. (*Pain* signifies *suffering*.)

It may, be said, however, that "to *be*, to *do*, and to *suffer*," denote something different from *being*, *action*, and *suffering*. But by perusing the seventy-first page of Mr. Murray's own Grammar, it will appear, beyond any doubt, that this author means *being*, *action*, and *suffering*, by "to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*."

Under this page, Mr. Murray is laboring to prove that a participle is a verb. In this attempt he employs the following language:

"But they (*participles*) also signify *action*."

That is, participles are verbs, because they, like verbs, signify *action*.

Again says Mr. Murray—

"That they (*participles*) are modes of verbs, is manifest for they signify *being*, *action* or *suffering*."

Goold Brown's definition:

"A verb is a word which signifies to *be*, to *act*, or to *be acted upon*, as I *am*, I *rule*, I *am ruled*."

We shall now illustrate Mr. Brown's definition of a verb by the use of *nouns*:

"A verb is a word which signifies to *be*, to *act* or to *be acted upon*; as,

1. Man derives his *being* from God. (*Being*.)

2. These horses are to run the next *race*. (*Race*.)

3. It was a hard *blow*. (*Blow*.)

That the word, *being*, does not fully signify to *be*, is obvious. But it comes as near this import as any other word in the language. There is no word in existence, which signifies to *be*. "To *be*" signifies to *be*. But is to a verb!? Does *am* signify to *be*.

I *am*.

Does *is* signify to *be*!? No verily.

Does *was*, signify to *be*!?

Henry *was*! John *had been*.

Does *had been* signify to *be*!?

Mr. Greenleaf has given a just commentary on the words, to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*.

A verb is a word which expresses *action* or *being*.—GREENLEAF

The form of expression, adopted by GOOLD BROWN, does not change the true ideas of Murray, which are, *being*, *action*, and *suffering*.

"To *act*." Is there a word in our language which signifies to *act*? That *act* with *to*, signifies to *act*, is obvious. But what one word can be found which signifies to *act*!? Does *wrote*, does *ruled*, does *flown*?

1. "James then, *wrote* a letter."

2. "John *ruled* his paper."

3. "The bird has *flown*."

Does *flown* signify to *act*!?

The noun, *blow*, comes as near the expression of the idea signified by the words, "to *be acted upon*," as any other word of which we can now think.

A severe *blow* was struck.

Blow, as a noun, is defined as follows:

"*Blow*—a stroke."

There can be no stroke unless something is struck—hence *blow*, and "to *be acted upon*," are much the same in idea.

Strictly speaking, Mr. Brown has so diminished the range, the reach, of Murray's definition of a verb that no verb can be found in the English language except the noun, *blow*, and "to *be*," and "to *act*!!"

Bradford Frazee's definition of a verb:

"A verb is a word that *asserts* being or action, or a state of being; as, I *write*, He *reads*, John *sits*.

1. Is John in the house?

Does *is* assert, *affirm* that John is in the house!?

2. "Go thou to school."

Does the verb, *go*, which is in the imperative mode, even according to Mr. Frazee's own Grammar, *assert*, *affirm* action!?

3. "If he comes soon."

Does *comes*, which is in the *contingent* mode, *declare*, *affirm*, *assert*, action!?!? Preposterous.

Away, away with trash like this. If this is the *inductive* system of BRADFORD FRAZEE, we pray that the ghost of Murray may visit it before the youth of our country have any thing to do with it. "An Improved Grammar of the English Language!!!" A verb is a word which *asserts*!!!!

John Frost's definition of a verb:

"A verb is a word which *affirms*, or *asserts*, as, *strike*, *walk*, *be*."

We regret that the *learned* author has left this definition without a *picture* nothing but a *cut* can illustrate it!! These verbs in the *imperative* mode, produce no effect whatever! It seems to us that the picture of a *puff-ball* would convey to, and impress upon, the pupil's mind, the true character of Doctor Frost's definition!

Pardon Davis's definition of a verb:

"Any word representing *action*, or *being*, is a verb; as *write*, *be*, *think*."

Does not *subtraction* represent action? What, then, prevents this common noun from becoming a verb??

"The *subtraction* of seven from fourteen, leaves seven."

Why is not "*being*," in the following instance, a verb?

"Both letters are now in *being*."

Does not "*being*" represent being?!

Caleb Farnum's definition of a verb:

"A verb is a word which signifies to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*; as,"

1. Both letters are now in *existence*. (*Existence*.)

2. We are now in the *investigation* of Mr. Farnum's definition of a verb. (*Investigation*.)

3. The *tooth-ache* produces great *suffering*. (*Toothache* and *suffering*.)

Will Mr. Farnum inform us by what authority he calls *resembles* a verb?!

Mr. Farnum *resembles* Mr. Murray.

Will Mr. Farnum inform us by what authority he makes *has* a verb.

Mr. Farnum *has* Mr. Murray's definition of a verb.

Does *resemble* signify *being*, *action*, or *suffering*!?

Does not *has* signify *possession*!?

Dr. Bullions's definition of a verb,

"A verb is a word which expresses an *action*, or *state*; as I *write*, He *sleeps*, They *are*."

If a verb is a word which expresses an *action*, why are not all the nouns which signify *actions*, verbs?!

1. "Henry is now engaged in this very *action*."

Does not the word, *action*, express *action*!?

Why, then, is not "*action*" a verb?!

2. "John is now in a deep *sleep*."

Does not the noun, *sleep*, express a *state*!?

Doctor Bullions is one of the *Murray menders*. In his preface he says,—

"With all its excellence, however, it (*Murray's Grammar*) is far from being incapable of improvement; and the attempt to add to its value as a manual for schools, by *correcting* what is *erroneous*, retrenching what is superfluous or unimportant, compressing what is prolix, *elucidating* what is *obscure*, *determining* what was left *doubtful*, *supplying* what is *defective*, and bringing up the whole to that *state of improvement* to which the labors of eminent scientific and practical writers of the present day, have so greatly contributed, can hardly fail, if *well executed*, to prove acceptable to the public!!"

"To that *state of improvement*."

Has not Mr. Bullions included the noun, *state* in his definition of a verb? Or does not the word, *state*, express a *state*!?

These men who speak so learnedly, yet so *improperly*, on the subject of mending *Murray's* wardrobe, will have enough to do to keep their

own from the ravages of the *paper mill*! That Mr. Bullions, or any other of the *grammar menders*, should presume to prate about bringing *Murray's* works "*up to the state of improvement to which the labors of eminent practical, scientific writers of the present day, have so greatly contributed*," is *bombast*. Let these men learn to *equal*—yes, to *equal*, Murray, before they boast of their abilities to surpass him!

Have,	Could,
May,	Would,
Can,	Should,
Must,	Shall,
Might,	Will,

Should it be urged that these words are *auxiliary* verbs, we must observe that their *auxiliary* character does not bring them within the scope of the definition of a verb. Besides, to urge that these words are *verbs* because they are denominated *auxiliary* verbs, is to contend that a certain man's *sur* name is *Johnson*, because his *Christian* name is *Samuel*! Does the fact that his *Christian* name is *Samuel*, establish the fact that his *sur*-name is *Johnson*!?

Does the fact that these words are called *auxiliary*, establish the fact that they are *really* verbs? If these words are verbs, they are verbs, not because they are called *auxiliary*, but because they are described in the definition of a verb.

In the definition of the verb we find the word, *signify*, employed:

"A verb is a word which *signifies* to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*."

Do any of these *auxiliaries* signify to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*? No one of them signifies any thing of the kind. In proof of this, it may be proper to subjoin the following illustration of these words:

HAVE.

"*Have*," denotes possession; as, children, *have* ye any meat?

MAY.

"*May*," expresses liberty; as, he *may* return if he desires it.

"*May*," also expresses doubt; as, he *may* not be here; although I expect him.

CAN.

"*Can*," expresses power, or ability; as, he *can* pass the guard.

MUST.

"*Must*," denotes necessity, or compulsion; as he *must* pay the debt.

MIGHT.

"*Might*," expresses liberty; as, he *might* have passed the guard, had he been so disposed.

"*Might*," signifies power also; as, he *might* have returned in spite of his keepers.

"*Might*," signifies mere possibility; as, Henry *might* have been present; but it is not probable.

COULD, and WOULD.

"*Could*," signifies power, or ability; as, he *could* stand alone, He *could* pay his debts.

Would, signifies determination; as, he *would* go in.

Would, signifies inclination; as, I *would* that all would come to a knowledge of the truth.

SHOULD.

Should, signifies duty; as, Henry *should* learn his lesson.

Should, signifies determination; as, if he was my child, he *should* obey my orders.

Should, signifies concession; as, *should* he return to Philadelphia, he will call on us. That is, conceding that he returns, &c.

SHALL, and WILL.

1. *Shall*, expresses a *promise*; as, you *shall* be rewarded.

2. *Shall*, expresses a *foretelling*; as, I *shall* go to-morrow.

3. *Shall*, expresses a command; as, thou *shalt* not steal.

4. *Shall* signifies a *threatening*; as, the soul that sinneth, *shall* die.

Will, signifies promising; as, I *will* let thee go.

2. *Will*, signifies foretelling; as, he *will* return soon, you *will* be sick next year.

How can *have*, *has*, *hath*, *had*, *hadst*, *hast*, *may*, *can*, *might*, *could*, *would*, *should*, *shall*, and *will*, be verbs!? Do these words signify *being*, *action*, or *suffering*?

"A verb is a word which signifies *being*, *action*, or *suffering*."

Let us not be told that this is not the form in which Murray gives the definition.

It is given by Mr. Murray himself, in this form; and it is given by Mr. Greenleaf, in the following:

"A verb is a word which expresses *action*, or *being*."

Did verbs signify nothing but *being*, *action*, and *suffering*, it might be well to incorporate their meaning with the definition of their *grammatical* characteristic. But, as they express forty, or fifty totally distinct things, it seems to me, unwise to encumber their *grammatical* description with a formal enumeration of their *Dictionary* imports.

VERBS signify *being*, *action*, *state*, *possession*, *promise*, *command*, *threat*, *foretelling*, *duty*, *power*, *liberty*, *likeness*, *possibility*, *determination*, *cessation*, *obligation*, *appearance*, *continuation*, *necessity*, *desire*, *suffering*, *confidence*, *just ideas of*, *source*, *capacity*, *risk*, *perception*, *faith in*, *improvement in appearance*, *equality*, *amount*, *caution*, *regard*, &c.

That verbs express these things, is clearly demonstrated below.

This is not all; for the meanings of verbs as here enumerated fall directly under the idea of grammar. The *context* meaning of words, is a *part of grammar*. The meaning of a word which is taken alone, is taught by a *Dictionary*, not by a *Grammar*. All the *shades* of meaning, which words acquire from their *framework* relation with each other, and all the shades of meaning, which they acquire from the nature of the subject to which they are applied in the form of a *syllabane*, or a *sentence*, make a part of *grammar*. These shades of *verbal import*, may be styled the *context* meaning of words. But these meanings are too numerous to become the *basis* of the *grammatical* definitions of the ten classes of words. The verb, *make*, alone, has fifty *context* meanings.

Do the verbs in the following sentences signify to *be*, to *do*, or to *suffer*?

THE MEANING OF VERBS.

1. Being: I *am*.
2. Action: I *write*.
3. State: I *sit*.
4. Possession: I *have* a book.
5. Promise: I *will* return.
6. Command: Thou *shalt* not steal.
7. Threat: If ye eat, ye *shall* die.
8. Foretelling: If ye eat, ye *will* die.
9. Duty: He *ought* to be there.
10. Power: He *can* be there.
11. Liberty: He *may* go there if he wishes.
12. Likeness: He *resembles* her.
13. Possibility: He *may* be there, and he *may* not.
14. Determination: He *shall* go.
15. Cessation: He *fasted* a day.
16. Obligation: He *must* pay the note.
17. Appearance: He *seems* well.
18. Continuation: He *remained* here three days.
19. Desire: He wishes, he *wants*, to return.
20. Necessity: He *needs* bread, and meat.
21. Suffering: He is *burning* up in this fire.
21. Suffering: He is *wasting* away under this disease.
22. Confidence in: "We *trust* we have a good conscience."
23. Just ideas of: He *understands* the problem.
24. Source: This river *heads* in the Blue Mountains.
25. Capacity to contain: The pail *holds* ten quarts.
26. Sound, true, just: The rule holds in lands as well as in other things.—LOCKE.
27. Continuation: While our obedience *holds*.—MILTON.
27. Continuation: "The provisions *lasted* six days."
28. Risk: These men never *risk* any thing.

29. *Clear, certain perception* : "If any man will do his will, he shall *know* of the doctrine.

30. *Faith in* : "The prince *confides* in his ministers."

30. *Faith in* : "These men *believe* in the Lord."

31. *Improvement in appearance* : The hat *becomes* him.

32. *Possession* : He *enjoys* good health. (*has*.)

33. *Necessity, duty* : "It *behooved* Christ to suffer."

34. *Equality* : One dollar *equals* one hundred cents.

35. *Amount* : The two sums *amount* to thirty cents.

36. *Equivalence* : The meat *weighs* ten pounds.

36. *Equivalence* : The board *measures* ten feet. [That is, the board in *measure*, is ten feet.]

37. *Caution* : "Beware of false prophets."

38. *Special care* : Beware thou, of the angel whom I send unto thee : obey thou him. [Ex.xxiii.]

39. *Brightness* : "His gold *shines* like the sun himself."

40. *Extension* : The Bridge *extends* across the stream.

[Does the bridge *act*? If not, *extends* does not signify an *action*.]

41. *Destitution* : "Timber may *want* strength, and solidity to answer the purpose."

42. *Occasion for* : "Their manners *want* correction."

We have demonstrated that verbs mean something more than *being, action, and suffering*.

In many instances, however, verbs have no meaning—on many occasions they surrender their signification entirely. To show this, it will be necessary to enter into a formal illustration.

That *trusts, understands, heads, holds, risk, know, believes, becomes, enjoys, behooves, equals, amounts, weights, measures, &c.*, may be so used that they will express actions, may be very possible. But do these verbs express *actions* here? They do not,

It may be said with an air of triumph, that several of the verbs employed in this illustration, are *auxiliary verbs*! If they are *auxiliary verbs*, they are *surely verbs*. And, if they are *verbs*, they are so because they fall under the following definition.

A *verb* is a word which signifies,

1. *Being*, 2. *Action*, or, 3. *Suffering*

But do they fall under this *definition*!?

What! Does the fact of calling a word an *auxiliary verb*, bring the word under the preceding definition of a verb? !!

"The papers are *extinct*."

Does *are* denote the existence of the papers? Nothing like it.

The adjective, *extinct*, shows that there are no papers to exist!! Do the papers exist in an *extinct* state!?

If the account which is given of the class of verbs in this work, is just, how *defective*, and erroneous is that given of this class of words in the old theory of English grammar! Can it be possible that the *character* of the verb, with all its *simplicity, prominence, and importance*, is not yet understood?

The following proposition will answer this question :

"A *VERB* is a word which signifies *being, action, or suffering*!!"

The expression of *being, action, and suffering*, is not peculiar to *verbs*. Hence, an attempt to define verbs upon this fact must fail. That verbs are the signs, the names, of ideas, is rendered very clear from the consideration that men employ them in the *expression of thought*. But that *what* they *express*, through the agency of their *Dictionary* meaning, is the *characteristic* mark by which they alone are classed *together*, is without foundation.

Having given a few of the *many* verbs which the definition does not describe, and which, consequently, it cannot include. We will now pass on to a consideration of a few of the *many* nouns which the definition of the verb, *truly* describes, and fairly includes,

The words in the following list, according to the common definition of a verb, are in truth *verbs*, though they are styled *nouns*.

Race, *action*.

Pain, *sensation of uneasiness*.—WALKER.

Investigation, *the act of searching, examining*.

Decursion, *the act of running down*.—WALKER.

Dedication, *the act of Dedicating*.—WALKER.

Decumbence, *the act of lying down*.—WALKER.

Declination, *the act of bending*.—WALKER.

Debasement, *the act of debasing or degrading*.—WALKER.

Being, *existence*.—WALKER.

Tooth-ache, *pain in the teeth*.

Head-ache, *pain in the head*.—WALKER.

To assert that, "a *verb* is a word which signifies *to be*," and then to exclude *being* from the class of verbs is absurd.

Equally inconsistent is it to affirm that a verb is a word which signifies *action*, and then exclude *race, investigation, decursion, dedication, decumbence, declination, debasement, and thousands* of the same kind from the family of verbs! And to include *suffering* in the *definition* of a verb, and after all, exclude *pain, head-ache, tooth-ache, &c.*, shows a defect in the definition, which bewilders the learner as much as the *tooth-ache* does its unhappy victim.

The truth is, that *to be, to do, or to suffer*, is neither a definition, nor a description, of a verb. To make this feeble attempt extend to the various characters which verbs sustain, would advance the little group, "*to be, to do, or to suffer*," to a catalogue of items, the length of which would perplex, and discourage the pupil at the very threshold.

Let us now hear Mr. Greenleaf upon the verb:

"A VERB is a word which expresses ACTION or BEING"—As, both letters are now in BEING!

The word, *being*, certainly expresses BEING—hence this common noun is a verb! This compiler is one who stands high—for mending Mr. Murray! But this noun is a verb by Mr. Murray's definition, and it continues a verb even by the definition given by his *simplifiers*!

Again—"The *race* of the last horses." Now, from the received definition of a verb, the noun, "*race*," is in truth a verb. Yet, from the received definition of a noun, this VERB is a noun!! What! will a friend to science pretend that, when, a verb is a word which expresses action, that "*race*" is not a verb? Does not this word express as much action as the word "*run*?" The word, *run*, is called a verb. But why? Because it expresses action. And will any grammarian show us that *race*, and *run*, in the following instance, do not express the same thing?

"This horse runs a swift race."

If *runs* is a verb because it expresses action, what must *race* be called? *Race* not only expresses action, but the very same action, denoted by the verb, "*runs*!"

Let us hear Mr. Comly upon the verb.

"A VERB is a part of speech which signifies to be, to act, or to receive an action."

It is very questionable whether there is a word in the English language, which denotes the ideas, or even one of the ideas embraced in Mr. Comly's definition. For instance—where is the word which signifies to act.

"Henry wrote a letter."

We ask whether there is a word in the expression which signifies to act? Can we say that "*wrote*" signifies to act? This word signifies the action itself, and that too, as already done! If we say "Nancy dances"—"*dances*," is a verb—but surely "*dances*" denotes the act itself!

"The boy runs."

"Runs" does not mean the "complex idea," "to act,"—this word denotes action itself.

But this definition is still more vulnerable—

"A verb is a word which signifies, to act, to be, or to receive an action."

What word has the English language, which signifies "to receive an action." That our language has some few words which signify receiving, or the act of receiving, is true—But we think that we hazard nothing in saying that the English language has no one word which signifies the complex idea in this definition of a verb, by Mr. Comly. A word, to be a verb under this definition, must not only signify the act of receiving; but it must also signify that the thing received, is another act! Hence a verb is a word which must signify two actions at the same time—yes, more, for both actions must be received.

A verb is a word which signifies "to receive an action."

If a word, then signifies the act of receiving a dollar, it is no verb at all—because a verb is a word which signifies the act of receiving actions! In the expression—"John received a crown," there is no verb! Yet in the instance—"John received a blow," *received* becomes a verb—since the thing received is an action!

Mr. Comly has undertaken to simplify Mr. Murray's Grammar. But this Grammar has neither required nor received any simplification from the pen of any author. Mr. Murray has presented his own errors as clearly as language could present them. In the grammar of Mr. Murray, nothing lies concealed—nothing is hid by a confused manner of expression. Mr. Murray collected the erroneous suggestions of hundreds of men, formed these hints into battle array, tented the field of grammatical science, and waged war against common sense, and his own language. And to render this fact more clear than the pen of Murray has presented it, we have had annual *simplifiers*, and *grammar liars*!! But the whole race in conjunction, has not half the powers which that good man has manifested in his works. He took the first suggestions upon this abstruse science—and he has expressed them in a style so limpid, and with a diction so smooth, and gentle, that the mind is charmed into a kind of literary trance; and thus swims along without feeling the snags of error, which retard its progress. "A verb, (say that great scholar,) signifies to be, to do, or to suffer."

His words fall like the nimble fingers of the master—and like the chords of his instrument they send forth a music which delights the ear even though it does not instruct the brain.

But Mr. COMLY says, "A verb is a part of speech, which signifies to act, to be, or to receive an action."

Let us now ask what could have induced Mr. COMLY to innovate upon the definition given by Mr. MURRAY. Mr. COMLY desired to express the fact that the thing denoted by the nominative, receives the action, expressed by the principal verb of the passive voice; as, the letter was written.

Is this fact an important one? It may be important where it has an application. But in grammar, it has no application. A definition of a verb, may be made without embracing this fact—but one never can be made by embracing it. And, for this clear reason—where the voice of the compound verb is active, the idea of receiving an action is as forcible as it is where the voice is passive. For instance—"I have written letters."

But we may be told that the action of writing is here received by the objective noun. And what then? Why it was Mr. Comly's intention that only the nominative should receive this action, as, the letter was written.

No matter, however, what Mr. Comly meant. We are concerned with what he has expressed. He has expressed no such *limitation*.

"A verb is a part of speech which signifies to *act*, to *be*, or to *receive an action*."

What is it that receives the action which the verb expresses? Does the definition answer this question? No.—But even upon the ground that the author's definition does restrict this action to the nominative noun, what then? He has taken a principle with the view to arrive at a *precise* point, which in its full operation, carries him through all the points in his definition. The principle which he has employed to restrict the action to the nominative case, carries it to the objective case also. And would the author be working like a logician to insert a saving clause in his definition, and thus cut down this general principle to suit the dimensions of his particular situation? No—let him take a new principle—one which requires no cutting, and carving, in his mill of phrases!

"A verb is a part of speech which signifies to *act*, to *be*, or to *receive an action*" into the *subject*!

We admit that this is curious phraseology—but when a man is disposed to reject the limbs which nature gives him, he must receive *wooden* ones, or go without!

Let us now hear Mr. Hubbard on the subject of the verb.

"A verb is a word which signifies to *BE*, to *ACT*, or to *be acted upon*."

When we first saw this definition, we withdrew our pen. But from further reflection, we thought that the definition ought "TO BE ACTED UPON."

The work of Mr. Hubbard, is recommended by gentlemen of some science, and from this fact alone, we feel bound to give it a passing notice. Mr. Hubbard admits, in the preface of his work, that he has selected from other grammars considerably—and drawn very heavily upon the work of Gould Brown. And if we recollect right, the definition before us, is that which Mr. Brown formed out of Comly's definition of the same part of speech! We think, however, that the definition, as presented by Mr. G. B. has a little more *ornament* about it! Mr. Brown says,

"A verb is a word which signifies to *BE*, to *DO* an ACTION, or to *BE ACTED UPON*."

This form of the definition, has a peculiar advantage over that in which Mr. Hubbard presents it! Mr. Hubbard says—

"A verb is a word which signifies to *BE*, to *ACT*, or to *BE ACTED UPON*."

Now, when we say to *act*, we cannot proceed, and point out *what* we *act*, unless we go by Cardell, and say to *act* an *action*!! But in using "to *do*" instead of "to *act*," one is able even without Mr. C. to express distinctly what he acts—for he can then say, as has Mr. Brown, to *do* an

ACTION!! Thus, Mr. Brown renders all plain—for without the word, *action*, the pupil would be very likely to think that the meaning might be to *do* something besides *actions*!!

"To be acted upon,"

In what light is this clause to be taken? Or, is it not designed for the *light*? What word is there in the English language, which signifies "TO BE ACTED UPON? The noun, *BLOW*, comes as near this mixed idea as any other word—but even this does not fully answer. This word, however, may be a NOUN, and a VERB—and that all may be conducted upon fair principles, we shall give the word as it is defined to be a noun; and also as it is defined to be a verb—we shall then leave it to the reader to say whether *blow* as a noun, or *blow* as a verb, is made a verb by the clause—"SIGNIFIES TO BE ACTED UPON!"

As a noun it is thus defined—*blow*, a *stroke*. As a verb, it is thus defined—*blow*, to *plant*, to *bloom*, to *blossom*?

Any word representing *action* or *being*, is a verb; as, *Write, be, think*.—PARDON DAVIS.

How can *write* represent action unless it is the *name* of action!! And, if *write* is a name, is it not a *noun*!!?

Does not the nouns, *action*, and *being*, used in this very definition of a verb, represent *action*, and *being*!!! Why, then, are not *action*, and *being*, verbs!!! Will it be said that the word, *action*, does not represent action!! Will it be said that the noun, *being*, does not represent *being*!!?

Allow us to repeat this definition of a verb:

"Any word representing *action*, or *being*, is a verb."

Ah! and does it follow from this that no other words are verbs!!!?

Every teacher of a *public* school, is a human being. Does it follow from this that no being who does not teach a *public* school, is human!!!? Even if all the words which signify *action* or *being*, were verbs, would it follow that no others are verbs!!? Verbs express hundreds, and hundreds of things besides, *action*, and *being*.

Now, if the illustration on page 53, of the meaning of verbs, is correct, and surely it is *proved* from *examples*, how diminutively does the British definition, "*being, action, or suffering*," appear?—a mere *mouse*, laboring to *swallow* an *ox*! But the *limitation* of the British definition is not its worst fault. The definition is designed as a kind of net in which to catch *verbs only*, but it seems much better adapted to the catching of *nouns*! Verbs can hardly be *driven* into it: but *nouns* can not be kept *out* of it! "Mend it," mend it! It has been mended with every kind of material, already, and by all sorts of *workmen*. Some have tampered with it till it will hold nothing; others have *patched*, and *overlaid* it till no eye can discern what it is, or what it contains—and among

them all, it has lost the life of words and the comeliness of language.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

1. Some of the old school grammarians say that the *actor* himself gives the noun the *nominative-case* character; as,

"The book was read by *me*!"

Others of this class of scholars, say that the *subject itself* gives the noun the *nominative-case* character; as,

John, thou wast punished by thy teacher!"

But the new school grammarians repudiate the doctrine that the *actor* himself infuses into the noun, the *nominative-case* character: they reject this doctrine as *witchcraft*.

What! can the thing itself impart to its mere name, any sort of character? More especially, can the thing infuse into its mere name, a character which the thing does not possess!? Has the *actor* himself the *nominative-case* character? No, no! How, then, can the *actor* infuse into its mere name this character!? Preposterous! As well may it be said that a *coward* can impart martial courage to *his* name!!!

They tell us that a *subject* is the thing mainly spoken of. But of what does the *subject* character consist? Does the *subject* character consist of the mere fact that the thing is principally spoken of? If it does not consist of this fact, in the name of philosophy, of what does it consist? Let the *subject* character, however, consist of what it may, we declare that the doctrine that the thing, the real subject, imparts this character to its mere name, is nothing but *witchcraft*. The doctrine, that the *subject* character, be it what it may, is translated through the *pores* of the subject into the *name* of the subject, where it is changed into the *nominative-case*, is neither more nor less, than the doctrine of *miracles*! We reject the doctrine of the *formation* of this character in the subject,—we reject the doctrine of the *translation* of this character from the thing to the name of the thing,—and we reject the doctrine of the *transubstantiation* of this character into the *nominative case*! No being but God himself, can do these mighty, these wonderful, works, Murray! he attempt to perform these feats!? No! no! *Murray*, and all his jugglers, must here fail, as did the *enchanters* and the *soothsayers* of Egypt, in their attempt to imitate the thunder, and lightning, the tempest, and pestilence, which the minister of God spread over that land.

The old school grammarians say that the *verb* character is derived from the thing which the word signifies. But what is the *verb* character? They inform us that "A verb is a word which signifies *being, action, or suffering.*"

This definition, however, does not answer the question. This definition tell us *what* a verb sig-

nifies—it does not even undertake to inform us in what the *verb* trait of character consists.

We have shown that *nouns* and other parts of speech signify the same things. We must, then, repeat the question:

What is the *verb* trait of character? Is the *verb* trait of character the fact that the word signifies *being, action, or suffering*? No! no! nothing like it.

The *verb* trait of character, is the capacity of the word to *aid* in forming a cordiction.

This simple capacity which has nothing to do with the *signification* of the word, is the *ear-mark* that distinguishes the verb from all other *branch* words.

And to express this characteristic of the verb, we have formed the following definition which we offer as a substitute for the old one. But the verb is in possession of four *distinct* powers which are never exerted by any other words, hence in our substitute, we shall include these four powers that are peculiar to the verb.

THE VERB DENOMINATION,

Is a large class of *cordictive* branch words which act in a *quadruple, triple, double, or single* capacity, as occasion requires; as,

1. John *loves* his enemies, John *has* books. *Quadruple.*
2. John *will* love his enemies; Go thou. *Triple.*
3. John *having* a book, he read aloud. *Triple.*
4. John *being* wise, we took his advice. *Double*
5. John *will* love his enemies. *Single.*
6. John *will* be good. *Single.*
7. John *will* have come by ten o'clock. *Single.*

[The same definition in another form.]

THE VERB DENOMINATION,

Is a large class of *cordictive* branch words which exert, or surrender their *cordictive, ascribing, tense, and their significant* power, as occasion requires; as,

1. I *have* a book.
Here *have* exerts its *four* powers.
2. I *can* have a book.
Here *can* exerts its *four* powers. But *have* surrenders three; *have* exerts its *significant* power only.
3. John *can* be good.
Here *can* exerts its *four* powers. But *be* surrenders three; *be* exerts its *ascribing* power only.
4. John *will* have come by ten o'clock.
Here *will* exerts its *cordictive, its significant, and its tense* power.
Have exerts its *tense* power only. *Come* exerts its *significant* power only.

Have, Be.

Have, and Be are the only verbs which are

required to surrender both their *cordictive*, and their *significant* power, on any occasion.

Where *be*, or *been* is used to *ascribe* something which is expressed by other words, it surrenders both its *cordictive*, and its *significant* power; as,

1. John can *be* good.
2. James will *be* a good boy.
3. Joseph has *been* good.
4. Nathaniel will have *been* in the city three weeks next Monday.

1. In the first *be* ascribes the goodness, expressed by *good*, to John.

2. In the second, *be* is used to ascribe the predicate, a *good boy*, to James.

3. In the third, *be*, thrown into *been*, ascribes the goodness denoted by *good*, to Joseph.

4. In the fourth, *been*, (which is *be* in another form,) is employed to ascribe Nathaniel to the city—or rather, to ascribe him to the *place* denoted by *in*. In the following, however, *be* exerts its *significant* power only:—

John must *be*.

That is, he must *exist*.

Have.

Where *have* is used to fix the *time* of the mono, it surrenders its *ascribing*, its *cordictive*, and its *significant* power; as,

1. John could *have* written last week.
2. Nathaniel will have been in Philadelphia three weeks next Monday.
3. I shall *have* seen my father by one o'clock to morrow.
4. I shall *have* a book soon.

In the fourth, *have* retains its *significant* power, which it exerts in expressing *possession*.

5. I *have* written several books.

Here *have* surrenders its *significant*, but retains its *cordictive*, its *ascribing*, and its *tense* power.

1. I *have* a book. (Exertion of the four powers.)
2. They *do* the work. (Exertion of the four powers.)
3. I *can* have a book. (*Can*. Exertion of the four powers.)
4. *Has* he a book. (Exertion of the four powers.)
5. I *have written* a book. (*Have* exerts three powers—written one.)
6. I *can have* a book. (*Have* exerts its *significant* power only.)
7. They *do write* books. (*Do* exerts its *cordictive*, its *ascribing*, and its *tense* power—*write* exerts its *significant* power only.)
8. I *am* sick. (*Am* surrenders its *significant*, but exerts its *cordictive*, *ascribing*, and its *tense* power.)
9. I *am*. (Here *am* exerts its four powers. *Am* here expresses existence.)

But, as the works on whose definitions of the verb, we have already commented, have been improved by JOHN S. HART, JOSEPH R. CHANDLER, &c., we deem it important to show what these *Murray* menders say upon the verb.

JOHN S. HART says that:

“A VERB is a *part of speech* used to *assert* or *affirm*; as, the boy *sleeps*.”

To doubt the *correctness* of this proposition as a definition of a verb, would be *sacrilegious*.

This is the language of the POPE of the PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and it must be considered as *canonical*, in grammar, as the words of ST. PAUL in religion.

Still with all the *sacred drapery* with which this definition is attired, it can not awe us into *perfect* silence.

This definition of a verb, though given by the *Papal See* himself, does not seem to us to be sufficiently *Catholic* to include the verb in *interrogative* propositions; as, *is* John sick? *Do* they *write* slowly?

As here is no *assertion*, or *affirmation*, *is*, *do*, and *write* are not verbs!!

Nor can we see in what way this definition of a verb includes the verbs in *imperative* sentences; as, *Go* thou.

Now, unless Mr. Hart can show that when we command persons to go, we actually affirm that they are now in the act of going, how can *go* be made a verb?!!

In short it seems clear to our minds that this definition of a verb embraces all the nouns, and all the pronouns which are in the *nominative* case, in *affirmative* sentences, and excludes all the verbs which are in *imperative*, *interrogative*, *petitionative*, and in *subfirmative* sentences.

1. “The *boy sleeps*.”

That *sleeps* is used to aid the word, *boy*, in making the affirmation, is obvious. But, while it is obvious that *sleeps* is used to aid the word, *boy*, to form the cordiction of the sentence, it is clear that *boy* is used to aid the word, *sleeps*, to form the same affirmation!! Hence, if *sleeps* is a verb because it aids in the formation of the assertion, by parity of reasoning, the noun, *boy*, is a verb too! “A verb is a *part of speech* used to *assert* or *affirm*; as, the boy *sleeps*.” (HART’S Grammar, p. 61.)

In a note, written in *very bad English*, Mr. Hart says, “This is *true* of no other part of speech, and may be considered the *distinguishing* characteristic of the verb.” (Page 61.)

What is “*true of no other part of speech*?”

Why, it is *true of no other part of speech* that the verb is used to *assert* or *affirm*!!!

But is not the *noun* used to *assert* or *affirm*? And is not the *pronoun* used to *assert* or *affirm*? Can an assertion, an affirmation, be made without the use of a *noun*, or a *pronoun*? Why does Mr. HART use the noun, *boy*, in the example by which he attempts to illustrate his definition of the verb?

Why does he not make the assertion without this noun!? [Sleeps.]

It is *true of no other part of speech* that the verb is used to assert, or affirm!

According to Mr. HART's definition of a verb not one of the following syllabanes, has a *verb* :

To walk. To sleep.

Is it said that the President is ill?

Pardon our transgressions.

Forgive our sins.

These syllabanes contain no assertion; hence they have no *verbs*!!

It is *true of no other part of speech* that the *verb* is used to assert, or affirm. :

That is, it is *true of no other man* that JOHN S. HART has given a definition of a verb, which *excludes all verbs* from *interrogative, imperative, petitionative, and conditional sentences*!!

And it is *true of no other man*, JOSEPH R. Chandler excepted, that JOHN S. HART makes the *verb* the only word which is used to *affirm* or *assert*!!

Now, as Mr. Hart has made the verb the only word which is used to *assert*, or *affirm*, he would be glad to make his Grammar the only one which can be used in the *Public schools*.

To accomplish the *first*, he emblazons his *principalship* in relation to the HIGH SCHOOL, and his MEMBERSHIP in respect to the AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, upon the title page of his book. And to secure the latter, he requires all the young gentlemen sent from the *Grammar schools*, for admission into the HIGH SCHOOL, to be examined in *his own Grammar*!! So that what with his *principalship*, and what with his *membership*, Mr. HART has managed to make many believe that he has actually mended up the old grammar with considerable skill; and partly with this impression, and partly by *coercing* the MASTERS in the PUBLIC Grammar schools, to use his book, by rejecting the young gentlemen who are not able to say,

"A verb is a *part of speech* used to *assert* or *affirm*," he has succeeded in *forcing* several to use a book in which there is neither *grammatical truth*, nor *grammatical English*!

But, although Mr. Hart's definition does not furnish the *true ear-mark* of a verb, it does give the important fact that a verb is a *part of speech*.

We should all feel thankful for this information. With this clear statement, that the verb is a mere *part of the language*, we shall not be very liable to adopt the error, that the verb is the *whole*, the *entire language*!!!

True, from a slight glance, this seems impossible; but if JOHN S. HART can *imagine* that he constitutes the entire *American Philosophical Society*, as he *himself* intimates, may not many people imagine that the *verb* constitutes the *entire ENGLISH LANGUAGE*!!

Mr. Chandler's definition of a verb.

"VERBS generally express what is declared of some object or its existence." [Page 11.]

That is, there must be *something* declared of an object; and the word which expresses this *something*, is a verb.

In what way to illustrate this idea by examples, we know not. Mr. Chandler, however, employs the following sentences:

Verbs.

Verbs.

"Charles writes. William reads."

"The people worship. The birds sing."

"Charles writes."

Here the something which is declared, is that Charles, not Joseph, writes. And *writes*, says Mr. Chandler, is a verb because it expresses this something. What something? Why, that *Charles writes*. But can *writes* express the fact that *Charles writes*!! Let us see.

Writes,—

But who writes!! This is not expressed by *writes*!! Hence *writes* is not a *verb*!!! To express the fact that *Charles writes*, the word, *Charles*, should stand in juxtaposition with *writes*; as,

Charles writes.

"VERBS generally express *what* is declared of some object." Now, that which is here declared, is that *Charles writes*. But does *writes* express the fact that *Charles writes*!!?

What is it which expresses the fact that it is *Charles*, and not *Joseph*, who writes!! We somewhat think that the fact that it is *Charles*, and not another, is expressed by the proper noun, *Charles*!!!

"VERBS generally express *what* is declared of some object."

Who that has glanced at the *outside* of Mr. Chandler's head, through the medium of the pictures which adorn several of our *print shops*, can believe that this definition of a verb, is a true portrait of the *inside* of the same part of this distinguished person!? That this definition of a verb, however, is a *true drawing* of the *inside* of his head, is obvious from the consideration that he himself made it!!! The pictures in the *print shops* give the *crust* only; but this definition of a verb, gives the *pulp itself*!!!

"VERBS generally express *what* is declared of some object."

1. "Mr. Chandler is a very great grammarian."

The something which is here declared of Mr. Chandler, is that he is a *very great grammarian*.

Before *is*, then, can be called a *verb*, it must express this entire fact, or predicate of Mr. Chandler!!!

2. "Mr. Webster is now in Congress."

What is here declared of Mr. Webster? Why,

that he is in Congress. But does *is* express this fact!? If *is* expresses this entire fact, why not use *is* alone—*is*!!!

The teacher who uses Mr. Chandler's Grammar does not know what this definition of a verb is.

It is here declared that *the teacher does not know what Mr. Chandler's definition of a verb, is*. But surely the verb, *does know*, does not express all this!!!

"VERBS generally express what is declared of some object."

John writes with a gold pen.

Here it is declared of John that he *writes with a gold pen*. But does *writes* express all this!? Nothing like it! the only idea of which *writes* is significant is that of writing—*writes* does not express *who* writes—nor does this verb express with what *instrument* the writer forms the letters!!!

1. Will John come?
2. John, go thou to school.
3. Pardon our transgressions.
4. If it rains!

Here are four sentences—yet if Mr. Chandler is right, there is not one verb employed!!!

The first is an *interrogation*—hence there is nothing declared of an object.

The second is a *command*—hence there is nothing declared in it of an object.

The third is a *petition*; and the fourth is a *subfirmation*.

We find the following note appended to Mr. Chandler's definition of a verb:

"Verbs are to a sentence, what a vowel is to a word; that is, as without a vowel no word can be formed, so, without a verb no perfect sentence, however short, can be made." [P. 47.]

We will not say that there is a "*screw loose here*" but there are certainly *several wanting*!!!

Here is the doctrine which Mr. Hart attempts to inculcate that no word but a *verb*, can aid in the formation of a sentence. But surely what Mr. Chandler here says of the verb, may be said of both nouns, and pronouns:

Nouns, and pronouns are to a sentence what a vowel is to a word; that is, as without a vowel no word can be formed, so, without a *noun*, or *pronoun* no perfect sentence, however short, can be made!!

Just before the publication of Chandler's Grammar almost every body was notified by a special proclamation in the HAND BILL form, that the memorable event would soon happen. And at length the book itself actually appeared according to the *hand Bill* prediction.

It came forth, labeled

"Chandler's common school Grammar."

From Science hill, loud peans came
To Genius, Learning, and to Fame,
The publishers exulting, said

A Grammar rare, is being made
By the great Grammar King himself,
Which will lay Murray on the shelf,
"The house is being built," says Joe,
This phrase shall soon be all the go,
For I, the King, will have it so.
And Science hill be brought so low
That all who on this Grammar feast,
Will reach it with one step at least.
And, what we more than all desire,
Our speech will fewer words require,
Since all that can be said or done,
Will be expressed by *verbs alone*!!

CHAPTER XI.

OF MOOD.

"Mood or mode is a particular form of the verb, showing the manner in which the being, action or passion is represented."

The nature of mood may be more intelligibly explained to the scholar, by observing that it consists in the change which the verb undergoes, to signify various intentions of the mind, and various modifications and circumstances of action; which explanation, if compared with the following account and uses of the different moods, will be found to agree with, and illustrate them.—MURRAY.

This definition is so far from the true character of mood, that we do not hesitate to say the whole is unfounded. The mood of a verb has no connection with its *forms*, with its *changes*.

"There are five moods of verbs, the INDICATIVE, the IMPERATIVE, the POTENTIAL, the SUBJUNCTIVE, and the INFINITIVE."

The Indicative Mood simply indicates, or declares a thing; as, he loves, he is loved—or it asks a question; as, Does he love? Is he loved?

The Imperative Mood is used for commanding, exhorting, entreating, or permitting; as, Depart thou; mind ye; let us stay; go in peace.

The Potential Mood implies possibility or liberty, power, will, or obligation; as, It may rain; he may go or stay; I can ride; he would walk; they should learn.

The Subjunctive Mood represents a thing under condition, motive, wish, supposition, &c., and is preceded by a conjunction, expressed or understood, and attended by another verb; as I will respect him, *though* he chide me; were he good he would be happy; that is, *if* he were good.

The Infinitive Mood expresses a thing in a general and unlimited manner, without any distinction of number.—MURRAY.

The definition says that mood is a *particular* form—if so, the form, peculiar to a certain mood, must be *fixed*, and *unchangeable* so long as the

verb is of the same mood; otherwise, there is no particular form in the case.

1. "The *imperative* mood is used for commanding, exhorting, entreating or permitting; as, *Depart* thou; *mind* ye; *let* us stay; *go* in peace."

Let us now put these verbs into their *indicative* form, or mood, and see whether they continue in the same shape in which they are in the imperative:

Example.—We *depart*, we *mind*, they *stay*, ye *go* in peace.

Reader, observe the verbs in both sets of examples. Are they not of the same form in both? The *imperative* mood, therefore, is the *indicative*; and the *indicative*, the *imperative*!! This is not quibbling, reader, for we are told, by the definition of mood, that it is a particular form of the verb. Hence, as the *imperative* form, and the *indicative* form, are the same, there can be no distinction between the two moods.

Let us now put the same verbs into the *infinitive* mood. *To depart*; *to mind*; *to let*; *to stay*; *to go*.

Do these verbs vary their forms? How, then, can they change their mood? For the form of the verb is its mood!!

2. "The *potential* implies *possibility*, *liberty*, *power*, *will*, or *obligation*. Example: I *can* write.

Is it the form of *can*, which expresses the power to do the action, denoted by *write*? No. The *body*, the *trunk*, of the word, denotes this power. Where would be the use of giving a word, a form, synonymous, in meaning, with the word itself? Is it the true province of *can* to denote power. But it may be said that *can* is the form, or mood of *write*. Let us examine this point. If *can* is a part of *write*, it is clear that *can*, and *write* make but one word. *Write* denotes the action of making letters with a pen; *can* expresses the power, or ability of doing it. But is it true that the same verb expresses both the action, and power of doing it? No.

Again—*can* is called an auxiliary verb; and *write* is called a principal—are there, then, not two verbs here? Two names have been given: why imply by giving two names, that there are two things, or words, if, indeed, there is but one?

Perhaps some may contend that because *can* is auxiliary to *write*, it can with propriety be identified with *write*: hence, both make but one. If *can* is to be considered as a mere part of *write*, simply because it is secondary to it, should not the adjective, and its noun be consolidated, and thus call both words one noun!? should not the verb, and the adverb be identified one with the other, by calling both, one part of speech? should not the article, and the noun become woven into one another also, by styling both a noun!? And

should not the preposition be cemented to the noun, and the noun to the preposition, and thus diminish the number of the parts of speech by including of hats under the name, noun?

But are words less distinct as individuals, because they are secondary to others? Shall the sub-officers enter into, and make a part of, the individuality of the superior? Each officer has his province, and so does each word have its.

Can denotes the power; and *writes* the action about which the power is to be employed.

Does it appear from the closeness of the two words that one is a mere part of the other? Is not *can* placed that distance from *write*, which shows that it is a distinct word? Is it united with it in orthographical frame-work?

In truth, however, *can* is not secondary to *write*. *Can* holds no frame-work relation with *write*. Does *can* ascribe the ability to the action itself, or does it attribute it to the person denoted by *I*? "I can write."

Whether the real power is more, or less, important than the real action is not the point! And it is well that this is not, for all the philosophy of which man is master, would not be sufficient to solve the problem. One thing, however, is clear; namely, that so far as the furnishing of the material out of which the sentence character of the above frame-work of words, is formed, gives rank, standing, importance, to words, *can* stands much higher than *write*. *Can*, and *write* both contain the first principles of a sentence character—but the sentence character of the above assemblage of words, is formed by the concurrent exertion of *I* and *can*. The affirmation, the sentence character, respects power, ability—I *can*. I *can* write. Not—I *write*.

"The potential mood implies possibility, liberty, power, will, or obligation."*

The next reflection which we shall offer upon this definition, is that it embraces many adjectives, and adverbs, and includes many, very many, verbs that are in the *indicative*—

The verbs in italic, in the following examples, are in the *indicative*—

1. He *ought* to be here: (moral obligation.)
2. They *liberated* us from this bondage: (*liberty*.)
3. We *freed* them from those fetters: (*liberty*.)
4. We *please* ourselves, not others: (*liberty*.)
5. The articles *incline* me to purchase: (*will*.)
6. I *mean* to write: (*will*.)
7. He *intends* to be good: (*will*.)
8. I *wish* the man would appear: (*will*.)

Perhaps John is *wilful*.

Perhaps is an adverb, and certainly denotes possibility; *wilful* is an adjective, and surely expresses will.

With respect to the verbs in the preceding

*To this attempt at a definition of this mood, John Comly adds the item of *duty*.

instances, we have no hesitation in saying, that they *all*, individually taken, *imply* one, or another, of the items which make up this singular description of a *useless* mood. And many of the verbs *express* in a *direct* way the very items which this mood represents.

Another objection which we offer to this attempt, is the fact that the very signs of the potential mood, associate themselves with those of the *subjunctive*; as, it *may* rain, *If* it *may* rain; He *may* go, or stay, *If* he *may* go, or stay; *I can* ride, *If I can* ride; He *would* walk, *Whether* or *if* he *would* walk; He *may* go or stay, *If* he *may* go or stay; They *should* learn, *If* they *should* learn.

Now, we ask, in which mood the verbs that are attended by the two different signs at the same time, are to be. *If*, places the verb in the *subjunctive* mood, and *can*, in the *potential*!!! The truth is, that if the potential mood is continued, it will be important to have a new mood; for the verbs which are thus liberally furnished with modal signs, are in the *subjunctive potential* mood!!!

We shall now subjoin a few remarks upon the manner in which Mr. Murray supports the *potential* mood. The course he adopts is presented under the 73d page of his duodecimo work. The remarks commence thus:

"That the potential mood should be separated from the *subjunctive*, is evident from the intricacy, and confusion which are produced by their being *blended together*; from the distinct nature of the two moods, the former of which may be expressed without any condition, supposition, &c., as will appear from the following instances:—'They *might* have done better.' 'We *may* always act upright.' 'He was generous, and *would* not take revenge,' 'We *should* resist the allurements of vice,' 'I *could* formerly indulge myself in things, of which I cannot now think but with pain.'"

"The former of which may be expressed without any condition or supposition."

1. *I may* be there at ten; and *I may* not till eleven.

Here, the potential is certainly identified with the *subjunctive*, for here is *contingency*.

2. "They *might* have done better;" it is hard judging, however.

Is there no uncertainty here?!

3. They *may* act uprightly, and they *may* not; time alone will decide.

Is there no uncertainty here?

Mr. Murray's object in the introduction of the potential mood, is, according to his own language, to classify those verbs which, in *his* opinion, have a *mood* distinct from the *subjunctive*. But has he done this? that is, has he effected this classification? The preceding examples answer, *no*?

Again, says Mr. Murray:

"Some grammarians have supposed that the potential mood, as distinguished above from the *subjunctive* coincides with the *indicative*. But as

the latter 'simply indicates or declares a thing,' it is manifest that the former, which modifies the declaration and introduces an idea materially distinct from it, must be considerably different. '*I can* walk,' '*I should* walk,' appear so essentially distinct from the simplicity of, '*I walk*,' '*I walked*,' as to warrant a correspondent distinction of moods."

What! why this shift, why this strange obliquity. If the first ground is firm, why has Mr. Murray left it? Why does he now resort to the *simple*, and the *complex* state of the verb, to support that very mood which he had before placed on a *different* basis? Why not return to the very principles of that mood to support it? Look at this—

"'*I can* walk,' '*I should* walk,' appear to be so essentially distinct from the simplicity of '*I walk*,' '*I walked*,' as to warrant a correspondent distinction of *mood*."

It seems, then, the difference between the potential mood, and the *indicative*, is that the former has an *auxiliary*, and a *principal* verb; but the latter, a *principal* only!! "*I can* walk" is compound; "*I walk*" is simple. But, how will this learned author dispose of the following—

1. "*I can* walk;" *Potential*.
2. "*I will* walk;" *Indicative*!!
3. "*I should* walk;" *Potential*.
4. "*I have* walked;" *Indicative*!!

Can it be said that the *indicative* is here more simple than the *potential*!!!!

This great philologist remarks that one is so much more complex than the other, that a *correspondent* mood is justified. If a *correspondent* mood is denoted by *potential*, we are ignorant of the import of the two words. It appears to us, if the phrase "*correspondent mood*," has any meaning, it denotes one which will touch, and present, the difference between the two verbs "*can* walk," and "*walk*." Hence, instead of *potential*, it should be *compound mood*. According to the deliberate studied course of this great philological pioneer, the moods instead of *indicative*, and *potential*, should be *compound*, and *simple*!

1. Compound mood—I *can* walk!
2. Simple mood—I *walk*!
3. Compound mood—I *should* walk!
4. Simple mood—I *walked*!
5. Simple mood—If he *walks*!
6. Compound mood—If he *will* walk!
7. Simple mood—To *walk*!
8. Compound mood—To *have* walked!
9. Double compound—*Shall* have been freed!

This *correspondent* mood, then, is seen to be very comprehensive, and though in *name* partially compound; yet in point of fact, *entirely* simple!

"Some grammarians have supposed that the potential mood, as distinguished above from the *subjunctive*, coincides with the *indicative*. But as the latter simply indicates or declares a thing, it

is manifest that the former, which modifies the declaration, and introduces an idea materially distinct from it, must be considerably different."

And is every *different* idea to give a *distinct* mood to the verb? If so, a declaration, and an interrogation, afford good ground for two different moods! But yet Mr. Murray places interrogation, and declaration, in the same mood!!

Declaration. He *is* writing.

Interrogation. *Is* he writing?

If each new or different idea, which the modifying words introduce, is taken as ground for a distinct mood, *will*, *shall*, *have*, and *are*, give different moods:

1. I *will* write; (*foretells*.)
2. Ye *shall* not steal; (*commands*.)
3. I *have* books; (*possession*.)
4. We *are* punished; (*ascribes*.)

What! a *different* idea to give rise to a distinct mood! If so, *can*, *should*, *must*, *would*, and *may*, pave the way for *five* new moods!—Or, will it be said that each of these words, denotes the same idea!?

But after all, it will be found—that this potential mood is neither more, nor less, than the *indicative*. What is the *indicative*?

"The *indicative* mood simply *indicates*, or *declares*; or, it *asks* a question."

Now, will any one pretend that *may*, *can*, *must*, *might*, *could*, *would*, and *should*, do not indicate; that they do not declare? And will any one say that these words do not ask, or *interrogate*?

1. He *can* walk—a *declaration*!
2. *Can* he walk?—a *question*!
3. They *should* walk—a *declaration*!
4. *Should* they, or *should* they not, walk? a *question*.

How, then, is the *potential* mood distinguished from the *indicative*? *Both* moods are the *same* mood!

Thus much on the principles upon which Mr. Murray has attempted to establish the potential mood. Let us conclude by a few remarks upon the *advantages* of this mood. And, first: are there any advantages resulting from the introduction of this mood? Mr. Murray is so far from showing the least profit, the smallest advantage, which the learner derives from this mood, that he does not even attempt it. In the first instance, no one can show that any good is derived from this mood; and in the second, if one could show an evident advantage from its use, it is so *vaguely* defined, so *laxly* described, that it includes any verb in the language! This mood is a species of usurpation: it seizes verbs which belong to other moods. Let us, then, sink the floating barge, and suppress this *modal* piracy.

Good writers have long been in the practice of using *were*, in the *subjunctive* mode, with the

Uni cordictive pronoun of the *pare-theme* relation; as, if *I were* there—

Wert with the *Uni cordictive* pronoun of the *prosotheme* relation; as, if *thou wert* there—and were with the *Uni cordictive* noun or pronoun of the *pantatheme* relation; as, if *John were* there, if *he were* there, &c.

The use of *were*, and *wert* instead of *was*, and *wast*, is inconsistent with the *nature* of that relation which exists between the *cordictive* noun or pronoun and the verb. Nor is this use of *were*, and *wert* consistent with the custom of using other verbs to accomplish the same object. The object is to mark *present* time by the *passed* tense form; as, *Were* I well I would attend; if *I were* there, I would inform him of his danger. That is, *were* I now well, if I were *now* there, &c.

But as *was* may mark *present* time with as much precision as *were*, why should *were* be preferred? That other verbs are used in the *passed* tense form, to mark *present* time, without any peculiar modification, may be seen by the following instances:

1. If he *wrote* a good hand he might be employed as clerk. (*Present* time.)

2. *Did* he write well, I would employ him. (*Present* time.)

3. *Had* he a book, he would learn Grammar. (*Present* time.)

4. *Hadst* thou a teacher, thou couldst be taught. (*Present* time.)

Now, uniformity seems to require that *wrote*, *did*, *had*, and *hadst* should be thrown into some peculiar form, when their *passed* tense forms are used to denote *present* time. But instead of seeking for uniformity in *new* forms for all verbs in such instances, would it not be wiser to obtain it by abandoning *were*, and *wert* by adopting *was*, and *wast*?

1. *Was* I a good writer he would employ me.

2. *Wast* thou a good scholar, thou couldst be employed in teaching.

3. If *I was* in Boston, I could see my friends.

4. If thou *wast* well, we would return.

Were and *wert* are also used to denote *passed* time, when the *cordictive* noun or pronoun is singular; as,

If *I were* in Boston last week, he did not know it.

If thou *wert* in Boston last week, I did not know it.

If he *were* in Boston last week, I did not know it.

If *bad English* consists in a deviation in the use of any, or of all the words of our language, from its true genius, the above use of *were* and *wert* is certainly incorrect.

There are those, however, who will attempt to sanction this use—they will resort to the *subjunctive* mode. But as this old *subjunctive* mode is a mere *grammatical* dream, *ungrammatically* told,

and beyond *interpretation*, no argument from this source can sustain the use of *were* with any singular noun, or pronoun.

And as for *wert*, it is a shameful *fungus* which might be severed from our language without diminishing the number of its *words*. (The legitimate form is *wast*.)

OF THE INDICATIVE MOOD.

"The indicative mood simply indicates or declares; or it asks a question."

To comment on this definition, would be useless. The following instances, in italic characters, not only prove this language very deficient as a definition of this mood; but they must surprise those who breathe a full and fervent approbation upon the pages of L. Murray's English Grammar.

1. "When ye *shall be entered* into the village, ye shall find a colt tied."

"*Shall be entered*," asks no question; nor does it make any declaration.

2. When he *writes*, I will inform you.

"*Writes*" is in the indicative; but it neither declares, nor asks.

3. It is said that he *is sick*.

Now, it is not declared that *he is sick*; it is merely declared that this is *said* of him. To place this verb in the indicative, according to Mr. Murray's description of this mood, the clause should be separated from the rest of the sentence:

1. *He is sick*.

2. *Is he sick?*

The italic clause in the following period, makes neither a question, nor a declaration.

When the mail *returns*, we shall get some news.

This construction presents a *concession*. The mode of speech is one which leads the mind to *concede* that the mail will return. But a declaration would be,

The mail *returns* to-day, and we shall get some news.

OF THE INFINITIVE.

"The infinitive mood, expresses a thing in an unlimited sense."

1. I saw John *burn* his hand.

To being understood before *burn*, *burn* is in the infinitive mood. This verb, then, renders this act so general, so unlimited, that it is uncertain who *burned* his hand!!!

It may be proper to give Mr. G. B.'s definition of this mood. We take it, not from his "*First Lines*,"—but from "*his finished labors*." We shall first give our author's definition of mood itself."

"Moods are *different forms* of the verb, each of which expresses the being, action, or passion in some particular manner."

"The infinitive mood is that form of the verb

which expresses the action, being, or passion in an unlimited manner, and without *number* or *person*!

Let us apply the definition—I told John to *bring* the book, James, was commanded to *return* to the city, Goold Brown is not fit to *write* a Grammar.

Is not the act of bringing confined, or *limited*, to John as the agent? Is not the act of returning limited to John also? And, surely, our author himself must admit that the act of writing a grammar, is limited to *Goold Brown*!! It is the very fact that this act is limited to *him*, which justifies us in using the words "*not fit*!"

Now, the infinitive mood is in plain English the *unlimited* mood. And even if there is an *unlimited* mood to verbs why is it necessary to recognise this mood in a grammar? Is there any thing so very remarkable in this *unlimited* mood that a constant recognition of it becomes so important? "Yes." What is it? it is a want of *restriction* to any certain agent! But why should grammarians be so particular to notice even in analyzing, the verb's *want* of limitation, while at the same time, they are *perfectly silent* on the verb's *limitation*,—the verb's *restriction*, to an agent, is never mentioned! Is it not clearly enough to be seen even by *grammarians*, that the *unlimited* mood suggests a *limited* mood! The moods, then, are two; namely—1. *Limited*, and 2. *Unlimited*.

The *limited* mood is that which restricts the being action, or passion to a certain subject; as, Goold Brown *finished* his labors in 1830!

The *unlimited* mood is that which does not restrict the action, or suffering to any certain being, or thing; as, Goold Brown was to *finish* his labors in 1830!!

Here it is uncertain upon *whom cruel fate fixed* this *final* act!

Will our author contend, in support of his definition of the infinitive mood, that this act, as here expressed, is not *limited* to *him*? For him to *disown* the act itself, would certainly not surprise us! But how he can say that this act is not here ascribed, *limited*, to himself, is as surprising to us as it is true to all who have read his definition of the infinitive mood!!

Let us now hear this Murray mender on the *subjunctive* mood:

"The subjunctive mood is that form of the verb, which represents the being, action, or passion, as conditional, doubtful, or contingent; as, If thou *go*, see that thou *offend* not."

In an observation under this definition, the compiler says that,

"The subjunctive mood is always connected with another verb. Its dependence is usually denoted by a conjunction; as, *if that, though, lest, unless*."

Mr. G. B. first defines mood to be a particular form of a verb—he then tells us that the subjunc-

tive mood is that *form* of the verb, &c. After this he affirms, in his observation, that the subjunctive mood is always connected with another verb. Let us now examine his own example for the truth of this connection.

"If thou *go*, see that thou offend not."

Now, in what way is the *form* of the word, *go*, connected with either of the other verbs? Pray, is the form of *go* connected with *see*, or with *offend*!?

But our author is thorough, for he even tells us the nature of this connection! He says that it is the connection of *dependence*. Nay—he informs us what it is which denotes this relation of dependence.

"Its dependence is usually denoted by a conjunction; as, *if, that, though, lest, unless*."

It is possible that our author means to inform us that the subjunctive *form*, mood of *go*, has a dependent connection with *see*, or *offend*, and that *if* is employed to express this dependence!?

We must recur again to this *mender's* own language—

"The subjunctive mood is that *form* which represents the being, action or passion, as *conditional, doubtful, or contingent*."

Now, is it *go* which denotes the *doubt*, the *condition*, the *contingency*! If *go* represents the contingency, where is the use of *if*! If, then is not used to denote a dependent connection which *go* has with another verb, but to express a condition! "If thou *go* see that thou offend not."

Now, if the subjunctive mood is constituted of *doubt, contingency, uncertainty*, why are not the verbs in the following sentences all in the subjunctive mood?

1. "Perhaps John *will return* when you urge him to do so."

2. ["He *may possibly come* to day] (if it should not rain.)"

Will return, and *come* are in the *indicative*!

("John *will*, peradventure, *return* next week) (if I send for him.)"

Will return is a verb in the *indicative* mood. But *send* is a verb in the *subjunctive* mood!

The sentence contains two monos; and there is just as much doubt found in the one as in the other! It is not certain that he will come nor is it certain that I shall send!?

Let us see which mood has the advantage on the score of *dependence*! Does my sending depend upon John's returning—or does his conditional return depend on my *sending*!?

("Peradventure, John *will return* next week) (if I *send* for him.)"

And what denotes this *dependent* connection which the *indicatively* expressed event has with the *subjunctively* expressed one!? Why, Mr. G. B.'s *if*! If Gould Brown has mended L. Murray, then, indeed, *mending* consists in an *enlargement* of the breach!!

When we shall have seen that verbs have any such moods as grammarians have attempted to fix upon them, we shall be glad to confess the sin of charging them with laboring for ages to hang hats made out of *mere imagination* upon pins, and hooks which they have *never been able to find*.

In theory, the *subjunctive* mood, has never been separated from other moods—in practice, this mood is the work of *chance*. In theory, it is not found in the genius of our language—and, in practice, it has too much of the *pendant* to bear any analogy to the unostentatious appearance of the good old Anglo-Saxon style which pervades, and distinguishes the English Language.

What! is "if he *do* come." English!?

Is, "if thou *wert*," English!?

1. "The man writes letters."

Here is a declaration—this declaration is speech. And is the speech itself to be called a mere mood, or mode, of speech! If we take away the declaration, the *indicative* mood, there is nothing left which resembles speech at all!

2. "Is John here?"

The interrogation which alone is the speech, is called a *mood* of the verb, *is*! If this mood of the verb, then, should be taken from the sentence, there would be nothing left but the dead words, *here, John, and is*!

Thus the trunk of the tree is degraded to a mere twig, to a mere shoot, and, indeed, to nothing but the dead bark!

These moods of which the old theory says so much, are, in truth, the speech itself. They are the *cordictions* of the various assemblages of words, which are called sentences. They are the life, as *cordiction* implies, of words. (See Book I. p. 55.)

CHAPTER XII.

OF TENSE.

Tense is the *distinction* of time.—MURRAY.

Tense is the *distinction* of the time in which an action or event occurs.—COMLY.

Tense means time, or the distinction of time.—INGERSOLL.

Tense is the division of time.—GREENLEAF.

Tenses are modifications which distinguish time.—HUBBARD.

We could cite many more upon this subject; but we deem these sufficient. In making out the different tenses, each author has completely abandoned his first definition of tense. Each has founded his definition of *tense* upon *time alone*. But in defining the *various tenses*, he has built, not upon *time*, but upon the *event* denoted by the verb! "*Tense*," says Mr. Murray, "is the distinction of time."

The same author remarks immediately after, that

"The present tense represents an *action*, or an *event*," &c.

How is it possible for a *distinction* of time to represent an *action*? If tense itself is a distinction of time, the present tense is a part of that *distinction*. Mr. Murray has undertaken to define the thing itself—but he has defined only the *distinctions* of the thing! *Tense* is the thing to be divided, and the present, perfect, imperfect, pluperfect, and the future tense, are the *divisions*, or *distinctions* of *tense*.

"The present tense represents an action or event as passing at the time in which it is mentioned; as, *I rule, I am ruled.*"

Let us try Mr. Murray's success by the following instances:

1. The paper is ruled!!!

This action had been done *before* it was mentioned; yet this verb is of the *present* tense! Look again at the above definition of the present tense.

"As *passing* at the *TIME* in which it is mentioned."

2. The letters are written! (*Done before mentioned.*)

The bird is shot. (*Done before mentioned.*)

From Mr. Murray's definition of the present tense, no verb can be of the *present* tense except the few which represent actions that may be said to be completed at any stage of the event. Such, for example, as, "*I rule, I am ruled, I fear.*"

These are events which find a finish whenever they *cease*: they sustain, however, very different characters from events in general. These events surely illustrate Mr. Murray's definition of the present tense. But as these events are *singular* in their character, his definition must necessarily be limited in its application.

Let us use the same verb, ("*rule,*") in an instance of a different character.

"The paper is ruled."

This action may have taken place *years* before the time of mentioning it!

The glass of water is drunk.

If the reporter is declaring this action while it is going on, how does he know that he has told the truth? Suppose the drinker to have ceased without finishing the glass. The fact would not then be truly represented. The truth is, that the act must be finished before it is reported, or published—otherwise no declaration, confined to the present tense, could be depended upon. When the act is done, he that declares its completion, knows it—but no one can safely assert its finish at the very time it is taking place.

We shall now make an application of the following verbs upon the principle laid down by Mr. Murray in his *definition* of the present tense:

"*Is finished—is done—is paid—is dead—is present.*"

"The present tense represents an action which is passing at the *very time* in which it is mentioned." As the saddle is finished.

What! at the very time when the mechanic is laboring on it?

The shoes are done.

And is the shoemaker now working on these *finished* shoes!! Suppose the shoes had been completed on *Monday*; and the owner calls on *Saturday*, cannot the shoemaker say—"your shoes are done!" If the shoemaker is right, the *grammar-maker* is wrong.

Suppose a demand was made of A. in 1820, for \$1000, and at this time answered. But, in 1827, this same demand for some cause, or other, is again made of A.; to which A. replies—this demand is *paid* already.

This language which we have drawn from the mouth of A. by an hypothesis, is correct in tense—yet it is directly opposed to Mr. Murray's definition of the *present* tense.

"He is dead."

The verb is of the *present* tense; and, if the *present* tense represents an action which is going on while it is mentioned, this person is not *dead*—he is *only dying*!! And, as a *dying* man is still a *living* man, the New York Gazette which announces that Mr. "JASON" is *dead*, means to assert nothing more than that he is now *dying*!! Why, upon this principle every man is now *dead*—

"The moment we begin to live, we all begin to die."

IMPERFECT TENSE.

2. "The imperfect tense represents the action or event either as past and finished, or as remaining unfinished at a certain time past."

That is, a *finished* thing is an *unfinished* one!! (Will the reader look at *imperfect* as defined by Walker.)

But what has time, or tense, to do with the *finished*, or *unfinished* state of the event? TENSE, says the author, is the *distinction* of time. Therefore it is absurd to connect it with the *progress* of the work itself. We defy *ingenuity* itself, to form a consistent set of tenses upon the *state* of the action, or event denoted by the verb. Why, so *unconnected* is the *state* of the action with the *tense* of the verb, that it is perfectly immaterial whether the event is done, or not! For example—"John never *wrote* to his brother Charles."

Here the action never was even *begun*—yet the verb is of the *imperfect* tense!

To define the different tenses, is to show within what periods of time they place, or fix, what is denoted by the verb. And the moment another item is included, *confusion* is embraced. If one desires to give a definition of man, he must not

attempt to do it by including a pig with him! Mr. Murray promises a definition of the *tenses*—not a *description* of the state of *forwardness* of actions! If we drop the state of the event, there is no difficulty in defining the various tenses. Look at Mr. Murray's present tense:—

"The present tense represents an action or event as taking place at the time in which it is mentioned!!!"

Here you see the *state* of the event, or action becomes the *basis* of this absurd definition. The act must be taking place at the very time in which it is reported to be *finished*!! If we drop the *state* of the event, a definition may be easily given.

The present tense fixes whatever the verb denotes, within a period of time now passing under the mind as one *continuous whole*; as, "I rule, I am ruled, I fear." The paper is ruled—The saddle is made—The note is paid."

Yes, if we drop the *pig*, there will fall with it, all the difficulty of defining *MAN*!

"The imperfect tense represents an action either as past and finished, or as remaining unfinished at a certain time past; as, the saddle is *finished*! The shoes are *done*! The demand is *paid*! The man is *dead*!"

"The imperfect tense represents an action either as *past* and *finished*," says the author—hence we say that the above verbs are of the *imperfect* tense!!

Let us now throw out the *state* of the event, and build a definition of the imperfect tense upon time alone.

But why, in the name of reason, should this tense be called *imperfect*! The time is all gone—*all perfectly* passed off! Hence,

Imperfection is perfection!! We shall undertake to account for this *British* curiosity, at which even our *American children* have gazed with astonishment!

The declaration of our independence, *was made* fifty years ago.

Yet "*was made*," is *imperfect*! Children in America cannot see the propriety of saying that tense is the distinction of *time*—and then calling the tense *imperfect*, that expresses time which is *perfectly* past off! Nor can they reconcile it with their ideas of things, as *tense* is the *distinction of time*, that when the verb alludes to time which is but *imperfectly* past away, it should be said to be of the *perfect* tense! They think that, *wrote*, in the expression—

He *wrote* to his mother thirty years ago, should be of the *perfect* tense. And that "*has written*," in the instance—

He "*has written*" to his mother this year, should be of the *imperfect* tense! They reason in this way—"wrote" alludes to a portion of time which has *perfectly*, even to a *moment*, past away—But "*has written*," to a portion, all of which has not yet past off. True, say they, some has

gone; but this year, this *whole* year is but *imperfectly* gone, since a portion of it still remains with us. They do not, in their reasoning, embrace the state of the event—nor can they see the least propriety in so doing. Mr. Murray, however, saw so much propriety in embracing this, that he has founded all his definitions of the tenses upon it. And his *simplifiers* feel the importance of this principle so deeply, that we have not examined the work of one who has rejected it! Even Mr. G. B., in "*his finished labors*," holds that the action must be completed—

"The imperfect tense is that which expresses what *took* place within some period of time fully past;" as, John *did not hurt* himself last week! We *did not see* him, I *admired not* his behaviour!! I *could have gone* last week!! Did all, or even any, of these events *take place*!?

Mr. G. B. *did not furnish* the world with an improved grammar when he *finished his labors*!

Now, did the act of furnishing take place!?

"The *imperfect* tense represents the action or event either as passed and *finished*, or as remaining *unfinished* at a certain time past; as, 'I loved her for her modesty.' 'They were travelling post when he met them last year.'"

Mr. Murray found that actions fixed by the tense of the verb to past portions of time, are of two sorts; namely, *FINISHED*, and *UNFINISHED*. To apply the phrase "*perfect* tense," reasoned he, to these actions, would be *absurd* in the extreme. True, reasoned the learned author, the phrase "*perfect* tense," will apply with force where the action is done, or finished; as, "I loved her for her modesty."

But this phrase will apply with a very ill *grace*, indeed, where the action remains *unfinished*, and where the action *did not take place*! as, "They were travelling post when he met them" last week.

Here we find Mr. Murray in a *dilemma*. In our opinion, he should here have left out the *state* of the event altogether—here, yes even before he arrived at this place, he should have dropt it—he should not have embraced it even in his definition of the *present* tense. But he has included it in his present—yes, and has built mainly upon it. And what has been the result? We have answered this question in *advance*—we have shown, in the first part of this chapter, what has been the result.

"The present tense represents an action or event as passing or going on at the *very time* in which it is mentioned;" as, "the paper is ruled," "the shoes are made," "the demand is paid!"

Now, all these actions are denoted by verbs of the *present* tense—yet all of them had been *completed* before they were mentioned—perhaps years before!!

But Mr. Murray has a certain thing to do—and a way of his own, of course, in which to proceed

He proceeds with his reasoning, as we fancy, in the following manner :

"The names are *perfect* and *imperfect*—these words must be so applied as to be *rational* in their use. But I know that there is no little difficulty in bringing them to bear in this way, upon the subject of the tenses. Where I would use '*perfect*' because the time is *all* gone, I find many actions *unfinished*—as, '*They were travelling* post when he met them' last week."

"And where I would apply '*perfect*' on the ground that all the actions are *finished*, I find that some of the period of time within which the verb fixes the events, is not *yet past off*; as, they '*have written*' to their mother this week."

"This week is not *perfectly* past—though the act of writing is completed. The *state* of the event must not be given up—I have founded my definition of the present upon this *basis* with great success!! To depart from this principle seems not only *imprudent*, but *impossible*. Hence, '*imperfect*' must be applied where the time is *perfectly* gone—Because it is here that the *imperfect*, the *unfinished*, events occur; as, '*They were travelling* post when he met them' last week."

"And '*perfect*,' must be applied where the time is but *imperfectly*, or partially past—because it is here that the events occur which are in the *perfectly* finished state; as, '*They have written* to their parents this week.'"

Thus ends the logical view taken of this subject by Mr. MURRAY. Nor do we think it without ingenuity. But we could wish that the learned author had been correct even at the expense of ingenuity.

"The imperfect tense represents an action, or event either as past, and finished, or as remaining unfinished at a certain time past; as, I *loved* her for her modesty. *They were walking* yesterday, to church, when I met them.

They were walking, yesterday, to church.

Does it seem likely that this event was not completed yesterday? Yesterday is "a certain time past;" and, as there is nothing which looks like lengthening out the journey—like continuing it over night—like bringing it into *this* day, the fair inference is that this act was finished within the *past time* here mentioned.

They were drinking a glass of brandy last year.

Is there any thing here which looks like a continuation of the act requisite to dispose of this small quantity of *poison*, over to this moment!! Who knows, then, that this event did not take place within the specified past time?

But it may be said that the character of these examples, eludes all logic, and baffles all confutation. We will, therefore, give Mr. Murray's own example:

"*They were travelling* post when he met them:"

Who knows how long these individuals *continued* their travelling. Who knows that they did not stop at the very moment he met them. There is nothing in this example which decides the point. They might have continued, and they might have closed, terminated the action at the time of the *meeting*. The thing is a matter of deduction; and whatever conclusions are drawn, must be drawn from the nature of the event, aside from the tense of the verb. Is it more likely that he met them at the commencement, or middle, than it is that he met them at the *closing* step of this travelling? Be this as it may, the tense of the verb can not be affected by it. The point, whether they continued after he met them, or whether he finished at the very moment of meeting, cannot be decided by any thing which this example presents. The imperfect, then, has been built upon a mere uncertainty: an uncertainty, too, which has nothing to do with the *tense* form of the verb!

Let us next show that this definition of the imperfect tense does in truth include the verb of the *pluperfect*.

1. They *had been travelling* two hours before he met them!

"*Had been travelling*," is of the pluperfect tense; although it is as well described by the preceding attempt at a definition of the *imperfect*, as the example given by the author in illustration of his imperfect.

The received definition of the perfect tense:

"The *perfect* tense' not only refers to what is past, but conveys an allusion to the present time; as, I *have seen* the person."

PLUPERFECT TENSE.

Pluperfect denotes something *more* than perfect. We are told that it is inconsistent to say *more* perfect, *most* perfect. This is, therefore, the condemnation of the phrase, *pluperfect tense*! Nothing, says the old theory, is more than perfect; and consequently, none can say with propriety that one thing is more perfect than another. How, then, can one tense be *more* perfect than another?

We can understand how one action can be perfect *before* another; but, it is difficult to see that one can be *more* perfect than another.

Example.—John *had written* a letter before his teacher returned.

We shall now subjoin a few promiscuous observations upon the subject of tense as applied to certain words in our language, and close the chapter.

And first—it is said that *should* is imperfect tense—the imperfect tense represents past time: as, He wrote last year to his mother.

Let us, then, say—

He *should* write to his mother last year!!

Again. *Might* is of the imperfect tense. Let us, then, say—

He *might* write to his mother last year!!

How! he *might* write last year!! He *should* write last year!! Perfect nonsense.

Yes, it is laid down as a *sound* principle in our language, that *MIGHT*, *COULD*, *WOULD*, and *SHOULD*, are verbs of the *IMPERFECT*, or *PAST TENSE*. But we cannot properly say, he *SHOULD* write to his friend last week. Nor is it correct to say, he *MIGHT* write to his friend last year.

MIGHT, and *SHOULD*, have no allusion to *past* time. They belong to the class of *inceptive* verbs which denote the *present* time. *WOULD*, and *COULD*, *may* relate to *past* time; as, I *could* write, last year, a better hand than I can this. They *would* return last week. That is, they were *determined*.

But, in general, these verbs are both of the *present tense*; as, "I *could* write, if I had paper; I *would* write, if I had a pen."

Does it appear, then, that our language has yet received a *grammar* suited to its peculiar genius?

Secondly.—It is said by all who have gone before us upon this science, that *may have*, *can have*, and *must have*, are of the perfect tense. But in the expression,

God *must have known* the fate of men before he created them, the verb is, in truth, of the *PLUPERFECT TENSE*!!

Again. In the expression,

James *may have learned* his lesson last evening, the verb is of the *IMPERFECT*, or *PAST TENSE*!!

Thirdly.—It is said that the *pluperfect* tense signifies a thing that *past* prior to some point of time specified in the same sentence. If this is a correct definition of this tense, the verb *might have loved*, *may*, or *may not*, be *pluperfect* in its tense. For example:

I *might have loved* her after she returned to the city.

Here the act of loving is represented as having been possible *after* (not *before*) the other point of time.

Again: The lad *should have gone* immediately after his father bade him!!

Finally, we may see from examples which occur every hour, that these very verbs that are confined by our *British English Grammars*, to the *pluperfect* tense, are generally in the *imperfect*, or *perfect* tense.

Imperfect; as, He *might have learned* yesterday.

Perfect; as, he *might have written* this week to his friends.

MIGHT, *COULD*, *WOULD*, and *SHOULD*, are classed as verbs of the *past*, the *imperfect* tense. And this classification is surely intended to respect their natural, and common tense characters. Yet we assert that these *inceptives* naturally have the

present tense. They *may* be forced from the *present*; and we shall here show in what way they may be carried back from their *natural* time to *past* time.

1st. By some prefix, alluding to *past* time; as, *I thought* that he *would* return.

I thought, is the prefix.

They *concluded* that he *might* recover, *I said* that he *should* submit.

2d. By a suitable *affix*; as, he *could* perform the operation *last* year, more skilfully than he can this.

Last year is an essential *affix* in carrying *could* back to *past* time.

They *would* come to the city, *last week*, I *could* not accomplish the business *in time*.

The clause which carries *could* back to the *past* time is suggested by the *mono*, *in time*. From this *mono*, it may be asked, in time for what? Answer—in time to *take the stage before it had left the city*.

As to *should*, nothing but a *prefix* can remove it from the *present* to the *past* time: no *affix* can be devised which will accomplish the removal of this auxiliary from its native rank, or place.

Is it not strange, then, that the old school grammarians should rank this verb as though, by its *nature*, it belongs to the *past* time?

True, there is much weighty authority bearing *might*, *could*, *would*, and *should*, into the faded regions of *past* time. But with all the weight of learned dictums, these verbs will, unless attended by prefixes, or affixes, return into *reality*, *present* time. And we trust in the power of *common sense*, to confine them, ere long, to their native home. No—we cannot believe that the never-ending generations of that portion of the human race, which enjoys the unbounded blessing of using the English language, is to receive its knowledge of this language through the old theory of grammar. The time must come when this *patch-work* of error must be torn off. Yes, the strong hand of freedom will not only rend it into tatters, but will substitute an elastic mantle—one adorned with the principles of our own language, which will shape to all its deformities, and thereby present its irregular figure!

To say why any tense in the grammar of our language has been called *first*, or *second*, future, is not very easy! Why not have the *third*, *fourth*, and *fifth* future as well as the *first*, and *second*? For instance, I *shall have* written the letter by six o'clock.

Shall have written is denominated *second future*! But why *second*? Surely it is the *first* point of future time alluded to in the assertion! *Six o'clock* is the *second future*!

Goold Brown's Definition of Tense:

"Tenses are those modifications of the verb, which distinguish time."

1. The *present tense* is that which expresses

what now *exists* or is taking place; as, "I *hear* a noise, somebody *is coming*."—GOULD BROWN.

"The present tense is that which expresses," &c.

Is that what? is that *modification*. The present tense is that *modification* which expresses what now exists, or what is taking place; as,

1. *Were* he now here, he could see his friend.

Does this form, this *modification*, *were*, express present time!?

2. "They *were* there last week!!"

In the first, *were* is a *modification* which is called *present* tense! But in the second, *were* is a *modification* which is called *imperfect* tense!

1. *Were* they now here, &c. Present!

They *were* there last week. *Imperfect* tense!!

What a wonderful difference there is between these two *weres* in their *personal appearance*!

1. "The boilers *burst* daily," last year.

2. The boilers *burst* daily, this year.

Burst in the first instance, does not differ much from *burst* in the second: both seem to have the same *form*, the same *modification*.

Yet, says Mr. Brown, the first *burst* expresses past time—but the second, *present*! "Tenses are those *modifications* of the verb, which distinguish time!"—GOULD BROWN.

We somewhat think, that unless the monos, "*last year*," and "*this year*," are the forms of the verb, *burst*, our author will be compelled to debit this case to loss.

1. *Had* he a Grammar he might learn his lesson.

2. He *had* a Grammar last evening.

The first *had* is *present*—the second is *imperfect*!!

1. Last evening we *put* our books on this desk.

2. Let us now *put* our books away.

Put, in the first, is *present*! *Put*, in the second, is *imperfect*!! But who that can discover the difference between the *forms* of these two *puts*, (*put*, *put*), can be surprised at this!?

The present tense is that which expresses what now exists, or what is going on.—G. BROWN.

1. "The shoes *are made*."

2. "The bird *is dead*."

3. "The bill *is paid*."

Does *are made*, express what is now going on!?

Nothing like it. Does *are made*, express what now exists. What does now exist? the shoes.

"Your shoes *are made*."

Does *are made* express the shoes!?

Let Mr. G. Brown himself reply:

"The present tense is that which expresses what now exists, or is taking place."

What does exist now? The action denoted by *made*, does not *now* exist—the action is completed—finished.

Your shoes *are made* already.

The shoes *themselves* may exist—nothing else can. If, then, the present tense is that which expresses what now exists, the tense of *are made*, expresses the shoes!!!!

These reflections apply to the other examples:

1. "The bird *is shot*."

2. "The bill *is paid*."

3. The lad's finger *is cut* off.

Is the act now taking place!? It has already taken place! Does this action now exist!? No

The tense of "*is cut*," then, can have no allusion to the action. The tense of this verb must express the *finger*: the finger now exists!!!

4. "John *go* to school."

Is *John* going to school at the very time in which he is commanded to go!?

The present tense expresses that which now exists, or is taking place.—G. BROWN.

5. "Pardon our iniquities."

If Mr. G. B's. Grammar is true, this expression means that God is actually pardoning us while we make the petition!!

6. "John, *cut* off your finger."

Is there any *modification* of the verb, *cut*, which indicates that John is cutting off his finger, while he receives this command!?

"The present tense is that which expresses what now exists, or is taking place." That is, what now exists, or what is now taking place.

"John, *return* from school within three hours after one o'clock."

And does the tense *modification* of *return*, express what is *now* taking place!?

Again—Henry is to *pay* the debt next year."

That is, he is *now counting* out the money—he is now paying the debt!!!

To *pay* is a verb in the infinitive mood, *present* tense. The infinitive mood is that form of the verb which expresses the action in an *unlimited* manner! And the present tense is that *modification* of the verb, which expresses what is now taking place!!

The imperfect tense is that which expresses what took place within some period of time fully passed; as, We *saw* him last week, I *admired* his behaviour. GOULD BROWN.

Let us put *this* definition to the test.

1. "John *had written* a letter last week before I returned."

"*Had written*," expresses what took place within a period of time fully passed. The act was done last week!

"*Had written*," then, is a verb of the *imperfect* tense!!

"The imperfect tense expresses that which took place within some period of time fully passed."

John, is my hat made? "Yes—it was finished last week." My hat, then, *is made*?

Here *is made* expresses what took place last week! This verb, then, is of the *imperfect* tense!

The first future tense is that which expresses what will take place hereafter; as, I *shall see* him again. GOULD BROWN.

Why is not *go*, in the first future tense?

"Go thou to school."

Is not this act to be done after the command is given? This definition of the *first future* tense embraces every verb in the *imperative* mood!! Nor is this all—this definition of the *first future* embraces every verb of the *second future*! Nor, indeed, can we stop here; for it embraces nearly all in the *infinitive* mood.

1. Imperative—*Go home.* Yet to be done.

2. "*Save us from our errors.*" Yet to be done!

Indicative—I *shall have seen him* by to-morrow.
GOULD BROWN.

"The first future tense is that which expresses what will take place hereafter."

Does not *to-morrow* mean hereafter!?

Infinitive—John is to *return* next Monday.

Is it not here expressed that this act is to take place hereafter!? Or, is next Monday *present* tense!?

THE SUBSTITUTE.

The word, *tense*, means time—hence there is not much propriety in applying this word to that which merely expresses time. Can a man be called a hat, because there is some relation between a hat, and a man? Can the word, *tense*, be applied to the verb because there is some relation between a *verb*, and *tense*!? In this case it may be done, for there is a necessity for it. The verbs express *tense*—hence some name expressive of this fact should be applied to them. This name, perhaps, may be found in the word,

TENSE.

Tense is the fourth *power* of the *verb*, and is exerted in pointing out six different times.

There are six tenses, viz. :—

1. *Present*,
2. *Re-present*,
3. *Past*,
4. *Prior-past*,
5. *Future*, and
6. *Prior-future*.

1. PRESENT TENSE.

The *present* tense is the power which the verb exerts in representing time to be in our presence, which may be more or less, according to the nature of the case; as,

1. *I am.*
2. Henry *rides* out daily.
3. Virtue is commendable.
4. These merchants *purchase* their goods in Manchester.
5. God *will* whatever comes to *pass*.

REMARKS.

1. *I am.*

Perhaps in *I am*, there is no more *present* time than is occupied in uttering the sentence.

2. Henry *rides* out daily.

Here, from the nature of the case, the *present* time designated by *rides*, may be long or short. Should the practice of riding out daily be continued ten years, the period of *present* time indicated by the tense of *rides*, must comprise not fewer than *one hundred and twenty months*.

3. Virtue *is* commendable.

Here, the *present* time has no end.

4. These merchants *purchase* their goods in Manchester.

Here, the amount of *present* time must be decided by the number of years in which these men continue in business.

2. RE-PRESENT TENSE.

The *re-present* tense is the *time-expressing* power which a verb exerts in making the *passed* part of an *expressed*, or *implied* period, *present* time again; as, Thomas *has* read his book through.

That is, Thomas has read his book through *this evening, this morning or this week.* [*Re*, again.]

3. PASSED TENSE.

The *passed* tense is the power which the verb exerts in taking a point of time by *itself*, and representing it to be fully *passed off*—out of our *presence*; as,

1. They *came* to me.
2. The birds *flew* over the trees.
3. Mary *loved* her little brother.

4. PRIOR-PASSED TENSE.

The *Prior-passed* tense is the *time-expressing* power which a verb exerts in pointing out time that passed off *before* the *passed* time designated by another verb; as,

1. [*I had* seen him before] (he called) (on me.)
2. [He (that *had* been dead) sat up,] (and began to speak.)

5. FUTURE TENSE.

The *future* tense is the *time-expressing* power which a verb exerts in representing the time not only to be *future*, but independent of, and disconnected with, every other future time; as,

1. *I will* return next week.
2. Jane *shall* learn English grammar soon.
3. *Should* it rain to-morrow, we *shall* not return.

6. PRIOR-FUTURE TENSE.

The *prior-future* tense is the *time-expressing* power which a verb exerts in representing that the future time to which allusion is made, will come into our *presence* before another future time is mentioned in another mono; as,

1. [*I shall* have seen them] (by ten o'clock.)
2. [The two houses *will* have finished their business when] (the king shall come to prorogue them.)

CHAPTER XIII.

THE NUMBER AND PERSON OF VERBS.

WHEN one speaks of the head of a pin, or a finger of the hand, he speaks of something which exists. But when he speaks of the *number*, and *person* of a verb, he speaks of what does not exist. The non-existence of these properties, as attributes of the verb, may account for the manner in which Murray introduces them:

"Section 2. Of *number* and *person*."

Verbs have two numbers, the *singular* and *plural*.—MURRAY.

The way in which Mr. Murray has introduced this subject, is indicative of much embarrassment. The author seems to introduce the *number*, and *person* of verbs, under a full conviction that nothing of the kind belongs to verbs. Yet he appears to possess great tact in the management of his case—and well he may, for he had been thoroughly drilled before in the work of making fiction appear a reality. Through his whole Grammar he writes as though the things of which he speaks, had an actual existence! Even the cases which are obviously without any real existence, he explains just as though they were a solid reality!

When he comes to treat of the *number*, and *person*, of verbs, he introduces the subject with as much formality as he would do any important reality!

"Section second. Of *number*, and *person*."

Well what about *number*, and *person*? Why, verbs have *number*, and *person*! But this is saying nothing about *number*, and *person*! This is speaking of *verbs*!! Had the learned author said,—

Section 2. Of *verbs*,

One would have been prepared to give his attention to a discussion of the *verb*. But, as he commences a new Section under a new title, the reader little expects that the things advertised by this new head, are to be set aside, and the verb resumed for farther investigation. This illusive course indicates no imbecility in Mr. Murray. On the contrary, it shows a tact which every able advocate will employ in a bad cause. When the bad points are introduced, this ingenious man so mixes them up with those which can be understood, that the reader thinks that he understands the bad points themselves, when, indeed, these have been buried under other parts, or left entirely out of view. We, then, as the advocates for truth, feel bound to compel Mr. Murray to speak to the point—and that, too, without equivocation. We, therefore, put the questions—

What is the *number* of a *verb*?

What is the *person* of a *verb*?

When Mr. Murray shall have answered these questions, he may proceed the best way he can. We think, however, that he will then have no occasion for the sentence,

"Verbs have *two numbers*, the singular, and the plural!"

Observe the manner in which Mr. Murray has distinguished these two numbers—

"As, I *run*, we *run*!"

What can be the difference between these two *runs*? Yes—first *run* is singular—and, secondly without the least change, this same *run* becomes plural! It can be clearly understood that *I* is singular, and that *we* is plural—but in what way, *run* is both singular and plural, is the very thing which constitutes Mr. Murray's bad point—and which he, in the introduction of this subject, labors to evade.

How has Mr. Murray treated the parts of this science, which do not rest solely in the fancy? He has not said "*of letters*," and remarked that the English alphabet has twenty-six letters. No—he has given a definition of a letter, and then proceeded with the other parts of the subject—

"A letter is the first principle or least part of a word." "The letters in the English language are called the English alphabet, and are twenty-six in number."

Nor does Mr. Murray, in commencing the subject of grammar, proceed to say into how many parts the art is divided, before he attempts to define what the art is. He does not say,

"OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR."

And then state that,—

"English grammar is divided into four parts; namely, orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody."

But, after advertising the subject by a proper head, he proceeds to give a definition of grammar itself—then to make a division of the art into four parts. And why has he not pursued this systematic course in all instances? It is because the subject, as he has taken it up, does not permit. Does not permit? why? Because the things of which he treats, are generally fancied into being—they do not belong to the English tongue—hence he can give them no definition. He could not say that the *number* of a verb is *this part* of a verb—nor could he say that *number* is *that part* of a verb. He could not say that the *number* is any variation of a verb—How, then, could he define it? Thus,

The *number* of a *verb* is just *nothing at all*—as, "I *run*, we *run*!"

In speaking of the number of nouns, the author proceeds thus:

"OF NUMBER"

"Number is the consideration of an object, as one or more."

"Nouns have two numbers, the singular, and the plural."

"The singular number expresses but one thing; as, a *chair*, a *table*."

"The plural number signifies more objects than one; as, *chairs*, *tables*."

Here we find that the author shows his love of method—and whenever he is seen to leave this, all is not right.

But mark the difference in the two illustrations—"chair" illustrates the singular number of a noun—*chairs*, the plural. How very different are the two numbers of the verb illustrated—indeed, indeed—"run" is singular, and "run" is plural! No variation here—the same animal may be a pig, or a puppy—yes, and after all there is neither one, nor the other—for the verb has neither a singular, nor a plural number. The learner is informed that,

"Number is the consideration of an object, as one or more."

But is there any such property as a "consideration," about the verb, *run*?

No one can say from this verb, how many perform the act of running!! Number, therefore, belongs not to the verbs, but to the nouns, and pronouns. But, we are told that the number of actors infuses itself into the action itself—hence the sign, or name of the action, is rendered singular, or plural, according to the number of agents or actors. Hear, hear! "You recollect," say Kirkham, and Ingersoll, "that the nominative case is the actor, or subject, and the active verb is the action performed by the nominative." "By this you may perceive that a very intimate connection or relation exists between the nominative and the verb. Therefore, if any one creature or thing acts, only one action at the same instant can be done; as 'the girl writes.'" "The nominative, girl, is here, of the singular number, because it signifies but one person; and the verb, 'writes,' denotes but one action which the girl performs; therefore, the verb, 'writes,' is of the singular number, agreeing with its nominative, 'girl.'"

When we read the profound discourses of Mr. Kirkham, delivered in the form of lectures, we are compelled to pause, to consider—the lecturer runs so deep that ordinary grammarians cannot penetrate his doctrine. In the instance before us, we find him sinking so deep into the relation between the verb, and the nominative, that he falls far below language—the lecturer has run down to things themselves! And we must admit, if a grammar was to be made, teaching the relations of actions, and things, that Mr. Kirkham, aided by Mr. Ingersoll, would be admirably well calculated for its formation. It seems to us, too, that such a grammar might be rendered very useful to the community at large—for what could be more advantageous to a lady, or gentleman, than to know with certainty that she, or he has, when

moved, performed, but one single action! And, for the farmer to be made certain that one of his oxen performs but just one action, and that both perform two, *seems to us of much moment!*

But we must leave the utility of a grammar of things, for the principle which the lecturer has presented in his simple instance of illustration—

"The girl writes."

Here, says the lecturer, is but one action. We are now to suppose, of course, that the young Miss writes a letter, or two, to her friends. Let us, then, put the example into some full, and proper, form—as, the girl writes three letters a year, to her friend in the country.

Now, will any rational being, and especially a lecturer upon science, pretend that this young Miss performs but one action? An astonishing Miss is she who can write three letters in one single act!! And, indeed, she who can write even one letter, in one single act, is rare! The letter must be remarkably brief—or the writer uncommonly gifted! But, admitting the lecturer's principle to hold in its application to things, how fallacious is it when applied to words! When, says he, "the action is performed by one single actor, the verb is in the singular number!" Let us now see this assertion verified.

The letters were written by one girl.

Here there is but one actor—yet the verb is *plural*! The girl is the actor—she is the writer—*were written* is the verb—and, from Mr. Kirkham's doctrine, this verb, which is of the third person *plural*, should be of the third person, *singular*!

"This letter was written by sixteen girls."

Here, the agents are *sixteen*—yet *was written*, is a verb of the *singular number*!

"This letter *was read* by one girl sixteen times."

Here the verb comprehends sixteen acts—yet, this same verb is of the singular number!! The number of a verb, then, and Mr. Kirkham's doctrine, are the same thing; namely, "*just nothing at all*."

It may be well to examine the way in which Mr. MURRAY has been mended by one, or two, who say they have *finished* their labors.

The *person*, and *number* of a verb are those *modifications* in which it agrees with its subject, or nominative,—GOULD BROWN.

1. I *must write*.

Must write, is a verb of the *first person*.

2. Thou *must write*.

Must write, is a verb of the *second person*!!

3. He *must write*.

Must write, is a verb of the *third person*!!

1. "*Must write*." This modification is called *first person*.

2. "*Must write*." This modification is called *second person*!!

3. "*Must write*." And this modification is called *third person*!!!

Let us now find the modification of this verb, which is called the *singular number*:

1. *I must write*.

This modification is called the *singular number of must write*!!

2. *Ye must write*.

This particular modification of *must write*, is called the *plural number*.

3. *John must write*.

This modification is called the *singular number of must write*!!

What an obvious difference there is between the modifications which are called *singular* and *plural*!!! "*Must write*," is *singular*. But "*must write*," is *plural*!!!!

Then, again, how strikingly different are the three *person* modifications of this verb!

"*Must write*," is *first person*—but "*must write*," is *second*!!! And "*must write*," is *third person*!!!!

This is charming indeed.

Again.—Who is there that can not admire the nice difference between the *numeral*, and the *person*, modifications of this verb?

"*Must write*," is *first person*—but "*must write*," is *singular number*!!!!

This machinery works so finely that we must give another instance, or two:

1. *I write*.

Write is a verb of the *first person*.

2. "If thou *write* next week."

This form of *write* is *second person*.

First person—*write*.

Second person—*write*!!!

3. "If he *write* next Thursday."

But this form of *write* is *third person*!!!!

Let us now exhibit the different *numeral* forms of *write*:

1. *I write*. *Singular*.

2. *We write*. *Plural*!!

1. *Singular form*—*write*.

2. *Plural form*—*write*!!!!

1. *I wrote*.

This form of *write* is *first person*, *singular number*! We regret that Mr. Goold Brown finished his labors without informing the pupil which particular part of *wrote* is the *person* modification; and which the *numeral*! Was it not that the letter, *o*, is a *tense* modification we should be inclined to the opinion that this vowel is the *person* modification, and the cross of the *t* the *numeral*!!

1. *I wrote*. *First person, singular*!

2. *I wrote*. *First person, singular*!!

There is much which is *singular* about this affair! But the most *singular* thing which we see, is the fact that the affair itself exists. Look—and be amazed:

The *person*, and *number* of a verb are those modifications in which it agrees with its subject, or nominative.—GOOLD BROWN.

Murray is handsomely mended up here!!

Mr. Murray attempts to speak of two creatures which do not exist, without referring them to any *genus*, or *species*. *Person*, and *number*.

What are they? Mr. Murray has not informed us. He tells us, however, that they belong to *verbs*. But with what race of beings they are classed; or whether they belong to verbs as ears do to heads, and as toes do to feet, or as goods, and chattels do to men, Mr. Murray attempts not to decide.

Mr. GOOLD BROWN finding in his teaching process, this delinquency in Murray, quite intolerable, undertakes to refer these two creatures to their proper category:

The *person* and *number* of a verb, are those modifications in which it agrees with its subject, or nominative.—GOOLD BROWN.

It is true that the pupil must examine Murray's Grammar in vain for a definition of the *person*, and *number* of a verb. And it is true that he must examine the verb in vain for the modifications of which Mr. GOOLD BROWN speaks!

"The *person*, and *number* of a verb, are those modifications in which it agrees with its subject, or nominative!"

Does the verb agree with its nominative in modifications!? This is something new. Mr. GOOLD BROWN says, in one of his rules in *syntax*, that,

"A verb must agree with its subject or nominative in *person* and *number*." Page 94.

The ideas of this rule are not even similar to those in the definition of the *person*, and *number* of verbs.

1. "The *pens* are made by John."

The word, *pens*, is the nominative, and *are* is the verb. *Pen* has the *s* modification—*pens*. But has *are* this modification!?

2. "John makes pens."

Makes is the verb, and has the *s* modification—but *John*, the nominative, has no *s* modification! To make the sentence conform to Mr. Brown's doctrine, it should read thus:

Johns makes pens!

"John makes pens."

In this case the very reverse of Mr. Brown's doctrine is the truth: the verb does not agree in modification with the nominative; but it does agree in modification with the object, makes pens!.

In due time we shall examine the rule which we have taken from page ninety-four. And, unless we are altogether mistaken, we shall demonstrate that "a verb '*must*' not agree with its nominative in *number* and *person*."—(Book II. p. 262.)

DIVISION OF VERBS INTO TRANSITIVE, AND INTRANSITIVE.

Why not use *transitive*, and *intransitive*, inquires an old school grammarian?

Because these words are not *applicable*. These words are employed in the old grammars: but they do not answer the purpose for which they are there used better than any other two words would. In subdividing the great *verb* family, the cause of truth, and the good of both teacher and pupil would be subserved as well by the use of *rock*, and *river*, as by the use of *transitive* and *intransitive*. True, *rock*, and *river* mean nothing which pertains to *verbs*. But do *transitive* and *intransitive* mean any thing which belongs to verbs? The child is taught to call *resembles* a *transitive* verb. But why not teach the child to denominate *resembles* a river verb! True there is nothing about *resembles* which is like a river. Nor is there any thing about this verb which is like the true meaning of *transitive*. The old grammars tell us that a *transitive* verb expresses an *action* which passes *from* its agent, and terminates on an object. But, as *resembles* does not express any action at all, how can it be a *transitive* verb? In the following instance, *strikes* is called an *intransitive* verb:

John *strikes* on the ground.

Does not this verb express an action which passes from John, and terminates on the ground?

In the following, *strikes* is actually called a *transitive* verb:

James *strikes* the ground.

Now, does not the action of John, as well as that of James, *terminate* upon the ground?

The following merits attention quite as much as either of the preceding:

The ground was *struck* by John.

Although we are told in the old grammars, that a *transitive* verb is one which expresses an action that passes from an agent, and terminates on an object, yet *struck*, is not called a *transitive* verb?

Mr. John S. Hart, has compiled an English grammar. Under page 62, he says:

"A *transitive* verb is one which requires an objective case after it; as, James *writes* a letter."

If this sentence has any bearing upon the subject under consideration, it has something which I am unable to understand. Mr. Hart says, that a *transitive* verb is one which requires an objective case after it. In the following sentence, *see* is *transitive*—yet no objective case can be placed after it:

Whom did you *see*?

Here, *whom*, the objective case, is actually put before *did*, the auxiliary verb!

To construct this sentence according to Mr. Hart, it would read as follows:

Did you *see whom*?

There is an objection to Mr. Hart's definition of a *transitive* verb, that springs out of the difficulty with which the child meets in deciding *what* the *objective* case is. Mr. Hart informs the pupil that "A *transitive* verb is one which requires an objective case after it." But the pupil turns to Mr. Hart with this problem:

"What is the *objective* case?"

Can the learned *Murray mender* solve the *child's* problem? No! Under page 47, Mr. Hart informs the child, that the *nominative*, and *objective* cases are *alike*.

"167. The *nominative*, and *objective* are *alike*." Page 47.

Under page 45, Mr. Hart defines these two cases:

1. "The *nominative* case is that in which something is asserted of the noun."

2. "The *objective* case is that in which the noun is the object of some verb or preposition."

Under page 46, Mr. Hart resumes the subject of the cases; and here he says that

"It is of the greatest *importance* that the pupil should learn as early as possible to distinguish between the *nominative*, and *objective* cases. The possessive may be recognised at once by its form. But to distinguish readily the other two, is one of the greatest *stumbling blocks to beginners*."

Yet this compiler attempts to define a *transitive* verb upon the *distinctive* fact that it requires the objective case after it!

But from what is the child to derive his knowledge of the three cases? Mr. Hart has furnished him with the following propositions which are devoid of all *meaning*, all *sense*, and of all grammatical *propriety*.

1. "The *nominative* case is that in *which* something is asserted of the noun."

2. "The *possessive* case is that in *which* something belongs to the noun."

3. "The *objective* case is that in *which* the noun is the object of some verb, or preposition."

The following is Mr. Hart's definition of an *intransitive* verb:

"An *intransitive* verb is one which does not require an objective case after it; as, John *sleeps*."

One would presume from the fact that Mr. Hart is "*member* of the American *Philosophical Society*," that he would not attempt to define a thing by stating what it does *not* do! It seems to me, though I am not "*member* of" any *Philosophical Society*, that in defining an *intransitive* verb, it would not be at all inconsistent with *philosophy*, to say what it requires. But strange as it may appear to philosophers in general, here is a grammarian who is not only "*Principal* of the *Philadelphia High School*," but "*Member* of the *Ameri-*

can *Philosophical Society*," who attempts to define an intransitive verb by specifying, not what it does require, but what it does *not* require!

"An *intransitive* verb is one which does require an *objective* case after it!"

If we wish to define a hatter do we tell what he does not make, or what he does make? Mr. Hart's way of defining a hatter seems to be this:

A hatter is one who does *not* make *boots*!

From this, Mr. Hart seems to conclude that it follows that every person who does *not* make *boots*, is a hatter!

Almost every person would *instinctively* define a hatter as follows:

A hatter is one who makes *hats*.

And surely there is no *grammarian* who is "member of" a *philosophical society*, that would not define any thing whatever upon the same *affirmative* principles on which the mere child would define a hatter!

But, if an *intransitive* verb is one which does not require an *objective* case, why is not every *passive* verb *intransitive*?

1. The world *was created* by God.
2. The child *has been taught*.
3. The letter *had been written*.

Neither *was created*, *has been taught*, nor *had been written*, requires an *objective* case; still Mr. Hart *himself* calls these verbs not *intransitive*, but *passive*!

When L. Murray constructed his English grammar, the basis on which verbs were subdivided, was the *transitive* character of the action denoted by the verb. And even now, among *old school* grammarians in general, this *character* of the action expressed by the verb, is the basis of verbs into *transitive*, and *intransitive*. But this character of the action is now considered by many as the mere *figment* of the mind. Among these may be reckoned Mr. Hart who has reckoned this *fiction* for that on which he has attempted to subdivide verbs into *transitive*, and *intransitive*. Mr. Hart not only saw that every passive verb which expresses action, signifies a *transitive* action; and, that hence every such verb is as much *transitive* as any verbs which are actually called *transitive*, but he saw also that thousands of verbs, which are denominated *transitive*, express no *action* whatever. For instance:—

1. John *enjoys* good health.
2. Stephen *resembles* his mother.
3. James *has* a new book.
4. The timber *wants* strength and solidity.

Enjoys, *resembles*, *has*, and *wants* are *transitive*. Yet not one of the four verbs signifies an action of any description!

Mr. Hart has not been willing to call these verbs *transitive* upon the *old figment* principle; hence he denominates them *transitive* upon a *new figment* principle.

Now to arrest the progress of *fiction* in the subdivision of verbs, I have taken great pains to place this subdivision upon a *reality* which even the mere child can readily understand. And to express the distinctive character which verbs derive from this reality on which they are subdivided, I employ,

Mono, Duo, Uni, Ambi.

The several remarks in the Grammar, which fall under the general head of *OBSERVATIONS*, and which are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, &c., are facts in the science of English grammar, of which every old school grammarian is perfectly *ignorant*. Had Mr. Murray known these facts when he compiled his grammar, he never would have subdivided verbs into *active*, *passive*, and *neuter*. And had his *pretended simplifiers* known these facts, they would not have subdivided verbs into *transitive* and *intransitive*.

The old subdivision of verbs, *numerous* as it is, does not make any difference between a *neuter* verb which has a *sense* relation with the *nominative* case, and one which has a *sense* relation with an *objective* case:—

1. He *run*.
2. James told me to *run*.

In both, *run* is a *neuter* verb. But, in the first, this *neuter* verb is connected with *he*, the *nominative*: in the second, however, this *neuter* verb is connected with *me*, the *objective* case! To supply this deficiency in the old grammars, I use *uni*, and *ambi*.

Should an old school grammarian, after reading what is here said, upon the use of *transitive*, and *intransitive*, decide in favor of these words, I should exclaim,

"Let Ephraim alone—he is joined to his idols."

SUBDIVISION OF VERBS.

Verbs are subdivided upon the basis of the *number* of *cordictive*, and *uncordictive* nouns, and pronouns with which they have a *sense connection*, into

Mono, Duo, Uni, Ambi.
[*Monos*, one; *Duo*, two. *Uni*, one; *Ambi*, two.]

1. MONO VERBS.

A *mono* verb is one which has a *sense* relation with one *cordictive* noun, or with one *cordictive* pronoun only; as,

1. Snow *falls*.
2. John *walks*.
3. Nathaniel *must be punished*.
4. He *laughs*.
5. She *smiles*.

2. DUO VERBS.

A *duo* verb is one which has a *sense* relation

with one *cordictive*, and with one *uncordictive* noun, or pronoun only; as

1. Jane *enjoys* good health.
2. Sarah *resembles* him.
3. Joseph *has* a new book.

3. UNI VERBS.

A *uni* verb is one which has a *sense* relation with one *uncordictive* noun, or pronoun only; as, I saw the birds *fly*; James desired me to *return*. [*Fly, return.*]

4. AMBI VERBS.

An *ambi* verb is one which has a *sense* relation with two *uncordictive* nouns, or pronouns only; as, John wished me to *write* the letters. [*Write.*]

NOTE.—The *uni* and the *ambi* verbs are found in the *demimono* only.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Verbs which are always *inceptive*, are always *mono*. [Page 137.]

2. Every *inceptive*, as well as every *medial* verb, is *mono*; as, John *must have* written.

3. The *final* verb, and the *solo* verb are the only ones which can be *duo*.

4. If the *mono* has but one noun, or pronoun, all the verbs are *mono*: as, James *will have been punished*.

5. If the *mono* has two nouns, two pronouns, or one noun, and one pronoun, the *final*, or the *solo* verb which may be in it, is *duo*; as, Cato *must have killed* himself; Moses *served* Jethro; they *hurt* us.

6. There may be a *demimono* which has neither a noun nor a pronoun; as, The horse was inclined (to *run*.)

7. If there is neither a noun, nor a pronoun in the *demimono*, and the verb in the *demimono* has a *sense* relation with the *cordictive* noun, or pronoun of the *ne-demimono*, it is a *mono* verb; as, [*The horse was inclined*] (to *run*.)

8. If the verb in the *demimono* has a *sense* relation with the *cordictive* noun, or pronoun of the *ne-demimono*, it is a *duo* verb; [I *am*] (to *write* a letter.)

9. No *demimono* can have more than one noun; nor can any *demimono* have more than one pronoun.

10. No *demimono* can have more than *three* verbs. [*To have been punished.*]

11. The word *have* as an *inceptive* verb in the *demimono*, has no *sense* relation with any *noun*, or *pronoun*; as, they were to *have* written letters.

12. *Have*, as an *inceptive* verb in the *ne-demimono*, has a *sense* relation with the *cordictive* noun, or pronoun; as, they *have* written their copics.

CHAPTER XIV.

1. PRINCIPAL VERB. 2. AUXILIARY VERB.

1. WHAT is a principal verb? This question is not answered in the old theory of English Grammar.

2. What is an *auxiliary* verb? To this interrogation, Murray, replies as follows—

“Auxiliary or helping verbs, are those by the help of which the *English* verbs are principally conjugated.”

We presume that our auxiliary verbs are *Latin*, or *Greek*, and that our *principal* verbs are *English*!!

Peter Bullions says—

“The auxiliary, or helping verbs, by the help of which verbs are principally inflected, are the following—*Do, did, have, had,*” &c.

It seems by this paragraph that *auxiliary verbs* are not *verbs* at all!! “The auxiliary, or helping verbs, by the help of which *verbs* are principally inflected!!”

Caleb Farnum says—

“Auxiliary verbs are several *short* verbs used in forming the moods, tenses, &c., of other verbs.”

Must is one of these *short* verbs. But *hit* is not—*hit* is a *long* verb!!!

This is a very pretty division of verbs—

1. *Short* verbs, and

2. *Long* verbs!!

Goold Brown says that—

“An *auxiliary* verb is a *short* verb prefixed to one of the principal parts of another verb, to express some particular *mode* and time of the being, action or passion.”

In some instances *have* is an *auxiliary*—in others, a *principal*.

1. “They *have* returned.”

Here *have* is so *short* that it is a mere *auxiliary*!!

2. “They *have* a book.”

Here *have* is so *long* that it is a *principal* verb!!

Short verbs, and *Long* verbs!

Well—it is a distinction which can be *measured*—it can be ascertained with great precision!!!

Under page 45, *Goold Brown* recognizes *principal* verbs:

“*Do, be, and have*, belong also to *principal* verbs.”

But what is a principal verb? The only answer to this question, which can be found in the old theory, is that a *principal* verb is a *long* verb! This answer is a fair deduction from the fact that an auxiliary verb is denominated “a *short* verb!!”

SHORT VERBS.

Do, have, shall, will, may, can, am, must,
 Did, had, should, would, might, could, was.
Am, do, and have, are also principal verbs.—

BULLIONS.

Both the name, and the function of these verbs, can be readily understood.

"*Short,*" and "*helping,*" are easy of comprehension.

But there is one thing which we must say we do not comprehend: we can not see why the *long*, the *principal*, verbs are not *auxiliary*! If John, and James accomplish an object by their joint exertion, is not John an auxiliary to James? Certainly. If John is an *auxiliary* to James, is not James an *auxiliary* to John?

Are not both, then auxiliary actors!!? If the auxiliary verb *helps* the principal, the *principal* must do some part of the work. Hence the *principal*, and the *auxiliary* accomplish the work by their joint action. Both, then, are auxiliary verbs!! For instance,

"I have written a book."

"*Have*" is an *auxiliary*, a *helping*, verb, because it aids "*written*" in forming the imperfect tense. Does *have* form this tense without any aid from "*written*?" If so, *have* is a *principal*—not an *auxiliary*!! On the contrary, if *have*, and *written* form this tense conjunctively, by their joint, their united efforts, both are *auxiliary* verbs!!!

Let us see—

1. I have written a book.

2. I have a book.

Have without *written* is *present*. But when *have* is accompanied by *written*, the sentence has the *imperfect* tense!! Does not *written*, then, help *have* in the formation of the tense? Is not *written*, then, an *auxiliary* verb!? O! says Mr. Gould Brown, *written* is not short enough for an *auxiliary*—*have* is the shorter verb of the two—hence *have* is the *auxiliary*!!!

It is a curious fact that in almost every instance, the true doctrine is the very reverse of that taught by the old theory. The verb which is called *auxiliary*, is really the *principal*, the *main*, verb. It is the *auxiliary* verb alone, which aids the *cordictive* noun in forming the *cordiction*, the sentence character.

"John can write."

Here *can*, not *write*, aids the *cordictive* noun, *John*, in forming, in producing this affirmation.

Write has the *cordictive* power—but this power is not exerted here. In the following the *cordictive* power of *write* is exerted!

John writes.

What, then, is the *principal* verb?

The *principal* verb is that which aids the *cordictive* in producing the *cordiction*—in forming the sentence character.

We should be glad to discuss the subject of the *divisions* of verbs into *regular*, and *irregular*, *neuter* and *passive*. But we have not space. We say, however, that these divisions belong to the same family of *errors*, and *contradictions*, which we have so abundantly exposed. They have nothing to recommend them to our *mercy*,—nor have they any thing to deter us from treating them in the same way in which we have dealt with the numerous other members of the *fraternity* to which they belong.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

SUBDIVISION OF VERBS.

Verbs are subdivided upon the basis of their relative position in a verb series, and upon their capacity to be used without another verb, into

1. *Inceptive*,
2. *Final*,
3. *Medial*, and
4. *Solo*.

1. An *Inceptive* verb is the *first* word in the *verb* series; as,

Can be punished: *Might* have been punished.

2. A *Final* verb is the last word in the *verb* series; as,

Can be *punished*; *Was* *punished*; *Might* have been *punished*.

3. A *medial* verb is one which comes somewhere between the *Inceptive*, and the *Final* verb; as,

Can be punished; *Might* have been punished.

4. A *Solo* verb is one which is used *alone*, without another verb; as,

John *punished* them; *Be* thou good; *I* have a book.

1. *Verbs* which are always *inceptive*.

May	Might	Shall
Can	Could	Should
Must	Would	Ought.

2. *Verbs* which may be *Inceptive*, *Medial*, *Final*, or *Solo*, as occasion requires.

Be. *Have.*

ILLUSTRATION.

1. Joseph, *be* writing your copy. [*Inceptive.*]
2. Jane will soon *be* writing. [*Medial.*]
3. Sarah must *be* good. [*Final.*]
4. Sarah, *be* thou diligent. [*Solo.*]

Have.

1. I *have* written. [*Inceptive.*]
2. John will *have* written. [*Medial.*]
3. I must *have* a book. [*Final.*]
4. I *have* a book. [*Solo.*]

REMARK.

We not unfrequently find the word *being* used as a *medial* verb. For instance—"The house is *being* built;" "The boy is *being* taught."

This use of *being* is shamefully bad; indeed, it is so despicable, that I can hardly consent to comment upon it. That *being* is neither *medial* nor *final*, must be clear to all who have made the construction of the *verb* series a subject of thought. [Book II.]

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE PARTICIPLE.

THE PARTICIPLE is a certain form of the verb, and derives its name from its participating, not only of the properties of a verb, but also of those of an adjective; as, "I am desirous of *knowing* him;" "*admired* and *applauded*, he became vain;" "*Having finished* his work, he submitted it," &c. MURRAY.

"And derives its name from its participating, not only of the properties of a verb, but also of those of an adjective," has nothing to do with the definition—this clause is the work of *supererogation*. If the definition is made out at all, it is completed in the first branch of the sentence.

"The *participle* is a certain form of the verb."

What form is it to which allusion is here made!

No one would receive the following as a definition of a horse—

"A horse is a certain kind of an animal!"

Yet, what Mr. Murray's definition of the *participle*, is to this part of speech, this definition of a horse, is to this animal. And were we to add, and he is owned by farmers, mechanics, merchants, &c., we could help the first attempt as much as Mr. Murray has his definition by the clause, "*and derives its name*," &c.

"The *participle* is a certain form of the verb;" as, "I am desirous of *knowing* him, *Admired* and *applauded*, he became vain;" "*Having finished* his work, he presented it for examination."

In the definition, the student is informed that a *participle* is one certain *form*—Yet in the illustration, he is presented with no fewer than *three*!

1. *Knowing*.

2. *Applauded*.

3. *Having finished*.

A *participle* is a form of a verb—But is it possible that the *mere form* of one part of speech is another part of speech!

Why, if a *participle* is defined to be a *form* of a *verb*, it follows that a verb may be defined to be a *form* of a *participle*.

A verb, is as well defined by saying—

A *verb* is a certain form of a *participle*, as a *participle* is by saying—

"A *participle* is a certain form of a *verb*."

The student is told that a *participle* is a certain form of a verb, participating the nature of a verb, and an *adjective*. He is also told that from this circumstance it *derives its name*. Would it not, then, be much better to call this part of speech, a *verbal adjective*? We do not know what has given rise to the use of the term, "*participle*," in the old theory of English Grammar. But this we do know, that if the reason assigned by Mr. Murray, and others, is the true one, it has been introduced without any good reason! A *participle* does not partake of the nature of an *adjective* to any greater degree than does a verb in its *PRIMITIVE* state!

1. "James is *writing* letters which are to be *carried* to Boston, by his brother, Charles."

2. "John is *reading* books, *written* by his father."

3. "They are *loved*, and *applauded* by their friends."

The words in italic characters are *participles*—but do they partake of the nature of *adjectives*? Can any word be more singly devoted to the expression of *action*, than is the word, *writing*—"James is *writing* letters which are to be *carried* to Boston, by his brother, Charles."

But it is pretended that "*writing*" points out the *attitude*, or *condition* of the writer—hence cometh the adjective character! Let us, then, say,

"James *wrote* letters last evening to his father."

Now, does not "*wrote*" show the same condition, *posture*, or *attitude* which "*writing*" points out? Is his manner of *sitting*, or standing, as presented by "*writing*" different from that presented by *wrote*!? Why, then, is not *wrote* a *participle* as much as *writing*!? But neither "*writing*," nor "*wrote*" points out any condition whatever—the condition of the person is a matter of inference that the mind makes from the nature of the very action which is done. These words express the action, and *nothing more*.

"James is, *writing* letters, which are to be *carried* to Boston, by his brother, Charles."

Nor does the word, *carried*, denote any thing which should entitle it to be called a *verbal adjective*. It does not partake of an *adjective* in the slightest degree—the word is used to express the *action* of Charles—it expresses that merely.

The expression a little varied—

Charles "*carries*" letters to Boston, for his brother James.

Does "*carries*" denote any thing different here from that which it signifies in the other construction!? Why, then, is not this word a *participle* in both instances?

If there was the least particle of plausible matter

which we could find to oppose, we might have some inducements to pursue this subject—but as there is not even *one* point in the whole subject which appears to favor the position of the old school grammarians, we shall close this chapter as soon as possible. Before we do this, however, we shall submit a few remarks upon some particular examples of illustration, chosen by the latest *menders* of Mr. Murray.

"I have a letter *written*." GOULD BROWN.

Here it is said, that *written* partakes of the nature of an *adjective*, inasmuch as it points out the condition, or state of the letter. "*Written*," however, used as an adjective, conveys an idea very different from that denoted by the participle above—

1. "I have a letter *written*."

2. "I have a *written* letter!"

In the first, "*written*" denotes that the letter is *finished*—in the second, it denotes the kind of letter—a *written* letter, not a *printed* one.

In the expression, "a *written* letter," this word is purely an adjective—in the first it is a *participle*.—In the first, the word expresses the action of writing with an allusion to the completion of the act—I have a letter already *written*. That is, the act is already finished. If, *written* was used in contrast with "*unwritten*," we should be bound to admit its adjective character—for it would then be an adjective, and nothing else; as, I have a *written* letter—but not an *unwritten* one!!

Suppose the sentence had been continued by Mr. GOULD BROWN.

"I have a letter *written* by James Johnson."

"*Written*" here denotes the action of Mr. Johnson, and is used for that purpose, and for no other—yet this same word is a *participle*! Is it not, then, as clear as *perspicuity itself*, that the definition of a participle cannot be founded upon its similarity to other parts of speech, and that it cannot rest even upon its own meaning since this varies with every change of *construction*. The *adjective* is a word so various in its imports that Mr. Murray could not find a definition which could reach its true character—yet he undertakes to place a definition of a *participle* upon the character of an *adjective*, a part of speech whose nature he has been *unable* to define. "A verb signifies *being, action, or suffering*;" as, James resembles me, he *ought* to be in Boston on Monday next, John merits praise!!

That a participle is not an *adjective* in character, will appear to all who consider that all participles may be qualified by adverbs of *time*, and *manner*; as,

I have a letter *now written*.

The letter has been *written* ACCURATELY.

In *writing* the letter WELL, you will please your teacher!

All participles express the same ideas which the verbs denote—upon this principle, then, they

are not like adjectives? We ask, therefore, upon what ground it can be pretended that a participle is like an adjective? Has a participle any degree of *comparison*? *None*.

It is not true, then, that a participle partakes of the nature of an *adjective*. Nor does a participle merely participate of the nature of a verb. A participle is a verb. It is true, that participles may be so applied that they lose their verb character, and take that of an *ADJECTIVE*, or that of a *NOUN*; as *written* letters, *flying* clouds, *running* water.

The words which are participles in other instances, are *here* *pure* adjectives. The word, *silver*, is a noun generally, yet it may be so used as to become an *adjective*; as, *silver* dollars.

Goold Brown :

A participle is a word derived from a verb, participating the properties of a verb and an adjective; and is generally formed by adding *ing, d, or ed*, to the verb; as, Rule, *ruling, ruled*.—GOULD BROWN.

"And is generally formed by adding, *ing, d, or ed*, to the verb," is an important part of the definition!

Under the same page the compiler observes that, "Participles, like verbs, express *being, action, or passion*."

Why, then, are not *participles verbs*? Does not Mr. Brown say that if a word signifies *being, action, or passion*, it is a verb!? Why, then, is not a participle a verb!?

The old theory generally divides participles into,

1. *Present*,
2. *Imperfect*,
3. *Compound perfect*.

Why not have *present* verbs? If a participle is called *Present* because it *expresses* present time, should not a verb which expresses present time be denominated a *Present* verb!?

But the truth is that the *Present* participle does not express any time whatever. The time is always expressed by an *inceptive* verb, or by some *mono* implied, or expressed; as,

1. I am *writing*.
2. I was *writing*.
3. I have been *writing*.
4. I will be *writing*.

The different times are here expressed by *am, was, have, been, and will*.

1. "Washington *being* a prudent man, they gave heed to his advice."

Here *gave* expresses the time of the *mono*, "*Washington being*."

"Johnson *being* learned in the law, his clients confide in his opinions."

Here *confide* is the true index to the time of the *mono*, "*Johnson being learned*."

Was *confide* carried to *confided*, the time of the

mono, "*Johnson being learned*," would be past; as,

("Johnson *being* learned) in the law, his clients *confided* in his opinions.

The first is equal to—

As Johnson *is* learned, &c.

The second, to—

As Johnson *was* learned, &c.

What is usually denominated the *present* participle by the old grammarians, is called an *Imperfect* participle by *Goold Brown*.

The *imperfect* participle is always formed by adding *ing* to the verb; and implies a *continuation* of the being, action, or passion; as, *loving, seeing, being*.—GOOLD BROWN.

Let us see the way in which this definition works in practice.

1. "The note *being* paid, the suit was withdrawn."

Here *being* is an imperfect participle, and is formed from *be* by affixing *ing*. But does *being* imply a *continuation* of the act of paying the note!? What, is the debtor to *continue* to pay a demand after he has already paid it!!! This is *strange*, and *hard*.

2. "The man *being* killed by his fellow traveller, his horse was stolen."

What! does *being* imply that the man is still to be killed by his fellow traveller!? *Cruel fate*!

3. "John *being* a thief, was imprisoned for the safety of the community."

What! is there no reform? Is it here meant that John is to continue to steal!?

4. GOOLD BROWN *having* finished his labors, they are now public property."

But, according to the author's position in relation to the import of *having*, his labors are to be continued!!!!

5. "John will be *writing* a letter next week."

Is there any intimation here that John will continue in the act of writing letters!?

6. "James will be *laughing* within an hour."

What! is it here intimated that James will continue to laugh!? Nothing like it.

"John was *dying* last week."

Does *dying* imply that John is to continue to die!?!?

But what a singular choice our author has made in his technical to express the idea of *continuation*! "*Imperfect*." Does the word, *imperfect*, import continuation!?! Would not *continuative* answer Mr. *Goold Brown's* purpose much better than *imperfect*?

1. "An *imperfect participle*."

2. A *continuative* participle.

But we presume that Mr. B. has not labored to express the character of the *participle*, but that of the thing denoted by the participle.

The *action, being, or passion*, says he is not

completed—hence it is *imperfect*. And as the action, *being*, or passion is imperfect, the word which denotes it must be called *imperfect*. But would it not be much better for the grammarian to attend to the character of the words than to give his time to that of things?

Besides, if the participle is called imperfect because it expresses an action which is imperfect, should not the verb which expresses an imperfect action, be denominated an *imperfect verb*!?

1. That stream of water *runs* through Harrisburg.

2. That stream of water is *running* through Harrisburg.

Which form of expression indicates the longer continuation of the action of running!?! If, then, running is denominated an *imperfect* participle because the action of which it is the name, is not finished, has not ceased,—should not "*runs*" be styled an *imperfect verb*!?

But is not the practice of applying to words the names which expresses the character of the things denoted, the perfection of folly? What, is a word *imperfect* because it denotes an imperfect thing!?! By parity of reasoning, a word is *round* because it denotes a round thing! By parity of reasoning, a word is *square* because it signifies a *square* thing. By parity of reasoning, a word is *iron* because it expresses an *iron* thing. By parity of reasoning, a noun is *sweet*, or *sour*, *red* or *black*, according to the character of the thing of which it is significant! Thus *circle* is a *round* noun!! *Crow*, as well as *negro*, is a *black* noun!!

Why is *negro* a black noun! Because the being denoted by the word, is black! Why is *running* an *imperfect* participle? Because the action denoted by the word is imperfect!!!

Is not this the very principle upon which the old theory authors, and old theory menders proceed? In compliance with this philosophy, they make *imperfect* participles: as, The stream is *running*.

In compliance with this principle, they make *perfect* participles; as, I have a letter *written* by John.

Do they not call *written* a *perfect* participle, because it signifies a *perfect* action, a *perfectly* finished action!?

And on the same principle, must they not call *grapes* a *sour* noun, and *sugar*, a *sweet* noun, and *water* a *liquid* noun, and *ice* a *solid, cold, frozen* noun!?!?

The perfect participle implies the *completion*, the *perfection*, of the being, action or passion."—GOOLD BROWN.

COMPOUND PARTICIPLE.

The nature of the *compound* participle is obvious: its characteristic is a mixture of *perfection*,

and *imperfection*, in the same action! This is too clear to require illustration. Hence the old school grammarians content themselves by showing how it is formed. This, however, was unnecessary. The component parts of the *compound* participle, are clearly indicated by the very word, *compound*. The commingling of the *perfect*, and *imperfect*, participle, forms the *compound* participle! But, hold, here is an instance from *Goold Brown* himself:

"He '*having loved*' his mother, lamented her death."

Loved indicates that the action is perfected, finished—but *having* implies the continuation, the imperfection—hence the complex, the compound, character!!!

Is not the doctrine of *transubstantiation* the principle on which the old school grammarians have built much of their theory? See it clearly illustrated in a work recently compiled by *John Frost*. This Murray mender has *diminutive* nouns. That is, nouns which represent *small* things. *Mouse* would be a *diminutive* noun. But why do not these men carry their principle through: as they call *mouse* a *diminutive* noun, why do they not call *elephant* a *big* noun!! If the character of the thing is transfused into the words which denote the things, why do not the old school grammar makers, and menders, adhere to the principle throughout? Why do they not divide nouns into *long-eared* nouns; as, *rabbit*—and, into *short-eared* nouns; as *cat*!!! In short, why do not these distinguished scholars act upon their theory fully: are they apprehensive that they would be compelled to have *short-tailed* nouns, *long-tailed* nouns, &c., &c., &c.!!

THE SUBSTITUTE.

It is true, as Mr. Murray says, that the participle is a particular *form* of the verb. And, had he informed the child what particular character distinguishes this form, his definition would be much more satisfactory. The *particular form* of the verb, which the old school grammarians call a participle, is the *tenseless* form of it; as, *writing*, *written*. *Having*, *Being*, *Been*, &c.

THE TENSELESS FORM OF VERBS.

The *forms* of verbs are naturally divided into

1. *Tense* forms, and
2. *Tenseless* forms.

1. TENSE FORM.

The *tense* form of a verb is the form which indicates the exertion of one of the six *time-expressing* powers of the verb; as *Walk, walks, walketh, walked*; *Go, went*; *Be, was, art, wast*; *Write, wrote*.

TENSELESS FORM.

The *tenseless* form of a verb is a form which indicates the *non-exertion* of the six *time-expressing* powers of the verb; as, *walking, going, gone, been, seeing, writing, written*.

TENSELESS FORMS OF VERBS.

writing	written
—	loving
being	been
—	putting

HOW FORMED.

The *tenseless* forms of verbs are produced by incorporating *o*, *en*, *ne*, *n*, *u*, or *ing*, either with the radical state, or with the *passed* tense form of the verb; as,

1. *Written*.
2. *Gone*.
3. *Flown*.
4. *Begun*.
5. *Going*.

DIVISION.

The *tenseless* forms of verbs are divided into

1. *Be*, and
2. *Be* and *Have*.

1. The *tenseless Be* form is the *derivative*, *ing*,
2. The *tenseless Be* and *Have* forms are *en*, *ne*, *n*, *u*, and *o*.

1. TENSELESS BE FORM.

The *tenseless Be* form of a verb is the *derivative*, *ing*, and is incorporated with the *final* verb in the series where some form of *be* is employed as an *inceptive*, or as a *medial* verb: as,

1. Jane will *be* coming.
2. James *is* writing.
3. Charles has *been* laughing.
4. Thou *art* reading.
5. We *are* walking.

2. TENSELESS *be* and *have* FORM.

The *tenseless Be* and *Have* form of a verb is the *derivative* deflection which is incorporated with a verb where some form of *Be*, or *Have* is employed as an *inceptive*, or as a *medial* verb; as,

1. I *have* written. [*en*.]
2. Thou *hast* gone too far. [*ne*.]
3. He had forsaken us. [*n*.]

CHAPTER XVI.

OF AN ADVERB.

AN ADVERB is a part of speech, joined to a verb, a participle, an adjective, and sometimes to another adverb, to express some quality or circumstance respecting it.—MURRAY.

Respecting what? respecting an *adverb*? That is, an adverb is a part of speech joined to a verb, a participle and an adjective, to express some quality or circumstance respecting *itself*!!

This must be the meaning; or the pronoun, *it*, must represent *verb, participle, adjective, and adverb*!

To render this attempt at a definition of the *adverb*, correct English, the pronoun, *it*, should give place to *them*—

An adverb is a part of speech, joined to a verb, a participle, an adjective, and sometimes to another *adverb*, to express some quality or circumstance respecting *them*.

Nor is this error to be thrown upon the printer, or publisher. The error has been handed down through the successive editions of Mr. Murray's Grammar to the present time! Nor is this the only error which this sentence throws upon its author. The word, *sometimes*, strongly implies that an adverb is *always* joined to a *verb*, always to a *participle*, and always to an *adjective*! The adverb, however, is not *always* joined to a *verb*, because it is sometimes joined to a *participle*—for it is frequently joined to an *adjective*! An adverb is not always joined to an adjective, since on many occasions, it is joined to another adverb! If we drop the word "*sometimes*," and substitute *them* for *it*, the sentence will be English.

An adverb is a part of speech joined to a verb, a participle, an adjective, and to another adverb, to express some quality, or circumstance respecting them.

We object most strenuously to this sentence as a definition of an *adverb*! It leaves the *very principle* adopted in all languages for grammatical solution. The principle to which we allude is a *new name* for a new relation—or a change of *name* for a change of *relation*. We have shown in the preceding chapter, that a new name has been introduced into the old theory of the English grammar, upon no stronger ground than a *pretended participation*. But in this definition of adverb, we find that the words which are constantly changing their relations, are compelled to receive the *same name in each*. If a verb, from a *pretended participation* of an adjective, deserves a *new name*, what do adverbs deserve which give up their whole *adverbial* character?

"They were spoken of."

Here, *of* is an *adverb*. Why? Because it relates, not to a noun, but to a *verb*!

"Of whom did he speak?" "Of Johnson."

Here, *of* is a *preposition*. Why? Because it relates to a *noun*. And we contend that this is the true principle—and where this principle is rejected, grammar is *disregarded*. If this principle is the true one—then no word can be called an *adverb*, which does not qualify a *verb*. The words which are liable to a change of character from different relations, should be named, and analyzed with close reference to their various connections. Only the words which relate to verbs, should be called *adverbs*. The words which, from their peculiar readiness to throw off one character for another, should be named according to the relation which they are found to hold in the sentence under consideration.

"He writes *very* well."

In this instance, *very* is an *ad-verb*, added to the adverb, *well*!! *Well* is an adverb, added to *writes*.

"James is *much too* dull to make a scholar."

Much, is an *ad-adjective*, added to *too*.

too, is an *ad-adjective*, added to *dull*.

dull, is an adjective, added to James.

"Jane writes *very much too fast*."

Very, is an *ad-ad-adverb*, added to *much*!

much, is an *ad-ad-adverb*, added to *too*!

too, is an *ad-adverb*, added to *fast*!

fast, is an adverb, added to *writes*.

Why is *fast* called an adverb? because it is added to a *verb*. *Very well*.

Why should *too* be called an *ad-adverb*? because it is added to an adverb!

Why should *much* be called an *ad-ad-adverb*? because it is added to an *ad-verb*!

Why should *very* be called an *ad-ad-ad-adverb*? because it is added to an *ad-ad-adverb*!!

The analyzing of the words under the title of *adverbs*, which do not refer to *verbs*, is against the fair, and *natural*, suggestion of the very name, *adverb*. *Adverb*—what does the word import? Surely something added—added to what? Of course to nothing but a *verb*. What, then, is the character of the course adopted by grammarians in reference to this denomination of words? It is directly opposed to the course pursued by them in reference to all the other denominations of words, and to the true character of the idea which the name of this denomination of words, conveys. This course has confused the whole theory, and practice of the student, upon the adverb. Why, then, should it be continued? Why not relieve the student of his burden by the introduction of that principle which is recognised in every other part of our language? Why should the teachers of our youth be compelled any longer to tamper with tender years? Let this definition be abrogated, and a new one introduced—one suited to the genius of the language, and

the capacity of the child, to the name of this denomination of words, and the practice of analyzing every other.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

THE ADVERB DENOMINATION,

Is a *large* class of *uncordictive branch* words, appropriated to *verbs* to express something which has a *branch* dependence upon whatever *verbs* denote, whether with, or without restriction; as,

1. John *certainly* pronounced the words. [*Without restriction.*]

2. John *certainly* pronounced the words with propriety. [*With restriction.*]

3. John pronounced the words *properly*. [*Without restriction.*]

4. Henry was *not* hurt. [*Without restriction.*]

5. Henry was *not* hurt by a fall. [*With restriction.*]

Here, *not* does not deny the general act, but the restricted one—was not hurt *by a fall*.

6. James can *not* write with his pen. [*With restriction.*]

7. James can *not* write. [*Without restriction.*]

8. It is written, Man shall *not* live. [*Without restriction.*]

9. It is written, Man shall *not* live by bread alone. [*With restriction.*]

THE SUBADVERB DENOMINATION,

Is a *small* class of *uncordictive branch* words appropriated to adverbs, or to *superior* subadverbs, to denote something which has a *branch* dependence upon what is expressed by adverbs, or *superior* subadverbs; as,

1. John wrote his copy *very* slowly, and *quite* exact.

2. This boy writes *much* too fast.

3. The young lady reads *exceedingly* well.

THE SUBADJECTIVE DENOMINATION,

Is a *small* class of *uncordictive branch* words, appropriated to adjectives, or *superior* subadjectives, to denote something which has a *branch* dependence upon what is expressed by adjectives, or by *superior* subadjectives; as,

1. It is *so* cold that I must have a fire.

2. There is a *milk* white bird.

3. A *blood* red leaf.

Cold weather.

Cold is an adjective.

Too cold weather.

Too is a subadjective.

Much too cold weather.

Much, and *too* are subadjectives.

Very much too cold weather.

Very, *much*, and *too*, are subadjectives.

This boy's mother's father's son.

This, *boy's*, and *mother's*, are subadjectives.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE PREPOSITION.

PREPOSITIONS serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them; as, he went *from* London *to* York.—MURRAY.

A preposition is a word used to show the relation of different words to each other, and generally points to a following noun, or pronoun; as, *in*, *with*, *to*.—COMLY.

Prepositions serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them.—INGERSOLL.

A PREPOSITION has something remarkable—so also have the preceding definitions—hence in this particular they all resemble the *preposition*!! Mr. Murray says that a “preposition serves to connect words with one another, and to show a relation between them.”

The first part of this definition makes a preposition nothing but a *conjunction*! And the second part is without any kind of import whatever—First, the words are connected—Secondly, there is a relation shown between them. Now, let it be observed that the two words which are connected by a third never have any relation one with the other! For example—An “APPLE and PIE.

Apple and *pie*, are the words connected—yet there is no *relation* between them! If we drop, *and*, the words are no longer connected, hence there is a *relation* between them; as, an *apple pie*!!

Every *conjunction*, and every *preposition*, destroys all relation between words. If one should say—

John and James—or, John *or* James, he would not express a relation between these words—but he would destroy the very relation which would exist in the absence of *and*, and *or*; as, John James—

What *James* is this? It is *John* James—not *Charles* James.

Again. “John is with the teacher.”

Now, *is*, and *teacher* have no kind of relation whatever—for *is* being an intransitive, or neuter verb, can have nothing to do with the *objective* noun. This relation is destroyed by the preposition, *with*. If you remove “*with*,” there will come into being a close relation between *is* and *teacher*; as, John is the *teacher*!!

Yes, so close does the removal of this preposition render the relation, that *is* is made to refer to *teacher* as its subject—and *teacher* is rendered the subject of *is*! Where, then, can Mr. Murray find support for his definition!?

“A preposition serves to *connect* words, and to show a *relation* between them.”

But, has not the very reverse been proved? Yes—“A preposition, so far as it regards the

relation of words, destroys it! The following is much superior to the one given by Murray, Comly, Ingersoll, Greenleaf, Waterman, and others"—

"A preposition is a branch word which *separates* other words, and destroys the relation between them; as, John is *with* the teacher!!"

Let us now see in what manner Mr. Murray has been mended. Let us hear Mr. Comly—

"A *preposition* is a word used to show the relation of different words to each other, and generally points to a following noun or pronoun; as, *in, with, to.*"

Mr. Comly has not only not mended Mr. Murray's definition, but he has not illustrated his *own*! The clause—"and generally points to a following noun or pronoun," is the only part of Mr. Comly's definition, which can be understood even by illustration, and this he has failed, through the omission of examples, to render intelligible!! In what way is it shown that a preposition generally points to a following noun, or pronoun,—and in what way is this *pointing itself* explained? Surely not by *in, with, to*! One would certainly suppose that the author would have given some examples of this *pointing*, as he calls it—for instance; *in the city, with his brother, to the window.*

But all the explanation which Mr. Comly gives, is found in this triplicate group of prepositions. But, why should this part receive an illustration? Not because it has any thing which relates exclusively to *prepositions*—but in giving it an illustration, the author would have exhibited a little better qualification for the task which he had undertaken! Does not an *article* point to a following noun; as, "a man," "the fields."

"A *preposition* is a word used to show the relation of different words to each other; as, *in, with, to*!!"

Let us now examine this part of the author's definition; and illustrate its powers of application—

"Where is Charles? He is *in*—*in* what? Why—he is *in himself*."

Now, if *in* shows any relation between any two words in this sentence, we *must* think that there is a relation which we cannot see, which we cannot comprehend! Say, if you please, that *in* shows a relation between the words *he*, and *himself*. This, however, cannot be—for surely there cannot exist any sort of *grammatical* relation between the words *he*, and *himself*! There is a relation existing between the word *he*, and the word *is*. The relation between *is*, and *he*, is as close as that between the *ear*, and the *head*. Let us, then, examine "*is*" and "*himself*." Let us suppose that Mr. Comly is right in his definition of a preposition—

"He is *in himself*."

In, is a preposition showing a relation which exists between the words, *is* and *himself*. *Is*, is an intransitive, or *neuter* verb, and it can have no kind

of grammatical relation with any word which is in the *objective* case, without producing *bad* English; as, he is *him*.

But the example, (he is in himself,) is perfectly good English—besides, the word, *himself*, is the object of the preposition, *in*; hence it can have no relation with any verb whatever. We ask, then, between what two words, the preposition, *in*, shows a relation? Why cannot this relation be found, and defined? Because there is no relation between these words!! Perhaps it may be said that prepositions show a relation between themselves, and the following nouns, and pronouns, to which they generally *point*! It seems, then, that a preposition is a word used to show its relation to another word! That is, a preposition has no meaning, but is used *merely* to inform the reader concerning its own *important self*! But do not all other branch words show their own relations to their supers as much as the prepositions!! Does not the article point to a following noun upon which it depends; as, *a book, the pupil.*

Do not *adjectives* point to nouns, and pronouns also; as, "*an honest man is the noblest work of God*;" he is *good*, and *wise*, and *humble*, and *happy*.

But suppose that a preposition is the only word in our language which conveys the least allusion of its *own* relation with another word—yes, take this for the truth—yet the received definition of a preposition gains nothing from the concession—because the definition asserts that—

"A *PREPOSITION* is a word used, not to point out its own relation but to show a relation existing between *other words*! But so far as relation comes into this question, it is *destroyed*, not pointed out; as, he is *in himself*—he is *himself*!"

The omission of *in* produces a relation between *is*, and *himself*, which the use of *in*, completely destroys!

Again—"James is with that man."

Here, the words, *man*, and *is*, have no kind of relation whatever—in the following, however, the verb, *is*, has a close relation with *man*—

James is that man!

Further—"He sent to that man."

Here, *to*, the very word which is said to *create*, and *show* the relation, acts as a *preventive* against all relation!! By omitting *to*, the verb, *sent*, has a close relation with the noun, *man*—

He sent that man!

Here, the word, *man*, becomes the uncordictive noun of *sent*—whereas, in the *first* construction, this noun is the uncordictive noun of the preposition, *to*; hence, it can have no kind of framework relation with *sent*, in the first!

Having applied Mr. Comly's definition of the preposition, by a use of his own words (*to*, and *with*) we will now hear Mr. Ingersoll upon the *preposition*. This gentleman is a great talker—indeed

his book is entitled *Conversations!* That Mr. Ingersoll has mended Mr. Murray, there can be little doubt—but in what particular way, he himself must state. The learned mender begins—

“Tutor.—We commence this morning with the preposition, which is a *part* of speech very easily understood.”

“A preposition serves to *connect* words with one another, and to show the *relation* between them.”
Three cheers!

Let us now hear Mr. Kirkham. He has undertaken to *mend*, by coming forward in the very pleasing attitude of a lecturer. Mr. Kirkham turned Mr. Ingersoll's colloquial powers into a sort of clerical faculty, and appeared upon the great theatre of *patch-work*, not *viva voce*, but in the *imperishable*, and monumental mode of *print!* His *prologue* was a large sheet, called—

“THE COMPENDIUM.”

This sheet, decorated as it was about the margin, had the desired effect. *Americans* could not behold the *resplendent dapples of ink*, which *bedizened* the whole border of this *grammar-plain*, without giving to him the praise of *genius*, and the reward of *merit*. His sheets were all purchased—and this liberal encouragement enabled him to publish Mr. Ingersoll's Grammar!! Hence we find the very definition which Mr. Ingersoll gives of the preposition, *adopted* by Mr. KIRKHAM. It may, perhaps be asked who is this Mr. Kirkham? He is Mr. Samuel Kirkham! And who is Mr. Samuel Kirkham, pray? He is the man who *pilfered* from the new system to form his *own!!* Who is he? He is a SCHOLAR—he is the man who has overcome all the difficulties within the range of that science, which had exhausted a Murray's learning in vain, which had met the gigantic mind of a Johnson with success, played with the genius of a Webster with delight, baffled the acquirements of a Comly in literary glee, and buried the erudition of a Tooke beneath a huge pile of Anglo-Saxon verbiage.

And by what *mysterious* means, has this Mr. Kirkham accomplished all this? Why, by publishing other men's ideas, ah, and *language* too! Hence in Mr. Kirkham's book, we find the following—

“A preposition serves to *connect* words, and show the *relation* between them!”

The following is the manner in which Mr. Kirkham proceeds to show how it is that prepositions *connect* other words—

Most of the prepositions are known by the list; therefore you will please to look at your compend, and commit the whole catalogue. In the course of your parsing, you will find others not contained in the list; but, when you become acquainted with the nature and character of this part of speech you will know it whenever you see it.

The following sentence will show the use of prepositions: When corn is ripe, in October, it is gathered in the field by men, who go from hill to hill with baskets, into which they put the ears. Read this without the prepositions in, by, from, to, &c., and you will find a total want of connection and meaning.

Again: The man lives—the city. He writes—a pen. The child fell—the water. The apple dropped—the ground. You reside—the college.

You perceive, in each of these sentences, either a total want of connection, or a connection that produces nonsense or falsehood. But if we fill up the vacancies in order by the prepositions *in, with, into, to, opposite to, or over against*, the sense and connection will be complete.

You now understand the nature and use of prepositions as *connectives*.—KIRKHAM.

The principle assumed by this *mender of menders*, is just as applicable to other parts of speech as to prepositions! For instance, if we omit the verb, *is*, in the following example—

“John is sick.”

The same *want of frame-work* connection, produced by omitting the prepositions in the above instance is clear—

“John—sick!”

Again—“John eats apples.”

“John—apples!”

Hence it seems that Mr. Kirkham has not only explained the *prepositions*, but the verbs also!!

One of the *mender's* examples is this—

“When corn is ripe in October.”

Now by omitting *in*, he is able to explain the *nature, and use* of the preposition!

Thus—when corn is ripe—October.

But as the omission of *is* will cause a greater want of connection, this verb, must be a preposition.

Let us see—“When corn—ripe in October!”

A few more examples will put Mr. Kirkham's position in a clear point of view.

1. John *laughs*—his sister.
2. John ——— at his sister!
3. He *was punished*—teachers.
4. He ——— by teachers.
5. They *shot*—a bird.
6. They ——— at a bird!

Now in the sixth example, the *preposition* is *retained*; yet there is no kind of regular connection! But in the fifth, the verb is retained, and the *preposition* omitted; and the connection is regular, and the sense clear! The question, then, is, which is the most powerful *connective*, a verb, or a *preposition*!!

Let us now see if Mr. Kirkham has not illustrated the *conjunction* in his attempt to mend Mr. Murray on the preposition!

1. He is taller *than* John.
2. He is taller ——— John!
3. He is good, *therefore* happy.

4. He is good ——— happy !!

Let us next show that this learned mender of Murray, has illustrated the *adjective* in his exemplification of the *preposition* !

1. "He is *taller* than John."

2. He is ——— than John.

Let us next show that the *articles* are demonstrated to be *prepositions*, by Mr. Kirkham !

1. "He is *the* very person."

2. He is ——— very person !!

"You now understand the *nature* and *use* of prepositions as *connectives*," says the mender ; "I will, in the next place, show how they express *relations*."

"John's hat is *under* his arm. In this expression, *under* shows the relation existing between *hat* and *arm*, or the relative position each has in regard to the other. If I say the knife lies on the floor, you perceive that *on* shows the relation between the *knife* and the *floor*. And if I say, I will throw the knife *into* the drawer—*under* the bed—up stairs—*through* the window—*across* the street—*over* the house, &c., the several prepositions express the different relations existing between the *knife* and the other nouns, *drawer*, *bed*, *stairs*, *window*, *street*, and *house*."

The first example is—

John's hat is *under* his arm."

Under shows no *relation*—this preposition denotes a *place*—and the verb asserts that the hat is in this place. If, however, one is resolved on maintaining that *under* denotes relation, we ask what sort of relation it is ! A *local* relation—a *place* relation. But *under* denotes, not relation, but *place*—and by asserting through the verb, is, that the hat occupies this place, a relation is at once *implied*, or *inferred*, to exist between the *hat*, and the *arm*. The relation, then, is a matter of *inference*. Should D. say that he *purchased* a lot of land of B., a relation is at once *inferred* : for, says the mind, how could this act of *purchasing* take place without some relation between the parties to the contract ? Yet, we humbly believe, that no one would undertake to assert that the verb, *purchase*, expresses a *relation* ! The word, *purchase*, expresses an *action*, in performing which, a relation must take place—this relation, however, is a *consequential* thing, and must, if denoted at all, be expressed by another word. The act of purchasing, has rendered D. a *purchaser*—hence *purchaser* is the word which expresses the relation of D. to B.

It may be said, for the sake of variety in the mode of communication, that *under* shows the relation of *place*. So, also, may it be said, that *has* shows the *relation of possession* ; as, John *has* a book.

If *under* points out a relation between the hat, and the arm, certainly *has* expresses a relation between John, and his book ! Hence, *has*, accord-

ing to Mr. Kirkham, is as much a preposition as *under* ! But to settle this fact, we need only observe, that *of*, and *has*, denote the same thing. Therefore, if *of* is a preposition, because it shows a *relation*, *has*, by parity of reasoning, must also be a preposition !

1. "The book *of* John."

2. "John *has* a book !"

Of, and *has*, expresses the relation of possession, hence both are prepositions !

Again—"John *resembles* Nancy."

"*Resembles*" expresses the *relation of likeness*, of *similarity* ; and it must, of course, be a preposition ! But, replies the reader, perhaps *has* and *resembles* do not serve to *connect* as the prepositions do ! Let us see—

John ——— book !

John ——— Nancy !

These verbs, then, like all others, *connect*, and show a *relation*—hence they are prepositions !

"John *drinks* water."

"*Drinks*" shows the relation in which John stands to the water !

"John *obeys* his teacher."

"*Obeys*" shows the relation which John bears to his teacher—hence this verb is a *preposition* !

"John *governs* his teacher."

"*Governs*" expresses the relation of John to his teacher ; hence, this verb is a *preposition* !

"Red cloth."

"*Red*" expresses the relation which this quality bears to the cloth : hence *red* is a *preposition* !

"He is good ; *therefore* he is happy."

"*Therefore*" is a conjunction, and shows the relation between the cause, and effect ; this conjunction, then, which points out the relation of cause, and effect, is in truth a *preposition* !

We defy *ingenuity itself*, to form a definition of any denomination of words—upon *relation*, or *connection* ? There are many prepositions which express a *want* of relation ; as, he is *from* home, he is *without* money !

But even if no preposition expressed a *destitution* of relation, yet as verbs, conjunctions, adjectives, and all other denominations of words, *connect*, and show relations, as clearly as do the prepositions, how can a definition of a preposition be founded upon *relation*, or *connection* ? Let us, for one moment, consider the meaning of the word, *relation*. This word means a likeness, a reference, a respect to.

"John *eats* apples."

Here, *eats* has a reference to *John*, and *apples*—yes, *eats* shows the *relation* of John to the apples !

"That is the lad *who* writes so well."

By omitting *who*, it will be seen that the same *mechanical vacuity* is produced, which the omission of any preposition would create :

"That is the lad ——— writes so well."

Who keeps up the relation in *sense, sound, and mechanism*, which actually exists between the *lad* and his *action*.

But it may be said that this sentence can be understood without *who*. This we grant—so, also, could the following sentence be understood without *in*—

“When corn is ripe — October ! !

It is clear, then, that *pronouns*, according to the old definition of a preposition, are indeed, prepositions ! ! !

1. “John is rich—but James is poor.”

2. ——— is rich—but ——— is poor.

Is there not a complete *want* of *connection*, and *relation* in the second instance? What, then, does this prove? It demonstrates that even *nouns* are, by the old English Grammar, *prepositions* ! !

1. “John went for a dollar.”

2. John went — a dollar ! !

3. John went for a — ! !

4. John ——— for a dollar ! !

5. ——— went for a dollar ! !

1. “Jane has been loved by John.”

2. Jane has been loved — John.

3. Jane ——— loved — John ! !

Let us now close this chapter by congratulating the old school grammarians on having so able a commentator as Mr. Samuel Kirkham, to defend their errors !

PREPOSITION.

What is the meaning of the word, *preposition*? This word is made directly from the Latin *præpositio*. The word, however, is formed *indirectly* from *præ*, which means *before*, and *pono* which signifies to put. From this derivation of the word, it is made, *forced*, to mean the word which is placed *before* another word. But are not *a*, *an*, and *the* placed *before* the nouns to which they belong? Why, then, are not these articles, these *points, prepositions* ! ! ?

1. He saw *a* man.

The man drove *an* ox.

Why is not *the*, before *man*, a preposition ! ?

Why, too, is not *an*, before *ox*, a preposition ! ?

Why is not *a*, before *man*, a preposition ! ?

Are not these words placed *before* their nouns ! ?

1. “Of good men.”

2. John went *with* these young people to the most distant part in yonder field.

Of is a preposition. That is, *of* is placed *before* ! But, before what word is *of* placed? *Of* is put before *good*. *Of*, then, is a preposition of *good* ! !

Will it be said that *of* is a *preposition* in relation to *men*? This cannot be sustained for a moment. *Of* is not placed before *men*—*of* is placed before *good*.

Good is placed before *men*.

Why, then, is not *good* a preposition ! ! ? Because the word, *preposition*, has no *strength*—no *virtue*—no *import*. *Appropriate* technicals acquire

strength by application ; but lax ones grow more, and more feeble, till they become perfectly powerless. A word is called a *preposition* because it comes *before* the word with which it makes sense. Yet *of*, although it does not come *before* the word with which it makes sense, is called a preposition !

But this is not all—for *good*, which actually comes before the noun with which it makes sense, is called not a *preposition*, but an *adjective* ! ! What a sure guide the pupil finds for practice, in this theory ! !

“In the beginning was the word.”

Is *in* the preposition of *beginning*? No !

In is the preposition of *the* ! ! *In* is placed before *the*. *The* is the preposition of *beginning* ! ! Yet in the process of parsing, *in* is called the preposition of *beginning*, and *the* is no preposition at all—the *is* a *joint*, an *article* !

If words are classed in reference to their position in regard to other words, should we not have *post-positions*, as well as *pre-positions* ! ?

1. Whom do you speak of?

2. “I speak of John.”

If *of*, in the second sentence, is a *pre-position*, is it not a *post-position* in the first ! ?

Upon this principle there could be but two parts of speech in any sentence.

1. *Pre-positions*, and

2. *Post-positions*.

What an expressive nomenclature it makes !

With what perfect distinctness does the word, *preposition*, express the exact grammatical character of words ! ? *Of* happens to be placed *before* another word : and, as its entire grammatical character lies in this exact position, this entire character is fully portrayed by the mere utterance of this illegitimate technical, *preposition* ! !

We say, *illegitimate*, because the suffix, *tion*, which constitutes an essential part of this word, should not be incorporated with words that are applied to things. The affix, *tion*, signifies *action*—and it should be confined to words which are the names of actions :

1. Subtract—subtraction.

2. Lament—lamentation.

3. Dedicate—dedication.

We may be told that there are exceptions to this doctrine. For instance : fortify—fortification.

That *fortification* is applied to the wall which fortifies, is true. This wall is a strong *fortification*.

Here, the word, to which *tion* is affixed, slips off of the action, to the thing which performs it. But this application, even under the partial sanction of the circumstances, is illegitimate.

Preposition should be used, not as the name of a word, but as the name of the act of *placing* one thing, or word before another.

Of good men.

The *preposition* of *of*, before *good*, is according to the genius of our language. The *preposition*

of good, before of, would be contrary to the genius of it.

Here *preposition* is properly used. But, as *before* is found in the first part of the word *preposition*, with should be used instead of *before*; as,

The *preposition* of good, with *men*, is just.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

THE PREPOSITION DENOMINATION.

The *preposition* denomination is a small class of *uncordictive branch* words appropriated to the nouns, and pronouns of the *uncordictive* monos, to express *where*, or *what* one thing is in respect to another; as,

1. Joseph is *in* the house. [*Where?—in.*]
2. John is *on* the house. [*Where?—on.*]
3. Johnson is *under* the house. [*Where?—under.*]

4. Stephen was *at* the house. [*Where?—at.*]
5. Samuel will be *over* the house. [*Where?—over.*]

6. The bird flew *between* the trees. [*Where?—between.*]

7. The belt was *about* his waist. [*Where?—about.*]

8. He went out *about* the third hour. [*Where?—about.*]

Where was this act in respect to the third hour? Was it *under*, *over*, or *beyond*? it was *about*. That is, it was in the neighbourhood of the third hour.

9. Paul was *about* to open his mouth. [*Where?—about.*]

Where was Paul in respect to the act of *opening* his mouth? he was near the act—he was *about* it.

10. "They were *about* to flee out of the ship." [*Where?—about.*]

That is, they were *about*, or in the neighbourhood of the fleeing out of the ship.

What brought them so near this act? the *preparation* which they had made to do it.

11. They were then *about* sixty men. *Where?—about.*

Sixty men is a *numerical* mark, and they numbered so many that they came into the neighbourhood of this mark—they, in *number*, were *about* this mark—*near* it.

12. They stood *about* the room. [*Where?—not under, but about.*]

13. He was speaking *about* me. [*Where did the ideas come?—about.*]

The act of speaking may have been miles from me; but the ideas, the sentiments, which were uttered, are *represented* to be *about* me; and, as they are *represented* to be *near* me, the conclusion is that they *concerned* me. If a thing is placed *by*, or *about* me, the fair inference is that it *respects*, or *concerns* me.

14. "I must be *about* my Father's business." [*Where?—about.*]

Why be *by* it, *about* it? that I may attend to it.

15. Scatter the seed *about* the field. [*Where?—not under, not above, not beyond, but about.*]

16. Give me peace *above* all other things. [*What peace is.*]

Here *above* shows what peace is in respect to all other things. Well, what is peace in respect to all other things? *Above* says that it is *superior* to all other things—*above* says that, in respect to all other things, *peace* is the *greater* blessing. What is peace in respect to all other things? it is *greater*. In respect to what is peace inferior? in respect to the Supreme Being.

17. Henry was called *after* his uncle. [*What uncle is.*]

What is the uncle in respect to the act of naming Henry? *After* says that the uncle was the *pattern*, the model, which governed the act of naming Henry.

18. John went *after* his book. [*What the book is.*]

What is the book in respect to *went*? the book in respect to this action, is a *cause*. The book, says *after*, produced a motive, an inducement, in John to go. If so, the book, in respect to this action is a *primary* cause.

19. They walk *after* the flesh. [*What the flesh is.*]

What is the flesh in respect to the *walking* of these people? *After* says that it is a guide, a law.

20. He esteemed virtue *before* gold. [*What virtue is.*]

Virtue, in respect to gold, is a *superior*. So says *before*.

21. And he set Ephraim *before* Manasseh. [*What Ephraim is.*]

22. The world was all *before* them. [*Where? before, not behind.*]

23. In history, John is behind his class. [*Where? behind.*]

24. John is behind his class *in* history. [*Where? in, not on.*]

25. John is *below* me in the class. [*Where? below.*]

26. James went *as* a soldier. [*What James was.*]

What does *as* express here? *As* expresses what James was in respect to a soldier. Well, what does *as* say James was in respect to a soldier? *as* says that James was *identical* with a soldier. [See *As*, Book I. p. 35.]

[Words of the Preposition Denomination express *where*, or *what* one thing is in respect to another.]

27. John took this note *for* good money. [*What the note is.*]

For shows what this note was, in John's estimation, in respect to good money. Well, what does *for* say the note was in respect to *good money*, according to John's estimation? *for* says that the note, in John's estimation, was *identical* with

good money. In this case, *for*, and *as*, are nearly synonymous. John took this note *for* good money. But James took that note *as* bad money.

28. Mr. Jones took all the money *but* this note. [What the note is.]

This note is the *excepted*, the *subtracted*, thing. This character of the note is expressed by *but*. *But* is employed to express that, in respect to the money from which this note is taken, the note is an *excepted*, a *subtracted*, bill. (Book I. p. 43.)

29. What man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit (*for* the kingdom) of God? [What the man is in respect to the kingdom.]

The principal cordiction in this syllabane, is that of a bold *affirmation*. True, the words are packed in the *interrogatory* form. But this mode of packing them is adopted to give the *negation*, which is the only thing affirmed, greater force. The sense is this, viz. No man who puts his hand to the plough, and looks back, is fit *for* the kingdom of God.

For is of the *preposition denomination*; and it is used to show what the man is in respect to this certain kingdom. Well, what is the character of the man in respect to this particular kingdom? *For* affirms it to be that of *fitness*.

Why does the writer use a preposition which is calculated to express fitness, a suitability, in the man, when he wishes to express that the very man is *not* fit? He expresses the fitness that he may have an opportunity to *deny* it?

No man who does the certain acts mentioned in this sentence, is fit *for* the kingdom.

No does not deny the *fitness* of the man in general; no denies his fitness *for* this certain kingdom.

With reference to this kingdom, the man who does so, and so, is *not* fit. Still with respect to other places, he may be perfectly *fit*. (Book III.)

30. "But I tell you (*of* a truth) there be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see the kingdom of God."

[*Of* shows what *truth* is in respect to all that part of the sentence which follows the word, *truth*.]

Well what does *of* say concerning the character of truth in respect to this certain part of the sentence? *Of* says that truth is the *source* of the complex fact stated in this part of the sentence.

I tell you.

That is, I tell *to* you. That is, I bring *to* you. Well, what do I bring? I bring what is stated in the following syllabane:

"There be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see the kingdom of God."

This is what I tell—or this is what I bring *to* you. In what do I bring it *to* you? in a *basket* made out of *words*. Whence do I get this thing, the fact which I tell, or bring *to* you in this verbal

basket? I derived it out of *truth*. Very much as the hatter derives the hats out of *fur*, I derive this fact out of *truth*.

But what object is to be gained by representing that *truth* is the source of this fact? By this representation every one is bound to infer that the fact itself is *true*. As a hat which is made of *fur*, is a *fur* hat, so a statement which is made of *truth*, is a *true* statement. (Book III.)

31. He was led up (*of* the spirit.)

The spirit is the agent—hence the *source*. (Book III.)

32. "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, I command you to rise up, and walk."

What is the name in respect to the act, called *command*? *In* says that the name is a *commission*.

In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, I command you.

That is, in the *commission* of this personage, I command you.

The name is used for the whole paper of *commission*, because the *name*, the *signature*, of him who gives power, renders the paper specifying the power, given, valid, efficient. *In* shows that, in respect to this act, this name is a *commission* authorizing the agent to act. Book III.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CONJUNCTION.

A CONJUNCTION is a part of speech that is chiefly used to connect sentences; so as out of two or more sentences to make but one; it sometimes connect only words; as, Thou *and* he are happy *because* you are good; Two, *and* three are five. MURRAY.

What is the difference between Mr. Murray's definition of a *conjunction*, and his definition of a *preposition*?

Prepositions serve to *connect* words with one another and to show the *relation* between them; as, He went *from* London *to* York; She is *above* disguise; They are supported *by* industry.—MURRAY.

The above definition of the conjunction naturally falls into two parts—and of these we shall speak in their order.

1. "A Conjunction is a part of speech that is chiefly used to *connect* sentences; so as out of two or more sentences to make but one."

2. "It sometimes connects only words."

Part first—"used to *connect* sentences;" as, Thou and he are happy *because* you are good."

Now, here are two sentences: namely, "Thou and he are happy," and "you are good." And "because" is said to be a conjunction, connecting

these two distinct sentences in a way which makes them both into *one*!

The only way in which *because* connects the two sentences is that of showing or expressing that the *second* is the *cause* of the *first*—

"Thou and he are happy." But from what cause, or source? "*You are good*" is the cause. and the word, *because* is placed before this mono, *you are good*, to express that this very mono denotes the cause of the happiness of thee, and him mentioned in the first sentence—

["Thou and he are happy] *because* (*you are good*.)"

The only way, then, in which "*because*" converts these two sentences into *one* sentence, is by expressing the relation of *cause*. Now, if the fact of expressing the *causative* character of one sentence converts *two* distinct, separate, sentences, into one sentence, what shall we say of the following instances?

Romans, xiii. 1, 2.—"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers."

"For one believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak, eateth herbs."

Here *for* is a conjunction, expressing the same kind of relation, denoted by *because* in Mr. Murray's instance of illustration; yet here are not only two distinct sentences, but two distinct verses!

Romans, xiv.—"Him that is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to doubtful disputations."

2. "*Because* one believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak, eateth herbs."

Romans, xv. 2, 3.—"Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification."

5. "*Because* even Christ pleased not himself; but as it is written, The reproaches of them that reproached thee, fell on me."

Are these two verses converted into *one sentence* by the conjunction, *because*!?

Thus much for Mr. Murray's attempt to convert the *cause*, and *effect* into *one* thing! The most that can be said in favor of Mr. M's. notions, is, that the conjunction subjoins a new sentence, erects a *new* building near an old one, or near an older one. But does the act of erecting the new house, convert the old, and the new, into one building!? The conjunction exerts no influence over the preceding sentence—the conjunction brings a new sentence into the discourse; as, [Thou and he are happy] *because* (*you are good*.)"

The old, or first, sentence is in brackets, and is introduced without any aid from *because*. The second sentence is, "*you are happy*," and is advertised at least by the conjunction, *because*. But in what way *because* can convert these two affirmations into *one* affirmation, is to us mysterious indeed!

Part second—"used to connect words; as, an *apple* AND a *pie*."

It is said that *and* is a conjunction connecting *apple*, and *pie*. But in what way, or in what particular, *and* connects these, or any other words, we are not informed. The truth is, that these words have *no connection*. These words are separated by *and*!—*apple*, and *pie*. *And*, not only does not connect these nouns, but it actually *divides*, yes, *separates* one from the other; for, if we omit *and*, these words have a close connection—*apple pie*.

Give me an *apple pie*!

Give me an *apple*, and *pie*!

A conjunction is a word used to connect words, or sentences, in construction, and to show the dependence of the terms so connected; as, Thou *and* he are happy, *because* you are good.—GOULD BROWN.

"To connect words, or sentences in construction!"

Have we not already proved in the chapter on the preposition, that *verbs*, *adjectives*, *articles*, *adverbs*, *nouns*, *pronouns*, *participles* and even *interjections*, connect in *construction*!?

"God *created* all things."

God ——— all things!

Now, does not the omission of *created* break up, and break down, the construction, the frame-work?

And does not *created* show the particular relation of *God* to *things*; and also the precise dependence of *things* on *God*?

The verb, *created*, then, paints Mr. G. B. upon the subject of the conjunction, to the life!!

1. That the conjunction is not distinguished from other parts of speech by its *dictionary* import, is proved from the fact that conjunctions are not peculiar in signification—

"I went to him in haste *for* he cried out *for* anguish."

Here both *fors* denote *cause*—yet the first is a *conjunction*; the second, a *preposition*.

2. That the conjunctions are not distinguished by their powers to *connect*, is proved from the fact that all the other parts of speech have the same connecting powers which the conjunction possesses—

"I went to him in haste — he cried out — anguish!"

Does the omission of *for*, the conjunction, or the omission of *for*, the preposition, produce the greater *wreck* in the frame-work of this sentence!? Let us omit *to*, and *in*—

"I went him haste he cried out in anguish!"

Do not prepositions, then, connect as well as conjunctions?

Let us next omit the verbs—

"I to him in haste *for* he out *for* anguish!"

Here the omission of *went*, and *cried*, shakes this verbal frame-work into the huge pile of *monumental* ruins beneath which Mr. Murray, and

Goold Brown lie buried without hope of *resurrection*!

Prepositions, and conjunctions *originally* stood in one class, and went under the name of *conjunctions*; but for a good reason, the class has been divided into two families: *conjunctions*, and *prepositions*. And, strange to tell, these two classes have been defined without the least reference to the difference between, the two parts of speech, or to the true character of either! And we are now to point out this difference, and to express the *true character of both*!

1. What is the difference between the frame-work relation of a *conjunction*, and that of a *preposition*? It is this, namely, one is *individual*; the other is *collective*—the preposition belongs to an individual word, the conjunction belongs to a collection of words! The conjunction belongs to a whole company of words, but a preposition belongs to one word only, of a company. The preposition seizes but *one* bird of the flock—whereas, the conjunction seizes the *whole* flock.

ILLUSTRATION.

"I went to him *in* haste—for he cried out *for* anguish."

1. *To* has a frame-work relation with an individual word, namely, *him*.

2. *In* has a frame-work relation with an individual word, namely, *haste*.

3. *For* has a frame-work relation with the whole assemblage, "*he cried out*."

4. *For*, in the last instance, has a frame-work relation with an individual word, namely, *anguish*. Thus much for the *difference*.

Let us now see what is the characteristic of the words which the old school grammarians call *conjunctions*. The characteristic of a conjunction is its *frame-work* relation to an *entire* mono. The conjunction is not distinguished from the *preposition* by any *difference* in the ideas which the two express. The conjunction may denote cause; and so may the preposition; as, "He trembled *for* fear, *for* he saw a ghost."

Will it be pretended that the first *for* does not connect as much as the second? Let us omit both, that we may see which is the greater *connector*.

1. He trembled—fear: *for* he saw a ghost.

2. He trembled *for* fear: he saw a ghost.

Both *fors* denote cause; both *connect*, although the *first* is much more necessary to keep up the *connection* of the preposition than the second! Yet, the first is called a *preposition*—the second, a *conjunction*! But let us now ask wherein do these two *fors* differ in their *frame-work* relation? The first is appropriated to an individual word, *fear*; and the second, to an entire assemblage, to an entire *mono*, of words: *he saw a ghost*. This is the difference. And there is the same difference between the *conjunction*, and the *article*.

The article is appropriated, not to a *mono*, but to an *individual* word; as, *The* man saw a child.

Nor is the *conjunction* distinguished less from the *verb* by the capacity in the former to be appropriated to an entire *mono* only, and the capacity in the latter to be appropriated to *individual* words only. Every branch word except the *conjunction*, has the capacity to hold a *frame-work* connection with an *individual* word. Not only so, but no branch word, except the *conjunction*, has the capacity to hold a *frame-work* connection with an *entire* *mono*. In this particular, then, is to be found the distinguishing grammatic difference between the conjunction and all the other branch words.

If words are called conjunctions because they connect, the verb is as much entitled to be called a conjunction as any denomination of words in the language. Let this be demonstrated by omitting the verbs in the following instances.

1. John *eats* apples!

2. John—apples!

3. John *laughs* at his sister.

4. John—at his sister.

5. John *resembles* me.

6. John—me.

7. He was taught by that teacher!

8. He—by that teacher!

There is no conjunction in the English language which connects two nouns, or two verbs, or two adjectives: conjunctions never connect one word with another word! Let us take *and* in the following sentence:

1. "The horse, *and* saddle were injured."

The old school grammarians analyze *and* as a *conjunction*, connecting *horse*, and *saddle*. The very import of *and* stands directly opposed to this disposition of the word. This conjunction means *add*. It is equal, in *import*, to the verb, *add*, in the imperative mode. The reader, or hearer, then understands from *and*, that he is to *add* something. Now, there can be nothing added where there is not something already presented to which an addition may be made. In the sentence which we have just quoted, the *horse* is mentioned first—the horse being introduced, the word, *and*, is employed as a sign of some addition. And the question is, what it is which is to be added? Is the *real* saddle to be added to the *real* horse? This adjection would certainly produce no very strange appearance. But just think what a very different figure this work of adjection would make, if the saddle should be mentioned before the horse: the saddle, *and* horse were injured! Here we find, not the saddle put upon the horse, but the *horse* upon the saddle! This theory works so ill in practice, that even Mr. Murray himself would disown it! Let us, then, enquire whether it is the *word*, saddle, which is to be added to the *word*, horse? Upon this principle, the thing injured was not the saddle, but the *word*, saddle!

"The horse, and *saddle* were injured."

But, why add the word, *saddle*, to the word, *horse*? "Why, that the noun, *saddle*, may meet with the same fate which the word, *horse*, suffers."

This would be plausible logic if the word, *horse*, was injured—but, as not one *hair* of the noun, *horse*, is injured, we do not see the propriety of binding by means of this verbal girth, *and*, the noun, *saddle*, to the noun, *horse*, to procure some injury to the noun, *saddle*! What, connect the *signs*, to effect the thing signified!? This sort of philosophy would imprison the *portrait* to punish the *criminal* whom it represents!! No, no—let us reject this chaff, and resort to the *kernel*.

"The horse, and *saddle* were injured."

That is, the horse was injured; *and* the saddle was injured. In other words, the horse was injured, *add* that the saddle was also injured. The author of the sentence first asserts in an *implementary* mono, that the horse was injured. Having done this in an elliptical mono, he says, *add* to the fact that the horse was injured, the fact that the saddle was also injured. The mono which *add* introduces is that which follows *and*, as may be seen by rendering both monos full :

[The horse was injured;] *and* (the saddle was injured.)

And, then, is a conjunction, and is used to introduce an additional mono into the sentence.

Originally, *prepositions*, and *conjunctions*, were classed in the *same* family. Both classes were then parsed as *conjunctions*. This fact indicates that the old school grammarians understood little of the true character of these two denominations of words. There is as much reason for including the *adjective*, and *conjunction* in one class as there is for embracing the *preposition*, and *conjunction* in one! *And*, was it not that the verb has *cordictive* power, there would have been just as good ground for including the *conjunction*, and *verb* in the same denomination, as there was for embracing the *preposition*, and *conjunction* in the same! The verb is *distinguished*, then, from every other branch word, whether *article*, *adjective*, *adverb*, *preposition*, or *conjunction*, by its *capacity* to aid in forming a cordiction. *And*, consequently, every *uncordictive branch* word is distinguished from the verb by a *want*, a *destitution*, of this capacity.

As the old school grammarians *originally* included the *conjunctions*, and *prepositions* in one family, and parsed them under the name of *conjunction*, it may be well enough to inquire more particularly in what these two denominations of words agree. These two denominations are alike in this: both are *uncordictive*. That is, both are incapable of rendering any aid in forming a cordiction. In other words, both denominations are destitute of *cordictive* power. There is no *conjunction*, nor is there any *preposition*, which can render any aid in forming a cordiction. This may be seen from the following experiments :

1. He *of*. (No cordiction.)

2. Ye *than*. (No cordiction.)

Of, and *than*, then, agree in this, namely, neither has the *cordictive* power.

How very different are these two denominations of words from the verbs.

1. He *is*. (A cordiction.)

2. Ye *are*. (A cordiction.)

Is, and *are*, are verbs; but *of*, and *than* are *uncordictive* branch words.

Let us now see whether *conjunctions*, and *prepositions* are distinguished from the *article*, the *adjective*, and the *adverb*, by a *want*, a *destitution*, of *cordictive* power.

1. He *a*. (No cordiction.)

2. He *the*. (No cordiction.)

3. He *old*. (No cordiction.)

4. He *where*. (No cordiction.)

5. *There* he. (No cordiction.)

Now, as the only analogy between the *conjunction*, and the *preposition*, lies in the *want* of the *cordictive* power, is it not clear that the *article*, the *adjective*, and the *adverb*, could have been included with the *conjunction* with as much propriety as was the *preposition*?

Under Part V., (Book I. p. 79,) these denominations are all brought into one class: they constitute the great family of *uncordictive* clades. But, while their *want* of the cordictive power, brings them into the same group, the same verbal community, their other grammatical properties, subdivide them into four classes; namely.

1. *Conjunctions*.

2. *Prepositions*.

3. *Articles*, and *adjectives*.

4. *Adverbs*.

We have already shown what it is which distinguishes these four classes from the verb; and we have also shown what it is which distinguishes the *conjunction* from the other four classes. We have said that the *Grammatic* property by which the conjunction is distinguished from the *article*, *adjective*, *adverb*, and *preposition*, is its capacity to be appropriated to an entire mono of words; its capacity to stand conjoined to an entire *cordictive* mono. And in reference to this *framework* capacity, we have defined the conjunction.

II. ARTICLE, ADJECTIVE, AND PREPOSITION.

Having disposed of the *conjunction*, let us devote a few moments to the *article*, the *adjective*, and the *preposition*. These three parts of speech are distinguished from the conjunction by what we may denominate an *individual* framework appropriation. They are destitute of all ability to be appropriated to a *mono*. But, while they are destitute of the power to be attached to a mono, they have the capacity to be appropriated to *individual* words. Thus much for the *feature* which throws these three parts of speech out of the *uncordictive* clade family.

Let us now see wherein the *article*, and *adjective* differ from the *preposition*. The preposition has the capacity to hold a frame-work connection with individual words; the *article*, and *adjective* have the same frame-work power. The *article*, and the *adjective* have the ability to be appropriated to *nouns*: the *preposition* has the same power.

1. *The men.* (*Article.*)
2. *Good men.* (*Adjective.*)
3. *Of men.* (*Preposition.*)

Although these three classes agree in each particular which we have named—yet there is one particular in which they differ. The *preposition* is applicable to uncordictive nouns and uncordictive pronouns only, as, *of things, of them.*

But the *article* and the *adjective* are applicable to the *cordictive*, and to the *uncordictive* nouns, and pronouns; as, *the good things are the good things.*
cor. uncor.

1. *The men saw the book.*
2. *Good men do good deeds.*
3. *He went with them.*

He that attempts to found a *part of speech* distinction, a *part of speech* difference, between the *article*, and the *adjective*, undertakes a task which he cannot accomplish. The *part of speech* characteristic of the *article*, is the *part of speech* trait of the *adjective*! Both are *branches*, and not *trunks*: both are *uncordictive*, and not *cordictive*.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

THE CONJUNCTION DENOMINATION.

The *conjunction* denomination is a small class of *uncordictive branch* words appropriated to *cordictive sub syllabanes*, to express *what* the *predicates* of the *sub syllabanes*, are to the *predicates* of the *supers*; as, *I called you; but you did not come.*

1. [*Joseph went,*] (*because John wanted to see him.*) *Because.*

In the *trone*, it is predicated of *Joseph*, that *he went*; in the *clad*, it is predicated of *John*, that *he wanted to see Joseph*. Here, then, are two predicates—and the point to be decided is, what is one in respect to the other. This point is clearly decided by *because*: *because* indicates very distinctly, that *John's* desire to see *Joseph* was the *cause* of the going of *Joseph*.

1. *John wanted to see him.*

Because is appropriated to this syllabane to express the fact that what is predicated of *John* was the cause why *Joseph* went.

2. [*John wanted to see Joseph,*] (*therefore Joseph went to him.*) *Therefore.*

Here, it is predicated of *Joseph*, that he went to *John*. And *therefore* is appropriated to the syllabane which makes this predicate, to express what this predicate was in respect to that made of *John* in the *super syllabane*. *Therefore* says that the predicate made of *Joseph* by the syllabane to which it, *therefore*, is appropriated, was an *effect*,

a *consequence* flowing from the predicate made of *John* by the *super syllabane*.

3. [*John went;*] (*but he did not stay.*) *But.*

It is predicated of *John* in the *super mono*, that he went—in the *sub*, that he did not stay.

But indicates that *his not remaining* was an *inconsistency*. An *inconsistency* in respect to what? in respect to the fact that he went. Why is *John's* not remaining an *inconsistency* in respect to this fact? Because *his not remaining* did not agree with the *presumed* purpose of his going. When it is asserted that *John* went to a wedding, it is presumed by him to whom this act is affirmed, that he remained there till the marriage was over. This very presumption is a *part* of the predicate which is set up in this hypothesis. If, then, the conduct of *John* was contrary to, or different from, the presumption raised by the predicate, his conduct was, in respect to this predicate, an *inconsistency*.

It may be replied, however, that *John* might account for his not remaining, in a very satisfactory way. True, but as this fact is not a part of the predicate in any sense whatever, it cannot render his course *consistent* with the predicate.

4. *John went to a wedding; but he did not stay.*

Here it is predicated of *John*, that he went to a wedding. Hence any course of conduct on the part of *John*, which is inconsistent with, or different from, the legitimate impression which this predicate is calculated to make on the mind of him to whom the language is uttered, is an *inconsistency* in respect to this predicate.

If a man erects a fine house, and destroys it, the act of destroying it, is an *inconsistency* in respect to that of building it. The destruction of the house does not accord with any impression which the erecting of it was calculated to make upon the minds of those who knew the act of building it.

5. *John built a fine house for his son; (but he destroyed it immediately.)*

Where the results are consistent with the building of the house, *and* should be used; as,

6. *John has built a fine house; (and his son lives) (in it)*

and his son lives in it.

Why is *and* used before this syllabane? to show that the predicate made of the son by the syllabane,

his son lives in it,

is a *consistency* in respect to the predicate made of *John* in the *super syllabane*:

The living in houses is one of the common results of building them.

Where the result is what may naturally be expected, *and* should be used; as,

John has gone to a wedding; and he will stay till it is over.

But where the result is *eccentric, unusual, and*

unlooked-for from the nature of the case, but should be used; as,

John has gone to a wedding; but he will not remain to witness the marriage

7. John purchased salt, (and meat.)

That is, he purchased salt; (and he purchased meat.)

In the clad, the predicate is, *purchased meat*. And, *and* informs the reader in advance, that this predicate is very *similar* to that in the trone. The act which forms the vital part of the predicate made of John in the clad, is nearly identical with that which is made of him in the trone. And the meat, although in a physical point of view, very different from salt, is here rendered very similar to the salt. In what respect is the meat rendered similar to the salt? Both are *purchased* articles. Had not the meat been rendered similar to the salt in *some degree*, *and* could not be used.

What does *and* mean?

This conjunction expresses *analogy*. Where the predicate in the *sub* mono, is *analogous* to that in the *super*, and a conjunction is *required* to express the similarity, *and* should be used; as,

John purchased my salt, (*and* sold his own meat.)

The purchasing of the salt was a *business* transaction; and, as the selling of the meat was also a *business* transaction, the predicate in the clad, is similar to that in the trone.

To say that *and* connects, is to do nothing. Does not a *verb* connect?

1. Peter resembles her.
2. Peter her!

Is it not obvious that *resembles* connects?

What is the *meaning* of *and*—or of what is *and* the *sign*, the *name*?

"*And*," says Webster, "is a conjunction *connective*, or conjoining word." That the conjunctive character of *and*, may be well understood, he gives the following illustration:

"John, and Peter, and James rode to New York—that is, John rode to New York; *add* or *further*, Peter rode to New York; *add* James rode to New York." According to this illustration, *and* means more, further, addition. How, then, can it be a *conjoining* word? Was *and* a conjunction in character, it would exert as much influence over the preceding member of the sentence, as it does over the *succeeding* one. But Mr. Webster's explanation makes *and* exert all its influence over the member of the sentence, which follows *and*:

"John, and Peter, and James, rode to New York." That is, says Mr. Webster, John rode to New York; *add* or *further*, Peter rode to New York; *add* James rode to New York."

The word, *and*, has nothing to do with the first member of the paragraph,—"*John rode to New*

York." The first *and* is employed to subjoin, to add, to affix, the second member to the first—and "*Peter rode to New York*."

The second *and* is used, not to conjoin the second, and the third member of the sentence, but to affix, subjoin, add the third to the second. *And*, then, is a *subjoining* word—not a *conjoining* one. What! is the chain which drags a log to a standing tree, a *conjunction*? To be a *conjoining* chain, it must drag the firmly fixed tree as well as the log, till it brings them together. The first proposition is always fixed—it cannot be moved by *and*, as, "*John rode to New York*."

A second proposition may be dragged to the first by *and*; as, "*John rode to New York; and Peter rode to New York*."

Fancy that the Bible is before you. Does the hand which moves Webster's Dictionary up to the Bible, exert any influence over the Bible? Mr. Webster has well illustrated one trait in the character of *and*; but he has not illustrated any part of the character of a *conjoining* word! The main trait in the character of *and*, which Mr. Webster, in common with other old school grammarians, has not attempted to give, is the expression of *harmony* in character with the preceding matter. For instance—"John, and Peter, and James, rode to New York." Here John, Peter, and James, ride to the same *place*—in this they harmonize, agree—in this they are *homogeneous*.

John rode; but Peter walked to New York.

The *agent* character of Peter does not harmonize with that of John; hence *and* cannot be used before *Peter*.

John rode to New York; but Peter rode to Boston.

The character which *Boston* gives Peter, does not accord with that which *New York* gives John; hence *and* can not be used.

"*And*" signifies harmony in character.

"A certain man planted a vineyard, *and* set a hedge about it, *and* digged a place for the wine vat, *and* built a tower, *and* let it out to husbandmen, *and* went into a far country."

These five acts have the same agent—in this they harmonize—hence *and* is properly used before the words, *set*, *digged*, *built*, *let*, and *went*.

In the following, *and* is properly used:

A certain man planted a vineyard; *and* his brother set a hedge about it.

The setting of the hedge is in harmony with the planting of the vineyard; the setting results naturally enough from the planting.

In the following, *and* can not be used:

John built a house; but it did not stand long.

There is no harmony between the implied intention of the builder, and the ruin of the house; it was built, not for destruction, but for duration.

In the following, *and* should be used:

John makes money; *and* he keeps it.

The keeping of the money is in harmony with the implied purpose for which John makes it.

In the following, *and* can not be used with any propriety.

John makes money; *but* he wastes it.

The wasting of the money is not in harmony with the implied purpose for which it is made.

In the following, *and* should be used;

"Henry has purchased a horse, *and* John has sold an ox to-day."

As these two acts are *business* transactions, they are in harmony one with the other.

In the following, *and* can not be used:

The Alderman heard the witness; *but* he had not sworn him.

The not swearing of the witness is so very inconsistent with the hearing of his statement, that the use of *and* would be as great a mockery in grammar, as such a proceeding would be in the administration of justice.

The following is good in grammar, and law.

The Alderman swore the witness, *and* then heard his statement.

And signifies that the character of the matter which follows it, is in harmony with that of the matter which precedes it. The word, *but*, and several other conjunctions signify the reverse.

8. [John is older] (*than* his brother.)

That is, [John is older] (*than* his brother is old.)

It is predicated of John, that he is *older*—and it is predicated of his brother that he is *old*.

The quintessence of both predicates, is *age*.

John has *more age* than his brother.

There is no comparison between John, and his brother here: the comparison is instituted between the *ages* of the two persons.

The predicates are *older*, and *old*. And *than* is employed to show what the predicate, *old*, is in respect to the other predicate, *older*. Well, what is *old* in respect to *older*? *Old*, in respect to *older*, is a *criterion*, a *rule*, a producer of superiority. When is John *older*? Why, when he stands by the side of his brother. How are these persons brought together? By the use of *than*. What is the meaning of *than*? *than* means *that*. I am *taller than* James.

When am I *taller*? when *that* James is placed by me. I am *taller*. But how, by what means am I rendered *taller*? Let the means be pointed out by *than* which is really *that*.

I am taller *that* James is tall.

It is not the province of *than* to institute a comparison: the comparison is suggested by *er*.

I am taller.

The idea of comparison is fully suggested by *er*. *Than* (*that*) acts as a mere index to express the fact that the thing named after *than* is the one by which my height is to be measured with a view to make me taller.

I am taller than James is *tall*.

That is, when the height of *that* James is the criterion by which to decide my height I am taller. But when the height of that tree, is taken as the criterion by which to decide my height, I am not taller.

Than (*that*) is the index pointing to the object named after it (*than*) as the subject of the *quality* that is to be the criterion by which to decide the amount of the same quality in the subject named before *than*.

Whether I am happy or not, in the use of *criterion* as a means for expressing what the *sub* predicate is in respect to the *super*, I am sure that I am *right* in saying that *than*, in meaning, is nothing but *that*. It is common to change the form of a word to adapt the word to a new place. By the substitution of *n* for *t*, *that* has become *than*. Both forms, however, have the same meaning.

I am *taller*, that man's *height* being the *criterion* by which to decide.

9. [He commenced his house long ago;] (*yet* it is not finished.)

It is not finished, expresses a state which, in relation to the super predicate, is an *inconsistency*. That is, the unfinished condition of the house as a *result*, does not agree with the predicate which is made of him in the *trone*.

10. [John can not go] (*unless* his brother pays him.)

Unless shows that the predicate in the syllabane to which *unless* is appropriated, is, in respect to the predicate made of John in the *trone*, a *si ne qua non*, an *indispensable* condition.

(*Unless* a man is good) [he can not be happy.]

11. (*Although* he promised to call) [I have not seen him.]

I have not seen him is a modest way of saying that he has not called. The sense, then, is this:

[He has not called] (*although* he promised to call.)

Although indicates that the predicate in the syllabane to which *although* is appropriated, is an *inconsistency* in respect to the predicate made in the super syllabane.

12. [John went] (*notwithstanding* his mother wished him to remain) (at home.)

Notwithstanding is always a *conjunction*, and always indicates that the predicate in the syllabane to which *notwithstanding* is appropriated, is an *obstacle* in respect to the predicate in the super syllabane.

NOT ONLY.

13. [Henry is *not only* brave,] (but he is kind.)

Not only is appropriated to the syllabane which begins with *but*. *Not only* is appropriated to this syllabane to indicate what the predicate in the syllabane, is in respect to the predicate in the *trone*, *Henry is brave*. Well, what does *not only*

say on this subject? *Not only* says that the predicate made of Henry in the *sub* syllabane, is an *unusual* addition, an *unexpected* addition, to the predicate made of him in the *trone*. *Not only* intimates that it is very rare that we can subjoin *kindness* to *bravery*.

[Henry is (*not only*) brave, *but he is kind*.]

14. [Henry is (*both* brave,) (and , , kind.)]

15. [Henry is brave] (*as well as* , , kind.)

[Henry is brave] [*as well as he is kind*.]

The words, *as well as*, are taken as *one* word. *As well as*, as here used, is nearly synonymous with *and*, and is used to show what the predicate in its own mono, is in respect to that in the *trone*. Well, what does *as well as* say on this subject? "*As well as* says that, in respect to the predicate in the *trone*, that in the *clad*, is a *principal*. How so? There are two attributes predicated of Henry. One is *bravery*, the other is *kindness* :

[Henry is brave] (*as well as he is kind*.)

From the current of thought in this proposition, it is obvious that this sentence is not the *first* upon the subject of Henry. It is more than probable that something like the following, had been said before the above sentence was uttered :

"I am well aware that Henry is *kind*, which with me, is every thing."

Henry is brave *too*.

That is, his *bravery*, though a mere *secondary* thing with you, sir, may be added to his *kindness*.

The difference between *and*, and *as well as* is this—*and* indicates that there is no difference in *importance* between the two predicates; as,

[Henry is brave] (*and* kind.)

But *as well as* indicates that the predicate in its own syllabane, is more important to the party concerned than that in the super syllabane; as,

[Henry is brave] (*as well as kind*.)

Says John,

"Father, I wish you would send Stephen, the servant, to me."

Says the father, in reply,

[I will send Nathaniel] (*as well as* Stephen.)

It would be wrong to say,

[I will send Stephen] (*as well as* Nathaniel.)

Because this mode of packing the parts of the sentence, would not only indicate that, in the estimation of the son, *Nathaniel* is the more important servant for him, but would indicate that the son had actually spoken to the father for *Nathaniel*.

Mr. Jones says, Mr. Shepherd.

"Have you a good cow which you will sell me?"

I have, replies Mr. Shepherd,

"Here is one which I will sell you."

But, says Mr. Jones,

"She has a *calf* by her side."

True—but I will sell you the *cow* (*as well as* the *calf*.)

This not only makes the *calf* more important than the *cow*, but intimates that Mr. Jones is desirous to purchase a *calf*.

The following, however, will give a true expression of the thoughts of Mr. Jones.

True—but I will sell you the *calf* *as well as* the *cow*.

It may not be amiss to remark here that, in *as well as*, *as* retains the import of identity which is ascribed to it under page 35, Book I.

I will sell you the *calf* *as well as* the *cow*.

That is, on the *same* liberal terms. But whence the idea of liberal? from *well*. I will sell you the *calf* on the *same well* terms on which I will sell you the *cow*.

That is on the *same good* terms.

Henry is brave *as well as* kind.

That is, he may be considered brave with the *same wellness* (if I may use this form,) with which he can be considered kind.

Another interesting trait in the character of *as*, is its *retrospective*, *backward*, allusion, or reference.

James went *as* a soldier.

A little attention will show that *as* refers back to James; for *as* is here used to express the idea that *James* is identical with a soldier. *As* is here a preposition, and shows what *James* is in respect to a soldier—not what a *soldier* is in respect to *James*.

Henry is brave *as well as* kind.

Here, too, is the *same backward* allusion by *as well as*. The *bravery* is *as well* predicated of Henry as the *kindness*.

IF.

1. John went to see *if* he had a letter in the office.

In this instance, *if* is used to indicate that the predicate which follows it, is a *problem* for solution, in respect to the predicate in the super part of the sentence.

2. John will take out the letter *if* they will allow him to.

Here *if* is employed to express that, in respect to the *super* predicate, the *sub* is a *condition*. The use of *if* to express the character of a condition, explains how this word has come to be employed to express the *problem* character. In all conditions, there is an uncertainty—they may be complied with, and they may not. All conditions, as terms on which events depend, involve a *problem*. And, as *if* is generally used to express the character of a predicate which is a condition that always involves a *problem*, it has come to be used occasionally, to express the character of a predicate which is a *problem* for solution, without any condition whatever.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE ARTICLE.

THE definition of the article runs thus—"An article is a word prefixed to substantives to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends."

"An apple-tree is a tree which produces apples."

Inverted—"Every tree which bears apples, is an apple-tree."

"An article is a word prefixed to substantives to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends."

Inverted—Every word which is prefixed to substantives, and points them out, and shows how far their signification extends, is an ARTICLE.

But is the proposition made in the inverted order of the definition, *true*? Surely not. There are but three words in the language which are called articles. Yet there are thousands which sustain the *very character* that Mr. Murray's definition gives to the article!! For EXAMPLES—*red*, in *red house*—*my*, in *my hat*—*ten*, in *ten books*—*John's*, in *John's coat*.

Now all these words with the exception of the noun, *John's*, and the pronoun, *my*, are adjectives!

"*A* or *an* is styled the indefinite article; it is used in a vague sense." (Murray.)

"*The* is styled the definite article; because it ascertains what particular thing or things are meant." (Murray.)

With respect to Mr. Murray's *indefinite* article, it may be observed that no such article can exist without destroying, completely, his general definition of an article. That definition requires that, a word should be *definite* to become an article. "An article, says that definition, must *point out* substantives, and *show how far their significations extend*." But can an *indefinite* word *point out*, and *show how far the signification* of a noun extends?

Some have said that *a* limits or points out in a *numeral* sense; as, *a book*.

These should recollect that, the singular number, or unity is suggested by the number of the noun—singular, *book*—plural, *books*.

Much has been written upon *a*; and as we conceive, without presenting this word in its true character—Harris has attempted an explanation of this letter—but he has failed of giving the word its real function. Johnson has made a like attempt, with similar success. And Lowth has tried his able pen upon this word, in vain. Mr. Murray, aiming at nothing original, has labored to embrace in his grammar, all the opinions which the above named scholars entertained, and expressed of this letter. Hence in his grammar, we first find this article a *definite* word—but secondly, an *indefinite*, a *vague* particle!!

The learned Noah Webster has written a work which he has styled,

"A PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL GRAMMAR."

In this he has made some severe strictures upon the opinions of Harris, Lowth, Johnson, and others. Having made a few remarks upon their views of this article, he undertakes to give his *own* of this word—and this opinion, together with those given by the other authors, we shall here take the liberty to examine.

"*A* leaves the individual unascertained; whereas the article, *the*, ascertains the individual. (Harris's *Hermes*.)

If Harris is correct, how can *a* be an article without destroying the *received* definition of an article? Harris says, that "*A* leaves the individual *unascertained*"—whereas the received definition of an article says that, an article *points out*, that it *shows how far*—or in other phrase, "An article is a word which *ascertains* the individual, or individuals that are meant by the writer, or speaker."

Hear Harris again—"A respects our primary perception, and denotes individuals as *unknown*."

But the received definition of an article, declares that a word to be an article must point out, and *ascertain* the individuals—"how far the signification of the noun extends"—That is, to *what individual*, or *individuals* the noun reaches.

Hear Lowth. "*A* is used in a vague sense, to point out one single thing of the kind."

That is, *A* is used in an *indefinite* sense to DEFINE!!! Will the reader look again—"A, says Lowth, is used in a vague sense to point out!"

"A," says Lowth again, "*determines* it to be one single thing of the kind, leaving it still uncertain *which*."

But *a* never determines the *kind* of a thing—this is done by the *noun* itself; as, *a book*.

Does *a* here determine the *kind* of object? It is the word, *book*, which shows what the writer has in view. This noun determines the object to be a *book*, and not an *apple*—a *book*, and not another thing. Then, to ascertain what kind of a book, we must use some adjective; as, *a new book*—a *grammar book*, &c.

"A," says Lowth, "is used in a vague sense, to point out one *single* thing."

The adjective, *one*, is used to point out unity. But we are much deceived if *a* is so used. The expressions, *A man* was lost, and *one man* was lost, are very different. The last conveys more than the first. Besides, the *leading* ideas are different. In the first, the proposition is founded upon the *species* of being; as, *A man* was lost here last night—not *a horse*—not an *ox*—not *a child*.

But, in the second, the proposition turns almost solely upon the *number* of men lost. It seems to have been previously known what *kind* of being was lost—and this fact being before ascertained,

the only important item, of which they to whom the sentence is addressed, are ignorant, is the *number*, lost. When *a* is used, the proposition turns upon the *species*, or *race* of things; as, give me a *book*—not a *pen*.

But, when *one* is used, the *species* or *race* is known before; and the proposition turns entirely upon the *number* of the individuals; as, give me *one book*. That is, give me *one*, and not *two*, or *more*.

When *a* is used, the mind is led from one *denomination*, or *kind* to another. Hence, when we say, Rome was not built in a *day*, the length of time, is not sought after in *days*, but in a different denomination; as, Rome was not built in a *day*, but in a *century*. If, however, we say, Rome was not built in *one day*, no *new* denomination is intimated; and the quantity of time is sought after in *number* of days; as, Rome was not built in *one day*, but in *ten, sixty, eighty*. Surely it would be laughable to find the following: Rome was not built in a day, but in sixty! Hence we see that *a* gives no intimation of unity.

The answers to the following simple questions, must show that, *a* has no reference to *unity*.

How many horses have you, Sir? I have a horse!

How many horses have you, Sir? I have *one* horse.

Again, if we ask—"What animal is that in yonder field?"

The answer must be given with *a*, not *one*; as, what animal is that in yonder field? *a* sheep. But if we ask as to the *number*—the answer must be given with *one*, as, How many sheep are in yonder field? *one*.

Now let us hear Mr. Webster:

"The history of this word is briefly this. *An* and *one* are the same word—*an*, the Saxon or English orthography, and *one* a corruption of the French *un* or *une*. The Greek *en*, the Latin *unus*, that is, *un* with the usual ending of adjectives, and the Saxon *an* or *ane*, are mere dialectical differences of orthography, as are the German *ein*, and the Dutch *een*. Before the conquest, *an* was used in computation of numbering—an, twa, three,—one, two, three, &c.; and the *n* was used before consonants, as well as before vowels—'Ac him sæd hyra *an*'—But to him said one of them.—*Alfred Orosius*, lib. 6. 30. 'An cyning'—one king.—*Sax. Chron.* p. 82. Who were in that one ship.—*ibm.* 98. *An*, therefore, is the original English adjective or ordinal number *one*; and was never written *a* until after the conquest.

"The conquest, with other innovations, introduced into books the French *un*, *une*, from the Latin *unus*; the French being the only court

language for three or four centuries. But the English *an* was retained in popular usage; and both words, or rather both orthographies, maintained their ground—but the meaning of both is precisely the same. The only differences between the words are these—*an* is no longer used in arithmetic or as an ordinal number—though its only signification is *unity*—nor can we use *an* as a substitute, without a noun, as we do, *one*—John is *one* of them. But although *an* cannot, in these applications, be used for *one*, the latter can always be used for *an*.

"Hence we see that *an* or *a* is a mere adjective; or as I should call it, an attribute expressing *unity*, and, grammatically considered, it has no character which is not common to every ordinal number in the language."

The above quotation shows that reading alone will never make a *sound* scholar. All Mr. Webster's book-knowledge is good in its place, but it has no bearing upon *this* question. The question is not from what *a* has been derived. Nor is the question, in *what particular sense the old materials were used, from which A has been made, or formed*. The question is nothing more, nor less than this—how, or in what *particular sense* is *a* now used in the *English* language? It may be that Mr. Webster is correct in the *history* of this word—but we deny the correctness of his inference; namely, that because *a* has been derived from a word which, in its own language expressed *unity*, *a* itself must express unity in our language! Words, as they pass by derivation from one language to another, may vary in *meaning* as well as in form. Of this truth, Mr. Webster himself seems well aware. For, in the forty-eighth page of his Grammar, we find this remark in the form of a *Note* :

"To what unaccountable negligence shall we ascribe the utter misconception of the character and use of this word." (*as*)? 'A conjunction!' When the word is a substitute in the German tongue, and never has had any other use in our own! It is the same word as *es* in Greek."

Again, says Mr. Webster, "MAY conveys the idea of liberty or permission; as, He may go, if he will, or it denotes *possibility*; as, He may have written to me." The same author adds in a note, this:

"The *primitive* idea expressed by *may*, was *power*; Saxon, *magan*, to be able."

Mr. Webster continues—"Can, which is from the same radical as *ken*, and *can*, to *see* and *know*, has now the *sense* of to be *able*."

Mr. Webster here admits that *words may vary in meaning* as they pass from one language to another. Hence, to show that his position with respect to *a* is tenable, he is bound to prove a negative; namely, that *a* has not changed its *original*, or *primitive* meaning.

Now, it so happens that the noun restricted in

its application by the *singular* number, can not denote but *one*—and, as when nothing is desired but to bring this number of the noun into action, *A* is always used, grammarians, have concluded that *A* itself actually denotes the unity. The unity, however, is denoted by the *number* of the noun, as we trust we shall demonstrate before the conclusion of this chapter. But as the etymology, or derivation of this word, favours the received notions of unity, much exertion will be required to place the real character of this adjective (*a*), in a clear point of view. And we observe, first, that so far as *Etymological* authority is concerned, the popular doctrine is but weakly sustained. For even the French call the original word from which *A* has been derived, sometimes an article, and sometimes a *numeral adjective*! Where *un* in the French, is used in the way in which we employ *A*, it is called an article! But where *un* is used in the sense in which we employ *one*, *un* is then called a *numeral adjective*. Hence we can show by etymological proof that *A* does not express unity in English.

Before Mr. Webster, therefore, can support his doctrine from the mere *etymology* of *a*, he must show that *un* is always used in the sense of *one*!! This he can hardly accomplish! If *un* always means *one*, we ask how it happens that the acute philologists of France, denominate *un* in one expression an *article*, and in another, a *numeral adjective*? Should Mr. Webster be unable to answer this query, perhaps the very learned Mr. CARDELL who has adopted Mr. Webster's exposition, may find time to solve it "by the laws of matter and thought!"

How, it may be asked, does it happen that when *a* is used, *just one* is always denoted by the noun? It happens because the singular form of the noun, acts whenever *a*, *any*, *the*, &c., belong to it; as, *the man*. *Just one*!

His man. *Just one*!

Any man. *Just one*!

Will it be said that *the*, *any*, and *my* denote unity? Should it be replied that *my* indicates one—we will give the following:

"*Our man*." *Just one still*!!

It is the *singular* number of the noun which indicates the unity, in each of the preceding instances.

Harris remarks that "*A* respects the *primary* perception, and denotes individuals as unknown;" as, a man is coming to us.

Thus we see that none of the learned can agree as to the meaning of this adjective.

The *primary* perception is a matter of *inference*. Whence this idea of primary perception? It arises from this—When any previous knowledge is had of the individual person, or thing, *the* is used, as, *the man* is coming to us. That is, some man distinguished, and recognised by us as one of whom we had a previous knowledge. And

because *the* is *not* used before the noun, the mind infers that this is the first time we have seen this man. It is, then, the *absence* of *the*, and not the presence of *a*, which makes this perception *primary*. But to put this beyond all doubts, suppose that no article is used; as, six men are coming to us.

Why does it here appear that these are persons of whom we have had no previous knowledge? Or how does it happen that our perception of these men is *primary*? Surely not because *a* is placed before the noun, for there is no *a*; but because of the omission of *the*. If we say—the six men are coming to us, the perception is *secondary*.

Having shown that it is the *absence* of *the*, and not the *presence* of *a*, which suggests the primary perception alluded to by this acute scholar, we shall next attempt to demonstrate that the *old* definition of the article not only fails to reach the character of any article, but that it fully includes all *adjectives*, all *possessive nouns*, and all *possessive pronouns*!

"An article is a word prefixed to substantives to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends; as, a garden, an eagle, the woman." (MURRAY.)

1. "*A garden*."

Now, who can tell, from the use of *a*, *what* garden is meant!? No one. *A*, then, does not point out, and show the extent of the noun's application! *A*, therefore, can be no article by virtue of the *old* definition of an article.

2. "*An eagle*."

Who can ascertain from *an*, what eagle is meant!? *An* is no article by virtue of the *British* doctrine!

3. "*The woman*."

Nor does "*the*" point out what woman is meant! By what authority, then, can "*the*" be considered an article? Is "*the*" an article by virtue of the *British* doctrine expressed in the following definition:

"An article is a word prefixed to substantives to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends."

We say, without the fear of doing an injustice to any one, that *the* is no article by this definition! "*The*" does not point out, *the* does not show *what* woman is meant!

4. "*The names of the members*."

Now, it is not "*the*" which points out what names! The noun, "*names*," is rendered definite by the mono, "*of the members*!" To prove this, nothing is necessary but the omission of this mono:

"The names."

What names? Whose names? Let the mono, "*of the members*," answer this question:

"The names of the members!"

Even without *the*, the application of the noun is just as definite:

"Names of the members!"

But without this defining mono, the noun, "names" has no restricted application:

"The names!"

Let us prefix *the* to the noun "members:"

5. "The names of the members."

If an article points out, if an article shows how far the noun's application extends, as *the* is called an article, *the* ought to tell what members these are, to whom allusion is made!!

"The members."

But *what* members!? Why, *the* members!! But what members are *the* members!? They are *the* members!!!

"The members of the senate!"

It is seen, then, that "*of the senate*," is the article which points out, which shows how far the signification of this noun extends!!

"Of the senate."

What senate!? Why, let Mr. Murray's *definite* article answer! *The* senate!

But *what* senate is *the* senate? Why, *the* senate is *the* senate!!!

Reader, will you be so kind as to examine the following sentence, and say whether the nouns are rendered *definite* by *the*, or by the monos which follow?

The NAMES of the members OF THE SENATE of the "United States."

1. What names? "*of the members*!"

2. What members? "*of the senate*!"

3. What senate? "*of the United States*!"

"An article is a word prefixed to nouns to *point them out*, and to show *how far* their *signification extends*; as, *a* garden, *an* eagle, *the* woman."—(MURRAY.)

To *point them out*, and to show *how far* their *signification extends*!!! *Indeed*. And are the children of our free country compelled to *learn* this sort of philosophy? Is it possible that a knowledge of this same philosophy entitles a man to be denominated a *grammarian*? Even so—nay more, a want of it is said to *degrade* him!!

Having proved from Mr. Murray's own examples that no article does point out the extent of the noun's application, we shall next attempt to show that the old school grammarians, on the article, actually includes all the adjectives, all the possessive nouns, and all the possessive pronouns!!

"An article is a word prefixed to substantives to *point them out*, and to show *how far* their *signification extends*;" as, *a right hand*, *the sick woman*, *John's hat*, *her glove*!

1. "A *right hand*."

What hand; *right hand*."

2. "The *sick woman*."

What woman? *sick woman*!

Let us now see whether *a*, and *the* will point out *what* hand, and *what* woman.

1. What hand? *a hand*!!

2. What woman? *the woman*!!

Classification of Articles.

"In English there are but two articles—*a* and *the*. *A* is styled the indefinite article—it is used in a *vague* sense to point out; as, "*a* book, *an* apple."

"*A* is styled the indefinite article—it is used in a *vague* sense to *point out*."—(MURRAY.)

1. How can any article be an *indefinite* word?

2. Can an *indefinite* word be an *article*? Does not the *definition* of an *article* require the word to be *definite*?

"An article is a word prefixed to substantives to *point them out*, and to show *how far* their *signification extends*!!"

3. How can an indefinite word be used to point out?

"*A* is used in a *vague* sense to point out."

That is, *a* is an *indefinite* word, used to *define*, to point out!!

"*The* is called the definite article, because it ascertains what particular thing or things are meant; as, "*bring me the book*, *give me the apples*."

No one can determine from *the*, *what* book is meant—nor can any one ascertain from *the*, *what* apples are meant!! The book, and apples must be ascertained by some *clause*, or *adjective which has been omitted*. And *the* merely intimates the existence of a clause, or word of this description.* But does *the* by this intimation, *point out* the things *themselves*? What, because *D.* informs three gentlemen, that there is a man in the world, who can point out to them a Mr. Shepherd, does it follow that *D. himself* points out this Mr. Shepherd to these gentlemen? Again. *T.* intimates to *A.* that there is a tailor in the world who will mend *B.'s coat*—therefore it follows that *T. himself* mends *B.'s coat*!! Such an argument does not mend Mr. Murray's *coat*.

1. Though there is no corn in *the* crib!

2. Though *the* fig tree beareth no fruit!

3. Though *the* grass should not grow!

4. *The* ox knoweth his master!

5. *The* hand is an important part of *the* human body!

6. *The* sky is clear!

7. *The* sun has risen!

8. *The* moon has changed!

Now, why does not *the* tell us what *particular* crib is meant, and what certain *fig-tree*, and what certain *grass*, and what particular *ox*, and what particular *hand*—are meant!!?

"*A* leaves the individual uncertain; whereas, the article, '*the*,' ascertains the identity of the individual;" as, *a* man was lost, *the* man was lost, —*Harris's Hermes*.

"*A* man was lost?" uncertain *what* man.

"*The* man was lost."

What man? just as uncertain!!

No, but says Mr. Murray with Mr. Harris, and ten thousand of others, it is quite certain what man was lost—for the points out what one!!

"The man was lost!"

But what man is *the* man!? Why, *the* man is *the* man!!

If, however, we add some *descriptive* monos we shall soon ascertain what man was lost—

The man *who lived in the new brick three story house on the right hand side*, was lost!

We think that we are within the limits of truth, when we say that if all that has been written upon the article was collected, and bound into one book, it would make an octavo volume of five hundred pages! Yet in all this, it is emphatically taught that *the* ascertains, *defines*, *points* out what, or who is meant!! But we deny the soundness of the *doctrine*, and defy ingenuity, learning, or cunning to show that *the* ascertains who, or what is meant, by the speaker, or writer!

But, replies the old school grammarian, there is certainly a difference between *a* and *the*. True, but does it follow because *red* differs from *black*, that *black* is *white*?

That is, does it follow because *the* differs from *a*, that *a* is *indefinite*, or that *the* is *definite*!?

A.

We shall now resume the general British doctrine, namely, that *a* is a word of *number*, and means one; as, *a* man was lost.

What, then, is the use of *a*? Is it used here to show the absence of *the*? O, no! It is used *expressly* to prevent the noun, *man*, from embracing the *whole human family*. But, asks the reader, is there not just *one* man denoted? O, yes! What is it that signifies this *unity*? *unity* is denoted, not by *a*, but by the *singular* number of *man*! *A* is placed before the noun, and the singular number takes effect; and thus the idea of *unity* is suggested. But does not *a* exert some kind of influence over the noun? O, yes—Does *a* not shrink the noun to just *one*? No! the *singular* number *itself* of the noun, fixes this numerical application. It is important that some influence should be exerted over the noun to bring this *number* of the noun to act! *A* exerts this influence. Why then, is not *a* a word of *number*? Because *a* does not denote the *unity*; *a*, like any other word, destroys the generic grasp, or application, of the noun—this being destroyed, the singular form of the noun acts, and thus denotes *unity*!

What is the difference between *one*, and *a*? The difference is very great, very clear, and very interesting. *One* has *unity* within itself, which it expresses. The difference between *a*, and *one* may lead to the difference between the phrases—*One* man, and *A* man.

In the first, *unity* is the leading idea, and is expressed by *one* itself. But, in the second, the

kind of animal, is the leading idea; and this is expressed by the noun, *man*. In the second, there is surely the notion of *singleness*—this, however, is a secondary idea, and, after all, is expressed, not by *A*, but by the *number* of *man*! For this noun, by the means of its numeral form, denotes just one individual!

Let us now hear Mr. Webster from another part of his book—"The definite, *an*, or *a*, being merely *one*, in its English orthography, and precisely synonymous with it, limits a common name to an *individual* of the species."*

"*A*'s sole use is to express *unity*, and with respect to number is the most definite word imaginable—as, *a* church, *a* ship, that is, *one* church, *one* ship."—WEBSTER.

1. A. 2. ONE.

Has *a* even the least numeral cast! *One*, however, is all *numeral*. *One* is the very *essence* of *unity*. Now if this letter (*a*) is "*the most definite word imaginable as to number*," why will it not make some display of its numeral powers? *A!* ONE.

Mr. Webster says that these words are exactly synonymous! Let us see:

1. "A man was shot."

What was shot? A MAN. (Not an ox.)

2. One man was shot.

How many? *One*. Not two.

"How the" *position* "vanishes before the test!"

Further, 1. There was but *one* sheep lost!

2. There was but a sheep lost!

Are these two propositions the *same*? The first turns upon the *number* lost—The second, upon the *kind* of animal!! There was but *a* *sheep* lost. That is, no other animal was lost.

We hope the reader will have patience—it is our desire to exhaust this subject—which has been in the hands of the learned world for ages.

"Its sole use," says Mr. Webster, "is to express *unity*, and with respect to number, is the most definite word imaginable—as, *a* church, *a* ship—that is, *one* church, *one* ship."

True, here, there is *one* church only. But does this oneness demonstrate that *a* is the word which denotes, the *unity*? If we say—"the church," there is this same idea of *unity*, yet no one will pretend that *the* is synonymous with *one*!!!

1. A church—just one.

2. THE church—just one.

3. ONE church—just one.

Each example speaks of the same *number* of churches!! Is there, then, no difference between *A*, *THE*, and *ONE*?

We have already remarked the *unity* is expressed by the *noun* itself. And we are now

*It is not a little strange that even the learned Mr. Cardell, who has performed so many philological miracles, asserts that *a*, and *one*, are the same meaning.

prepared to present that fact in a clear light. And first—Every noun in the singular number, which is *not* under any qualification, is taken in its broadest sense; as, *man, book*.

But when a noun is acted upon by any word, or words, it gives up its broadest sense; and, by its *singular number*, the noun in, and of *Church* itself, expresses *unity*.

Here every church is embraced. But when we say, *the church*, there is but one church meant. And why? Not because *the* signifies *one*—but because the noun is moved in from its natural, or broad extent, and continues in the *singular form*.

Further—their church.

Here is *unity*!! This idea, however, is not denoted by *their*, but by the *singular form* of the noun, *church*! And here it should be observed that, although a noun in its broadest sense, is in its singular form; yet this singular form will not take effect until the noun is *jogged* by another word. And the moment this *jogging* takes place, the *singular form* is *alive*, and the noun by means of its singular form denotes *unity*. The article *a* then, as has been before said, does not express *unity*—but, like *the*, or any other word, *a* jogs the noun, and this jogging brings the singular form to life, and thereby enables the *noun itself* to *express unity*. If it is asked whence the idea of *unity* in the following examples, the answer is from the *nouns themselves*—which being touched by another word, act with their *singular forms*, and denote *unity* itself.

1 "A man. (one man.)"

The philosophy of the thing is this :

When *a* comes in contact with *man*, *man* surrenders its *generic* character, its *generic* grasp. Having let go of the race, *man* is capable of expressing *unity* by means of its *singular form*. This *form*, which never acts till the genus is given up, expresses a oneness, a *unity*, as soon as the race is abandoned by the noun. But, then, the singular form, expresses *unity* in that *dull, obscure*, way which renders it scarcely perceptible. And the idea of *unity* thus expressed, is always a *secondary* one.

2. *One man came.*

Here too the singular form of *man*, expresses *unity*—but the *unity* which it expresses, is a *dull, obscure* idea which is nearly lost by the lively, bold, *unity*, expressed by *one*, and made the main thing in the entire mono.

1. *A man came.* (Not a *child*.)

2. *One man came.* (Not *three*.)

Within a day or two, a friend has placed in our hands a new work on English Grammar, which out of courtesy towards its author, we feel bound to notice. The following is the title page:

Davis's Modern Practical English Grammar. Adapted to the American System of teaching. BY PARDON DAVIS.

By the use of "*modern*" it is clearly indicated

that Mr. *Davis* is the author of an *Ancient English Grammar*—and by that of "*Practical*," it is rendered obvious that he is the author of an *Impractical English Grammar*! We have not yet seen these works!

His practical English Grammar is adapted to the "American system of teaching."

We are not familiar with the American *system* of teaching—hence, we are unable to appreciate the following—

"Adapted to the American system of teaching!"

We should be glad to learn what this system of instruction is—and we intend to procure the *Ancient Practical English Grammar* by Mr. *Davis*, which we presume will open the mysteries of it.

As a child upon the shoulders of a giant, can see farther than the giant himself, so Mr. *Davis*, upon the head of *Murray*, or upon that of *Bullions*, can see farther than *Murray*, or *Bullions*! This *elevation* has enabled him to discover that the English language has *thirty, or forty articles*!

Under page 12, he defines an *Article* :

"ARTICLE."

All words in the English language which are placed before nouns *merely to point them out*, or to *limit the extent of their application*, are *articles*." PARDON DAVIS.

We can not comprehend the words,—"*merely to point them out*."

Does this part of the definition mean *merely* to distinguish nouns from other words?

If so, we feel confident that there is not even one word in the English language, which can be called an *article*!

What! Has our language a word which is used *merely* to show that the word with which it is joined, is not a verb, not a preposition, not a conjunction, but a noun!!

A book, the man.

Is *a* used *merely* to show that *book* is a noun!! Is the used *merely* to establish the fact that *man* is a noun!!

Why should a language have *thirty, or forty* words *merely* to show that the words with which they stand in juxtaposition, are *nouns*!! Would not one word answer this simple purpose? The word, *a*, is an *article* because it is used *merely* to show that the word with which it is joined, is a noun! If the object is *merely* to show that the word is a noun, why not use *a* in every instance when it becomes important to designate the fact that this, or that word is a *noun*!!

Articles are of two kinds, *definite* and *indefinite*.—PARDON DAVIS.

1. *Definite* articles are those which point out or designate the noun; as, *the, this, that, those, former, latter*.—PARDON DAVIS.

2. *Indefinite* articles are those which *limit the extent of the noun's application*; as, *a, an, one, any, ten, all, many*.—PARDON DAVIS.

Here we find *a*, *an*, &c. are indefinite articles because they *limit*!!?

3. *Numeral* articles are either *cardinal*; as, *one*, *two*, *three*; or *ordinal*; as, *first*, *second*, *third*:—the former are *indefinite*, the latter, *definite*.—PARDON DAVIS.

"One man was lost." *One* is an *indefinite numeral* article!!!

"Henry is the *first* man." *First* is a *definite ordinal numeral* article!!

Articles are sometimes assisted by other articles; as, *A hundred* men; and sometimes by adverbs; as *so many* men. PARDON DAVIS.

Hundred is an *indefinite numeral* article; and *a* is an *indefinite assistant* article!!!

Does not *so* bear the same relation to *many* that *a* does to *hundred*? Why, then, is not *so* an article!?

But why even should *a*, and *the* be denominated *articles*?

ARTICLE. (Latin, *articulus*, a joint.)

1. *Article*, an *article* of agreement, or other things which serve to *connect*.

As this word is derived from *articulus*, a joint, its application to an instrument of writing, is sanctioned by its etymology: the *joint* connects the two parts of the limb: and the instrument of writing connects the parties. Hence this instrument may be called an *article*. The instrument of writing is the *joint* between the two parties.

This word is also properly applied to a *clause*; for a clause of an instrument of writing, serves to connect what precedes it, and what follows it. Here we have the idea of the *joint*: *articulus*, a joint. But is there any thing in the import of the Latin, *articulus*, which justifies the application of the word, *article*, to *a*, *an*, and *the*? Do these words resemble *joints*? Had the old school grammarians applied the name, *article*, to the words which they call *verbs*, *conjunctions*, or *prepositions*, we should feel bound to admit the legitimacy of their applications. In the verb, conjunction, and preposition, there may be seen a *connective* character. This may be seen by omitting them in the following instances:

1. John *loves* Sarah. John Sarah.

2. The arms *of* John. Arms John.

3. I *called* John, for I wanted him. I called John, I wanted him.

1. As the name of a clause, in an instrument of writing, &c., "*article*" must be considered a *word*. But, as the name of *a*, *an*, and *the*, "*article*" can not be considered a *word* any more than *ol*, *dreed*, or any other unmeaning combination of letters, formed *directly* from the alphabet! The word, *article*, in relation to *a*, *the*, *one*, *first*, &c., is *without meaning*!

Under page 14, Mr. Davis defines an Adjective:

An adjective is a word which expresses or alludes to some quality or inherent property of the thing represented by the noun: as, *A wise* man, *A straight* line. PARDON DAVIS.

It does not require much acuteness to see that Mr. Davis has increased the family of *articles*, because, in his judgment, the words which he has added to this family, do not fall under his favorite definition of an adjective. Nor does it require much depth in metaphysics to see that the very words which he has added to this family of articles are clearly embraced by his definition of an adjective!

Let us first ascertain what a *quality* is:

A *quality*—that which belongs to a substance, or can be predicated of it.—WEBSTER.

A quality is that which can not exist in, and of itself, but must have some subject to sustain it; as, a *square* block, a *black* cloth.

The destruction of the block would result in the destruction of the quality which is here denominated *square*. The block, then, is the subject which sustains this quality. In the same way, the cloth is the subject which sustains the quality, denominated *black*.

Watts, who has written much upon qualities, says—

"Motion, shape, quantity, weight, &c., are properties of bodies, and that wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, &c., are qualities of the mind."

A mode or quality is that property which can not exist in, and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by, the help of some substance which, for this reason, is called its subject.—WATTS.

"One book," "Three books,"

1. As the unity which is expressed by "*one*," belongs to the book, and as it could not exist without the book, or some equivalent subject, it is a *quality*. And, as this unity is a quality, *one* is an *adjective*!!

"*Three*" denotes a quality—hence *three* is an adjective!! Will it be said that *three* does not express a *quality*? *Three* expresses three units which cannot exist without a subject. A unit belongs to each book—hence *three* is an *adjective*!

"A hundred men."

The word, *hundred*, expresses a hundred *units*, a hundred *ones*, which belong to the men. One of the hundred units belongs to each of the hundred men. Hence *hundred* is an adjective!

"Henry is the *first* boy whom I saw."

The priority which belongs to the boy, and which is here expressed by the word, *first*, is a quality. Hence the article, *first*, is an *adjective*!! Can there be a doubt upon this point? That there can be no first, where there is not *something* to be first, is obvious. Priority can not exist alone—it must have a subject. Has priority ever been seen without a subject? Do men talk about the first—and yet have nothing to which priority belongs!?

"An adjective is a word which expresses or

alludes to some quality or inherent property of the thing represented by the noun; as,

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| 1. One book. | 4. Many apples. |
| 2. Thirty pens. | 5. Each knife. |
| 3. A hundred men. | 6. Every pupil. |

"Each" denotes the quality of individuality which in this case, belongs to the knife.

"Many" expresses the quality of a great number of units, which in this instance belong to the pens.

"Every" expresses the quality of individuality which in this place, belongs to each pupil.

Each. But each what? Individuality of what? Individuality of each knife. If a knife is singled out as an individual object, or thing, does not the individuality thus produced, pertain to the knife? Could the individuality of a knife exist without a knife!!! Remember that whatever can not exist without a subject, is a quality!

But this definition of an adjective not only recalls all the words which Mr. Davis has added to the family of articles, but it really makes almost every word in a sentence an adjective.

"The statement is *accurately* made."

"Statement" is a noun, and, as "*accurately*" expresses a quality which belongs to the statement, *accurately* is an adjective!!!

If the statement is made *accurately*, does not the accuracy with which it is made belong to it!?

"The line is made *crookedly*."

"*Crookedly*" denotes a quality—and, if you examine the line you will see this very quality in the line itself.



"Line" is a noun, and represents the thing to which this quality belongs—hence the adverb *crookedly* is an adjective!!!

"John is a man of great *strength*."

Strength expresses a quality which belongs to man. Hence this common noun is an adjective!!!

"James *runs*."

"Runs" denotes an action—and, as an action can not exist independent of a subject, an agent, it is a quality. And, as an adjective is a word that expresses a quality which belongs to the thing represented by the noun, the verb, *runs*, is an adjective!!! Does not this definition of an adjective work wonders!?

The following is the first sentence in the INTRODUCTION of this marvellous book:

Language in its most comprehensive sense, is the medium of communication of ideas practised by all animal nature."

What is practised by all animal nature?

Answer. Medium!!!

Perhaps the author would say that *practised* refers to *communication*.

But as men neither *practise* a communication, nor a medium, one is no better than the other! Such however, is the construction of this sentence, that *practised* must belong to *medium*.

It is somewhat surprising that Mr. Davis, who abounds in *articles*, could not afford one before *communication*!

"Of communication of ideas."

Of the communication of ideas!

"Practised by all animal nature."

What! Can a writer substitute the characteristics of the agents for the agents themselves!?

Can *human nature* be substituted for *human beings* in the following?

This is the greatest work which has ever been produced by *human nature*!!

The new system as well as the nature of *a*, *an* and *the*, makes articles *adjectives*. [Book II. page 97.]

CHAPTER XX.

THE INTERJECTION.

AN INTERJECTION is a word used to express some passion, or emotion of the mind; as, Oh! MURRAY.

2. AN INTERJECTION is a word that is uttered merely to indicate some strong, or sudden emotion of the mind; as, Oh! alas! GOULD BROWN.

3. AN INTERJECTION is a word which expresses some emotion of the speaker; as, Oh! what a sight is here! Well done! PETER BULLIONS.

4. AN INTERJECTION is a word used to express sudden emotion. JOHN FROST.

An interjection is a word used to express some *passion*, or emotion of mind. MURRAY.

1. Is John *mad*?"

Why is not the adjective, *mad*, an *interjection*!? Does not this adjective express a *passion*, an *emotion*!?

2. "Henry was in a *rage*."

Does not the common noun, *rage*, express a *passion*, an *emotion*!?!?

3. "James was greatly *frightened*."

Why is not the perfect participle, *frightened*, an *interjection*!?!?

4. "Henry felt a sudden *terror*."

Does not *terror* express a *passion*, an emotion of the *mind*!?!? Why, then, is not this common noun an *interjection*!

5. "The man manifested great *frenzy*."

Yet the word, *frenzy*, is not an interjection!!

6. "Henry was *delighted*."

Yet *delighted* is not an interjection!!

7. "The brothers who manifested great *grief* on their separation, expressed great *joy* on their return to each other's arms."

Yet, *grief*, and *joy* are not *interjections*, but *common nouns*!!!

What is the meaning of the word, *interjection*? This word signifies thrown in *between*—or rather, the act of *throwing* in between. It is derived from the Latin, *interjacio*. It is made primarily from *inter*, between, and *jacio*, to throw.

This word, like *preposition*, is not applicable to things. The word, *interjection*, means an *action*—hence its application to words is *improper*.

"*Interjection*, throwing in between." This word is used by the makers; and *menders* of the old theory of English Grammar, as the class name of the words which express *passion*, *emotion*!! What analogy is there between the place which is called *between*, and *passion*, *emotion*!!? *Passion*, *emotion*, is the characteristic of the words—yet the class name of these words signifies *thrown in between*!!! If this is not writing with a *fork*, and with the hilt instead of the tines, we are incompetent judges! What! the man's name is *Jordan*—and he puts upon his door, *Nathans*!! The box contains tea—but it is marked *SUGAR*!! The words denote *passion*, *emotion*—but they are labeled, *INTERJECTION*!!! Surely this is a *consistency*!

Will the world continue to use a theory of which this is a fair sample?

"An *interjection* is a word used to express *passion*, or *emotion*!" How, by what means? By the *name* character, by the *name* relation, of these words to the *passion*, and *emotion*! If, then, the *interjections* are the names of *passion*, and *emotion*, are they not *nouns*? And, if they are not the *names* of *passion*, and *emotion*, how,—yes, how—can they express *passion*, and *emotion*!!!!

THE SUBSTITUTE.

THE *INTERJECTION* DENOMINATION is a *small* class of *intensive trunk* signs which reject all *branch* words, and express *individually*, the meaning of an entire sentence, in the *most hurried*, and *impressive* manner; as,

1. "O that my grief was thoroughly weighed, and my calamities laid together in the balance, for the arrows of the Almighty are within me."

This is the reply of Job to those who charged him with sin, folly, and impatience.

1. O that my grief was thoroughly weighed,—That is, *I most heartily wish* that my grief was thoroughly weighed, &c.

Here, O is synonymous with the sentence, *I most heartily wish*.

2. What, should Milo hate Clodus, the flower of his glory?

Here, Cicero, is speaking for Milo; and by the use of *what*, Cicero declares as follows,

It is too unnatural to be believed.

3. "Behold, my servants shall eat; but ye shall suffer hunger."

By the use of *behold*, the speaker expresses in the most hurried and impressive manner, the following sentiment:

Mark ye well this strange thing.

Then follows the strange thing:

My servants shall eat; but ye shall suffer hunger; my servants shall drink; but ye shall abide thirst."

Behold, however, does not always belong to the *INTERJECTION* denomination. It is often a member of the *VERB* denomination; as,

1. "*Behold* the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly father feedeth them."

There is the same sentiment, however, expressed by this *behold*, which is expressed by that in the other sentence. But, as *behold* is here a mere *branch* word, it can not be referred to the *INTERJECTION* denomination. *Behold*, here is appropriated to *fowls*, a *trunk* word in the mono.

1. "*Behold*, my servants shall eat," &c.

2. "*Behold* ye the *fowls* of the air."

Do you see that there is a comma after *behold* in the first? And do you observe that there is no comma after *behold*, in the second?

Reflect upon this too: in the first, the speaker does not say, *behold* my *servants*—but *behold*, my *servants shall eat*, &c.

Whereas, in the second, he says, *behold* ye the *fowls*.

3. "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

Here by the use of O, Paul expresses the following sentiment:

I am so wretched that no power can deliver me.

4. "O wretched prince."

5. "O cruel reverse of fortune."

6. "O father Micipsa."

7. O death, where is thy sting?

8. O grave, where is thy victory?

9. "And peace, O virtue, peace is all thy own."

Here the speaker declares by the use of O, that he is greatly delighted:

1. *I am so highly delighted that peace attends nothing but virtue.*

10. "My friend, you must submit to my orders." "Pish. Your orders!"

Here, by the use of *pish*, the speaker expresses the following sentiment:

I look upon you and your orders with superlative contempt!

11. Hush.

That is, *be thou silent*.

REMARKS.

Strange as it may appear, many, and indeed, nearly all philologists have virtually said *tush*, and *pish*, in relation to the whole class of *interjections*. Even HORNE TOOKE treats this part of speech with contempt. They generally take the ground that

interjections are not worthy of a place in *artificial* language. Horne Tooke treats them as illegitimate branches of refined speech, because he did not see in what way they could aid him in his attempt to gnash his teeth at his political foes. Murray found them too *knotty* for the edge of his knife; and his *simplifiers* have hitherto considered them too *self-willed* to yield to any authority which they could exercise over them. But they certainly fall under the following definition of words:

Words are *articulate* sounds used by *common* consent as the signs of our ideas! !—MURRAY.

We *articulate*, *spell*, and *write* these words—yet grammarians undertake to reject them as the language of the *brutes*

Are not these signs used by *common* consent? Where is there a *nation* which does not use them? Were not these *brute* signs used by *Greece*?

These words may be *beastly*; but they are *comprehensive*, and *forcible*. They are the life of oratory—each is a *full* sentence—and, like the electric shock, each produces an *instantaneous* impression. The interjections, not language! They are the refinement of language! And, as the grains of mica bedizen the sands of the celebrated Pætolus, so the interjections of speech, enrich the productions of the poets, and orators of every age, and nation.

But it is something in favor of this class of words, that they who attempt to cut them off from regular speech, betray, in their very act of *excision*, a censurable want of grammatical knowledge. Murray's judgment against them, begins as follows,

"*Besides these*, several *others*, frequently in the mouths of the multitude, might be enumerated.

Now, whether the interjections deserve a place in *artificial* language, or not, is a subject on which there may be different opinions. But I think that all will agree, that the words, *besides*, and *these*, deserve no place in the preceding sentence!

Several others frequently in the mouths of the multitude, might be enumerated. [*Besides these*!]

Goold Brown, who follows in the wake of Mr. Murray in almost every thing connected with language, repeats Mr. Murray's errors, both in grammar, and sentiments:

"*Besides these*, there are several others too often heard, which are unworthy to be considered as parts of a cultivated language."—G. B.'s Grammar.

CHAPTER XXI.

SYNTAX.

THE third part of grammar is SYNTAX, which treats of the agreement, and construction of words in a sentence.

MURRAY.

SYNTAX treats of the *relation*, *agreement*, *government*, and *arrangement*, of words in sentences.

GOOLD BROWN.

SYNTAX is that part of grammar which treats of the proper arrangement, and connection of words in a sentence.

PETER BULLIONS.

SYNTAX treats of the agreement, government, and proper arrangement of words and sentences.

COMLY.

SYNTAX treats of sentences. JOHN S. HART.

We must ask the reader to examine with some degree of care, the above definitions of *Syntax*. We must invite him to compare one with another.

Mr. Comly says that,

"*Syntax* treats of the agreement, government, and proper arrangement of words and sentences."

That is, *Syntax* treats of the proper agreement of words, and the proper agreement of sentences! The proper government of words, and the proper government of sentences! !

The third part of grammar is SYNTAX, which treats of the agreement and construction of words in a sentence.

MURRAY.

Mr. Comly has substituted *and* for *in*.

Goold Brown says,

"SYNTAX treats of the *relation*, *agreement*, *government*, and *arrangement*, of words in a sentence."

But does not every grammarian know that *Syntax* is the part of grammar, which contains the *Rules* that are necessary to enable one to construct sentences with propriety? How, then, can a definition of a sentence form a legitimate part of *Syntax*!

Under the same page on which *Syntax* is defined, we find a studied definition of a sentence.

A sentence is an assemblage of words, making complete sense, and always containing a nominative and a verb.

GOOLD BROWN.

Does the definition of a sentence fall under *relation* of words—*agreement* of words—*government* of words—or *arrangement* of words! ?

In what way the subject of a sentence can be discussed under the head of *Syntax*, is a mystery to us!

Mr. Brown continues—

"Sentences are of two kinds, *simple* and *compound*."

But what has the division of a sentence into *simple*, and *compound*, to do with *Syntax* which, according to Mr. Brown, is confined to the *relation*, *agreement*, *government*, and *arrangement* of words! ?

But Mr. Brown is not yet willing to return to *Syntax*—he leaves a sentence for a *clause*:

"A *clause* is a subdivision of a compound sentence." Nor will he yet return:

"A *phrase* is two or more words which express some relation of ideas without *affirmation* or *negation*! !"

"*Is John here*," then, is a phrase! Here are two, or more words which express some relation without *affirmation* or *negation*! !

In a Grammar, compiled by Pardon Davis, we find the following definition of Syntax—

"SYNTAX teaches the correct construction of sentences, and the arrangement of words in forming them."

The following *Syntax Rules* are from Goold Brown's Grammar.

RULE I.

Articles relate to nouns which they limit.
GOOLD BROWN.

Does this rule give any direction for the construction of a sentence!? Indeed is the paragraph a *rule*? It is a mere statement which, was it even true, could afford no aid in the formation of a sentence.

"Articles relate to the nouns which they limit."

Well, this is a wonderful affair! Without this *Rule* some people might think that articles do not relate to the nouns which they limit!!!

Could any one imagine that an article can *limit* a noun without relating to it!?

RULE II.

A noun or pronoun which is the subject of a verb, must be in the nominative case. GOOLD BROWN.

That is, a noun or pronoun which is in the nominative case to a verb, *must* be in the *nominative* case!!

In other words.—A man, or a woman who is in a river, must be in water!!!

Can a noun, or pronoun be the subject of any thing but a *verb*?

The rule implies that when a noun, or pronoun is the subject of a *preposition*, an *adjective*, an *adverb*, &c., it is not in the *nominative* case!!

But why is this paragraph placed under the head of SYNTAX? Is it a *guide* in the use of the English language!? It is any thing but a *rule*. We call on Mr. Brown for instances of false English, which violate this rule! Can he produce them!? No.

RULE III.

A noun, or a personal pronoun, used to explain a preceding noun or pronoun, is put, by apposition, in the same case. GOOLD BROWN.

Where is the false English which violates this *Rule*!? "*Syntax* is the part of grammar, which teaches us to form sentences from words with *propriety*." And is this statement a part of *Syntax*!?

But let us put this statement to the test:

1. "I am *John* whom you call."

The noun, *John*, is used to explain who I am—but is *John* put by apposition with *I*!?

2. "I *Paul* wrote."

That is, I who am *Paul*, wrote. *I* is in the nominative case to *wrote*—but *Paul* is in the nominative after *am*!!!

Are not *who*, and *am* understood? What does Mr. Brown himself say?

Words that are omitted by *ellipsis*, and that are necessarily understood, in order to complete the construction, *must* be supplied in *parsing*. GOOLD BROWN.

Let Mr. Brown show that, "I *who am Paul*," is not the true construction, if he can!

We say that no instance can be found in an English sentence, in which a noun, or a pronoun, is put by apposition into the same case with the noun, or pronoun which is explained! This *rule*, then, contemplates what does not exist.

RULE IV.

Adjectives relate to nouns, or pronouns.

GOOLD BROWN.

Will this statement which is improperly called a *Rule*, show a man how to use adjectives?!

We should be glad to review Mr. Brown's *Rules* in the order in which he has presented them. But we cannot be gratified. We have very little more space—and this we must devote to the discussion of his *Ninth Rule* which we have promised to demonstrate to be without a sound foundation.

RULE IX.

"A verb *must* agree with its subject or nominative in *person* and *number*."

In a preceding chapter, we promised to demonstrate that a verb *must not* agree with its nominative in *person*, and *number*.

"The verb agrees with its nominative case in *number* and *person*."

Truth is a conformity of what is signified, to the sign used—or truth is the agreement between the thing denoted, and the sign that denotes it. Knowledge is the apprehension of truth; or, knowledge is the apprehension of the agreement between the sign, and the thing signified. Hence, the degree of knowledge which one may acquire in studying any art or science, depends upon the degree of truth, which the art, or science may comprise. We say, (and we pledge ourselves to sustain the position) that there is no agreement between the old theory of English Grammar, and the grammatical principles of the English language—hence we contend that the theory is not true—and, as knowledge is the apprehension of truth, grammatical knowledge may be acquired as well without, as with, the aid of this system. A person, therefore, may have taught grammar for years, and still have no more true knowledge of this science than one who has never learned the defective definitions of the parts of speech, the blind rules, and ill founded remarks, which constitute the old Grammars on English philology.

We will fancy that two persons are now under an examination with a view to ascertain whether one has more grammatical knowledge than the

other. We will suppose that one has been a teacher of English grammar for years; and that the other has never undertaken even to acquire a knowledge of it by any system whatever. For the sake of distinction in conducting this examination, we will call the teacher R., and the other person S.

Now, we readily grant that R. has more *names* than S. But as names without ideas are a mere nothing, S. has as much real knowledge of this science as R., S. can tell the connection of the words in the majority of sentences without technical terms; and R. can do no more *with them*. What advantage, then, has R. over S.? R. can tell what he knows in technical language which one half of the people *can not* understand—S. is confined to plain terms, which all readily comprehend.

For example—"Martin Roche will deliver a lecture on Friday evening next, the 19th instant, in the Franklin Institute, on the subject of English Grammar, embracing a comparative review of Murray's principles, and those of Mr. James Brown's grammar, with a view to eligibility!"

What man, who can read English, cannot understand what Mr. Roche *intends* to say? And what man who can *write* English, could not have accomplished the intended object with as much brevity, and precision as this lecturer who has taught English grammar by the old system for twenty years!

A Specimen of R.'s manner of Parsing.

"On, a preposition belonging to *evening*.
Friday, an adjective belonging to *evening*.
evening, a noun, common.
next," an adjective belonging to *evening*.

S.'s manner.

"On, is a word making *sense* with *evening*.
Friday, is a word making *sense* with *evening*.
evening, is the principal word in the syllabane.
next," is a word making *sense* with *evening*.

We again ask, what particular advantage has the mode of R. over that of S.? S. ascertains, and gives the true connection of the words—and R. does *nothing more*. So far, therefore, as a capacity to connect the words of a sentence, constitutes a grammarian, S. is as much a grammarian as R.

But it may be said, that R. can use our language with more *grammatical* propriety than S. In reply to this, we will venture to say, that S. cannot use it with more *impropriety* than R. has done in the above advertisement. It is from example that one learns true, from false English—hence a person may use our language with as much propriety without technical grammar as he can with it. Has any real knowledge of the relation which exists between the verb and its subject, ever been acquired by the following rule?

"The verb agrees with its nominative case in number and person."

This RULE is not *true*—because there is no *conformity*—or in other words, there is not that agreement between the RULE, and the *relation* existing between the verb, and its subject, which is actually necessary to render the rule true. The British grammarians have spent years to illustrate this rule which has no sort of capacity to be applied to the peculiar relation that the verb has with its subject. Examples have been introduced—but these not only do not illustrate the adaptation of the rule, but they show the very *want* of the fitness of the Rule. The instances which have been used to illustrate the truth of this rule have a tendency to show the *true*, from *false*, English. If, then, these examples do not illustrate the rule, but serve to show correct English only, they are much more useful without the rule than with it. That the *rule* is ineffectual is manifest from the great number of EXERCISES which the pupil must correct before he can use the verb with *constructive* propriety. Was the rule true, a mere illustration of its truth, would enable one to use the verb in its proper subjective form—but as it is *false*, *good*, and *bad* English must be held in contrast before the eyes of the student for a long time, to enable him to select that modification of the verb, which suits its particular subject. Thus it is clear that one may acquire as much grammatical skill of our language without the aid of the old system as he can with its aid.

INCORRECT.

I writes.
We am.
He runnest.
They has.

CORRECT.

I write.
We are.
He runs.
They have.

"The verb must agree with its nominative case in number and person; as, I *run*, we *run*, you *run*, they *run*."

But what is an *agreement*? An *agreement* is a likeness in one, or more properties. Hence, if two things agree, they are alike in the properties, or particulars in which they agree. Thus, D. says to B., my coat agrees with yours in *color*. Now, if D's coat is black, and B's red, can it be said that they agree in color? They must both have the *same* color before they can agree in *color*?

It is said the verb agrees in NUMBER, and PERSON with its nominative case.

The terms of this RULE require that the verb should have *number* and *person*—for, in these particulars it is said to agree with its subject. Now, if we show that the verb has neither NUMBER, nor PERSON, we trust that we shall thereby demonstrate that the verb can no more agree with its nominative case in NUMBER and PERSON, than a *red* coat can agree with a *black* one in *color*! We shall here turn our attention to the manner in which the British grammarians make out the *existence* of the NUMBER, and person of the *verb*.

"SECTION 2.—Of Number and Person."

Verbs have two numbers, the singular and plural; as, I *run*, we *run*.—MURRAY.

Well, what about *number* and *person*?—Why, "verbs have number and person!" But this is not talking about *number*, and *person*; this is talking about *verbs*! Had the learned author said—

"SECTION 2.—Of Verbs,"

one would have been prepared for a discussion of the verb—but as he commences a new section under a new title, the reader little expects that the things advertised by this new title, will be set aside, and the *verb* resumed for further investigation.

"Verbs have *two numbers*, the singular, and the plural!" Observe the manner in which Mr. Murray has distinguished these two numbers—

"As, I *run*, we *run*!"

What, we pray to be informed, can be the difference between these two *runs*? Yes—first *run* is singular—and, secondly, without the least change, this same *run* becomes plural! It can be clearly understood that *I* is singular, and that *we* is plural—but in what way, *run* is both singular, and plural, is the very thing which constitutes Mr. Murray's bad point—and which he in the introduction of this subject labors to evade.

In speaking of the number of nouns, the author proceeds thus:

"OF NUMBER."

"Number is the consideration of an object, as one or more."

"Nouns have two numbers, the singular, and the plural."

"The singular number expresses but one thing; as, a chair, a table."

"The plural number signifies more objects than one; as, chairs, tables."

Here we find that the author shows his love of method—and whenever he is seen to leave this, depend upon it all is not right.

But mark the difference in the two illustrations—"chair" illustrates the singular number of a noun—yet not the plural; for it requires *chairs* to illustrate the plural. How very different are the two numbers of the verb illustrated—indeed, indeed—"run" is singular, and "run" is plural! No variation here—the same animal, as we have said in another chapter, may be a pig, or a puppy—yes, and after all, there is neither one, nor the other—for the verb has neither a singular, nor a plural number. The learner is informed that—

"Number is the consideration of an object, as one or more."

But is there any such property as a "consideration" about the verb, *run*?

No one can say from this verb, how many, or how few, perform the act of running! Number, therefore, belongs not to the verbs, but to nouns, and pronouns. But, we are told that the number of actors infuses itself into the action itself—hence the sign, or name of the action, is rendered singular, or plural, according to the number of agents or actors. But this doctrine we have refuted in another chapter.

This doctrine is advanced by Mr. Kirkham, and others who are no less positive in the denial of a true doctrine than logical, and brilliant in the support of a false one.

"Person," say they, "strictly speaking, "is a quality that belongs not to verbs, but to nouns, and pronouns. We say, however, that the verb must agree with its nominative in person as well as in number; that is, the verb must be spelled and spoken in such a manner, as to correspond with the first, second, or third person of the noun or pronoun which is nominative."

Now, the very reverse of Mr. Kirkham's position, happens to be the truth—for surely verbs have person, although they have no number. The person of a verb is that form, or inflection which the person of the nominative case gives the verb; as, thou write-*st*. She write-*s*.

Thou, is of the second person—and it is the second person of *thou*, which gives the verb, *write*, the *st* form. And this form being produced by the person, and not by the number of *thou*, must be called person.

She, has a capacity for showing that the person alluded to is spoken of—this capacity is the person of the word—now, the person of *she*, gives *write* the *s* termination—and this termination is the person of the word. If, then, we are asked to show the person of a verb, we are ready to make the exhibition. The following terminations are the PERSONS OF VERBS—T, ST, S, ES, TH.

These variations are produced, not by the number of the nominative, but by the person—were these produced by the number of the verb's subject, they would bear a numeral character—hence the verb would have number—but no person.

Formerly, our verbs received a form from the number of the plural subject—but not from the number of the singular—formerly, therefore, verbs had number; hence the time once was when verbs in English, possessed both number, and person—yet not both at the same time. For such is the genius of the relation between the verb, and its subject, that where the person of the subject exerts any influence over the verb, the number of the subject ceases to act; as, I *am*, thou *art*, he *is*.

Here the number of each subject, is singular—yet we find three variations in the verb, *be*. Whence these variations? Surely not from the

singular number of the three subjects—but from the three different persons of these subjects. We find *am*, first in this form, *BE*. And what power is it which brings *am* out of this radical form? Surely it is not the singular number of *I*: for, if it was the singular number which turns "*BE*" into *am*, *thou*, or *he* would perform this work of variation, for both have the singular number with which to accomplish it. Yet—*Thou am*, or *he am*, will hardly do! The first person alone, performs this act of inflection: as, *I am*.

Hence it is seen that *am* is the personal form of *BE*.

Having brought *am* out of *BE* through the agency of the first person, let us next ascertain what brings *art* out of *am*. This change is performed by the person of *thou*—the very person of *thou*, not *thou* itself, does this work of verbal deflection. But may it not be said that *thou* itself is the workman, and uses its person as one of its tools with which to do this work? O, no, but, if this strange figure must be introduced, let it be properly applied—the person, then, is the mechanic himself, and "*thou*" is the mere house in which he lives, or perhaps, the stage, or scaffolding upon which he stands to work, or operate upon the verb, *am*—*I am*, *thou art*.

As to *is*—this verb is made from *art* by the person which resides in *he*, the subject of the verb. How, then, we ask, does it appear that verbs have no person?

Says Mr. MURRAY, "the plural termination in *en*, as they *loven*, they *weren*, formerly in use, is laid aside, and has long been obsolete."

But does Mr. Murray say that the *personal* terminations have long, or ever been laid aside? O, no—He that declares that verbs have no person, is one who has undertaken to mend Mr. MURRAY.

We shall now resume the subject of *am*. When this subject was before under consideration, we think that we established our principal position; namely, *am* is brought out of *BE*, not by the *number* of its subject, but by the *person*; as, *I am*.

This pronoun has a capacity which enables it to distinguish myself from all others—this capacity, which, of course, custom has given to *I*, is called first person. Ah! says the reader, if this work of inflecting the verb, is done by the first person of the subject, then "*we am*" is good. How so? Because there resides in the pronoun, "*we*," this same first person which is found in *I*—But it is now *night* with this same first person—as we read, when the night cometh, no man can work, we have no reason to expect any thing from the hands of this person until the dawn of day! Ah! when will that be? As soon as you will erect his scaffold. What is his *scaffold*? His scaffold is *I—we*, is his sleeping chamber, in which he does *no work*. But *I*, as we before observed, is his scaffold, or stage upon which he stands while

turning *be* into *am*. And, if you take away his scaffolding, how can he work? This being away, and he being no *rake*, he returns to *we*, retires and *slumbers* upon the very genius of our language as his *pillow*. For, so far as regards the subject, and the verb, it is the plural number which works out the inflections of the verb when the person of the subject slumbers under the same roof; as, *we are*, *ye are*, *they are*.

It seems, then, that *are* is a *numeral* form. We admit it. Some verbs, then, have *number*? No—no verbs have *number*. There is *one* verb which has *number*! Which? *BE*. *Are* is the *numeral* inflection of *be*.

But does not the plural number operate upon any other verb?

This number takes effect only when brought in contact, or connection with *be*. Formerly, as we have before shown, the *plural number* exerted an influence in changing verbs in general; as, they *loven*.

But the powers of the *number*, are now not felt by any verb except by the verb *BE*. That *he* is turned into *are* by the number of *we*, is clear!

Let us next show how it is that *be* is changed to *are*, when *ye*, *you*, or *they* stands as the *cordictive* pronouns. This, again, is the result of the same *plural number*—for the plural number which is in *we*, is the same which is in *ye*, *you*, and *they*—*they* turned is into *are*. Therefore we find that, although the persons of these three *cordictive* pronouns, are different, yet the verb retains the *same* form with each subject; as, *we are*, *ye*, or *you are*, *they are*.

If, however, the person of the plural subject had any power over the form of the verb, each different person must give a new modification. But the person does not act when the subject is *plural*—hence we find that the verb has the *same* form as long as the subject remains *plural*; as, *we are*, *you are*, *they are*.

When the *cordictive trunk* word becomes *singular*, the *number* ceases to act, and the *person* revives—hence each different person of the singular *cordictive trunk* word, gives the verb a new form; as, *I am*, *thou art*, *he is*.

From what has been said upon the *number*, and *person* of verbs, it clearly appears that *no* verb can have both *number*, and *person* at the *same* time. For, when the subject is singular, the *person* gives the verb its form—and when it is plural, the *number* gives the verb its form. The rule, then, which says that,

"The verb *must* agree with its *nominative* case in *NUMBER*, and *PERSON*," is wrong—The rule should be thus—

RULE I.

The VERB agrees with its *singular* subject, in *person*; as, *I am*, *thou art*, *he is*.

RULE II.

The *VERB* agrees with its *plural* subject, in *number*; as, *we are, ye are, they are.*

But, to what extent will our language admit the application of these rules? These rules cannot be applied beyond the verb, *BE*. Thus every other verb in the language, is left *ruleless*. To correct the above rules, and state them in close phraseology, the two should be made into one, with a specification which will limit its application to *BE* alone—as follows:

RULE I.

BE agrees with its *singular* subject, in *person*, and with its *plural* subject in *number*; as, *I am, we are.*

This rule applies to *be*, and to no other verb—but it will not apply even to *be*, in all instances. For, in the *imperative* mood, this verb has no variation whatever; as, "*Be* thou a good boy, John. *Be* ye good children till I return."

In the first of these instances, the verb is of the second person (as say our *received* grammars), singular number—but in the second, the same verb without the least change, is of the second person *plural*!

The rule fails, completely fails, also, where *be* is placed beyond the subject's influence, by the intervention of one, or more other verbs; as, *He will have been* there six years next June.

In all similar instances *BE* is *been*, for it is neither under the control of the *number*, nor *person* of the subject. For, whether the *cordictive trunk* word is, *I, thou, he, we, ye, or they*, the form of *be*, is *been*; as, *They shall have been, Thou shalt have been, Ye shall have been.*

Nor will this rule apply where *be* is in the *subjunctive* mood; as, *If I were* there, &c. *If I be* there next week, &c.

In these, and all similar instances, this rule will not apply. It fails to apply not only in these instances, but in each instance of the *indicative* mood, in which an auxiliary verb precedes *be*; as, "*He will be here*"—"Thou wilt *be* there"—"*I can be* at home."

After, then, making the *most* of this rule, which is founded upon the *number*, and *person* of the verb, it is confined to *be*—and even to this verb, it will not apply in one-third of the instances where *be* is used. And as to this rule in its *original* form, it is a *burllesque* upon the true relation of the verb with the *cordictive* noun, and pronoun.

"The *verb* agrees with its *nominative* case in *number* and *person*!!"

The rule in this form—The verb agrees with its singular subject in *person*; as, *I am, thou art, he is.*

The verb agrees with its plural subject in *number*; as, *We are, ye are, they are*, is inapplicable! And even when it is cut down to the

dimensions of a mere nothing, it applies to but one verb, and to this one in a few instances only!

"*Be* agrees with its *singular* subject in *person*, and with its *plural*, in *number*; as, *I am, we are.*"

Let us now bring the rule to its true form—*Be*, when a *principal* verb in the *indicative* mood only, agrees with its singular subject in *person*, and with its plural, in *number*; as, *I am, we are.*

We will now undertake to extend the application of our first rule—the second can never be applied beyond *be* itself.

RULE I.

The verb agrees with its singular subject in *person* as, "*I am.*"

RULE II.

"The *VERB* agrees with its *plural* subject in *number*; as, *We are.*"

In saying—I *write*, thou *writest*, he *writes*, we have three *singular cordictive trunk words*—but we find only *two* personal forms in the verb. These are *st*, and *s*.

RULE I.

The verb agrees with the *cordictive* trunk word of the *second*, and of the *third* person *singular*, in *person*; as, *Thou writest, he writes.*

Let us now vary the tense—Thou *wrotest*, he *wrote*.

Here we find another failure. What now? We must cut down the rule:

The verb agrees with the second person singular, in *person*; as thou *wrotest*. But in the next instance this rule has no application—"Thou *must* learn well."

Yes, here the rule expires. Thus we have chased this phantom till this word of *compulsion* says stop. "*Thou must* learn well."

Learn what? Why, that the verb agrees with its *nominative* case in *NUMBER*, and *PERSON*!! No—thou *must* learn that the world has long been deceived by this rule, and that thou *must* not put too much confidence in *mere* assertion. Thou *must* not take the mere *importation* of assertion from England, to be proof of its truth—thou *must* doubt till the *proof* is made out. Consider that rules which are *untrue*, *trifle* with your most *precious moments*—hence thou *must* always insist upon having the reason!

But, alas, we may be wrong after all! We have forgotten to examine Mr. G. B.'s "*FIRST LINES*" on this subject. Let us, then, hasten to these *Lines*, that we may know *what* we are, and *where* we are! Our author says that—

"Persons, in grammar, are modifications that distinguish the *speaker*, the *hearer*, and the *person*, or *thing* merely spoken of." Under page 31, the

drawer of these *Lines* begins the parsing of the following sentence.

"She purchased it."

The parsing runs as follows:

She is a personal pronoun, of the third person singular number, feminine gender, and in the nominative case."

1. "A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun."

2. "A personal pronoun, is a pronoun that shows, by its form, of what person it is."

3. "The third person is that which denotes the person or thing *merely* spoken of."

4. "The singular number is that which denotes but one."

5. "The feminine gender, is that which denotes animals of the female-kind."

6. "The nominative case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the subject of a verb." (105 words in the solution of *she*!)

"*Purchased*, is a singular active transitive verb, from *purchase*, and *purchasing*, found in the indicative mood, imperfect tense, third person, singular number."

1. "A verb is a word that signifies *to be*, *to act*, or *to be acted upon*."

2. "A regular verb, is a verb that forms the preterite, and the perfect participle by assuming *d* or *ed*."

3. "An active transitive verb, is a verb that expresses an action which has some person or thing for its object."

4. "The indicative mood is that form of the verb, which simply indicates or declares a thing, or asks a question."

5. "The imperfect tense is that which expresses what took place within some period of time perfectly passed."

6. "The third person is that which denotes a person or thing *merely* spoken of."

7. "The singular number is that which denotes but one." (137 words in parsing *purchased*!)

"*Purchased*," is *third person, singular number*!!

"*Persons*, in grammar, are modifications that distinguish the *speaker*, the hearer, and the person or thing *merely* spoken of!!"

Pray, is it the form of "*purchased*" which shows what is spoken of in this sentence!?

"*She purchased it*."

Does the word, *purchased*, either by its dictionary character, or by its grammatical form, denote what is spoken of in this sentence!?

Does not the word, *she*, denote what is *merely* spoken of!?

And does not the word, *it*, denote what is *merely* spoken of!?

What, is the author of this sentence speaking of the *act of purchasing*—or is he speaking of the person who purchased, and the thing purchased!?

She—well, what about *she*? Why *she* purchased a book!

Mark the emphatic manner in which the drawer of these *Lines* makes an application of the definition of the third person to *purchased*—

Purchased, a verb of the *third person*.

"The third person is that which denotes the person, or thing *merely* spoken of."

Yes, the same definition which is applied to this verb, is applied to the pronoun, *she*, itself!

"Third person, and singular number."

Now, "number" (*says Murray's mender*) "is a modification which distinguishes unity from plurality!"

But where is this *numeral* modification of *purchased*!?

Purchased is said to be of the singular number—and then this definition is applied—

"The singular number is that which denotes but one!"

1. *I purchased*; (*singular*.)

2. *We purchased*; (*plural*.)

1. *I purchased*; (*first person*!)

2. *Ye purchased*; (*second person*!)

3. *They purchased*; (*third person*!)

Our mender certainly must have a copious vision—indeed, somewhere in the frame-work of his *grammar lens*, he must have a *numeral multiplier*—else, how should *one* form be *multiplied* to *so many*!?

"A verb *must* agree with its subject, or nominative, in *person*, and *number*; as, *I must walk*, *Thou must walk*, *He must walk*, *We, must walk*, *Ye must walk*, *They must walk*."

But we will employ our author's own example—"know."

1. If *I know*, (*one form*.)

2. If thou *know*, (*same form*.)

3. If he *know*, (*same form*.)

1. If we *know*, (*same form*.)

2. If ye *know*, (*same form*.)

3. If they *know*, (*same form*.)

Having shown that our mender is actually deceived in the number of forms with which verbs are furnished, for the expression of their grammatical properties, we should be inclined to give him an hour of rest, was it not that we feel curious to place his organ of *construction* beside his perception of *form*! This we shall do without any design to make this *novus homo* gloat! We shall not be *particular* in our selection of a sentence—we will take one of those which we have already presented—

"Persons, in grammar, are modifications that distinguish the speaker, the hearer, and the person, or thing *merely* spoken of"

That is, persons are modifications which distinguish the speaker that is *merely* spoken of, and the person, or thing, that is *merely* spoken of!!

This is *no quibble*—but the fair presentation of the construction of the sentence. Let us take something similar through which the true construction of this sentence can be clearly seen—

These compilations, in America, are works that degrade the *author*, the *teacher*, and the *student*, of the system!

That is, these compilations are works that degrade the author of the *system*, the teacher of the *system*, and the student of the *system*! What a production our author's sentence has turned out to be! In its sentiments *false*—in its *construction*, degrading to the very name of grammar!

We shall now undertake to bring the relation between the verb, and its *cordictive* noun, or pronoun, down to the naked facts. We must first observe, however, that Mr. Murray attempted to fix upon the verbs, *number*, and *person*, as *pins* from which to suspend this rule,—“The verb agrees with their nominative case, in *number*, and *person*.”

This being a rule in all the *learned* languages, the author presumed that no true system of grammar could be formed without it. Besides, Mr. M. saw a necessity for something of this kind to regulate the few inflections which the verbs, in particular instances, actually receive through the influence of their *cordictive* nouns, or pronouns. For example; *I am*, thou *art*, he *is*, we *are*, ye *are*, they *are*,—thou *writest*, he *writes*, or *writeth*.

But had Mr. M. considered that all these forms may be reduced to five, and receive an appropriate name, he would surely have given the name, and founded rules upon this name. The forms themselves are produced by the *reladiction* of the *cordictive* noun, or pronoun. Hence they should be styled *reladictive inflections*. They are five in number—*t, st, s, es, th*.

Yes, these are the inflections for the proper use of which the world has for ages been perplexed with the absurd rule—“The verb must agree with its nominative case in *number*, and *person*.”

The *substitute* for this Rule may be found in Book II, page 262.

The last Rule given by the old school Grammarians as a *guide* to the learner in forming *sentences*, on which I intend to comment, is that that is founded upon the curious doctrine that two single objects must be connected together to make them *two*!

RULE. Two or more *nominative* cases, though in the *singular* number, connected by the conjunction, *and*, require the verb to agree with them in the *plural* number; as, *John*, and *Charles* are good pupils. [J. R. Chandler's Grammar, p. 117.]

RULE. “Two or more *nominatives* in the *singular*, connected by *and* expressed or understood, require a verb in the *plural*; as, *Socrates* and *Plato were*” eminent philosophers. John S. Hart's Grammar, p. 113.

RULE. Two or more nouns in the *singular* number joined together by a *copulative* conjunction must have verbs agreeing with them in the *plural* number; as, *Socrates* and *Plato were* sound philosophers.—MURRAY, p. 130.

RULE. “Where a verb has two or more *nominatives* connected by *and*, it must agree with them in the *plural* number:” as, A boy, and a girl *are* human beings.—GOULD BROWN'S Grammar, p. 153.

Perhaps the common aphorism, “*what is everybody's business, is nobody's*,” is as strikingly exemplified in the general neglect with which the language of any nation is treated, as in anything in which men have a community of interest. The abuses which a language suffers, are rarely corrected: they are permitted to continue till that ear on which they at first grate, loses its power to distinguish between harmony and discord. And, as what is right in *sound*, is just in grammar, the true *genius* of the language, is often disregarded even by the best scholars. Was it not that what is the business of everybody, is that of nobody, we might hope for important simplifications in our vernacular tongue. As it is, however, little or nothing can be expected but a continuation of the changes which deform our language by a total disregard to its grammatical principles. It is not my intention to mention the numerous instances which these remarks embrace. It becomes necessary, however, to introduce one in which we depend, not upon the *language* employed, but upon the *nature* of the subject on which we speak, for what we wish to express. For instance: “John, and James are good boys.”

It is here said that John are good boys, and that James are good boys! The writer, however, depends upon his readers to correct this error in the expression, from the *nature* of the subject itself. That this is bad English, may be proved from supplying the ellipsis which even all the old school grammarians admit: John are good boys; and James are good boys.

Again. “John, and James write letters.”

By rendering these monos plenary, it will be seen that the sentence is not English:

John *write* letters; and James *write* letters.

Nothing is more obvious than that *write* can have no *syntax* relation with “John.” We do not say John *write*, but John *writes*.

Can it be replied that it is not pretended that *write* has a *syntax* relation with *John*? Why, John is said to be in the nominative case to *write*, and *write* is said to be a verb of the *plural* number, agreeing in *number* with the nominative *John*! But, as *write* is of the *plural*, and *John* of the *singular*, how is it possible for *write* to agree in *number* with *John*? Can W. agree in *opinion* with J. when W.'s opinion is entirely different from J.'s?

It may be replied, however, that *write* agrees with *John* and *brother*, in number. If *write* agrees with *John* and *brother* too, it certainly agrees with *John*. Yet, how, yea, how can *write* which is *plural*, agree in *number* with *John* which is *singular*? How can two men agree in *opinion*

about the value of a certain house, when one of the two thinks it worth \$8,000, and the other, \$4,000 only?

With a view to an impartial investigation of this subject, it will be necessary to settle, in the first place, whether there are *ellipses* in those constructions in which *and* falls between two correlative nouns of the *singular* number. And as a preliminary step in the decision of this point, it may be well to see whether there are ellipses where *and* falls between two correlative nouns of the *plural* number:

1. "Girls, and boys are human beings."
2. "Girls, and boys were present,"
3. "Girls, and boys write copies."
4. "Girls, and boys have books."

Must not every grammarian admit that the following is the true rendering of these sentences?

1. "Girls are human beings; and boys" *are human beings*.
2. "Girls were present; and boys" *were present*.
3. "Girls write copies; and boys" *write copies*.
4. "Girls have books; and boys" *have books*.

Now, as it must be allowed that this rendering is consistent with the very genius of the doctrine of *ellipsis*, how can it be said that the following sentences have no ellipses?

1. A girl, and a boy *are* human beings.
2. A girl, and a boy *were* present.
3. A girl, and a boy *write* copies.
4. A girl, and a boy *have* books.

But, say the old school grammarians, as the allowing of *ellipses* in these sentences, produces a gross incongruity in one instance, between the *language*, and the *sense*, and a gross violation of the first rule in our common grammars in the others, no ellipsis can be allowed. If an *ellipsis* is allowed in the first instance, the writer will be made to say that *one* girl is two, or more human beings! This, however, is the case, whether the *ellipses* are allowed or not?

1. "A girl, and a boy are *human beings*."

1. What is the predicate of this sentence? That is, what is the thing, or fact which is affirmed? The predicate is, "*human beings*."

2. Of what, or of whom, is this the predicate? In other words, to what, or to whom, is the fact that these persons are "*human beings*," ascribed? If I say, "John is a *thief*," it is predicated, or said, of John, that he is a *thief*.

And, if I say, "John is thirty *thieves*," it is predicated of John that he is *thirty thieves*.

1. Is any thing said, or predicated of a girl, in the following sentence?

"A girl, and a boy are *human beings*."

2. Is there any thing said, or predicated, of a boy in the following sentence?

"A girl, and a boy are *human beings*."

What is this predicate? "*human beings*." A girl,

yes, *one* girl, then, is said to be *human beings*, even without allowing any *ellipsis*!

It may be replied however that nothing is predicated of the *girl* separately from the *boy*, and nothing, of the *boy*, separately from the *girl*. In answer, it may be said that, if nothing is predicated of these two persons *separately*, there is *nothing* at all predicated of them. I challenge all the learning in the *heads*, and *books* of men, to show that, a sentence comprising but one verb, whether that verb is simple, or compound, can predicate any thing of *two* things, unless these two things are embraced in *one*, and the *same* noun, or pronoun! For instance, The *pens* are good, We are *pupils*.

It is a truth which is worthy of the admiration of the philologist, that the verb which affirms of *John*, cannot affirm of *James* unless both individuals are embraced in one and the same noun, or pronoun! If these individuals are mentioned in *different words*, whatever is said, predicated, of them, must be said, must be predicated, in *different monos*; as, "John, and James, are sick."

That is, John is sick; and James is *sick*.

"John, and James are sick."

Something is here affirmed of John; and something is here affirmed of James. *Are*, however, makes but *one* affirmation! Here are two persons, *John* and *James*: and, that something may be affirmed of both, there must be *two* affirmations! *Are* makes but *one* affirmation—and this one affirmation concerns *John* only. Hence, if there is not an *are* understood, nothing whatever is said of *James*!

1. ["Girls, (and boys , , ,) are] (human beings.)"

2. ["A girl and a boy are human beings."]

The objection which the old school grammarian offers to allowing *ellipses* in instances of the *singular* number is founded upon the incongruity of making *one* being *two* beings. I have shown, however, that this incongruity *does not* spring from allowing the *ellipses*: I have proved that this incongruity, this want of *sense*, exists even when the sentence is considered a *plenary* paragraph! But an *ellipsis* does not depend upon the *sense* of a sentence: an *ellipsis* depends upon the *construction* of the sentence. In the two following sentences, the *sense* is the *same*; yet in the first there is an *ellipsis*; in the second, none:

1. ["I gave (, John) an apple."]
2. ["I gave an apple] (to John.)"

What, is a *numeral difference* to decide upon cases of ellipses? Impossible. If a difference in *number* could exert any influence over cases of ellipses, the *mono* which *than* gives, might be *plenary*, or *implynary*, according to the *number* of the noun, or pronoun.

1. "John is taller (than *we* , , .)"
2. "John is taller (than *I*.)"

This incongruity of which the old school gram-

marrians complain must exist as long as our language remains *incompetent to express distinctly*, what it now leaves to the *nature* of the subject to decide :

1. "Six, and six are twelve."

2. "The *names* of the men, killed, were *Johnson, Stephenson, Jones, and Nathans*."

3. "The *names* of the two prisoners, were *Janeway and Lewis*."

1. In the first, it is affirmed that, *six* is *twelve* !

2. In the second, it is affirmed that, the *names* are *Johnson* ! If, then, the *expressed* idea is to be regarded, the word, *Johnson* is more than one name !

Nor is this all; for it is also affirmed, and that too with an exactness which excludes ambiguity, that *all* the men who were killed, were named *Johnson* ! "The *names* of the men, killed, were *Johnson* !"*

Nor indeed is *this* all; for, strange as it may appear, this very sentence affirms, *absolutely*, that *all* the men were named *Stephenson*, that they were *all* named *Jones*, and that they were *all* named *Nathans* !

This confusion is not the offspring of any *ellipsis* : it is the effect of an obvious incompetency in the language to *express* the just ideas in the case.

To remove this incompetency, some means must be contrived for making two *singular* nouns precisely synonymous in *syntax*, with one *plural* one. Until this is done, this constant *catachresis*, this *desperate abuse* of language, must continue.*

Will it be said that this contrivance is found in *and* ? Does *and* make two *singular* nouns synonymous in *syntax*, with one *plural* one ? How, in what way ? By indicating that the things mentioned by the two *singular* nouns, are to be taken *together*; as, John, *and* his brother, *are* coming.

The word, *and*, say the old school grammarians, indicates that *John* is to be taken, not alone, but with his brother; and that the brother is to be taken, not alone, but with John. What, then, is the difference between *and*, and *with* ?

1. "John, *and* his brother *are* coming."

2. "John *with* his brother, *is* coming."

Does not *with* indicate that *John* and the *brother* are to be taken *together* ? Why, then, do we not say—John with his brother, *are* coming ! (Not *is* !) What now becomes of the doctrine upon which the verb is made *plural* when *and* occurs

* A catachresis is a gross impropriety in speech. It is called by distinguished rhetoricians, a *desperate abuse* of words. It is the expressing of one idea by the name of another, which is incompatible with, and often contrary to it. "It is," says a distinguished writer, "when the speech is *hard, strange, and unwonted*."

These instances are grossly contrary to the general usage of our language in similar cases. (*Cata*, against and *chresis*, use.)

between two *singular* nouns ? If the doctrine, that the *verb*, should be *plural*, when the individuals denoted by *singular* nouns, are taken, not separately, but *together*, is sound, then indeed the following are *correct English* sentences :

1. John with his sister *were* at church !

2. John *were* at church with his sister !

3. John with his mother *are* ill with a cold ! (not *is*.)

4. A book with a pen *have* fallen !

5. A watch with its chain *have* been lost ! (not *has*.)

6. A horse with his saddle *have* been found ! (not *has*.)

7. The horse with his saddle *were* injured ! (not *was*.)

Now, it is the very province of *with* to unite one thing to another, and thereby to compel the reader to take them *together*. Yet, even under this connection, two *singular* nouns are not the *syntax* synonyme (*Syn-o-nim*.) of one *plural* one. How, then, can it be *pretended* that under that species of connection, which *and* indicates two *singular* nouns exert the same *syntax* influence over the verb, which one *plural* noun exerts ? *With* does bind one thing, to another; as, a house *with* an iron roof. But *and* never, never, connects one *thing* with another thing, nor one *word* with another word. *And* signifies the subjunction, the addition, of an entire proposition, of an entire cordiction, to some proposition, to some cordiction, of superior rank, in the sentence, or paragraph : as,

"John, *and* his wife have six children."

This is an instance of gross *catachresis*. It is here affirmed that John has six children, and that his wife has six children. And, was it not that what belongs to the husband, belongs also to the wife, and vice versa, this paragraph would give these parents *twelve* children instead of six !

"John, *and* his wife have six children."

That is, John *have* six children, and his wife *have* six children.

The catachresis, this *desperate abuse* of *have*, still remains. Hence I deem it of some importance to subjoin a few observations upon this particular point :

It is contended that *and* actually connects two single individuals, and thus constitutes plurality ; as, "He came forth bound *hand and foot*."

"*And*," here, say the old school grammarians, connects *hand* and *foot*, and thus makes them *plural* !

This is a curious doctrine indeed. What, is it necessary to connect the hand with the foot to make them *two* ? Do not these limbs amount to two without being tied together ?

These limbs, however, were *not* connected. Examine the sentence :

"And he came forth, bound *hand*, and *foot* with grave-clothes."

Will it be pretended that the foot was bound to the hand, or the *hand* to the *foot*? No.

What, then, does *and* connect? Does *and* connect the mere words, *hand* and *foot*? There is no connection, not *one particle*, between these two words. Take the following:

"*Salt and meat* are very scarce."

Is there any connection between the words, *salt* and *meat*? None whatever. If *and* connects these words, there must be a connection between them. But there is no connection between them: hence *and* does *not* connect them. If, however, we remove *and*, the removal will produce a connection between these very words:

Salt meat is very scarce.

And, then, does *not* connect words: it *separates* them.

To arrive at a just conclusion upon this subject, it will be necessary to settle a preliminary question: What does *and* mean? "*And*" is the sign of *addition*, the sign that something which follows *and*, is to be added to something which precedes *and*; as,

1. "I, *and* he are sick."
2. "I, *and* thou are well."

Now, is the word, *he*, added to the word, *I*, or is the real person denoted by the word, *he*, added to the real person denoted by the word *I*?

Neither is *word* added to *word*, nor *person* to *person*; but *affirmation* to *affirmation*. In other words, *proposition* to *proposition*.

"The saddle, *and* horse were injured."

That is, the saddle was injured; *and* the horse was injured. In other words, the saddle was injured, *add* that the horse was also injured. The author of the sentence first asserts in a *plenary* mono, that the saddle was injured. Having done this in a *plenary* mono, he says *add* to the fact that the saddle was injured, the fact that the horse was also injured. The mono which and introduces, is that which follows *and* as may be seen by rendering both monos full.

[The saddle was injured;] *and* (the horse was injured.)

And, then, is a *conjunction*, used to introduce an additional mono into the sentence.

But I may be told that the introduction of this new mono, produces an error in the *number* of *were*.

To this I reply that the introduction of this new mono, demonstrates that the verb should be in the *singular*, in all similar constructions:

1. I, and he *are*.
2. I, and thou *are*.

The use of *are*, for *is*, in the first, and *are* for *art*, in the second, sentence, is opposed to propriety in speech, and to solution in grammar. *Are* never can be made to have any *syntax* relation with *he*—*he are*! Nor can *are* hold any *syntax* relation with *thou*—*thou are*!

It is pretended, however, that *I*, and *he*, *are*

united by *and*. Now, if these two pronouns are united, they have become *one*; hence they are *singular*. Can the plural number be formed by putting two words into *one*?

It matters not in what way *I*, and *he* are united, since no union can render either one, or both *plural*. Will that union which may be produced between two chairs, by placing a string about a leg of one, and then about a leg of the other, produce *plurality*? Is there not *plurality* as much before the application of the string, as after? There are two chairs before the string is applied, and there are two after. The use of this string does not make the two *single* seats into one *plural* one! To make *one* chair *plural*, there must be as many as *two seats* in the *same frame-work*. The plural noun is one frame-work, not two; as, *books*, *pens*!

Now, "*book*," and "*pen*," can not be considered plural simply because they happen to be used in the same sentence: these words can not be put together in a way which will constitute *plurality*. Nor can the real *pen*, and the real *book* be expressed in *two words* in a manner which will constitute *plurality* in *grammar*. For so long as these things are denoted by two distinct words, they are taken *separately*, both by the mind, and by the nouns employed to denote them; as, *book*, and *pen*. But *plurality* in grammar is found where two, or more things are seized at the same time, and by the same word; as, *books*.

When two or more things are denoted separately, there is no *plurality*; as, "*I*, and *he* are, *I*, and *thou* are."

Here the individuals are denoted *separately*, hence, while there appears, from a slight glance, to be but one affirmation in a sentence, there are in truth *two*. One is made by expressed words, the other by *implied* ones:—

[*I*, (and he ,) are,] [*I*, (and thou ,) are.]

Now, by rendering these monos *plenary*, we shall convince all of the gross error which we trust the world will gradually, and gladly correct:

1. [*I are*,] (and he *are*.)
2. [*I are*,] (and thou *are*.)

Corrected :

1. [*I am*,] (and he *is*.)
2. [*I am*,] (and thou *art*.)

But the trones of course should be left in their *implementary* state; as,

1. I, and he *is*.
2. I, and thou *are*.

Improper :

1. I, and he *write*.
2. He, and thou *write*.

Proper :

1. I, and he *writes*.
2. He, and thou *writest*.

Rendered plenary:

1. I write, and he writes.
2. He writes, and thou writest.
1. I, and he write.
2. He, and thou write.

By rendering these monos plenary, it is seen that they are actually bad English:

1. I write, and he write!
2. He write, and thou write!

In instances in which or occurs, the verb is properly used.

I, or he is. He, or thou art.

Rendered plenary: I am; or he is, He is; or thou art.

To show the extent to which grammatical resolution is crippled by this total obliquity from the true genius of our language, I will parse these pronouns and verbs:

"I, and he are."

1. I, a pronoun, first person singular, and in the nominative case. But to what verb? No one knows—every grammarian is *mute*! Can I be nominative to *are*? Is I are English?

2. He, a pronoun, third person, singular, and in the nominative case to *are*! He are! He are sick! This, if possible, is worse than Mr. Murray's "thirteenth, and fourteenth editions! Thirteenth apples."

[In completing this article, perhaps I can not do better than to subjoin to the preceding reflections, the last part of my reply to a gentleman of Philadelphia, who, in making a NEWS PAPER attack upon the new system, ensconced himself behind the letter X.]

X. says that he, *Brown*, seems to exclude the meanings of words from any share in determining the manner of their use!!!

Hear, hear.—An example of this exclusion is to be found in that part of the introduction to "An English Synthology" which treats of the form of expression in this sentence; I and he are."

X. says that Brown admits that this form of expression has the sanction of usage. That Brown admits this, I am willing to allow. I I presume that Brown would admit that *sin* has the sanction of usage. But would X. argue from this admission, that *sin* is right?

What! is a mode of dress which is destructive to health, right because it has the sanction of usage?!

"There is nothing, but usage which makes it proper to say in English, I love them, and in French, I them love."

We are informed by the highest authority, that Adam gave names to the objects with which he found himself surrounded. But will X. pretend that the form of speech which Adam used, was that of usage? Who had used this language before Adam?! What, then, becomes of the following position taken by X.?

There is nothing but usage, which makes it proper to say in English, I love them, and in French, I them love."

I presume, then, that nothing but *usage*, made the language which the Supreme Being addressed to Adam, *grammatical*!

"Adam, where art thou?"

Some writers allege that there has been a time when there was no human society. If these writers are correct, there has been a time when there was neither *usage*, nor *language*! If there has been such a time, language must have had an *inceptive* stage. Let us suppose, then, that the Romans were the first human beings that have been blessed with the advantages of the institution of human society. Let us add to this that the first language originated with these people: and that the first form of speech was the following:

"Fructum mi hi." "fruit give me."

Now, if this particular form of speech, is the first offspring of the philological legislation of the Romans, what influence did usage exert over it?! Here, then, is a fixed form of speech without the aid of usage, *long continued use*. But it may be asked whether this form of speech was right at the time of its formation. It was right because there was no law, no rule, against it.

The Romans adopt this *form* of expression. That is, they adopt the principles on which this sentence is constructed. In what way, it may be asked, do they adopt these principles. By expressing all similar ideas in the same *form*. Well, says X. this is *usage*. Granted: the principles of this expression now have the sanction of *usage*. And a conformity to usage requires that all similar ideas should be expressed in this particular *form*. Now, let it be supposed that in process of time the Romans met with instances in which the ideas to be expressed, are, in fact, similar to those of the sentence, "Fructum mi hi," but that from a want of proper attention, they do not discover the *similarity*, and consequently, employ a different *form* of speech for the expression of these similar ideas. Would this obliquity be *usage*,—or a departure from *usage*? In other words, would not this new form of expression, arising from an ignorance of the true character of the ideas, be a *violation* of the principles on which the sentence, "Fructum mi hi, is constructed?

"Fructum mi hi." That is, give me fruit.

Let it be supposed that one Roman desired to say to another, *give thou to me a pen*. But from an ignorance of the analogy between these ideas, and those which are expressed in "Fructum mi hi," he used, not *pennam mi hi*, but, *mi hi pennam*; and that *mi hi pennam* became a common form of speech within the Roman dominions. Must not *mi hi pennam* be the offspring of ignorance, and a departure from the principles which enlightened *usage* had already sanctioned?

Again. Let it be supposed that in 1840, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, from a partial ignorance of the exact legal character of a particular case, departed from their numerous and just decisions in all similar cases. Would this unsound decision become the law of the land? Would a Philadelphia lawyer urge this decision before a lower court, as the law of Pennsylvania? He might, but he would do it with a very ill grace, and to very little purpose. He would be met by his opponent brother at the bar with the paramount argument that this particular decision, is a departure from the great principles of law on which all similar cases had been decided prior to 1840, by the same tribunal. The Judge in his charge to the jury, would sustain the rejoinder, and here would be an end of the question. Let me now make an application of this principle to the case of X. Brown says that, "*I and he are*," is not in accordance with the principles which usage has established; but an obvious departure from them. What are the principles which usage has established in regard to the form of the *verb*? They are expressed in the following *RULE*.

"The verb must agree with its nominative case in *number* and *person*," as, *I am*, *thou art*, *he is*, *they are*.

"*I and he are*."

He is here placed in the nominative case to *are*. But as *are* is *plural*, it does not agree with *he* which is *singular*. We *are*, you *are*, and they *are*, is English. But neither *I are*, nor *he are*, is English. It is a gross obliquity from English. This departure from the true genius of the language, has arisen from the *presumption* that two singular nouns, or pronouns, between which *and* is placed, are equal to one *plural* noun, or pronoun. Under this *false* notion of the subject, grammarians use the plural verb with two singular nominatives, which have *and* between them; as, "*I, and he are*."

The ground taken by the old school grammarians, is that *I*, and *he*, are connected by *and*—hence they are taken *together*—and, as they are taken *together*, they constitute a *plural* nominative.

X. is plain upon this point. He says that "His (Brown's) error arises from a disregard of the mental operation of grouping objects. When it is said that—this chair, and that chair, are good chairs, the mind, before it has employed words to express the thought, has considered them *together*, and has regarded them as *two chairs*." (X.)

I hope the readers of the *Lodger*, will do X. the justice to understand, fully, this reasoning. There is certainly a high degree of ingenuity in the argument. What! is it necessary for the mind to bring two chairs *together*, to make them two chairs? *Hear, hear*—"The mind, before it has employed words to express the thought, has considered them *together*, and has regarded them as *two chairs*!!" Were there not two chairs before

this very logical process!? Did the bringing of the chairs *together* multiply them from *unity* to *plurality*?

But why does X. resort to *philosophy* to sustain this form of expression? Does he not expressly declare that there is nothing but *usage* which can make one form right, and another one wrong!? *Hear, hear*.—"I have always thought that there was no appeal from the settled usages of a language!" "There is nothing but *usage* which makes it proper to say in English, *I love them*, and in French, *I them love*!!" (What *French*!!!)

But how does this doctrine of usage comport with the view which he expresses in the very first sentence of his first article?

"It is highly important that we should fully understand the *principles* on which the English Language is constructed!!"

Language, then, is formed upon *principles*. Let us read X. with a substitution of *usage* for *principles*:

It is highly important that we should fully understand the usage on which the English Language is constructed!! "We are indebted to Murray and others for what they have done towards reducing the disorder of *usage* to system, but we ought to feel more indebted to James Brown for his deeper exploration of this subject."

What subject? Why the *disorder of usage*!!! Language has principles—and *usage* should conform to them; but it never has taken, nor do I believe it ever will take, the *place* of them.

Upon what does X. attempt to sustain the use of *are* after *he* in the period—*I, and he are*? It is the curious doctrine that *two* chairs or other objects, are made *two* by taking them together. In other words, that plurality becomes plurality, because the mind groups the objects! But that the position, that, where two single objects are taken together, the verb should be plural, can not be sustained, is obvious from the consideration that where *with* occurs the verb is *singular*.

1. John with his brother is coming. (Not *are*.) Does not *with* indicate that John is taken with his brother? Are not the two, then, taken, *together*!?

2. A watch with its chain has been lost. (Not *have*.)

But does not the mind take the watch, and the chain *together*!? Is it in the power of X. to tell why this verb should not be plural? He says that *are* should be used because the mind considers *I* and *he* together! Can he show that the mind does not take the watch and its chain *together*!?

I deny the doctrine that *and* indicates that the objects are taken together. For instance:

He purchased *salt*, and *meat*.

Is there any thing here which indicates that he purchased the salt *with* the meat? Nothing. He might have purchased the salt in 1812, and the meat in 1844!

But where *with* is employed, we are compelled to take the articles together.

He purchased *salt with meat*.

It seems, then, that where we are compelled, from the nature of the expression, to take the single things together, the verb is singular!

As the character of the word, *and*, has an obvious bearing upon this question, it may be well to undertake a particular development of it in this place. Grammarians denominate *and* a conjunction. But as the letter *X*, conceals the identity of my opponent, so does the word, *conjunction*, conceal the true character of *and*.

"*And*" says Webster, "is a conjunction *connective*, or conjoining word." That the conjunctive character of *and*, may be well understood, he gives the following illustration:

"John, and Peter, and James rode to New York—that is, John rode to New York; *add* or *further*, Peter rode to New York; *add* James rode to New York." According to this illustration, *and* means more, further, addition. How, then, can it be a *conjoining* word? Was *and* a conjunction in character, it would exert as much influence over the preceding member of the sentence, as it does over the *succeeding* one. But Mr. Webster's explanation makes *and* exert all its influence over the member of the sentence, which follows *and*:

"John, and Peter, and James rode to New York." That is, says Mr. Webster, John rode to New York; *add* or *further*, Peter rode to New York; *add* James rode to New York." The word, *and*, has nothing to do with the first member of the paragraph,—"John rode to New York." The first *and* is employed to subjoin, to add, to affix, the second member to the first—and "*Peter rode to New York*."

The second *and* is used, not to conjoin the second and the third member of the sentence, but to affix, subjoin, add the third to the second. *And*, then, is a *subjoining* word—not a *conjoining* one. What! is the chain which drags a log to a standing tree, a *conjunction*? To be a *conjoining* chain, it must drag the firmly fixed tree as well as the log, till it brings them together. The first proposition is always fixed—it cannot be moved by *and*; as, "*John rode to New York*."

A second proposition may be dragged to the first by *and*; as "*John rode to New York; and Peter rode to New York*."

Fancy that the Bible is before you. Does the hand which moves Trego's Geography of Pennsylvania up to this Bible, exert any influence over the Bible? Mr. Webster has well illustrated one trait in the character of *and*; but he has not illustrated any part of the character of a *conjoining* word! The main trait in the character of *and*, which Mr. Webster, in common with other old school grammarians, has not attempted to give, is the expression of *harmony* in character, with the

preceding matter. For instance—"John, and Peter, and James rode to New York." Here John, Peter, and James ride to the same *place*—in this they harmonize, agree—in this they are *homogeneous*.

John rode; but Peter walked to New York.

The agent character of Peter does not harmonize with that of John, hence *and* cannot be used before Peter.

John rode to New York; but Peter rode to Boston.

The character which Boston gives Peter does not accord with that which New York gives John—hence *and* can not be used.

"*And*" signifies harmony in character.

"A certain man planted a vineyard, *and* set a hedge about it, *and* digged a place for the winevat, *and* built a tower, *and* let it out to husbandmen, *and* went into a far country."

These five acts have the same agent—in this they harmonize—hence *and* is properly used before the words, *set, digged, built, let, and went*.

In the following *and* is properly used:

A certain man planted a vineyard; and his brother set a hedge about it.

The setting of the hedge is in harmony with the planting of the vineyard: the setting results naturally enough from the planting.

In the following *and* can not be used. John built a house; but it did not stand long.

There is no harmony between the implied intention of the builder, and the ruin of the house; it was built, not for destruction, but for duration.

In the following, *and* should be used: John makes money *and* he keeps it.

The keeping of the money is in harmony with the implied purpose for which John makes it.

In the following, *and* can not be used with any propriety. John makes money; but he wastes it.

The wasting of the money is not in harmony with the implied purpose for which it is made.

In the following *and* should be used:

"Henry has purchased a horse, and John has sold an ox to-day." As these two acts are *business* transactions, they are in harmony one with the other.

In the following *and* can not be used:

The Alderman heard the witness; but he had not sworn him.

The not swearing of the witness is so much out of harmony with the hearing of his statement, that the use of *and* would be as great a mockery in grammar, as such a proceeding would be in the administration of justice.

The following is good in grammar, as well as in law.

The Alderman swore the witness, *and*, then, heard his statement.

And signifies that the character of the matter which follows it, is in harmony with that of the matter which precedes it. The word *but*, and several other conjunctions signify the reverse.

Why, then, is *and* used in the following?

"John, *and* Thomas are honest men."

X. says that *and* is employed because these two persons are taken together. But Brown says that *and* is used because the character of Thomas is in *harmony* with that of John.

If *and* is used because these two persons are taken together, the following is bad English:

John as well as Thomas is an honest man. Are they not here taken together?

As *well as*, and *and*, are the same in character, which may be seen from the following:

Henry is healthy *as well as* strong.

Henry is healthy, *and* strong.

Let me now ask why must *are* be used when *and* occurs?

"John and Thomas are honest men."

X. says *are* must be used because the mind takes John and Thomas together! But does not the mind take Thomas with John in the following? John *as well as* Thomas is honest!

Why do we not say,—John *as well as* Thomas *are* honest! To answer this question, X. must show that the writer does not intend to affirm the same thing of Thomas which he affirms of John! The doctrine of X. is that wherever the same predicate is ascribed to two singular subjects, the subjects must be taken together! He further teaches that as they are taken together, *are* must be used instead of *is*! But here are two *singular* subjects which the mind takes together, and to which the same predicate is ascribed—yet *is*, is employed instead of *are*! John as well as Thomas is honest!!

Here *s* the altar—X. is the victim which must be sacrificed upon it.

But what has thrown X. upon this burning pile of words? His "*disregard of*" the fact that two *singular* nouns can not make a *plural* one. *Book* may be repeated a thousand times,—yet each repetition denotes a single book—*Book, book, book*, is not *plural*. *Books* is the *plural of book*! The *plural* number is the *direct expression* of more than one thing, in the *same word*; as *man, men*.

I hope the readers of the Ledger will fully understand me here. Mr. Webster says—"Plural, containing more than one, designating two or more; as, a *plural word*."

"*I, and he are.*" (X.)

Is *I* a *plural word*? Is *he* a *plural word*?

Why then is *are* used with *he*? X. says that "*are*" is used because the *plural number* is found in the *nominative*. How, pray, is the *plural number* made out? Why, by taking the person denoted by *he*, with him who is expressed, by *I*!! Ah! and does the taking of the real persons denoted by the words *I*, and *he*, infuse the *plural number* into the word *I*, and into the word, *he*!! This is surely a curious way of rendering a word *plural*!

I have always understood that *we* is the plural of *I*, and *they*, of *he*. But X. says the plural of the words *I*, and *he*, is the taking of the person, whom *he* denotes, with the one whom *I* denotes!!

Mr. Webster says,—"*In grammar*, the *plural number* is that which designates more than one." Mark—it is the *plural number* of the word itself, which expresses the plurality of objects; as, *books, we, they*. In what way does X. get a plurality of objects? By taking the real person denoted by *he*, with the real person denoted by *I*!!

But Mr. Webster says that in grammar, the plurality of objects must be got by means of the *plural number* of the word; as, *We. They*.

"*I, and he are.*"

That here are two persons is not denied. Nor can it be denied that there are two persons in the following: "*I, as well as he is.*"

X. derives the plurality from the expression of two distinct single things by means of two *distinct* pronouns of the *singular number*! But in grammar the dominant principle is that the plurality must be expressed, not by the singular number of two distinct nouns, but by the *plural number* of the same noun! What! can it be said that the *singular number* of a noun, which is the same thing wherever found, is really the *plural number* because it is found in *I*, and *he*!! As well may it be said that one drop of water is two drops because it is found at one time in the tributary stream, and at another in the mighty ocean! The same singular number which is found in *I*, is found in *he*. There is but one singular number: The singular number of *I* is the capacity of this pronoun to denote but *one* person. This same numeral capacity is the singular number of *he*.

There is but one *plural number*—the plural number is the capacity of the word to express more than one thing; as, *we, they*.

This same numeral capacity which is in *we*, is in *they*.

"There can be no doubt," says X. "that it is proper to say, four and one are five. In accordance with our author's theory, we should say, four and one *is* five, and by applying his test we should find that we should say, four *is* five, and one *is* five."

1. "Four, and one are five."

2. "Four *is* five, and one *is* five."

The predicate is what is said of the subject. Here are two subjects—viz. *four* and *one*. What is the predicate? The predicate in both syllabanes, is *five*.

What is the predicate in the following?

John, and his brother are sick:

That is, what is said of John, and his brother?

It is said of them that they are *Sick*.

Sick, then, is the predicate of both. In other

words, it is predicated of John, and his brother, that they are sick.

"Four, and one are five."

Here five is the *predicate*. But of what is *five* the predicate? Five is the predicate of *four*!

Now X., is any thing predicated of four? O yes. What is it which is predicated of *four*? If any thing is predicated of four, it must be *five*; for five is the only predicate in the proposition. It is here said, then, that *four is five!!!* But X. says that it is correct to say, "*four and one are five.*"—but incorrect to say, four is five, and one is *five*."

If, however, X. is at all expert in the process of simple reasoning, he will see with perfect clearness, that *his* form of expression is liable to the same objection which he makes to Brown's."

"Four, and one are *five*."

Is any thing here affirmed? Yes.—What is it?

It is here affirmed that *four are five*! Is any thing predicated of *one*? Surely. What is the predicate of *one*? It is *five*? Five is the only predicate in the sentence—hence, if any thing is predicated of *one*, it must be *five*! What advantage, then, has the form of X. over that of Brown? NONE AT ALL!

1. "Four, and one are *five*."

2. "Four is five, and one is *five*."

But is this Brown's construction? *It is not*,—it is the invention of X. himself! The following is Brown's: Four *with* one are five.

That is, when you withe, tie, or add one to four, you have five. Brown's principles, then not only do not produce absurdity, but they remove it. But X. could not examine these principles which are presented in Book I. p. 63. And which are contained in the following extract:

["The man;] (and the woman bear the conjugal yoke.)"]

[The man]; (and the woman bears the conjugal yoke.)

The import of *and* is that of *add*. First, it is affirmed in an *implynary* mono, that the man bears the conjugal yoke—and, secondly, it is affirmed in a plenary mono, that the woman bears it. The true sense is this: the man bears the conjugal yoke, *add* that the woman bears it.

That is, add to the fact that the man bears this yoke, the fact that the woman also bears it.

["The man , , , ;] (and the woman bears the conjugal yoke.)"]

1. *The man , , , ;*

an implynary unbroken trone.

2. (and the woman bears the conjugal yoke.)

a plenary unbroken clad, juxta position, first rank, uni adaption.

Gnometric reading:

[The man bears the conjugal yoke;] (and the woman bears the conjugal yoke.)

It may be thought, however, that, as this reading makes the man bear all the yoke and the woman bear all of it, it does not give the *exact sense*. The exact sense according to what? According to the *import* of the sentence, or according to the *intention* of the author of the sentence? The author means to say that there is but *one* yoke, and that this is borne by the concurrent exertions of the husband, and the wife. This particular sense, however, is not derived from the language used, but from the *nature* of the subject itself. The same form of expression applied to a subject of a different nature, will make the writer say that one agent derives no aid from the other in performing the action expressed in the sentence.

"The man and the woman died."

[The man , , ;] (and the woman died.)

Here the Gnometric reading is,—

[The man died;] (and the woman died.)

But why is this the *true sense* reading? This is the true sense reading, because it represents the *exact import* of the sentence.

The writer predicates of the man, that he died,—and that he expired without any aid from the woman.

He also predicates of the woman, that she died,—and that she died without any aid from the man.

["The man died;] (and the woman died.)"]

"The man, and woman bear the yoke."

Is it not here predicated of the man that he *bears* the yoke? and is it not here predicated of the woman that she bears it? How, then, can the following rendering do this *sentence* the least injustice?

["The man bears the yoke;] (and the woman bears the yoke.)"]

There is a discrepancy between the *exact expression*, and the *nature* of the subject.

The nature of the subject predicates of the man a mere *participation* in the act of bearing the yoke; but the language predicates of the man, a *full performance* of this act. What, then, is the Grammarian to do? Is he to substitute the real thing for the language which is employed to express the real thing!? No, no. The grammarian is bound to give a solution of the language according to its true *constructive import*. It is not the province of the grammarian to solve the subject, the theme itself, but to *analyze the language* according to its constructive, and significant laws.

Where the agents are independent of one another in the performance of the expressed act, and should be used; as,

The man, and the woman died.

But where the act expressed, is done by the concurrent aid of all the agents, *with* should be used; as,

The man *with* the woman, bears the conjugal yoke.

When two or more things are mentioned by singular words, there is no *plurality* in *grammar*, as, *I, thou*, and *he* must return.

Plurality in *grammar*, and plurality in *things*, are totally different. Plurality in *grammar* is the expression of more than one thing by means of the same noun, or pronoun; as, *men, we, books, they*. But does the word *I*, express more than one? "*I*," then, is not plural.

I, he, and thou art. Is there a *plurality* of persons here? There certainly is. But is this plurality expressed by *one* word!? O, no. Here then, is no plurality in *grammar*. The plurality here belongs to the *things*,—not to the words which express the things.

I, thou, or he is.

Why should not *are* be used in this case?

There is a *plurality* of persons. The period mentions *three* persons. Why, then, should not *are* be used? Because there is no plurality in any one of the words which are employed to denote the persons. The plurality is here confined to the *things*—hence *are* should not be used.

"John, I hope that *you* are well."

You is the representative of "*John*"—hence there is not a plurality in the thing. But there is a *plurality* in the word, *you*; consequently, *are* should be used instead of *art*.

The application of a plural word to one object, does not destroy its *grammatical* plurality. There are two species of plurality—one may be denominated the *thing* plurality; the other the *word* plurality. The *word* plurality may exist where the *thing* plurality does not—and the *thing* plurality may exist where the *word* plurality does not.

John, how *are* you? (not, how *art* you.)

Here is the *word* plurality—but not the *thing* plurality

I, thou, or he is.

Here is the *thing* plurality—but not the *word* plurality. Hence *are* should not be used.

But it is pretended that these three persons are taken *together*, which gives a plurality. True, there is a *thing* plurality whether they are taken together, or not. But to justify the use of *are* there must be a *word* plurality in the *nominative* case. What word is in the *nominative* case? *He*. Is there a *word* plurality in *he*!? But I shall be told that, *I*, also is a *nominative* to *are*. Nor shall I fail to learn that the word, *thou*, is likewise a *nominative* to *are*. Thou *are*!—"I, and he are!!"

X. says that *I*, and *he* are taken together, which gives the plurality that requires *are*.

But does the taking of the *persons* together produce plurality in their *names*!? The real persons denoted by *I*, and *he*, are the *nominative* to *are*! The words, *I*, and *he*, are not the *nominative* to *are*. Hence to show that this *nominative* is plural, X. must show that the taking of the real

person denoted by the word, *I*, with him who is denoted by the word, *he*, infuses into these two, two pronouns, the *plural* number!

"*I, thou, or he is.*"

To what is *I*, in the *nominative* case? To *am* understood. To what is *thou* in the *nominative* case? To *art* understood. To what is *he* in the *nominative* case? To *is* expressed. This is the doctrine of every old school grammarian. And this too is the doctrine of every new school grammarian. The new school wish to extend this doctrine to every instance where *and* occurs between two singular *nominatives*: *I*, and *he is*. That is, *I am*, and *he is*.

The new school grammarians say that the verb should be *expressed* after the last *nominative* only; and that the last *nominative* only, should deride what certain form of the verb should be used; as, *I*, and *he is*. *He*, and *I am*. That is, *He is*, and *I am*.

I, thou, or he is.

I, thou, and he is.

That is, *I am*, *thou art*, and *he is*

"But X. would have it, *I, thou, and he are.*"

Hence the expression of the verbs which are understood; would make the sentence read as follows:

I are, thou are, and he are!! or,

I am, thou art, and he are!!!

But this is not all the folly of this departure from the *first* principles established by usage:

"*I, and he are pupils.*" That is,

I are pupils, and he are pupils!

Brown's plan is not so wonderful in its effects upon the things which are introduced into a sentence: it does not perform the miracle of making a plurality of pupils out of one person!

I, and *he* is a pupil. That is, *I am a pupil*, and *he is a pupil*.

"*I, and he are pupils!*"

Is this *form* of expression to last as long as the English Language endures? I think not, it is a departure from the principles sanctioned by usage. Nay, more, it is a departure from reason—it makes one thing into *many*—and it puts *grammatical* solution beyond the reach of skill. Can *I*, and *he* in the following period be parsed?

"*I, and he are pupils.*"

Can *I are pupils*, be parsed!?

But, absurd as this form of expression is, Brown does not expect to repeal it instantly. No. He not only uses it in his own writings, but he has made a rule to guide others in the use of it. (RULE XIII. BOOK II. p. 269.)

What cause, then, can X. assign for saying to this community that Brown designs to affect a *revolution* in the English Language!?

What excuse can he give for avowing to this community that Brown compares "the structure of a language" to the *trunk* of a tree and its *branches*?

What atonement can he make for avowing that Brown teaches the learner to pay no attention to the *meaning* of words!?

"I, and he are."

Can X. find any part of Brown's books which will justify the following.

"He discards the *meaning* of the words, *I*, and *he*, and considers nothing but the *framework* relation which he supposes they hold with each other!!"

Brown teaches that *I*, and *he*, hold a framework relation one with the other!!! Where can X. find a justification for this course?

Perhaps he will find it in that part of Brown's theory which sustains him in saying that, Brown teaches that we should say,

"four and one are five!"

"We say in accordance with settled usages, John, and Thomas are honest men."

That is. John are honest *men*, and Thomas are honest *men*!

It seems, then, that out of a single John, are made two, or more *honest men*; and that even out of one Thomas, this wonderful construction makes *many honest men*! I wish, indeed I wish, that we could find a construction in the articles of X. which could make out of *him*, even one *honest man*!!

But does not the mind consider the objects together where *as well as* occurs? For instance:

John *as well as* Thomas is an honest man.

Here the two persons are not only taken together by the mind, but in *construction*, *as well as* is synonymous with *and*. Why, then, should not *are* be used where *as well as* occurs, as well as where *and occurs*?

I, as well as he is. (not *are*)

"I, and he are!"

John, *as well as* Thomas is an honest man.

"John, and Thomas are honest men?"

John *are* honest *men*; and Thomas *are* honest *men*!

Can X. "*clear*" himself "*from*" this difficulty?

CHAPTER XXII

A COLLECTIVE NOUN IS ALWAYS SINGULAR UNLESS IT HAS THE PLURAL FORM.

ALTHOUGH we do not feel justified in extending our critical reflections upon the SYNTAX PART of the old theory yet our desire to say a few words on the subject of the following Rule, is so strong, that we shall devote another chapter to this part of the old Grammars.

RULE. When the nominative is a *collective* noun conveying the idea of *plurality*, the verb must

agree with it in the *plural* number. [Goold Brown's Grammar, p. 106.]

RULE. A collective noun or a noun of multitude requires the verb to be in the plural whenever the *idea* is *plural*. [John S. Hart's Grammar, p. 111.]

Hitherto the subject of nouns of multitude, has not, perhaps, been well understood, and of course, not clearly presented to the mind of the student. That these nouns are not rendered *peculiar* from the fact that they denote bodies which are made up of different parts, or of numerous members, may be made quite obvious to all who have minds, capable of comprehending *simple* principles, and *plain* truths. It is said that the word, *jury*, is a *collective* noun, a noun of *multitude*. It is the prototype, the thing denoted by the word, *jury*, composed of many members, or parts? So is the *prototype* of the word, *hand*? A jury may comprise *six* men; a jury may comprise *twelve* men; and a jury may comprise *twenty-four* men. A hand comprises *five* nails, *four* fingers, *one* thumb, *many* joints, *many* arteries, *many* veins, and *many* bones! If, then, the word, *jury*, is a *collective* name, a noun of *multitude*, because its prototype comprises *many* parts, certainly the word, *hand*, is a *collective* name, a noun of *multitude*!!

"*Family*" is said to be a name of multitude, while *book* is excluded from this class. Yet there are very few families that comprise as many members as a *book*. It is hardly possible to find a family that is composed of more than thirty parts, or members—yet it is equally hard to find a *book* which is made up of so few parts, members, or pages! A family is *one* thing made up of parts—a book is *one* thing made up of parts—a jury is *one* thing made up of parts—a tree is *one* thing made up of parts—a church is *one* thing made up of parts. A minute is *one* thing made up of parts. Is the church composed of sixty parts, or members, so is the *minute*. The word, *minute*, then, is as much a noun of multitude, as is the word, *church*.

It may be said that as the members of a jury, &c., are distinct individuals, it is hardly just to consider them as bearing the same relation to the jury, which the fingers, &c., bear to the hand. True, a man is a distinct whole; but he is also a mere part. John is a whole human being—but he is not a whole *jury*—he is a mere *part* of a jury. Every finger is a *whole*, abstractly considered; but in reference to the hand, every finger is a mere *part*. John is a *part* of a *jury*—a finger is a *part* of a *hand*!

It is not *sense* to say,

The *jury* has *agreed*.

And it is bad sense, and bad English, also, to say,

The *jury* *have* *agreed*.

It takes *two* to make an agreement! How

then, can *one* jury agree? But for brevity, this form of expression is generally used. The correct construction, however, is,

The *members* of the jury have agreed.

But as the *right* one has a prolixity which the *erroneous* one has not, the incorrect one has grown into general use. A similar case is found in the use of *you*, when applied to but one person; as,

John, where have *you* been?

The people have been disposed to sacrifice sense to *sound* in phraseology. Hence instead of saying—

“John, where hast *thou* been?”

they have adopted the substitute,

“John, where *have you* been?”

1. “The *jury* has agreed.”

2. “*John*, where have *you* been?”

In both, there is a defect in *sense*. The defect in *sense* in the first, lies in asserting that *one* can make an agreement; or, in other words, in intimating that it does not require as many as two to make an agreement.

The defect, in *sense*, in the second, lies in naming, calling, or addressing *two*, or more, when but *one* is *meant*?

But do expressions of this kind, stand condemned by the rules of grammar, as well as by the laws of *reason*? The first one frequently does—the second one rarely, if ever.

“The *jury* have agreed.”

Now, as this noun denotes but *one* jury, we can as well say, *he* have agreed, as we can, the *jury* have agreed!

“The jury will remain out till *they* have agreed on a verdict.”

This is correct English—for the pronoun, *they*, does not represent the noun, *jury*, but the word *members*—

“The jury will remain out till *its members* have agreed on a verdict.” To be brief, men have fallen into error; and being *conscious* of this error, they embrace the first opportunity to correct it—hence we use *they* instead of *it*—

“The jury will remain out till *they* have agreed on a verdict.”

Why is *they* used? because the *common sense* of the case confines the mind to the *members* of the jury. The word, *they*, therefore, does not stand for the word, *jury*, but for the word, *members*, which is constantly in the mind.

If these nouns of multitude, are *plural*, why will they not take a plural adjective; as, *Six* court! *These* jury! *Those* committee! *Three* community!! Let those who say that nouns of multitude, as they are called, are *plural*, show why these words reject all *plural* adjectives!!

We should be glad to discuss every Rule in the SYNTAX of the old theory. We absolutely regret that a *want* of *space* prevents us from making any reflections upon the PROSODY of the old theory. But we must deny ourselves this gratification. Had we the opportunity which *space* could afford us, we would attempt to demonstrate that the old school grammarians have produced a state in *Rhetoric* which they all incorporate with their Grammars, that would be styled *anarchy* and *misrule* in any political government ever known to man.

The *lividness*, *force*, *strength*, *dignity*, special *brevity*, and the embellishment which arises from imputing the import of one word to another, from introducing one thing as a mere index to another from taking a part for the whole, or the whole for a part, from *inverting* the meaning of words, from extravagant exaggerations, from introducing a series of things, or circumstances which gradually rise or fall, in dignity, upon a climactic scale, from contrasting contraries, from emphatically, and abruptly introducing something which is not connected with the main thing, from converting *mere things* into persons, from adding metaphor to metaphor, from bringing past events back into *present* time, from *methodical* *stately* arrangements of the words of a mono, or the monos of a sentence and from various other things, may be considered the *graces* of speech. These induements are to speech, what *turns*, *trills*, and *shakes* are to music.

But the word, *rhetoric*, is not expressive of these graces of speech.

The word, *rhetoric*, is made from the Greek, *rheo*, to speak, and *technicos*, technically, hence, means to speak, *technically*! That the application of this word to the doctrines of the induements with which certain monos are imbued, has produced a vast amount of embarrassment to the learner of the English Language, is obvious from the utter inapplicability of the term.

Nor is the use of the word, *figure*, as applied in *Rhetoric*, productive of much less difficulty to the learner than is the word, *rhetoric*. The word, *figure*, in Greek, is *schema*; in Latin, *habitus*, *vestitum*, and signifies the *apparel* of the body! But is there any *obvious* analogy between a man's *apparel*, and the following sentences which are called *figures*:

1. “*The sword is without.*”
2. “*They have Moses, and the prophets.*”
3. *The house is building.*
4. *The kettle boils.*
5. *Can the blind see?*
6. *Saul was swifter than an eagle.*

CHAPTER XXIII.

TRUTH, AND KNOWLEDGE.










1. What is *truth*? 2. What is *knowledge*?

Truth is a conformity of the thing signified to the sign used; and *knowledge* is the apprehension of this conformity.

Illustration: *Three marks, 1 1 1.*

The phrase, "*three marks*," is the sign used. The three marks are the things signified. The numeral agreement of the marks with the sign used, is that conformity which constitutes *truth*; and the apprehension of this conformity, is *knowledge*. Unless there is this conformity of the thing pointed out, to the sign employed, there is no *truth*; and, as *knowledge* is the *apprehension of truth*; and, as there can be no *truth* in the *absence* of this conformity for the mind to apprehend, it follows that there is no *knowledge* in the mind where there is a want of this conformity of the thing denoted, to the sign used. This may be illustrated in the following scheme: *Six marks, 1 1 1 1.*

Here the sign used is "*Six marks*." But, as there are not six marks in the group denoted, there is no apprehension of *truth* in the case; for that very conformity which constitutes *truth*, is *wanting*! Now, there is *truth* in any art, or science in which there is a correspondence, a conformity, an agreement between the *terms, definitions, rules, and remarks*, and the *principles* of the art, or science: and the student who apprehends this conformity, has *knowledge*; for the *apprehension of truth* is *knowledge*.

TRUTH.	ERROR.	ERROR.
1. Circle : 	1. Circle : 	1. Circles : 
2. Square : 	2. Square : 	2. Squares : 
3. Triangle : 	3. Triangle : 	3. Triangles : 

It is seen, then, that *truth* is a conformity of the *prototype* to the simple, or complex sign which is used; and that error is a *want* of a conformity of the prototype to the simple, or complex sign used. Now, the science of English grammar is a *complex prototype*; and the system which is presented in any book for the expression of this complex prototype, is the *complex sign* used. And in exact proportion to the conformity of this complex prototype to the complex sign employed for its expression, the old theory of English Grammar is *true*; and in exact proportion to a *want* of this conformity, is this theory erroneous. To ascertain, then, to what extent this theory is *true, or false*, it will be necessary

to examine the *doctrines*, the principles of the *complex prototype*, and the significancy of the complex sign which is used for the expression of these doctrines, these principles. Into this examination I have already entered with some degree of minuteness. And, if I have not conducted the discussion with the candour of a Christian, and with the skill of a logician, it is because these invaluable attributes are beyond my power of attainment.

Having taken what may be denominated the first step in this discussion, I will pass on to the second; and this I intend to take with great care.

A DEFINITION.

There is always *something* which makes the thing: and this something is here called the *esse* of the thing. (*Esse*, to be.) The *esse* of a thing is that certain part which makes the thing to be. The *esse* is the *sine qua non* part. That is, the *esse* is that part without which the thing could not be what it is; as, the *spring* of a watch, or the *weights* of a clock. And a *DEFINITION* is that proposition which distinguishes, which points out the thing by its *esse*; as,

1. A *watch* is a time-piece which goes by a *spring*.

2. A *clock* is a time-piece which goes by *weights*.

1. That which is the *esse* of one thing, may not be the *esse* of another; hence it does not follow because a *spring* is the *esse* of a *watch*, that it is the *esse* of a book. (Some books are bound with *springs* in their backs.) A time-piece without a *spring*, is not a *watch*: but a volume is a book without a *spring*.

2. No thing has *more* than one *esse*.

3. Every member of the same class must have the *same esse*.

4. All the things which have the *same esse*, must belong to the same class.

5. No things which have not the *same esse* can belong to the same class.

1. It is the province of a *definition* to point out one *class* from another. Hence we may give a definition of *man*; but not of a man.

2. It is the province of a *description* to point out one thing, or individual from another. Hence we *describe* a man; but define *man*. A definition considers things in *classes*—but a description considers things as *individuals*.

3. A definition can have no *exception*—a *rule* can have an exception.

Let us now see whether the following proposition is a *definition of language*.

1. A *Language*, or *Tongue* is a set of words made use of by any nation, or people, to *communicate* their *thoughts* to one another.—J. NEW BERRY.

LANGUAGE is the instrument, or means of communicating ideas.—WEBSTER'S GRAMMAR.

Language is a principal vehicle of thought.—G. BROWN.

Language, in its most extensive sense, comprehends all significant signs by which animals communicate intelligence from one to another.—J. JONES.

It appears to me that grammarians have not been very happy in their attempts at defining a *Language*. They tell us in substance, that a *Language* is the medium through which men communicate their thoughts to each other. But it seems, from what appears to be a proper view of the subject, that a *Language* is the mere material out of which the medium for communicating thought is formed. It appears to me, that a *sentence* is the only medium through which men express their thoughts. If a man wishes to communicate to me the fact, or the complex thought that, *he is sick*, he does not seize a *Language*, as a huntsman does a *gun*, as the means by which to accomplish his object. He makes a draft of three, or four words upon some language which we both understand, and forms these words into a *sentence*: and, through the *medium* of this *sentence*, he communicates the complex thought.

"*I am sick.*"

Now, is the English Language the medium through which this thought is communicated, or is the sentence, "*I am sick,*" this medium? If this thought is communicated to me through the medium of the English Language, then, the sentence, "*I am sick,*" is the English Language! And, if this *sentence* is the *English Language*, the *English Language* has not quite so many words as Dr. Webster has enumerated! The word, *language*, is not synonymous with the word, *speech*. In the syllabane, "*a Language,*" the word, *Language*, does not contemplate words in a combined state, but in an isolated, detached state. The word, *speech*, however, contemplates words in a combined, a syntaxed condition.

1. A language is the words from which any community, people, or nation forms that *sentential* medium through which they communicate their thoughts. A language is the *material*; and a *sentence* is the *medium* which is constructed from this material. The bricks, before employed by the mason, are as much the *house itself*, as are the isolated words the *medium* of communicating thought!

The following propositions are submitted as substitutes for the old definition of language:

1. A Language is a set of words out of which a nation, a people, or a community constructs *sentences* for the communication of their ideas.

2. A Language is the *significant material* out of which a community of people, constructs *sentences* for the expression of their thoughts,

The *esse* of a language lies in the fact that it is the *material* out of which the *vehicle* of thought is constructed. That is, it is this *relation* of *material* to a *sentence*, the true vehicle of thought, which makes a set of verbal signs a *language*. The great principle is this,—whatever is employed as the material out of which *sentences* are formed, is a *language*. Hence, if sentences are constructed from *pins*, and *needles*; *pins*, and *needles* are a language.

What the materials of a carriage are to this vehicle of pleasure, language is to the *vehicle of thought*. And if the materials out of which a carriage can be made, can be denominated a *carriage*, then indeed can the *unsyntaxed* words, yes, *precisely* as they stand in the columns of the *SPELLING BOOK*, or the *DICTIONARY*, be called the *vehicle* for the communication of thought! Our grammarians, then, have committed the singular error of applying the name of the thing formed, to the materials out of which it is formed! Nay, more, for they have ascribed, through the medium of this error, the very function, the very instrumentality of the thing formed, to the materials out of which it is formed! They say that *language* is the *medium* of communicating ideas; I say that language is the mere *material* from which this medium is constructed! In other words: they affirm that *rags* are the *paper* on which we *write*, and print: I say that *rags* are the *materials* out of which this paper is made!

1. The old: "Language is the *vehicle* of thought."

2. The new: Language is the *significant material* out of which the vehicle of thought is constructed.

Having stated, and illustrated my objections to the popular definition of language, I will make a few critical reflections upon the word, *language*.

There are three grounds upon which sound objections may be raised to the use of the word, *language*. The first ground is that this word is not calculated from its *etymology*, its derivation, to suggest, even in the slightest degree, the relation which a language holds to the mind. Words have an intimate connexion with the mind: they not only have imports, significations, which extend to the ideas of the mind, but they are *created* by the *mind* for the use of the *mind*: they are the material out of which that sentential medium is formed, through which *minds* interchange their ideas, their thoughts. Every word in a language has a grasp upon some *thought*: and the moment the power of custom breaks a word's hold on thought, the word becomes *obsolete*: it dies. And the reason why this state of soul follows as a consequence, is that the very *death* of a word is its *connexion* with *thought*: a word is a *significant spirit*, breathed into a shell, a *frame-work* of sound, ink, paint, or metal, and

is kept alive by its *action* upon *thought*. The meaning of the word, *language*, as derived (*meaning* derived) from the *etymology* of the word, is *tongue*, or something produced by the *tongue*! *Lingua*, the tongue. If, then, the tongue could produce a pain by pressing upon any part of the mouth, this pain might with propriety be called a *language*? A stove is called a *Franklin*, because it was produced by *Franklin*. A machine which illustrates the motions, and phases of the planets in their orbits, is called an *Orrery*, because the earl of Orrery had something to do with this machine in its inceptive stage of formation. Upon the same principle the emotion of pain, or pleasure produced by the *tongue* in the lip or hand, may be denominated *language*. *Lingua*, the tongue. But suppose the *lips*, *nose*, *teeth*, *palate*, and *larynx* should contribute *their* aid in the production of this pain in the lip, or pleasure in the hand, would there be any more propriety in calling the emotion thus produced, *language* than *larynx*—any more propriety in naming this emotion in reference to the *tongue*, than in reference to the *lips*, the *teeth*, the *nose*, or the *palate*? That there would not is proved from the fact that the Hebrews named language in reference to the *lips*. This is obvious from the marginal rendering of the word, *language*, in the Old Testament. For instance: "And the whole earth was of one *language*, and of one *speech*."

Margin: And the whole earth was "of one *lip*."

It is said that the tongue holds a higher rank in the production of speech than any other organ employed—and that, therefore, the speech takes the name of this organ in preference to that of any other? Without the *larynx*, no voice, no sounds, could be produced. As the loss of the tongue would not be so fatal to speech as that of the *larynx*, it follows that the *larynx* is the more important organ of the two; consequently, if comparative importance in instrumentality is to decide which name is to be applied, words would be called, not language but *larynx*! Let us now attempt to enforce this fact; the machine which is used to illustrate the motions, and phases of the planets in their orbits, was invented by *George Graham*, from whom Rowley, a workman, borrowed it and made one for the *Earl of Orrery*, after *whom* it was named by Sir Richard Steele. Now if this machine must be named after any one who had any thing to do with it in its inceptive stage of existence, it should certainly be called after *George Graham*. *Justice*, *taste*, *art*, *science*, and *judgment*, therefore, demand that the machine which is now called an *Orrery*, should be called a *Georgian*. or a *Gra-ham-i-an*. And upon the same principle let the set of words of which we construct sentences, be called a *larynx*. But reflection has suggested a better name for this astronomical machine, than either *Gra-ham-i-an*, or *Orrery*! and

the world has applied it; for these very machines are now styled *planetariums*. This is right, this is *tasteful*, *scientific*, and *judicious*. This machine is connected with the *planets*, and it should be named in reference to them. I might propose something similar: I might propose, not to discard the word, *language*, but to give a new name to our words, which shall express their relation to the mind in the same way, that *planetarium* expresses the relation of the *Orrery* to the planets. Instead, therefore, of naming the medium of the *mind* in reference to the *muscular* covering of the teeth, as did the Hebrews, or in reference to the instrument by which the *dog laps his* drink, as have the descendants of the Anglo Saxons, *it*, and the significant verbal materials of which it is composed, might be called *Phrenod*. *Phrenod* is constructed from the Greek elements, *phren*, the mind, and *odos*, a way, a means, a medium, and signifies the exalted highway over which *mind* travels to *mind*.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WORD, GRAMMAR.

HAVING disposed of the word, *language*, and of the different *definitions* which the old school grammarians have given of language itself, I shall make a few reflections upon that word which they *have employed* as the name of the constructive principles of language. That word is *grammar*.

"*Grammar*" is from the Greek word, *gramma*, which means a letter.

The word, *grammar*, has been applied, up to the present time to *all* the constructive principles of language for no better reason than that, in its Greek costume, it is a sign of a mere elementary part of a *printed* word! The word, *orthography*, however, which is so general in its *derivative* import, that it must extend to all the constructive principles of *printed*, and *written* speech, is brought down to the *mere* formation of letter words.

The word, *orthography*, is just as applicable to the formation of *entire sentences*, *entire paragraphs*, *entire chapters*, and *entire books*, as to the formation of *single words*.

This word is derived from *orthos*, right, and *grapho*, to *write*. Hence there is good reason why it should not be applied to the just formation of entire books—for *books* are *written* as well as *words*! The restriction of the word *orthography* to the formation of *mere words*, and the extension of the word, *grammar*, the name of a *mere letter*, to *all* the constructive principles of language, shows that little pains have been taken to place

the science of grammar upon a philosophic basis.

Would it not be well to take the following, change into consideration,—

English *orthography* is the art of using the English language with propriety. English orthography is divided into four parts, viz. *Grammar*, *Etymology*, *Syntax*, and *Prosody*.

Grammar teaches the principles of forming words from letters. (*Gramma*, a letter.)

The world, however, have not been satisfied with one name for this science; men have attempted to relieve the word *grammar*, by the aid of the word, *philology*! Hence this science is sometimes denominated English *Grammar*, and sometimes English *philology*! *Philology* is derived from *phi-le o*, to love, and *logos*, a word, and signifies a love of words! But what a vast difference there is between the *construction* of words, and the *love* which a man may have for them!! This word is defined in our dictionaries in the following manner:

PHILOLOGY.

1. "A love of words, or a desire to know the origin and construction of language."

There is nothing in the *etymology* of the word, which fully justifies the sense which is given in the following part of this definition:

"Or a desire to know the origin, and construction of language."

But still I am disposed to say that I do not think the giving of this sense to the word, is altogether without foundation.

2. "That branch of literature which comprehends a knowledge of the *etymology*, or *origin*, and *combination* of words."

Here I think is a total departure from the *etymology* of the word: *philology* is here defined to be a *branch of literature*! that is, the *love* for a science is converted into the *science* itself!! The word *philology*, means nothing but a love for words: upon what principle, then, can this word become the *name of the science* of words. *Philology* is constructed from the Greek words, *phi-le-o*, to love, and *logos*, a word. But to justify the above use of the word, *philology*, *phileo* should mean, not *love*, but *science*! Is the analogy between *love*, and *science* so very great, that the very word which means one can be applied to the other without an abuse of language?"

3. "Grammar, the *construction* of sentences, the *use* of words in language?"

Here we are informed that *philology* is the *use* of words! Is there any thing in art, or science,

which this word, *philology*, cannot be made to mean?

4. "Criticism, the interpretation of authors."

5. "The affinities of different languages."

6. "Whatever relates to the history or present state of languages."

7. "Rhetoric, poetry, history, and antiquities."

Rhetoric has to do with figures; poetry with rhyme, and measure; history with peace, and war, defeats, and victories; and antiquities with the monuments, coins, inscriptions, fragments, offices, habiliments, weapons, manners, ceremonies, and games of ancient times! Thus the word, *philology*, which, from its derivation, can mean nothing but a love of words, is made to range through the *past*, and the *present*, in search of every thing within these two epochs, upon which the human mind can fix! Yes, the tower of Babel, with its erection, and destruction on the memorable plains of Shinar, and the simple art of *English grammar*, are all scientifically brought into the same category, and all, most distinctly marked, clearly parcelled out, by this one word, *philology*!! Yes, the rash, inglorious expedition of the confident Mardonius, with the design of Darius, his father-in-law, to invade Greece, and avenge himself on the Athenians, and the simple art of *English Grammar*, are all reduced upon a plan of methodical simplicity, to the same class, and all distinguished by this one ear mark, *philology*! Nor is this all, for the ancient gods and goddesses, with the innumerable train of events over which they presided, are all, by the magical powers of this one word, *philology*, made to hold the relation of brotherhood with the simple art of *English grammar*!! And now, upon what principle in the use of words, has the word *philology*, received this mighty breadth of application? Is its range of application founded upon that meaning which the word derives from its two Greek elements, *phileo*, and *logos*? Or is the unlimited application of this word, placed upon some analogy existing between the love for a word, and all creation besides. But what analogy there is between the tower of Babel, and a love of a word, or between the love for a word, and the confusion of speech, is a point in the doctrine of similarities, which ordinary minds can hardly discover! True, if, as some writers say, this imperishable pile was divided into eight separate towers, there may be a striking analogy between the entire temple, and a language which is divided into ten parts of speech! But, then, what has this point of analogy to do with a love of a word!? If, too, as all writers state, this tower was above half a mile in circumference, and of a vast height, it must have borne a close analogy to the hill of science, and consequently, may well be denoted by the word, *philology*!!

CHAPTER XXV.

DEFINITION OF GRAMMAR.

1. "ENGLISH GRAMMAR is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety,"—MURRAY.

2. "English Grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety,"—LENNIE.

3. "English Grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety,"—COMLY.

4. "English Grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language correctly,"—GOULD BROWN.

5. "English Grammar teaches us to speak, and write the English language correctly,"—ROSWELL C. SMITH.

6. "English Grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety,"—FRENCH.

The first remark which may be made upon the above definitions, is that each obviously violates a plain principle of the very science which they all attempt in vain to define. That they should fail of defining the art of grammar, is nothing strange: nor is it any thing singular, that they should all be found faulty in *construction*. But, that they should all be marred with the *same* impropriety, is not only singular, but somewhat surprising. The use of the *three* words, *speaking*, and *writing*, for the word, *using*, is a *pleonasm* which is not so singular in itself as in its *multiplications*. In correcting Mr. Murray, I shall of course, correct those whom he has led into error in *construction*, and *doctrine*:

English Grammar is the art of *using* the English language with propriety.

The objection to the *doctrine* of this definition of Grammar, is that it embraces *Epe-e-ology*, the whole science of words. The definition embraces *Epe-de-col-o-gy*, which is taught by a *Dictionary*, and *Rhetoric*, which is taught by a *Rhetoric*. (BOOK. II.)

That the above definitions of grammar have led to erroneous views upon the true boundary lines of this science, is obvious from the following definitions of it:

1. "Grammar is the *science* of language. The object of grammar is to investigate the principles of speech, and to teach the right use of words,"—J. JONES.

2. "Grammar is the science of language,"—SAMUEL KIRKHAM.

"Grammar is the science of Language,"—JOHN S. HART.

These three definitions have obviously sprung from the lax phraseology of Murray's attempt to define this science. He says that,

"English grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."

Whereas upon a very little investigation it will be seen that English *grammar* is but a mere *part* of the art of *speaking*, and *writing* the English language with propriety. The *science* of language respects *all* the principles of speech. To learn, or to teach the *art*, or *science* of using any language with *propriety*, as many as three books are necessary; namely, a GRAMMAR, a DICTIONARY, and a RHETORIC.

1. A GRAMMAR teaches that part of the art of using a language with propriety, which consists of the *formation*, the *modification*, and the *arrangement* of words.

2. A DICTIONARY teaches that part of the art of using a language with propriety, which consists of the *literal* import or meaning of words.

3. A RHETORIC teaches that part of the art of using a language with propriety, which consists of the exact *adaptation* of the words to the *nature* of the occasion, and to the *figurative* character of the ideas intended to be expressed by the writer, or speaker.

Mr. Murray has divided the whole of this art "into four parts, viz. ORTHOGRAPHY, ETYMOLOGY, SYNTAX, and PROSODY."

Now in defining these four parts, the author loses more than *half* of what is included in his *definition* of English grammar!

1. "ORTHOGRAPHY teaches the nature, and powers of letters, and the just method of spelling words."

2. "ETYMOLOGY is the second part of grammar, which treats of the different sorts of words, their various modifications, and their derivation."

3. "SYNTAX is the third part of grammar, which treats of the agreement, and construction of words in a sentence."

4. "PROSODY is the fourth part of grammar, which teaches the true *pronunciation* of words, comprising *accent*, *quantity*, *emphasis*, *pause*, and *tone*, and the laws of *versification*."

These four parts, as here set out, do not comprise even half as much as the entire definition as given by MURRAY, and his followers. But the parts ought to be equal to the *whole*! The *definition* embraces all that can be said of language; but the parts into which this definition is divided, omit *perspicuity* of expression, *purity* of style, *propriety* of language, *precision* of words, and phrases, *clearness* of sentences, *unity* of sentences, *strength* of sentences, *figures* of speech and *punctuation*!! Mr. Murray himself enumerates these branches, and warmly recommends all to attend to them as soon as they shall have acquired a knowledge—of *what*? Why, a knowledge of *English Grammar*!! That is, after the student shall have acquired the *art* of speaking and writing the English language with *propriety*, he ought to attend to these parts that

he may be able to speak, and write it with accuracy!!

"English Grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."

This definition includes too much; or the works which present it, do not include enough. The definition says that English Grammar is the *whole art* of using the English language with propriety; and yet the very books, the very English Grammars which give this definition, make no attempt to teach the *Dictionary* meaning of words! If the old definition of English Grammar is sound, there should be added to the works which are called *English Grammars*, a full *DICTIONARY*, and a complete *RHETORIC*: the *literal* meaning of words can not be learned without a *DICTIONARY*; and the *figurative* meaning of them cannot be acquired without a *RHETORIC*.

Let us see what Dr. Webster says of *Grammar*.

6. "GRAMMAR, as a science, treats of the *natural* connexion between *ideas* and *words* which are the signs of ideas, and develops the principles of all languages!"

The above is a better account of *Ep-e-de-col-o-gy* than of *grammar*? *Ep-e-de-col-o-gy* is the science which treats of the (not *natural*) connexion of *words* with *ideas*, and develops the *significant* principles of all languages.

Dr. WEBSTER proceeds:

"These principles, (*principles of language*) are not *arbitrary*, nor subject to *change*, but *fixed*, and *permanent*, being founded on *facts*, and distinctions which are founded by *nature*! Thus the distinction between the *sexes*, between *things*, and their *qualities*, between the *names* of substances, and (the *names*) of their actions, or *motions*; between *unity*, and *plurality*; between *present*, and *future*, time and some other distinctions, are founded in *nature*, and give rise to different *species* of words, and to various inflections in all languages."

Nothing is more unsound than the doctrine that the principles of language are not subject to *change*. Mr. Webster has confounded the subject of language with that of *nature*. And I presume that when he declares that *language* is not *arbitrary*, he intends to say that *nature* is not *arbitrary*, but *fixed*, and *permanent*! That is, the sexes are not the arbitrary conventional productions of men, not the *changeable* creatures of human communities, but the fixed, *permanent* gifts, or distinctions of *nature herself*! Or in other words, the fact that *John* is a *man*, and not a *woman*, and that *Sarah* is a *woman*, and not a *man*, is not the result of any *conventional agreement* among men, but of *nature*, and of her alone! If, however, this distinguished grammarian means to tell us that the fact that the word, *John*, represents a *male*, and not a *female*, and the fact, that the word, *Sarah*, is the name of a *female*, and not

of a *male*, is not *arbitrary*, is not *changeable*, but is *fixed* and *permanent*, in short, is the *result* of *nature*, I must dissent. Indeed there would be much difficulty in persuading me, even by all the means that can be brought to bear upon this subject, that *nature* has any agency in fixing the application of the word, *John*, to a male, and the word, *Sarah*, to a female. Nothing could convince me that this is the fact, but ocular demonstration, of the *attachment*, the *appendage*, of these words to their respective sexes at the very time of their birth! I must see that *nature* has fixed *John* to a male, and *Sarah* to a female by her own *type* before I can agree with this great scholar in ascribing to *nature* an uncontrollable sway over the science of speech! If words are *produced*, *inflected*, *modified*, and *applied* by *nature*, how does it happen that the same word has so many significations as this learned author has given to the word, *philology*? Is *nature* as *various* in character as he has made "*philology*" in meaning! How does it happen too, if words are under the control of nature, that the same word is applied both to *males*, and *females*; as, *person*, *servant*, *teacher*, *who*, *which*, *bird*, *child*, *friend*, &c.? Do we find nature thus duplicating the functions of her acknowledged works? Does she require the eye to *see*, and *hear* too? Will it be said that the being who is called a person, has no sex, and, consequently, the word, *person*, is under no control from any *natural* gender? This can not be urged.

But, if *nature* is the *basis* of the structure of speech, how is it that not only words become *obsolete*, but inflections also? What has caused the inflection, *den*, in the word, *stride*, to fall into decay—stridden? What rude hand has so far assailed *nature*, the basis of speech, as to wrench the *den* inflection of *ride* from its *natural* place—ridden? What, too, has arrested the deflection, *writ*, on its way through life? Nature still lives, and should afford succour to all her children! "*Writ*," was once the flourishing, blooming form into which *write* threw itself to mark past time! If this past-tense form of *write*, was the work of *nature*, and nature has not sustained it, who will predict the *perpetuity* of *write* itself!

It seems that *nature*, or *men*, once proposed the word, *disopinion*, to be used in the sense of *difference* of opinion. Now, did nature put her veto upon the passage of this proposition; or did man's frigid look of disapprobation so encumber this verbal bantling that it had no power to creep into manhood? And what is it which rejected the following verbal deformity, *bescumber*? *B. Jonson* proposed it—and did *man*, or did *nature*, or did both flee from it! Think you, if the community of England had taken this *novus verbum* into their literary service, that nature, under a *Quo Warranto*, would have proceeded to inquire of that distinguished people, by what *warrant*, by what

authority, by what *right* they had made it a part of the diction of that far-famed island?

A proposition has been made also to make *besee* a word! This alphabetic concretion, however, has not become a part of our language. The proposition was made by WICKLIFFE. But did he make the proposition to *nature*? No, no. He made it to the community of which he was a member—he made the proposition to the human family to adopt this alphabetic terror as a part of their speech. He made the proposition by *using* this alphabetic convention; and his race rejected his proposition by *not using* it

CHAPTER XXVI.

ETYMOLOGY.

I SHALL introduce the subject of ETYMOLOGY, by citing a few of the many definitions which different writers have given of this part of the old system of English Grammar.

1. "The second part of grammar is Etymology, which treats of the different sorts of words, their various modifications, and their derivations."—MURRAY.

2. "Etymology treats of the *derivation* of words from their *radicals*, or *primitives*, and of their various inflections or modifications to express number, person, case, sex, time, and mode."—WEBSTER.

3. "Etymology treats of the different parts of speech, and their classes, and their modifications." G. BROWN.

4. "The second part of grammar is Etymology, which treats of the different sorts of words, or parts of speech, and their variations."—JOHN COMLY.

5. "Etymology teaches how to form all the words in the English language, into several grand divisions, or sorts, commonly called parts of speech.

"It includes a knowledge of the *meaning* and *use* of words: also their different changes and derivations.

"*Etymology* signifies the *origin* or *pedigree* of words."—SMITH.

Before I consider the word, *etymology*, it may be well enough to make a few remarks upon the apparent *want* of harmony in sentiment, or doctrine, which is obvious, in the above definitions. Mr. Murray says that the second part of grammar is etymology, and that it treats of the different *sorts* of words, their various modifications, and their derivations. Mr. Webster, however, rejects the main doctrine in this definition; for he confines etymology to the *derivation* of words from their *radicals*, and to their various inflections to make a distinction in number, case, person, sex, time, and

mode. But Gould Brown not only makes etymology divide words into parts of speech, but he makes it sub divide the parts of speech into *classes*. Mr. Smith, however, affirms that etymology divides the words of the English language into several *grand* divisions, or sorts only. Hence according to this author, the distinction of *transitive*, and *intransitive*, *passive*, and *neuter*, *regular*, and *irregular*, *proper*, and *common*, &c., &c., does not fall under *etymology*. To this he adds, "It includes a knowledge of the *meaning*, and *use* of words!" So far as utility is concerned, *Smith's* definition is a dead letter. The first part struggles out of existence from *starvation*, the second from *strangulation*. The first part *sips*—it takes in a mere item of etymology; but the second attempts to swallow down the *entire science* of language! "*English Grammar*," says this author, "teaches us to *speak*, and *write* the English Language correctly."

1. Etymology includes a knowledge of the *meaning* and *use* of words:

2. English Grammar teaches us the *meaning*, and *use* of words!

What is the difference between these two definitions? Let him that can tell the difference between two *errors* on the same subject, answer! Or what is the difference between *Smith's* definition of etymology, and *Pierce's* definition of the whole science of English grammar?

1. "Etymology includes a knowledge of the *meaning*, and *use* of words."—SMITH.

2. "English Grammar consists of *directions* for *speaking* and *writing* the English language correctly."—PIERCE.

He that can subtract one *cipher* from another, can tell the difference between these two *vain attempts* at a definition!

Let me now consider the word,

ETYMOLOGY.

This word is made from the Greek, *etumon*, a *true original*, and from *logos*, doctrine, a word, &c.

The first part of the word, *etymology*, is *etumon*. Now observe, *etumon* does not mean a word, but it means any thing which happens to be the *true original* of another thing. For instance, the *first* painting from which a second has been taken, is an *etumon*. Observe again, the only part of the word, *etymology*, which conveys any allusion to words, is *logy*, or *ology*.

This part, *ology*, is derived from *logos*; and, as *logos*, may mean *word*, the word *etymology*, may be applied to *words*. But to what kind of words may the word, *etymology*, be applied? This question is answered in this part, *etumon*. Authority is derived from *logos*, to apply the word, *etumon*, to *words*; yet not to *any*, and *all* words; for, while the word, *logos*, gives authority for the application

of the word, *etumon*, to words, the word, *etumon*, has the authority, the power to decide the kind of words! And, as the meaning of the word, *etumon*, is the power which it exerts in making this decision, the only kind of words to which *etumon* can be applied, is that class which is composed of true originals. This truth Mr. WEBSTER well understood at the time he penned his definition of the second part of English grammar: in that definition this truth is clearly recognised. Hear what he there says:

"*Etymology* treats of the derivation of words from their radicals"—from their true originals.

The word, *etymology*, is legitimately applied to the doctrine, or principles of deriving one word from another; and beyond this, it can not be applied with much propriety.

Etymology may be defined to be that part of the science of language, which teaches the laws, or principles of constructing new words from old ones.

I. PRINCIPLE.

In forming one new word from two, or more old ones, each old word should if possible be of the same language.

This principle is observed in the formation of the word, *etymology*, from its two originals, *etumon*, and *logos*.

Nor is this principle less obvious in the source of the word, *homicide*. This word is made from *homo*, a man, a human being, and *cædo*, to kill; and these elements are both *Latin*.

In the formation of the word, *hexangular*, however, there is a violation of this principle. The two elements from which this word is formed, are the Greek, *hex* six, and the Latin, *angulus*, a corner. Or, as Webster has it, from the Greek, *hex*, and the English, *angular*. But as this word can be formed entirely from Greek elements, this obliquity from a great principle in etymology, is without excuse. It may be formed from the Greek, *hex*, six, and from *gonia*, a corner: *hexgonial*, or *hex-ag-onal*.

II. PRINCIPLE.

In forming one new word from one, or more old ones, as much of the old should be retained as possible.

This principle is illustrated in the retention of the silent *h*, in diphthong, and triphthong; the silent *g*, in gnomon; also in the retention of the *ph*, and *h* in *phthisic*. *Diphthong* is from the Greek, *diphthongos*; *triphthong* is formed from *triphthongos*; *gnomon* from *gnomon*; and *phthisic* from *phthisis*. Had no regard been paid to this rule in ETYMOLOGY, these words would stand as follows.

Diphthong, *triphthong*, *nomon*, *tisic*.

In the formation of *frenzy*, *frenetic*, and some others, there is a violation of this rule. These

words are from the Greek, *phreneticos*, and the substitution of *f* for *ph* is contrary to a well-known etymological principle.

III. PRINCIPLE.

In forming words in which *sub* is a prefix, *b* is changed for *p*, where the body of the word begins with *p*; for *m*, where it begins with *m*; and for *f*, where it begins with *f*.

This principle is illustrated in the formation of the following words:

Sup-ple, from *sub*, and *pleo*, *Sup-plicate*, from *sub*, and *plico*, *Suf-fix*, from *sub*, and *figo*, *Suf-flate*, from *sub*, and *flo*, *Sum-mons*, from *sub-moneas*.

Perhaps I have already extended these principles beyond what may be deemed necessary to the accomplishment of the object for which they have been introduced. Still, however, I wish to subjoin the following principle, to which I must invite close attention.

IV. PRINCIPLE.

The *signification* of the *parent* word, should be similar to that of the *derived* one. Or,

The *signification* of the *new* word, should be similar to that of the *old*. Or,

The significant character of the *new* word, should find a *sound* basis in the significant character of the old one.

The rejection of this principle is the adoption of the doctrine that new words may be formed from nothing but sounds, or letters. In other words, he that denies the soundness of this principle, advocates the formation of new words from materials totally destitute of *signification*! If we reject this principle, the only source from which new words can be derived is the alphabet, and unmeaning sounds! If then an author has an idea for which he has no sign, he would have nothing to do in procuring one but to give a new combination of *alphabetical*, or *rudimental* characters. Upon this plan of forming new words, we might have *ol*, *dreed*, *ing*, *ed*, *en*, *fregendize*, *oold*, *vek*, *gead*, &c., as words. Would any man sanction this method of word-making? O, no! Yet, there is no difference between this method of forming words, and that by which thousands have been introduced into our language!

Let me repeat the principle which I wish to illustrate, and enforce:

"The significant character of the *parent* word should form a *sound* basis for the significant character of the *new* one."

Let us first inquire what constitutes this "*sound* basis." The sound basis mentioned in this important principle in etymology, is *similarity* in meaning. Hence the three propositions in which this principle is expressed, differ in nothing but form.

Let me now submit a few words which have the sanction of this principle.

I. ATHONY. (Greek, *a*, not, and *phone*, a voice.)

Aphony, without a voice, having no voice.

The first part (*a*) of this word, is a Greek *negative*; the second part, *phony*, is formed from the Greek word, *phone*, which means *voice*. Hence it is obvious that the *significant* character of *aphony*, has a sound base in the *significant* character of the *original* words from which it is formed.

II. TORNADO. (Latin, *tornatus*.)

Tornado, a whirlwind.

The Latin word, *torno*, from the perfect participle of which, *tornado* is formed, signifies to *turn*, or to go round like a *wheel*. Hence the meaning of *tornado* is fairly derived from the import of its *true original*.

III. ATHEIST. (Greek, *a*, not, and *theos*, God.)

Atheist, one who denies the being of a God.

From the Greek, *a*, not, and *theos*, God. The base of the *import* of *atheist*, is sound enough.

Let me now give some instances in which the *meaning* of the derived word, has no sound basis in the *import* of the *parent* word.

I. ARTICLE. (Latin, *articulus*, a joint.)

1. *Article*, an *article*, of agreement, or other things which serve to *connect*.

As this word is derived from *articulus*, a joint, its application to an instrument of writing is sanctioned by its etymology: the *joint* connects the two parts of the limb: and the instrument of writing connects the parties. Hence this instrument may be called an *article*. The instrument of writing is the *joint* between the two parties.

This word is also properly applied to a *clause*; for a clause of an instrument of writing, serves to connect what precedes it, and what follows it. Here we have the idea of the *joint*: *articulus*, a joint. But is there any thing in the import of the Latin, *articulus*, which justifies the application of the word, *article*, to *a*, *an*, and *the*? Do these parts of speech resemble *joints*? Had the old school grammarians applied the name, *article*, to that part of speech which they call a *verb*, to that which they call a *conjunction*, or to that which they denominate a *preposition*, I should feel bound to admit the legitimacy of their application. In the *verb*, *conjunction*, and *preposition*, there may be seen a *connective* character. This may be seen by omitting them in the following instances:

1. John *loves* Sarah. John Sarah.

2. The arms *of* John. Arms John.

3. I called John, *for* I wanted him. I called John, I wanted him.

1. As the name of a clause, in an instrument of writing, &c. "*article*" must be considered a *word*. But, as the name of *a*, *an*, and *the*, "*article*" can not be considered a *word* any more than

ol, *dreed*, or any other combination of letters, formed *directly* from the *alphabet*! It seems to me that a combination of sounds, or a combination of letters, can not be a word, unless it, (the *combination*) derives a *significant* character from the very elements out of which it, (the *combination*) is formed! Is it true that men of letters do recognise certain combinations of sounds, and letters which can lay *no* claim to any *import*, to any *meaning* whatever, except that which this, or that individual may have affixed to them as *words* provided these combinations are formed from some *older* combinations which are considered *words*? What, then, does the phrase, "*forming a new word*," or *coining new words* mean? Does this phrase mean the derivation of nothing but the *mere body* of a new word from the old word? To *derive* a word is not only to form the *body* of the new word, but to derive the *import*, the *meaning* of the new word from the old! Can, for example, the word, *plural*, be derived from *pluralis*, without bringing along with it the *plural* import of *pluralis*? Would not the application of *plural* to but *one* thing, destroy all idea that it is derived from the Latin, *pluralis*?

The moment *plural* is applied to what is inconsistent with the Latin, *pluralis*, it ceases to be a derivative from *pluralis*! If you apply *plural* as the name of light, or darkness, you render it an arbitrary combination of letters, formed directly from the alphabet itself. Away with the idea, then, that the "*plural*" thus applied, would be our legitimately applied plural, by which we signify more than one. It would not only be our *plural*, but it would not be *brother* to ours; It would not descend from the same *parent*. Indeed, it is a slander upon verbal pedigree to say that the *derived* word must find its body in some well-formed *Greek*, or *Latin* original, but that it may find its soul, its *vital* spark, in convenience, necessity, caprice, or ignorance! A *new* word, then, may be defined to be,

A *frame-work* of letters, or a frame-work of *sounds*, whose *form*, and whose *signification* find a sound basis in the *original* word, or words from which this frame-work is formed.

1. *Immaculate*, not having a moral blemish.

This word is formed from *in*, not, or without, and *macula*, a spot. This verbal frame-work finds a sound basis for its *form*, and for its *meaning* in the original words from which it is formed.

2. *Immure*, to imprison, to put within walls.

This verbal frame-work is formed from *in*, within, and *murus*, a wall, and finds a sound basis for its *form*, and *import*, in these original words.

3. *Timous*, early.—BACON.

Lord Bacon wished to form a word which should signify early. For this purpose he subjoins *ous* to the word, *time*; *time-ous*. But, as *ous* does not mean early, nor any thing like it, how can

time-ous signify early? If the meaning of the word, *time*, derives any qualification from this suffix, *ous*, it must derive that which the import of *ous* is calculated to impart. Now, *ous* imports *partaking of, consisting of, resembling, or, full of*. Thus *slander* with *ous* affixed, means, not *early slander*, but *partaking of, consisting of slander*; as, the report was *slanderous*. *Tumultuous* signifies *full of tumult*. The word, *time-ous*, must mean, not *early*, but *consisting of time, partaking of time, resembling time, or, full of time*. *Timous* as defined by Bacon has no sound significant basis in *time*: therefore the word, *timous*, as meaning *early*, if it is a word, has never been derived from *time*! BACON pretends to derive it from *time*: but he may as well pretend to derive it from *gold*, from *wood*! The signification which Bacon gives *timous* was never in the word, *time*: hence this import could never have been derived from the word, *time*.

4. *Orthography*, the art of writing words accurately.

This frame-work of letters, is formed from the Greek, *orthos*, right, and *grapho*, to write. That this word finds a sound basis in its original elements for its *shape*, for its *form*, can not be disputed: *Orthography, orthos-grapho*. The person of the offspring resembles the person of the parent. But in what way a sound basis for the meaning of the derivative, is to be found in the *primitives*, is not at all obvious. *Orthos* means *right, accurate*; *grapho* signifies *to write*, without the least intimation *what* is to be written! Did *grapho* signify not only to write, but to write *words*, then indeed a sound basis for the pretended meaning of *orthography* could be found in its original elements! But as we may write *letters, sentences, deeds, agreements, histories, travels, books, and lives* as well as *words*, where is the authority for confining the word *orthography* to the writing of *words*? The true import of *orthography* is the just, the right formation of any thing whatever which can be formed by the act of *writing*. Let us endeavour to bring this point to a sound test. Let us, then, suppose that some recent production has been picked up in which there are numerous strange things, and that among them is found the following word which the writer *pretends* he has constructed from *orthos*, and *grapho*:

Orthofic.

What! *orthofic*! *Orthofic*, derived from *orthos*, and *grapho*!! What punishment would a literary court inflict upon the author, of this crime in *etymology*? Suppose him to be before Lord Bacon himself! His Lordship would tremble with indignation; and the *identity* of the culprit would constitute the *form*, and *substance* of the entire trial! But when the question of form should be addressed by his lordship, "*What have you to say why sentence should not be pronounced against*

you?" would there not be some cogency in the following reply?

"If your Lordship's erudition can place your Lordship's offences above the law, may not my ignorance place mine within the *mercy* of its ministers? If my pretension that *orthofic* is formed from *orthos*, and *grapho*, is to banish me from the literary world, what should become of your Lordship's *peruke* for your Lordship's pretension that your Lordship had derived *timous* as importing *early*, from the word, *time*, and that too by affixing *ous*?" If *timous* means *early*, its *etymology* is obscure indeed! And, if *orthofic* has been constructed from *orthos*, and *grapho*, its *workmanship* is bad indeed.

Let us now apply the definition of a *new word* to the word, *etymology*.

A *new word* is a frame-work of letters, or a frame-work of sounds, whose *form*, and *signification* find a *sound basis* in the *original word*, or words from which this *verbal frame-work* is said to be formed.

Now, observe, it is said that the word, *etymology*, is constructed from *etumon*, and *logos*. Hence *etumon*, and *logos* are the older words: therefore they are called the old words, or the *original words* from which the *new word, etymology*, is constructed. Let us in the first instance compare the form of the new word with the form of the old one:

NEW.	OLD.
<i>Etymology</i>	<i>etumon-logos.</i>

So far as the similarity in *form* is competent to render this derivation of the word, *etymology*, probable, the position that *etymology* is formed from *etumon-logos*, is well sustained. The *selected* original elements certainly resemble in *form*, the word, *etymology*. But let me endeavour to make myself better understood on the doctrine of the analogy in *form* between the originals, and the derivatives. The original words are the *last* on which the new word must be made: and as the shoe must resemble the last in *form*, on which it is made, so must the new word resemble the old one, from which it is derived.

I have said that the old word is the *last* on which the new word is *shaped*: the old words are not only the last on which the new word must be *partially* shaped, but they are to a very considerable extent, the very *materials* out of which the new word is formed. Let us, then, compare the *shoe*, and the *last*, first in a mere frame-work, and secondly, in a *significant point of view*.

1. The last: *etumon-logos.*
2. The shoe: *etymology.*

Let us now see whether the new word has retained a tolerable degree of the *signification* of the old ones. If this is not the case, it must follow that the *presented last* is not that *on, by,*

and from which the presented word has been formed. And indeed, if this is not the case, it might follow also that this particular shoe, *etymology*, has been formed directly from the alphabet, without the aid of any last whatever.

Let us turn our attention once more to the exact import of the original words from which it is pretended that the word, *etymology*, has been formed. *Etumon* means a true original. It may be a true original paper, painting, statement, agreement, &c.

"*Logos*" means a word. The word, *etymology*, then, considered as the offspring of *etumon-logos*, must be confined to the sort of words to which *etumon-logos* is applied: or it must be confined to some process, doctrine, or principles which belong exclusively to this sort of words. "*Logos*" also means doctrine: hence, the word, *etymology*, may mean the doctrine of words. But it cannot mean the doctrine of all words: it can be applied to the doctrine of true original words. That is, words from which new words are made. "*Etymology*," then, is applied to the doctrine, to the principles of forming old words into new ones. The old school grammarians, however, apply it, not to the derivation of one word from another, but to the division of words into ten parts of speech! Let us now inquire whether this application of the word, *etymology*, finds any justification in the import of the original words from which *etymology* is said to be derived? That "*etymology*" as meaning true original words, (that is, the words from which others are made,) is formed, derived, from *etumon*, and *logos*, is not denied. But it is denied that "*etymology*," as meaning the division of words into parts of speech, is derived from *etumon*, and *logos*? This import was never in *etumon*, and *logos*, nor was any import ever in *etumon*, and *logos*, which can at all sanction this application of *etymology*. If, then, the idea of dividing words into parts of speech was never in *etumon*, and *logos*, how can this idea, this trait of significant character have been derived from these words!? But this is not all: the old school grammarians apply *etymology* to the gender, time, mood, number, and person, of words! Is there any part of the meaning of *etumon*, or of *logos*, which conveys any allusion whatever to plural, to singular, to time, to sex, to the distinction of persons into speakers, auditors, &c.? I can not be in an error on this point, for every Grammar of the old school stamp, treats of gender, number, time, mood, and speakers, and hearers, and neither, under the head of ETYMOLOGY. Yea, more: they also bring all the distinctions of articles into definite, and indefinite, of nouns into common and proper, participial, and abstract, of pronouns into personal, relative, neuter, interrogative, compound, and adjective, of verbs into active, neuter, passive, regular, irregular, transitive, intransitive, auxiliary, and principal, of participles into present, perfect, and compound, of adjectives into cardinal, ordinal,

numeral, &c. &c.!! Nor is this all: the cases of nouns, and pronouns are also brought under the word, *etymology*, which means merely the doctrine of forming old words into new ones in a way which will infuse into the new, the form, and meaning of the old.

CHAPTER XXVII.

A SENTENCE.

A SENTENCE is a very peculiar assemblage of words, and it should be well understood by him who attempts to acquire a knowledge of grammar. The definition of a sentence is a very unsuccessful attempt, as may be seen from an examination of the following reflections:

1. "A sentence is an assemblage of words forming a complete sense."

2. "A verb, and noun united form a sentence."

3. "A sentence is an assemblage of words making complete sense, and always contains an agent and a verb."

4. "In philosophical language, a sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, connected by an affirmation."

5. "A sentence is an expression of connected thought."

To understand the first of the above definitions, one should be able to say what its author intends by the phrase, "a complete sense." The word "complete," means finished, ended, full! The word, "sense," as used in this definition, must mean perception, or apprehension of the mind. It seems, then, that a Sentence is an assemblage of words, forming a finished, an ended, or a full perception, or apprehension; as, *John, new book, old wine*.

In calling to an individual by the instrumentality of the word, *John* the perception produced, is complete; for he has a full, and distinct apprehension that he is addressed: hence, this noun is indeed the assemblage of words, which forms a sentence!! But it may be said that although the individual thus addressed, may have a complete apprehension that he is addressed; yet, as this salutation is a mere preparation for some proposition, it is evident that the sense is not ended, not finished, consequently, not complete. By parity of reasoning, then, the assertion, "*John is*," is not a sentence; for, as in the case of the address something more may be looked for, so in the instance of this assertion, something more must be expected. To the first we may affix this: *John, come here*. To the second we may subjoin this: *John is sick unto death*.

Upon this principle, the assertion, *I saw those red*, is not a sentence, because I do not say those red what! But the subjunction of the things seen, renders this assertion a sentence; as, *I saw those red apples*!

So too the affirmation, "*Jane was punished*," is not a sentence, because the writer does not subjoin by *whom* she was punished!

2. "A verb and a noun form a sentence." Or, "Any finite verb with its nominative case forms a sentence;" as, *John is*.

This definition does not tell *what* a sentence is; it specifies what *parts of speech* compose one! To mention the material of which a table may be made, is not telling what a table is!

"Any finite verb with its nominative case forms a sentence;" as, *If he is there*.

He, and *is* are the materials out of which Mr. Murray makes a sentence—yet as the sense is not complete, the following definition by Mr. Kirkham, seems strongly to question Mr. Murray's ability to form a sentence out of so few materials:

"A sentence is an assemblage of words, forming a complete sense!"

That is, to form a sentence, you must add word to word, subjoin phrase to phrase, and annex clause to clause till all the *connected*, or *relative* parts of the same topic, are crowded into one undivided mass of words!!

3. "A sentence is an assemblage of words making complete sense, and *always* containing an *agent* and a verb;" as, *I have been punished*!

As Mr. Davenport has given no example in illustration of this definition, I have taken the liberty of supplying this very obvious *deficiency*. But I fear that the one which I have given him is not so well adapted to his views as he may wish. And I must admit that as the assemblage of words, which I have employed contains no *agent*, it seems not a very happy choice!

The next definition which I shall repeat, is from the pen of Noah Webster—

"In philosophical language, a sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, connected by an *affirmation*. Thus, God is omnipotent."

According to this definition, every sentence comprises an *affirmation*! Therefore, the following syllabanes are not sentences:

1. Is God omnipotent?
2. Did Saul persecute the Christians?
3. John, put your book on the table.
4. Joseph, will you bring some water?
5. Is your family all well?
6. "Have mercy on us,"
7. "*Forgive our sins*."
- "How the rule vanishes before the test!"

WEBSTER.

8. "A sentence is the expression of connected thought."

Although this definition is laughable, it is as sound as any of the old ones. "*Ripe Apples*," is a phrase which expresses *connected*, and *regularly connected* thought; yet this phrase, except by the authority of Mr. Kirkham, is not a sentence!

Hitherto insuperable difficulties have been found

in attempting to define a sentence. These, it is apprehended, have arisen from not ascertaining the sentence characteristic which distinguishes a sentence from any other syllabane. I believe that I have ascertained the true characteristic of a sentence.

This characteristic is the capacity of the syllabane to *stand alone*. But the word, *sentence*, is not expressive of this *characteristic* capacity of the syllabane—hence I have used the word, *Monologue* with the word, *sentence*. [*Monos* alone, and *Logos*, *Speech*.]

A MONOLOGUE, or SENTENCE is a syllabane of two, or more words, which is so far cut off from every other syllabane in *sense*, and *construction*, that it can stand *alone*; as, *Master, I have brought my son unto thee*.

2. *She said, no man, Lord*.

3. *In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God; and the Word was God*.

4. *I am*. [Book I. p. 14.]

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE OLD THEORY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR NOT A SYSTEM.

THAT the old theory of English Grammar is not a *system*, is obvious to all who have learned it. How, then, it may be asked, does it happen that so many admire it? They that admire the old theory of English grammar, do it not because they find any thing in it, worthy even of approbation, but because they find a high degree of *mystery* about it. Any other thing equally mysterious, is as well calculated to gain the admiration of these persons. I could give the names of hundreds who teach by this theory, and who say that they like to teach *English Grammar* much better than any other branch. But these persons teach this theory, not because they *do* understand it, but because they *do not*. There is something *mysterious* in this theory of *rough names*, *contradictory principles*, and *bewildering long notes*, which acts as a charm even upon the *reason* of some. In this, there is nothing strange: human beings, in general, almost revere in adult age, what they acquire in *childhood*. This is particularly the case when the thing acquired, is a *theory* taught from a book in *general* use. *Children* are inclined by nature, to adopt whatever is advanced in books, as true. And adults are inclined by nature, to "*hold on*" to whatever they bring up with them from the *nursery*, and the *school* room. This accounts for the tenacity with which so many hold to an old theory long after they become *convinced* that the *theory* cannot sustain *them*. In general, both teacher, and pupil, in *grammar*, are entirely dependent

upon mere *book* authority. Should it be laid down by an author of an *arithmetic*, that *five* with *four*, are *fifteen*, neither teacher, nor pupil would believe it upon the *authority* of the *book*.

But, in grammar, whatever the *book* says, is true to the *letter*! In *arithmetic*, there are principles which can be understood; and which, when applied, will decide whether *five* with *four*, are fifteen. In grammar, however, the only principles which can be understood, are the *dictums* of the *book*!—And the only process of *reasoning* consists of reciting *false rules*, *definitions*, *notes*, *observations*, and *exceptions* from *Murray*, *Ingersoll*, *Bullions*, *Comly*, *Webster*, *Smith*, *Kirkham*, *Goold Brown*, *Frost*, &c., &c., &c.

Would the prediction of fifty *false* prophets, establish it in the minds of the people, that JOHN JONES is to be *translated*!? Or would the declarations of fifty *blind* men establish it as a fact, that a *white* horse is a *black* one!?

I will not say that I have demonstrated that these *grammar menders* have no *eyes*—but I am entirely mistaken if I have not proved, that if they have any, they have little, or no use of them!!

The English language has *constructive* principles. It is the province of a maker of an English Grammar, to explain these principles, and to construct his theory upon them.

The old theory of English grammar, is denominated a *system*. This, however, is a gross misnomer; it bears no analogy to a *system*. In a *system*, the classes of the same grade, are all formed in *reference* to the same *trait* of character in the thing. That is, in the general classification of things, words, principles, or ideas, every class is formed in *reference* to the same principle, the same characteristic, the same *ear-mark*. And in each *sub classification*, each class is formed in *reference* to the same *ear-mark* in the thing.

Botany is the science of the *structure*, *functions*, *properties*, *habits*, and *arrangement* of plants. But a theory on this science, which does not adopt a *uniformity* in the plan of classification, is any thing but a *system*. For instance—were some of the *general* classes formed in *reference* to the *structure*, and others in *reference* to the *functions*, of plants, the theory would not be a *system*. *Uniformity* in classification, is absolutely essential to *system*—indeed, *uniformity* is *system* itself. Have the old school Grammarians observed a *uniformity of basis* in their classification of words as parts of speech?

Noun.	Article.
Verb.	Adjective.
Adverb.	Preposition.
Conjunction.	Pronoun.
Participle.	Interjection.

Here are ten classes in one *set*—yet no two classes in the set, are formed in *reference* to the same *ear-mark*, the same *trait* of character.

1. The **NOUN** is defined in *reference* to the *name* character of a word.

2. The **ARTICLE** is defined, not in *reference* to the *name* character of a word, but in *reference* to a *limiting* power which it is *said* to exert over other words.

3. The **VERB** is defined in *reference* to the *being*, *action*, and *suffering* which it expresses.

4. The **ADJECTIVE** is defined in *reference* to *adjection*, and *quality*.

5. The **ADVERB** is defined in *reference* to "*how*, *when*, and *where*."

6. The **PREPOSITION** is defined in *reference* to *relation*.

7. The **CONJUNCTION** is defined in *reference* to *connection*.

8. The **PRONOUN** is defined in *reference* to the *prevention* of the *repetition* of the noun.

9. The **PARTICIPLE** is defined in *reference* to its *participation* of the nature of a *verb*, and *adjective*.

10. The **INTERJECTION** is defined in *reference* to the *position* which it occupies with respect to other words, and to the *ideas* which it expresses.

The different principles in reference to which these ten classes are formed.

1. *Name* character of a word.
2. *Limiting* power over other words.
3. *Being*, *action*, and *suffering*. (Three.)
4. *Adjection*, and *quality*. (Two.)
5. *How*, *when*, and *where*. (Three.)
6. *Relation*.
7. *Connection*.
8. *Prevention* of repetition.
9. *Participation* of two natures!
10. *Preposition*, and character of ideas. (Two.)

As the verb is defined in *reference* to three things,—the adjective, in *reference* to two,—and the adverb in *reference* to three, the number of things as here indicated, is augmented to *sixteen*. These ten classes, then, which *system* requires to be formed in *reference* to one thing, are formed in *reference* to *sixteen*!! And these sixteen things in *reference* to which this one *set* of classes is formed, are as *dissimilar* as any two things which can be mentioned!!! This is *uniformity*,—this is *system* indeed! If one class is formed in *reference* to the *name* character of words, each should be formed in *reference* to this character. And, if all these classes cannot be defined in *reference* to this character, no one should be.

I have discussed each of these classes fully in another part of this work—hence I shall say nothing more in this place of this *error* of classification.

The old theory of English grammar is denominated a *system*. But this is a *gross misnomer*. In a *system*, the classes of the same grade, are all formed in *reference* to the same *trait* of character.

Any classification of words, which is not formed upon this principle, is *confusion*,—not *system*!

1. NOUN.

"A noun is the *name* of something;" as, *Book, John, London, Virtue, Accuracy*,
Upon what principle is a word called a *noun*?
The principle is the *name* character of the word.

2. ARTICLE.

"An article is a word put before a noun, to show the extent of its meaning; as, *a man, the man*." BULLIONS.

This definition conveys no allusion to the *name* character on which the noun is defined.

That the absurdity of this way of classing the words of a language, may be fully seen, let it be asked what would be thought of a teacher of a Seminary, who should attempt to make a classification of the pupils of his institution upon totally dissimilar principles. For instance—the pupils who study grammar, he classes in reference to this study, and denominates them the

Grammar Class.

But, them who study *geography*, he classes, not in reference to this study, but in reference to their ages!!!

Thus instead of having a *Grammar* class, and *Geography* class, the teacher has

1. *Grammar* class, and
2. *An age* class!!

What man, what child, does not see that if one is a *Grammar* class, the other is a *Geography* class?

1. A *noun* is the *name* of a thing; as, *John, London, book*. BULLIONS.

An *article* is a word put before a noun, to show the extent of its meaning; as, *a man, the man*. BULLIONS.

That is, they that study grammar, are a *Grammar* class,—but they that study geography, are an *Age* class!!!

3. ADJECTIVE.

"An adjective is a word added to a noun to express its quality; as, *a good boy*." BULLIONS.

Here the principle of classing words, is changed again. In the definition, no allusion is made to the showing of the *extent* of the *meaning* of the noun!! An *article* is a word which is put before a noun to show the noun's *extent* of meaning; as, *a man, the man*.

But an *adjective* is a word added to a noun to express the noun's quality; as, *a good boy*!!

4. PRONOUN.

"A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun; as, *John* is a good boy; *he* is diligent in *his* studies." BULLIONS.

Here too we find another *distinct* principle of classification. Here the principle of classing bears no analogy to that on which the noun is defined,

—to that on which the article is defined,—nor to that on which the adjective is defined!

A pronoun is used instead of a noun; as, "He promised to come *which* he did not do."

(Is *which* used instead of a noun, or instead of a verb!?)

5. VERB.

"A verb is a word that expresses an *action*, or *state*; as, *I write, you sit, he sleeps, they are*." BULLIONS.

Another change in the principle of classing words! The idea of substitution is entirely rejected: *action*, and *state* are here made the basis of classing words!

(We should be pleased to learn whether *resembles* falls under the idea of *action*, or *state*!? We feel somewhat curious too to learn whether *will*, in the expression, "*I will* pay you soon," expresses *action*, or *state*!! In this case *will* appears to express a *promise*!!!) BULLIONS' English Grammar, p. 32!!!

6. PARTICIPLE.

The participle is a part of the verb which contains no affirmation, but expresses *being, doing, or suffering*; as,

John being a good pupil, his teacher thought much of him."—Bullion's English Grammar *being* worse than Murray's, we cannot recommend it.

Being is a *participle*—but as the participle is the part of the verb, which contains no *affirmation*, we trust that we shall not be charged with having *said* that Bullion's Grammar is worse than Murray's!

7. ADVERB.

"An adverb is a word joined to a *verb*, an *adjective*, or to another *adverb*, to modify or denote some circumstances respecting it; Ann speaks *distinctly*; she is *remarkably* diligent, she reads *very correctly*." BULLIONS.

Here too is *new* ground. But it may be said that it is utterly impossible to class all words in reference to the same thing. We shall discuss this point in its proper place. Still we will simply enquire here whether *reads* is not as much the *name* of the action as is *Ann* the name of the agent—whether *correctly* is not as much the *name* of the *manner* in which she reads, as is *reads* the name of her action; and whether *very* is not as much the *name* of the *degree* of her manner as is *correctly* the name of the manner itself?

8. PREPOSITION.

"A preposition is a word which expresses the relation in which a substantive stands to a *verb*, or to another substantive in the same sentence; as, *Before* honor is humility; they speak *concerning* virtue." BULLIONS.

Nothing of the old ground is here seen: Behold old things have passed away—all things have become new!

9. CONJUNCTION.

"A conjunction is a word which joins words and sentences together; as, You and I must study; *but* he may go, and play." BULLIONS.

10. INTERJECTION.

An interjection is a word which expresses some emotion of the speaker; as, *Oh! What a sight is here! Well done!* BULLIONS.

Thus we have given not only the *ten different* principles in reference to which the *ten parts of speech* are defined, but the definitions themselves. The ten principles are not only entirely foreign to the subject of grammar, but totally different from one another. The *irrelevancy* of the principles to the subject of grammar, and the heterogeneity of them may be well illustrated by the following principles on which a *distinguished* pedagogue classed the pupils of his school.

1. *Age* of the child!
2. *Height* of the child!
3. *Weight* of the child!
4. *Color* of the child's coat!
5. *Extent* of the child's family connection!
6. *Kind* of food most desired by the child!
7. *Form* of the child's nose!
8. *Distance* which the child lives from the school house!
9. *Health* of the child!
10. *Number* of pigs possessed by the child's father!

Ridiculous as this may appear to the reader, we assure him that it is a fair illustration of the old theory of English Grammar.

"Age! has age any thing to do with the classification?" Nothing—nor has the *name* character of a word any thing to do with its *part of speech* character. As every pupil must have *age*, so every word in a language, must possess the *name* character! If you show us a word which is not the *name* of something, you will exhibit the *fifth* wheel to a coach. What enables a word to be a *name*? It is the *sign* character. Do not all words have the *sign* character! What says the following definition?

"Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas."

Who disputes the soundness of this definition of words? Does any one? Can any one!? All words, then, are *signs*. And, as no word has any thing but the *sign* character which this definition gives to all words, to enable it to become a *name*, how can *book* become a *name* any more than *behind*? If one word can become a *name* by virtue of its *sign* character, cannot all words become *names* by virtue of their *sign* character? And, if one word can become a *noun* by virtue of its *name* character, cannot all words become *nouns* by

the same means!? Why then, are not all words *nouns*!?

It seems from the following extract that Dr. WEBSTER holds that the *part of speech* trait of character is founded in *nature*:

"Thus the distinction between the *sexes*, between *things* and their *qualities*, between the *names* of *substances*, and of their *actions*, or *motions*, between *unity*, and *plurality*, between *present*, and *future* time, and some other distinctions are founded in *nature*, and gives rise to different species of words, and to various *inflections* in all languages."

Let us now ask this simple question: *what is founded in nature?* The *distinction* between the *sexes* is founded in nature. What else is founded in nature? The *distinction* between *things* and their *qualities*, is founded in *nature*. This is all very true: but while nature makes these distinctions in her works, she points out no exact method to man by which he is to *express* these *distinctions*. In very many instances indeed the distinction of sex in our language must be sought from the context itself, from the nature of the proposition, from the circumstances of the case.

True, nature makes a distinction between the *quality* and its *subject*. But nature does not point out the means by which men shall *express* this distinction! This distinction is expressed different ways in different languages. And even in the same language there is a variety of ways of expressing this very distinction! The *distinction* is one thing; the *method* of *expressing* it is another. With the distinction itself nature has every thing to do—but with the *means* of *expressing* this distinction *nature* has nothing to do! For instance: In the following words, and forms of words, we find *nine* modes of expressing the quality of *accuracy*: *correctness*, *correct*, *correctly*, *accuracy*, *accurate*, *accurately*, *propriety*, *proper*, *properly*!

But it is said by Dr. Webster in the subjoined part of his sentence which he offers as a definition of grammar, that these distinctions give rise to different species of words:

"And gives rise to *different* species of words, and to various *inflections* in all languages."

Is it possible that the *distinctions* which *nature* has made in her works, gives rise to *different species* of words, and various *inflections*? *Accuracy* denotes a *quality*; and yet *accuracy* is a *noun*: *pen* denotes, not a *quality* but an instrument; and, yet *pen* is a *noun*! *Accurate* denotes a *quality*, and *accuracy* denotes a *quality*; and, yet, *accurate* is an *adjective*, and *accuracy* a *noun*!

If Dr. Webster's doctrine is sound, all words denoting *qualities*, should be of the same species,

or of the same part of speech! But is it so? Examine for yourselves:

QUALITY.

1. *Accuracy.* Noun.
2. *Accurate.* Adjective.
3. *Accurately.* Adverb.

But Dr. Webster does not stop here: he proceeds as follows:

"The distinction between the *names of substances*, and the names of their *actions*, or *motions*, give rise to *different* species of words, and to various inflections in all languages."

This is so far from the truth, that the very same word which is the name of the substance is the name of the *action* of the substance: this is not rare, but common.

Noun. Verb.

1. The *judge* will *judge* us all.
Noun. Verb.
2. This *man* will *man* the ship.
Noun. Verb.
3. That *ship* did *ship* the articles.
Noun. Verb. Noun.
4. *Love* will *love* love.
Noun. Verb.
5. This *plow* will *plow* well.
Noun. Verb.
6. His *order* will *order* him to return.
Noun. Verb.
7. *Water* does *water* the plants.
Noun. Verb.
8. My *note* will *note* that fact.
Noun. Verb.
9. This *punch* did *punch* the brad.
Noun. Verb.
10. This *pen* did *pen* these lines.

Let us now give some instances in which the name of the *action*, or *motion* is a noun:

1. The *race* was run last week.
2. The *flight* of the bird was high.
3. *Investigation* is his employment.
4. He is never found in the *act* of *decursion*.
5. They are engaged in the *act* of *dedication*.

All the italic words in the above instances, and thousands of others, are the names of *actions*—yet these words are *nouns*. What, then, becomes of Mr. Webster's doctrine, that the distinction which nature has made between the substance, and its *action*, gives rise to *different* species of words? It is not the *kind* of thing denoted, which determines the *grammatical* species of words. Words may denote *action*, and be *nouns*; they may denote *action*, and be *verbs*.

The dictionary import, the *general* signification of a word, is not the true basis for its *grammatical* classification. And I undertake to say that the *cause* of which our present *destitution* of a correct system of English Grammar, is the effect, may be found in the *error* which all have committed upon the very threshold of their essays to form a system of definitions, and rules for the full expression of the constructive principles of our language to the juvenile mind. The import, the meaning of words, has been made by all grammarians; the main principle for the classification of the words in a sentence. Hence, as *nouns*, *verbs*, *pronouns*, *prepositions*, *conjunctions*, *adjectives*, and *adverbs*, may signify the *same* ideas, the *pupil*, *teacher*, *grammarian*, and *philosopher*, have ever been unable to find that clear line of distinction, which all grammarians have attempted to draw in their classification of the words of a sentence. For instance: *of*, *my*, *John's*, *own*, *have*, and *owns*, all denote the idea of *possession*.

1. This is the hat *of* John. *Of*, a preposition.
2. This is *John's* hat. *John's* a noun.
3. This is *my own* hat. *My*, a pronoun; *own*, an adjective.

4. They *have* three hats. *Have*, a verb.
5. They *own* three houses. *Own*, a verb.
- II. The words, *resembles*, *resemblance*, *similar*, *similarity*, *like*, *likeness*, *analogous*, *analogy*, all denote the same general idea, viz. the relation, or quality of resemblance.

1. He *resembles* me. *Resembles*, a verb.
2. There is a *resemblance* between us. *Resemblance*, a noun.
3. This is a *similar* circumstance. *Similar*, an adjective.
4. There is a *similarity* between those books. *Similarity*, a noun.
5. These two books are *like* mine. *Like*, an adjective.
6. The *likeness* between them is obvious. *Likeness*, a noun.
7. The cases are *analogous*. *Analogous*, an adjective.
8. The *analogy* between the cases, is clear. *Analogy*, a noun.

III. It is said a verb signifies *being*, or *action*, or some *state* of being. But many *nouns*, *adjectives*, *adverbs*, and even *interjections* express the same things.

1. An adjective denotes action; as, a *quivering* leaf, *running* water, *flying* clouds, a *breathing* body.

Adjectives denote some state; as, I am *well*, she is *sick*, he is *dead*, they are *safe*, we are *afraid*, John is *alive*.

2. Nouns denote some state; as, He is a man of *grief*, he is a man of *sorrow*, he is in great *distress* of mind, and body, I have great *misery*, I am in constant *fear*.

3. Prepositions denote some state; as, he is

under a millstone, he is *under* a tyrant, I am placed *over*, not *under*, these men, he is *in* good heart.

4. Adverbs denote some state; as, he is *out* of temper, he fell *out* with his friend, he fell *in* with this gentleman in June last, one is, but the other is *not*. Here *not* signifies a state of nonexistence.

IV. Nouns, and adjectives may denote the same ideas; as, a man of *virtue*, a *virtuous* man, a man of *merit*, a *meritorious* man, he is a man of *worth*, he is a *worthy* man.

V. Nouns, and adverbs denote the same ideas; as, he writes with *accuracy*, he writes *accurately*.

VI. Nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs denote the same ideas; as, he is a man of *merit*, they *merit* praise, he is a *meritorious* man, he conducted himself *meritoriously*.

Now, is there any one who can not see from the preceding exhibition, that the British English grammarians have attempted what can never be accomplished; namely, a consistent classification of words upon their *significations*?

There is much contention among grammarians respecting the *number* of the parts of speech. Some of the old school contend for *six*, some for *eight*, some for *nine*, and some for *ten*. Now, as the *number* of the parts of speech must necessarily depend upon the *principle* of *classification*, there may be but *one* part, and there may be as many parts as there are words in a language. If words are classed upon their exact *Dictionary* import, the English language would have *seventy*, or *eighty thousand* parts of speech. But, if words are classed upon the *number* of *syllables* which each word contains, there would be but *four parts* of speech, viz. *monosyllable*, *dissyllable*, *trisyllable*, and *polysyllable*.

Specimen of Parsing.

He surely understands geography

He, - - - a monosyllable.
sure-ly, - - - a dissyllable.
un-der-stands, - - a trisyllable.
ge-og-ra-phy, - - a polysyllable.

No word can be found which does not fall into one of the above classes.

The above is one among a thousand bases on which words may be classed; each basis giving a different number of parts, or classes. But, among all these bases of classification, there is but one which is *sound*; there is but one which is *calculated* to give the true *constructive principles* of our language: that one is the *frame-work philosophy* of a sentence.

1. A sentence is a frame-work of signs, employed by men for the communication of their ideas.

2. Grammar is a science which treats of the constructive principles of a sentence.

To *construct* is to build, to form. The word, *construct*, is derived from the Latin elements, *con*, together, and *struo*, to arrange, to pile up. Hence,

it is natural enough, that *construct* should mean the process, or act, of placing the parts of a thing according to some fixed principles of arrangement.

The word, *construction*, may mean the act of building, or forming; it may mean also the particular *form* which the thing receives from being constructed; and it may mean the *manner* in which the constituent parts of the thing constructed, are put together.

Perhaps, you will ask whether the word *grammar*, is synonymous with the word, *construction*. The word *construction*, is no more synonymous with the word, *grammar*, than the word, *boy*, is with the word, *Nathaniel*.

Boy.

Nathaniel.

"Boy" is *general* in its application—it means not only the same being to which the word, *Nathaniel*, applies, but it includes all the other beings of the same class. "*Construction*," like *boy*, is general; but "*grammar*," like "*Nathaniel*," is special, particular.

General, <i>boy</i> .	Particular, { James, Joseph, Nathaniel.
General, <i>colour</i> .	Particular, { red, yellow, blue, black, scarlet,
General, <i>construction</i> ,	Special, { architecture, mechanism, organization, anatomy, grammar.

1. If the construction belongs to a *house*, we call it, (the construction) *architecture*.

2. If the construction belongs to a *machine*, we call it *mechanism*.

3. If the construction belongs to *trees*, or *plants*, we call it *organization*.

4. If the construction belongs to an *animal body*, we call it *anatomy*.

5. If the construction belongs to a word, or a sentence, or to a language, we call it *grammar*.

We speak of the architecture of a house, a temple, a bridge, a fortification, &c., as fine, or otherwise. But we never speak of the *mechanism* of a house. Nor do we ever speak of the *anatomy* of a watch, or the *grammar* of a clock: we say the *mechanism* of a *watch*, the *mechanism* of a clock. Nor do we say the *organization* of a word, the *organization* of a sentence, the *organization* of a language. We say the *grammar* of a word, the *grammar* of a sentence, the *grammar* of a language.

"A Language is a *frame-work* of signs, used by men for the communication of their ideas."

In what way language is a *frame-work*, grammarians of the old school seem unable to comprehend. They appear to be *willing* to understand no system which is not composed of *actors*, *actions*

and *objects*! Now, *actors*, *actions*, and *objects* may hold a conspicuous place in a system of *metaphysics*; yet how they can become parts of a system of grammar, is not so very clear. But, is it not strange that these grammarians, after making *actors*, *actions*, *being*, and *objects*, the principal parts of their system, should proceed upon the ground that *language* itself is an *abstract nothing*, and a sentence the mere child of the imagination? Language, considered in its true character, seems to be as tangible as a clock; and a *sentence* as much a piece of mechanism as a watch. A sentence is a frame-work of words. A word is a sort of house, a kind of temple, constructed of sound, ink, paint, metal, or other matter, and is occupied by the *meaning*, the *signification* itself. Thus a *sentence* is a little *village*, a cluster of buildings, various in their shape, size, and occupants. Thus, too, while a chapter is a whole ward of a verbal city, and a sentence one block of houses in this ward, a whole book is the entire city, peopled by those significant citizens that are engaged exclusively in the commerce of ideas. Language, then, is a *frame-work* whose constructive principles are not derived from *actors*, *action*, and *objects*, and, therefore, can never be developed by any system of grammar which makes these its foundation. Grammar concerns the construction of the language, not the *actors*, *actions*, and *objects* which the words of a sentence denote. Hence, he who attempts to make a book to unfold the grammar, the mechanism of any language, should confine himself to *constructive* principles. To say what a word in any sentence *means*, is to leave the *frame-work*, the *architecture* of the house for its occupants. Bear this in mind: the *grammarian* is not to teach the nature of the *liquid*, but to illustrate the *construction* of the *vessel*! In other words, it is not the province of the grammarian to describe the fruit, but to teach the frame-work of the basket which contains the fruit.

Mr. Webster continues as follows:

"The grammar of a particular language, is a system of *general* principles, derived from *natural* distinctions of words, and of particular rules, deduced from the customary *forms* of speech in the nation using that language.

The grammar of a *particular* language is not a system of *general*, but of *special* principles!

This system of principles is not derived from *natural* distinctions of words. Indeed, if the distinctions among words, are the production of *nature*, nature is without any *uniformity* whatever; for according to the sentence quoted above, she is *different* in *different* nations!

"The grammar of a particular language is a system of general principles derived from *natural* distinctions of words, and of *particular* rules deduced from the *customary* forms of speech in the *nation* using that language!"

But how can a system of *general* principles be deduced from *particular* forms?

Mr. Webster continues:

"These usages are mostly *arbitrary*, or *incidental*; but when they become common to a nation, they are to be considered as *established*, and received as rules of the *highest authority*!"

And yet this distinguished man has spent a long life in opposing these very rules!! Yes, in relation to these very rules he remarks:—

"It is the last effort I shall make to arrest the progress of *error* on this subject. It needs the club of a *Hercules*, wielded by the arm of a giant, to destroy the hydra of educational prejudice. The club and the arm I pretend not to possess, and my efforts may be fruitless; but it will ever be a satisfaction to reflect that I have discharged a duty demanded by a deep sense of the importance of truth. It is not possible for me to think with indifference, that half a million of youth in our schools are daily toiling to learn that which is not *true*. It has been justly observed, that ignorance is preferable to *error*."

In a preceding paragraph, Mr. Webster says, that these usages are founded in *natural* distinctions of words—yet in the sentence now under consideration, he says that the usages which constitute the grammar of a language, are "mostly *arbitrary* or *incidental*."

"These usages are mostly *arbitrary* or *incidental*; but when they become common to a nation, they are to be considered as *established*, and received as rules of the *highest authority*."

And yet Mr. Webster in another book, holds the following language:

"In the gradual progress of language, many words acquire *new* meanings, while the old ones become *obsolete*. So *numerous* are such instances, that between *thirty* and *forty thousand* definitions are contained in this work, which are not known to exist in any other!!" (A house divided against itself cannot stand.)

We have now arrived at that place in the discussion of this subject where it becomes important to mention somewhat formally the true basis of a system of grammar. But before we do this, it may be well enough to ask the reader to give close attention to the following points:

1. The *constructive* character of a sentence.
2. The *significant* character of words.
3. The *relative* character of the things which are denoted by the words of the sentence.

1. The true basis of a system of grammar must depend upon which of the above characters, the author wishes to develop. If he desires to develop the *relative* character of the things which the words of a sentence, denote, the *foundation* of his system must be the *relative* character of these things.

2. If he wishes to develop the *significant* character of the component parts of a sentence, the *foundation* of his system must be the *dictionary* import of words.

3. But, if he wishes to develop the *constructive* character of a sentence, and of its component parts, the *foundation* of his system must be the *constructive*, the *frame-work*, philosophy of a sentence.

He must not begin by affirming that "a verb is a word which *signifies, being, action, or suffering.*" The *lexicographer* proclaims the *signification* of words! Let the *grammarian* publish their *construction*.

Nor must he begin by affirming that the nominative case is the name of the *agent*, the *actor*, the *subject*! Let the *grammarian* speak of the aid which the *cordictive* noun renders the verb in forming a *cordiction*, in the production of the *sentence* character. Whether the nominative case denotes the *agent*, the *object*, or *neither*, is no part of the *grammarian's* province to decide! The *relative* character of the things denoted, is no *part of grammar*!

But to be more formal: *what* does a system of grammar profess to teach? Does it not undertake to teach the *constructive* character of language? How, then, can it succeed in this undertaking while it founds all its distinctions, classifications, and rules, not upon the *constructive*, but upon the *significant* character of words, and the *relative* character of the things denoted by words?

Mr. MURRAY, his predecessors, and his successors, have undertaken to teach the *constructive* principles of the English Language; and, *incredible* as it may appear, in all their attempts to accomplish this great object, they have founded their theories, not upon *construction*, but upon the *signification* of words, and the *relation* of *things*!! That is, in their numerous attempts to form a system by which to teach the *constructive* character of a sentence, they have paid no regard to this *constructive* character; but they have founded a system partly upon its *significant* philosophy, and partly upon the *relative* character of the things which the sentence points out!

THE BASIS OF THE OLD THEORY.

1. The *constructive* character of a sentence.
2. The *significant* character of words.
3. The *relative* character of the things which are mentioned in a sentence."

CHAPTER XXIX.

"PARTS OF SPEECH."

What is the meaning of the word, *parts*?

Particular division; distinct species, or sort belonging to a whole." WEBSTER.

This is the only definition in any Dictionary which can justify this use of the word, *parts*.

"Distinct species or sort belonging to a *whole*."

Belonging to a whole *what*? What whole is it which the old school grammarians divide into *nine*, or *ten species, parts*? The following will answer the question:

"Parts of speech."

Speech, then, is divided into *nine species*!!! There are *nine parts* of speech. That is, there are *nine species* of *speech*!!!

Let us hear Mr. Bullions:

"The *parts* of *speech* in the English Language, are *nine*, viz.

Article, Noun, Adjective, Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, Interjection, and Conjunction."

What! Is an article a *species* of *speech*!? Is *a*, *is*, *the*, a *species* of *speech*!?

1. A *command* is a *species* of *speech*:

"Go off," "Return," "Take off thy shoes; for the ground on which thou standest, is holy."

2. An *affirmation* is a *species* of *speech*:

"And God said," Let there be light—"and there was light."

3. An *interrogation* is a *species* of *speech*:

"Does the sun shine?"

4. A *petition* is a *species* of *speech*:

"Forgive our sins."

5. A *subfirmation* is a *species* of *speech*:

"Thou canst make me whole if thou wilt."

The genus to which these five species of speech belong, is denominated *cordiction*.

The word, *parts*, is here used with much impropriety, or it is used in the sense of *species*—hence the phrase, "*Parts of speech*," must be *species* of *speech*! But a noun is no *speech* at all!

How, then, can a *noun* be a *species* of *speech*? *Book* is a noun—but is *book* *speech*!?

As *parts* is used in the sense of *species*, would it not be much better to say, *parts of words*.

That is, *species of words*!

In English, there are *nine species* of words:

Article, Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, Interjection, and Conjunction.

But is an article a *species* of *speech*?

"Parts of speech."

In what sense is the word, *speech*, here used?

This question is answered by Dr. Webster who says that,

Speech means *Language*. A particular language, as distinct from others. "*That which is spoken.*" WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY.

If *speech*, as used above, means *language*, the import of the head,—"*parts of speech,*" is *species of language*.

Hence the old school grammarians mean, by *nine parts of speech*, *nine species of language*; as, the *Latin*, the *Greek*, the *French*, the *English*, &c.

"*Parts of speech.*"

We presume that the old school grammarians mean to express by this head, the idea of *classes of words*. This we infer, not from the language used, but from the *nature* of the subject. As grammar concerns words, it is natural to presume that in a theory of grammar, the author would attempt to divide the words of the language upon whose constructive principles he writes, into *classes*. This presumption is the more natural from the consideration that almost every body knows that where there is not a throwing of things into *classes*, there is little *science*, or *method*.

It is the province of science to classify things upon the basis of their *analogies*. Things, however, can not be considered in *classes* without appropriate *class names*. Hence, where the terms which are used in analyzing, are the names of the things as *individuals*, and not as *classes*, there is a great want of scientific method and scientific truth. That the old theory of English grammar, has no *class names*, will be evident from a little attention to the subject of classification itself. Hence it may be well enough to devote a few moments to the subject of classification before we attempt to demonstrate that the old theory of English grammar is without this *vital* part.

We have already said that it is the province of science to make a distribution of things into *classes*. Hence, Philosophers have divided all the objects of thought into genera. "ARISTOTLE made ten *categories*, viz., *substance*, *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, *action*, *passion*, *time*, *place*, *situation*, and *habit*."

Things, however, are now considered in *classes*, under the following *class names*,—*Class*, *Order*, *Genus*, *Species*, and *Variety*.

We have not room for fixed definitions of these technical family names, as used in works of science. We must content ourselves with the observation that they are the classifying names of the various families of things, and beings, which are the subject of human contemplation. This method of disposing of the objects which surround us, is the work of *division*, and *subdivision*. The entire family, or race, is first divided into *classes*; each

class is subdivided into *orders*; each *order* is subdivided into *genuses*; each *genus* is subdivided into *species*; and, if the classifying properties are not exhausted in the *species*, each *species* is subdivided into *varieties*. We will give a specimen of this scientific analysis in the following classifications of the letter, O.

O, a letter of the *Orbic Class*. *Perfect Order*, *Branchless Genus*.

Here the *Genus* cannot be subdivided into *species*, for the classifying properties on which this series of classification is instituted, are exhausted in the *genus*.

ALPHABETIC CLASSISCOPE.

The whole race.

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ.

ORBIC CLASS. BCDGJOPQRSU.

Perfect } Order } OQ.
Imperfect } } BCDGJPRSU.

Branch }
Branchless } Genus } O.
Stem } } Q.
Stemless } } BDJPR.
CGSU.

Monopart } Species } J.
Duopart } } DP.
Tripart } } BR.

D Branch } Variety } B.
Q Branch } } R.

INORBIC CLASS. AEFHIKLMNTVWXYZ.

Rightangle } Order } EFHLT.
Acuteangle } } AKMNVWXYZ.

Monostem }
Duostem } Genus } EFLT.
Monostem } } H.
Duostem } } AKNVXYZ.
WM.

Unibranch }
Duobranch } Species } L.
Tribranch } } FT.
Unibranch } } E.
Bibranch } } XYV.
Double A } } AKN.
Double V. } } M.
W.

Let us now give the analysis of Q.

Q, a letter of the *Orbic Class*, *Perfect Order*, *Branch Genus*. (*No Species*.)

R, a letter of the *Orbic Class*, *Imperfect Order*, *Stem Genus*, *Tripart Species*, and *Q Branch Variety*,

Let us remark again that where there is not a throwing of things into *classes*, there is little *science*; it is the province of science to classify things upon the basis of their *analogies*. Things, however, cannot be considered in *classes*, without appropriate *class names*. And where the terms which are used in analyzing, are the names of the things as mere *individuals*, there is neither *method*, nor *truth*. For instance, the word, *be*, is not the

name of a *class* of letters, but of an *individual* letter. The word, *O*, is not the name of a *class* of alphabetical characters, but the name of an *individual* character. This may be seen from the following attempt at a definition of the word *be* :

1. The word, *be*, is the name of a *class* of letters in the English alphabet!

2. *B* is a class of letters in the English alphabet!

3. *B* is a *letter* in the English alphabet.

The word, *O*, then, is not a *class* name.

The syllabane, *Orbic Class*, is a *class name*. This name not only includes *O*, but every other letter which has any *orbic* quality; as, *B, C, D, G, J, O, P, Q, R, S, U*.

1. *Individual* name of *B*; *Be* :

2. *Class* name of *B*: *Orbic Class* :

If we have made the reader understand the principle on which science proceeds in analyzing, he will see a great want of science in the method of analyzing words by the old system of grammar. The technical terms that the old school grammarians apply to the words which they parse, are not *class*, but *individual* names! The word, *noun*, is the name of an *individual* word. This may be seen from the following :

1. A *NOUN* is a *class* of words, which is the name of any thing of which we can have a notion! :

2. A *NOUN* is the name of any *thing* of which we can have a notion.

The word, *noun*, then, takes words as *individuals*; whereas the technology which the new system proposes to substitute for the old, considers words in *classes*.

"Moses smote the rock."

The word, *Moses*, is called a *noun*. But the class to which this word belongs, is called, *noun denomination*.

The word, *smote*, is called a *verb*. But the class to which this word belongs, is styled, *verb denomination*.

When the pupil parses a word, he necessarily mentions it by *name*. Having mentioned the word, the next step should be to *class* it. But it may be thought that when he applies *noun*, to the word which he is parsing he classes the word,

"Man is mortal."

Man is a *noun*.

But, then, the application of *noun* to *man*, is not referring the word, *man*, to its appropriate *class*. The syllabane, a *noun* is a *class* of words is not sense—how, then can it be *science*?

THE SUBSTITUTE.

A DENOMINATION OF WORDS.

A *Denomination* of words is a number of *verbal* signs which have the same *characteristic* mark.

In English, there are ten *Denominations* of words, viz :

1. *Noun* Denomination.
2. *Pronoun* Denomination.
3. *Verb* Denomination.
4. *Preposition* Denomination.
5. *Conjunction* Denomination.
6. *Adjective* Denomination.
7. *Subadjective* Denomination.
8. *Adverb* Denomination.
9. *Subadverb* Denomination.
10. *Interjection* Denomination.

CHAPTER XXX.

PARSING.

THIS term is as unmeaning, and as inappropriate as is the head, "*Parts of Speech*."

Parse is from the Latin, *pars*, a part. If the derivative, *parse*, retains any of its primitive, *pars*, how can *parse* be applied to the process of *analyzing* a word!?

The is called the *definite article*.

And this is denominated *parsing*.

But as *all* of "*the*" is taken when it is called a definite article, how can *parse* be applied to the process!?

"*In the city of Philadelphia*."

1. *In* is a preposition, belonging to *city*.

The is the definite article, belonging to *city*.

This process is styled *parsing*!!

And "*parse*" is from *pars*, a part!

But as the *whole* word is taken, would it not be better to call this process, *wholing* than *parsing*!

"*Parsing* is the resolving of a *sentence* into its elements, or *parts of speech*." BULLIONS'S ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

"*Parsing* is the resolving of a *sentence*!"

If *parsing* is the resolving of a *sentence*, how can the old school grammarians talk of *parsing* a word!?! If the process of *parsing* belongs to a *sentence*, with what propriety can a pupil be told by his teacher, to parse *a, the, of, into, book, John, Boston*?

But the process of *parsing* relates to words—not to a *sentence*. How do you parse *Boston* in the syllabane, "*into Boston city*."

The old school grammarians are driven to this definition of *parsing* by the particular import of the word, *parse*, as derived from the Latin, *pars*. They know that the calling of *into* a preposition, is not a dividing of the word into *parts*. Hence they see that *parse* is *entirely inappropriate*. And to give this word the *semblance* of a just application, they say that *parsing* is the resolving of a

sentence. But is a sentence resolved into its elements by the process of *parsing* its *words*!? What are the elements of a sentence? They are *words*. In what way is a sentence resolved into words by parsing its *words*!? Is not a sentence in *words* before it is parsed!? If the process of taking the words of a sentence *individually*, is the resolving of it into its elements, the process of *reading* a sentence, is *parsing*!! The reader does not take the words of a sentence *collectively*, but *individually*—and, if this taking is resolving a sentence into *words*, why, the child who reads a sentence, actually *parses* it!! The truth is that the calling of the process of referring a word to its appropriate Denomination, the *parsing* of it, is a *gross misnomer*.

THE SUBSTITUTE.

1. NOMINATION. (for the mere *child*.)

In grammar, NOMINATION is the process of naming the words of a sentence, as mere *individuals*.

2. APPROPRIATION. (for the *adult pupil*.)

In grammar APPROPRIATION is the process of referring the words of a sentence to their respective Denominations, and of giving their respective *grammatical* properties. [Book II. p. 137.]

SPECIMEN OF NOMINATION.

[The power (of speech) is] (a faculty) (, , peculiar) (to man;) (and , , was bestowed) (on him) (by his beneficent Creator) (for the greatest , ;) (and , , ,) (, , most excellent uses ;) (but (alas !) how often do we pervert it) (to the worst , ,) (of purposes.)

[The is an adjective.
power is a noun.
(of is a preposition.
speech) is a noun.
is] is a verb.
(a is an adjective.
faculty) is a noun.
(which understood, is a pronoun.
is understood, is a verb.
peculiar) is an adjective.
(to is a preposition.
man ;) is a noun.
(and is a conjunction.
it understood, is a pronoun.
was is a verb.
bestowed) is a verb.
(on is a preposition.
him) is a pronoun.
(by is a preposition.
his is an adjective.
beneficent is an adjective.
Creator) is a noun.

(for is a preposition.
the is an adjective.
greatest is an adjective.
uses ;) understood, is a noun.
(and is a conjunction.
it understood, is a pronoun.
was understood, is a verb.
bestowed) understood, is a verb.
(for understood, is a preposition
the understood, is an adjective.
most is a subadjective.
excellent is an adjective.
uses ;) is a noun.
(but is a conjunction.
(alas !) is an interjection.
how is a subadverb.
often is an adverb.
do is a verb.
we is a pronoun.
pervert is a verb.
it) is a pronoun.
(to is a preposition.
the is an adjective.
worst is an adjective.
purpose) understood, is a noun.
(of is a preposition.
purposes) is a noun.

REMARKS.

Nomination is intended for the mere *beginner*. It is a brief, simple process, in which the mere *tyro* in analysis, may be drilled to advantage.

The different ways in which the word, NOMINATION, may be used in teaching.

1. *Teacher*.—"What word is in *nomination*?"
2. *Pupil*.—"Books."
3. *Teacher*.—"Who is the *nominator*?"
4. *Pupil*.—"John Howe."
5. *Teacher*.—"Has not the *books* been nominated already?"
6. *Pupil*.—"No, sir; *new* is the only word which has been in *nomination*."

II. APPROPRIATION.

In grammar, *appropriation* is the process of assigning words to their respective *denominations*, and *ectological* properties, to their respective words.

SPECIMEN.

[Absalom made Amasa] (, , captain) (of the host) (instead of Joab.)

1. [Absalom made Amasa]

Absalom is a *cordictive trunk* word of the *noun* denomination, aiding the verb, *made* to form the cordiction

of the mono, *individual* application, *panta-theme* reladiction, *uni* numerdiction, plused by *s.* and *masculin* genediction.

made, *I made,* *made* is a *branch* word of the *verb* denomination, exerting its *cordictive* power in aiding the *cordictive* noun, *Absalom*, to form the *cordiction* of the mono, its *tense* in marking *passed* time, its *ascribing* in attributing the act of *making* to *Absalom*, and its *significant* power in expressing the act of making *Amasa* into the captain of the host, *solo* position, of the *irregular passed tense* form, *passed tense* and *duo* adaption, *gnomefying* with *Absalom* and *Amasa*.

[To *gnomefy* with, is not only to make *sense* with, but to depend upon.]

Amasa is an *uncordictive trunk* word of the *noun* denomination, *individual* application, *panta-theme* reladiction, *uni* numerdiction, plused by *s.* and *masculin* genediction. [Book p. 244.]

CHAPTER XXXI.

OF THE GENERALLY RECEIVED OPINION, THAT MR. MURRAY, IN COMPILING THE RECEIVED SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, DESIRED TO CONFORM TO THE GRAMMAR OF OTHER LANGUAGES.

It is generally admitted that the theory of English Grammar, compiled by Mr. Murray, is not suited to the genius of the English language. And this unsuitableness is accounted for in the following manner:

It is pretended that it was the intention of Mr. Murray to construct his theory upon the principles of the Latin, to enable the English scholar to prepare through *his own language*, to enter upon the study of the *Latin*. But this reasoning, besides imputing a weakness to Mr. Murray, does an injustice to truth itself. For, what geographer in giving a description of the earth, would so far copy after a description of the moon, as to ascribe to the earth many parts, and peculiarities which belong exclusively to the moon herself; more especially when it is considered that the sole inducement for such *imitation* would be a mere *indirect* preparation on the part of those who may happen to study the astronomy of the *moon*? Who does not see that this method must subject the student to very serious injury—of the *earth*,

the very place which he inhabits, he has *false* ideas. But of the *moon*, a planet with which he has nothing to do, he has *correct* notions.

There are two languages, a *living* one, and a *dead* one—one in *general* use—the other in *limited* use.

The English being the *living* language, and the other the *dead*; the English being the one in *general* use, and the Latin being in very *limited* use; the English being studied by *all*, but the Latin only by a mere few, if only one of the two can be *clearly* and *truly* presented, the *English* should have the *decided preference*. Both languages, however, may be described without any sacrifice of either. Mr. Murray openly disclaims any forced *imitation*—he declares in his Grammar, and more than once too, that the *English* is a language, peculiar to itself, and that it should have a grammar suited to its *own* character. That great scholar had not the least inclination to compound for the sake of this pretended *accommodation*. The following is an extract from a review of Mr. Murray's Grammar—and with the sentiments here expressed, Mr. Murray was so well pleased, that he has given the extract a place in his work:

"Under the head of Etymology, the author of this grammar *judiciously* adheres to the *natural* simplicity of the *English* language, without embarrassing the learner, with distinctions *peculiar* to the *Latin* tongue."—*Analytical Review*.

And Mr. Murray himself, in speaking against the principle of *imitation*, remarks:

"That our grammar should conform to the Grammar of the Latin and Greek, no further than *convenience* and the *IDIOM* of our language require."

Again says Mr. Murray:

"This would encumber our language with many improper terms, and a heavy and useless load of distinctions." "On the principle of *imitating* other languages in *names* and *forms*, without a correspondence in *nature* and *idiom*, we might adopt a number of declensions as well as a variety of cases for English substantives."

The following taken from Mr. Murray's *English Grammar*, shows with what *pertinacity* he intended to adhere to the *genius* of the *English* language.

"The author of this work, long doubted the propriety of assigning to *English* nouns, an objective case." "The business of parsing, however, and of showing the connection and dependence of words, will be most conveniently accomplished by the adoption of such a case; and the irregularity of having our nouns sometimes placed in a situation, in which they cannot be said to be in any case at all, will be avoided."

Those, therefore, who would object to a revolution in the present system of English grammar,

upon the ground of a further *departure* from the *Latin*, act upon a principle which is strongly opposed by Mr. Murray himself.

The cases, as they now stand in English, are so very different, both in names, and principles, that the student is much perplexed in attempting to acquire those of the Latin through his knowledge of those of the English.

ENGLISH.	LATIN.
Nominative . . .	{ Nominative. Vocative.
Possessive . . .	Genitive.
Objective . . .	{ Accusative. Ablative. Dative.

Every language should be taught upon its own principles—and unless this is the case, no person can acquire a critical knowledge of any.

It may be said that although the cases in English afford the student in grammar, little, or no aid in the Latin, yet the technical name of the parts of speech in English, greatly assist him in the study not only of the Latin, but in other languages.

It is true that they who pass from the English to the Latin, are *aided* by the analogy in the technical names of the different classes of the words in both languages. It is not true, however, that they are *greatly* aided by this similarity; for any one of common *verbal* memory, can commit all the names of the ten parts of speech in half an hour, with ease.

But how few are they who ever study the Latin—and how numerous are they who study the English? If, then, the production of the greatest amount of good is to decide upon the expediency of introducing a few new, appropriate technicals, the point is decided in the affirmative with *acclamation*.

There are many who condemn a new word as soon as they find that it has not received its alphabetic niche in a dictionary. With such, all words of *recent* formation, are without comeliness, utility, and even existence, till they are scraped up by some lexicographer! Upon this principle, a merchant's goods are destitute of *beauty, utility*, and even of *being*, unless they are methodically placed upon his shelves! Mr. Webster, and many others, however, frankly denominate these *significant concretions*, words even before they have been taken into the *sanctum sanctorum*. In speaking of the number, and kind of words, which have been added to our language within a few years, Dr. Webster says:

5. "Terms in the arts, and sciences—of these some thousands have been added to our language within the last fifty years, of which a small number only, have found their way into *any dictionary*." "An accurate definition of these terms in accordance with the advanced state of science at the

present day, is now rendered important to all classes of readers by the popular character given of late, to the sciences, and the frequent occurrence of scientific terms and allusions in literary works. The exact number of these terms now introduced for the first time into a *dictionary*, is not known. It cannot, however, be much short of four thousand." "Among them are some of the most *common* words in the language, such as *oxyd, muriate, sulphate, sulphuric, nitric, azote, phosphorus, phosphorescent, planetarium, polarize, polarization, &c.*" Since the time of Johnson a *complete revolution* has taken place in almost every branch of physical science. *New* departments have been created, *new principles* developed, *new modes of classification* and description adopted. —Advertisement of Webster's Dict.

The best preparation which a *pupil* can have for his future studies, is a *critical* acquaintance with his *present* one. And the best terms for the teacher, and the learner of any art, or science, are those which are truly appropriate in meaning, purely technical in character, and strictly uniform in application.

CHAPTER XXXII.

A SYNOPTICAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT.

NOTWITHSTANDING few subjects have received more attention than "English Grammar," a system has not yet been formed which suits the peculiar genius of the ENGLISH LANGUAGE. Why have all attempts failed? Is the subject too intricate, too profound, for the distinguished scholars who have spent their days, and exhausted their learning upon it? Or has the time since this subject was first agitated, been too short for the accomplishment of the object in view? The author of this work is compelled to believe that neither the shortness of the time, nor the intricacy of the subject, can be urged as the reason why the world has not yet received a *correct, clear*, and *full* system of ENGLISH GRAMMAR. The *cause*, of which our present destitution of an English Grammar, is the effect, may be found in the *ERROR* which all have committed upon the very threshold of their books. The import, the meaning of words, has been made, in all works on English Grammar, the main principle of classification. Hence, as *nouns, verbs, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, adjectives, and adverbs*, may signify the same ideas, the *pupil, teacher, grammarian*, and *philosopher* have been unable to find that clear line of distinction, which all grammarians have attempted to draw between the different families of words. For instance—*Of, my, John's, own, have, and owns*, all denote the idea of possession.

1. This is the hat of John. *Of*, a preposition.
2. This is John's hat. *John's*, a noun.
3. This is my own hat. *My*, a pronoun; *own*, an adjective.
4. They have three hats. *Have*, a verb.
5. He owns three hats. *Owens*, a verb.

II. The words, *resembles*, *resemblance*, *similar*, *similarity*, *like*, *likeness*, *analogous*, *analogy*, all denote the same idea; namely, the relation, or quality of resemblance.

1. He resembles me. *Resembles*, a verb.
2. There is a resemblance between us. *Resemblance*, a noun.
3. This is a similar circumstance. *Similar*, an adjective.
4. There is a similarity between these two books. *Similarity*, a noun.
5. These two books are like mine. *Like*, an adjective.
6. The likeness between them is obvious. *Likeness*, a noun.
7. The cases are analogous. *Analogous*, an adjective.
8. The analogy between the cases, is clear. *Analogy*, a noun.

III. It is said that a verb expresses *action*, *being*, or some *state* of being. But, as so many *nouns*, *adjectives*, *adverbs*, and even *interjections*, express the same things, the above is not a definition of a verb.

1. AN ADJECTIVE denotes action; as, a *quivering* leaf, *running* water, *flying* clouds, a *breathing* body.

ADJECTIVES denote some *state*; as, I am *well*, he is *sick*, she is *dead*, he is *safe*, he is *afraid*, he is *alive*.

2. NOUNS denote some *state*; as, he is a man of *grief*, he is a man of *sorrow*, he is in great *distress* of mind, and body, I have much *misery*, I am in constant *fear*.

3. PREPOSITIONS denote some *state*; as, he is *under* a millstone, he is *under* a tyrant, I am placed *over*, not *under* these men; and I must control them, he is *in* good heart.

4. ADVERBS denote some *state*; as, he is *out* of temper, he fell *out* with his friend, he fell *in* with this gentleman in June last; one is, but the other is *not*.

NOTE.—Here *not* denotes a state of *death*, or non-existence.

IV. NOUNS, and ADJECTIVES may denote the same ideas; as, a man of *virtue*, a *virtuous* man, a man of *merit*, he is a *meritorious* man, he is a *worthy* man, he is a man of *worth*.

V. NOUNS, and ADVERBS denote the same ideas; as, he writes with *accuracy*, he writes *accurately*.

VI. NOUNS, VERBS, ADJECTIVES, and ADVERBS denote the same ideas; as, he is a man of *merit*,

he *merits* praise, he is a *meritorious* man, he conducted himself *meritoriously*.

Who from the preceding exhibition, cannot see that the *British Grammarians* have attempted what can never be *accomplished*; namely, a consistent classification of words upon their *significations*.

A hypothetical tree, comprising as many parts as our language has words, each part yielding fruit, and the whole tree producing as many kinds of fruit as the British grammarians have made parts of speech, may aid in giving a clear view of the erroneous course pursued by these distinguished scholars in forming the old theory of English Grammar.

Now, what construction, organization, is to the frame-work of this tree, grammar is to the frame-work of language. And, as the construction, the organization of the tree, is not the fruit which its component parts yield, so the grammar of a language, is not the *Dictionary* ideas which its words express. As grammar bears the same relation to language, which organization does to the tree, the proper course in forming a system of grammar, is to divide the words of a sentence, not according to their dictionary signification, but according to their *constructive* principles.

Would it not be absurd in forming a book from which to learn the *construction* of this tree, to make the classification of the different parts according to the kind of fruit, which each part yields? This course would abandon the *structure*, of the tree, and bring into the same class, parts, sustaining very different *constructive* characters. Would it be at all important, in presenting the mere frame-work of this tree, to ascertain how many kinds of fruit the whole tree yields? Certainly not.

The British grammarians, in attempting to form a system from which the *construction*, the grammar, of our language, may be acquired, have founded their whole theory, and practice, upon the *dictionary signification* of the words in a sentence. Or, to pursue the figure, they have founded their theory, not upon the *constructive* principles of this tree, but upon the particular *kind* of fruit, which its different parts yield!

Their first step has been, as is obvious from their principles, to ascertain how many kinds of fruit the whole tree produces. These, they have ascertained to be ten—hence they have thrown the seventy thousand parts into ten classes, each part being classed, as they *tell* us, according to the kind of fruit, which it yields. The parts are:

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Apple-part, | 6. Pear-part |
| 2. Peach-part, | 7. Citron-part, |
| 3. Plumb-part, | 8. Lemon-part, |
| 4. Cherry-part, | 9. Currant-part, |
| 5. Grape-part, | 10. Walnut-part |

The first objection to this course is, that the theory abandons construction, which is the very science it sets out to teach! The second, is that the practice abandons the theory itself! for, in practice, the parts of the tree are *not* classed according to the kinds of fruit which they produce. For instance, the branches which produce apples, are not referred to the apple-part class while those which do not produce this kind of fruit, are often referred to this class!

DEFINITIONS.

1. An Apple-part is a part which yields apples.

1. An article is a word prefixed to substantives to point them out, and show how far their signification extends; as *a woman, an eagle, the garden.*

A, an, and the do not yield apples—yet these parts of speech, are referred to the apple-part class. That is, *a, an, and the* do not point out, do not show how far the signification of their nouns, extends—yet *a, an, and the* are ranked as articles. Does *a* point out what woman is meant? Does *an* show what eagle is intended? And does *the* ascertain the identity of any garden? To show what woman is meant, *this, that, old, young, coloured, or white* might be used; as, *this woman, that woman, old woman, young woman, coloured woman, white woman.*

These words, however, which, to a greater, or less extent, do point out, are wrested from the class of articles, and forced into the class of adjectives. That is, these branches which actually produce apples, are compelled to leave their natural family, and take up their abode with strangers.

To show what eagle is meant, *bald* might be used—and to point out what garden is intended, *Washington* might be employed; as *Washington garden, bald eagle.*

Now, *bald, and Washington* do show how far the signification of their nouns extends. These defining words, however, are not referred to the *article* class; but, contrary to the theory (which is that the parts of the tree are to be classed according to the *kind of fruit*, which they bear) they are forced into other families!

In reply to these strictures upon this discrepancy in the grammatical disposition of *a, an, and the*, it may be said that it is not meant by the British grammarians that *a, an, and the* point out without the aid of other words. Their definition of an article, however, does not call on other words to aid *a, an, and the*, in the work of measuring the noun's extent of application. But let this objection to these reflections stand—and what follows? why, that all words which can point out the noun's application either *alone*, or by the aid of other words, are articles. And what adjective is there, which, by the aid of other words, cannot do this more minutely than *a, an, or the*?

Good boys that are properly educated, will become good men.

In this example, *good*, aided by the *mono*, *that are properly educated*, shows to what boys the word *boys*, reaches.

II. PEACH-PART.

A Peach-part is a part which yields fruit!

A substantive, or noun is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have any notion; as, *London, man, virtue, vice.*

As the definition of the peach-part, is universal in its application, so is that of a noun. As every part of the tree yields fruit, the definition of the peach-part embraces the *whole tree*. A peach-part is a part which yields fruit.

Now, as every part of the tree yields fruit, so does every word in the language, express some idea. This is in accordance with Mr. Murray's own definition of words, which says that—"Words are articulate sounds, used by common consent as the signs of our ideas."

How can a word be the sign of an idea, and not be the *name* of an idea? For example—The book is *under* the table.

As *under* is the sign, or name of a place, (of which we certainly can have a *notion*) this preposition is a noun.

But it may be said that *under* expresses a relation. Be it so—For, if *under* expresses a relation, it must be the *name* of a relation—Because it is not possible for a word to express an idea unless it is the *name* of an idea—It is the *namitive* power of a word, which enables it to express, or signify an idea. Hence, if a word has no *namitive* power, it can express no idea, and, in truth is no word at all!

The substitution of *idea* for *thing*, would not change the import of the British definition of a noun—A noun is the name of any idea which we have of any thing that exists; as,

John, and Foster write letters with accuracy.

If the British definition of a noun, is sound, all the words in the above sentence, are nouns, for each is the *name* of something. As *and* is the first word in the sentence, which is not called a noun, it may be well to commence with this word. Why is not *and* a noun? Is not this conjunction the *sign*, the *name* of an idea? If not, why does the use of *or* change the sense? *John, or Foster* writes with accuracy. And, if neither *and*, nor *or* is a sign, a name of any idea, why does the omission of both these conjunctions *change* the sense of the sentence?

John Foster writes letters with accuracy?

But it may be said that *and* does not mean a *literal* thing. This I grant, and while I concede this, I take occasion to remind the objector that *accuracy* does not mean a *literal* thing; that *virtue* does not mean a *literal* thing; and that *vice* does not mean a *literal* thing!! Nor indeed is there any word in the language which does mean a

literal thing. Words express the ideas which men form of things. Hear Mr. Murray on this point:

"Words are articulate sounds, used by common consent as the signs of our ideas."

The definition of a noun, to be strictly *literal*, should read thus—a noun is the name of any idea which we have of any thing that exists; as, *London, man, virtue, vice,*

The word, *thing*, as here used, includes something more than pen, book, knife, &c. &c.; it must embrace whatever exists, whether it is a being, fact, circumstance, action, mode, relation, time, place, &c.

"John, and Foster *write* with accuracy."

The next word in this sentence, which is wrested in practice from the hands of the theory, is *write*. *Write* is the name, or sign of an action; or it is the name of an idea which men have formed of the act of making letters with a pen, or pencil. Why then is not *write* a noun? Does not the definition say that any word which is the name, or sign of any thing that exists, or of which we have a notion, is a noun? And is not *write* the name, or sign of something of which we have a notion?

One of two things is certain, namely, either *write* is the name of the act of forming letters with a pen, or pencil, or this action has no name. But is this action a *nameless* action? Do not men know by what name to call it? Do they not at this advanced stage of things, know by what word, by what sign, by what name to designate this action which they so frequently perform!

"*With.*"

If *with* is not the sign, the name, of an idea, why is it employed in the expression of *ideas*? And if *with* has no definite meaning of its own, why is it that the substitution of *without*, produces so great a change in the sense of the sentence? "John, and Foster write letters *without* accuracy."

With is the sign that the quality of which *accuracy* is the name, belongs to the letters. But *without* is the sign the name of the fact that this quality does not belong to them. Or in other words, *with* is the name, or sign of the idea of the *presence* of the quality which is denoted by *accuracy*. But *without* is the name of the idea of the *absence* of this quality.

Take the word, *nothing*, in the following case:

He went; but he saw *nothing*.

Is *nothing* the name of a thing? Just as much as *without* is, and no more. *Nothing* is the name, or sign of the idea which we form in the *absence* of something—and *without* is the name, or sign, of the idea which we form of the *absence* of something. If "*nothing*" is a noun, why, then, is not *with*?

III. PLUM-PART

A Plum-part is a part which yields plums.

A verb is a word which signifies, *being, action, or suffering*; as, "*I am, I rule, I am ruled.*"

I find thousands of words which signify *being, action, or suffering*, that are not called verbs.

That is, there are thousands of the branches of this tree, actually bearing plums, that are not referred to the plum-part family. For instance:

The *existence* of man is short; but the *being* of God is eternal; man runs a short *race* here, he is seized with *pains*: he expires in the *pangs* of disease.

Do not the words, *existence*, and *being*, express being? Why then are they not *verbs*?

Does not *race* express action? Why then is not this common *noun* a *verb*?

Do not the words, *pains* and *pangs*, signify suffering? Why then should not these common nouns be yielded up to the definition of the verb, which imperiously demands them as its own?

Nor is this all,—for there are many parts of this tree, which do not bear plums, that are actually referred to the plum-part class; as,

1. John *resembles* his mother.
2. The papers *are* extinct.
3. Man *can* be just.
4. John *has* one acre of ground, which he *ought* to cultivate.

Resembles, are, can, has, and ought do not express the ideas which the definition of the verb requires; hence these words are not verbs by the authority of the definition. Here, then, is the double absurdity of withholding branches that yield plums, from the plum-part class, and of referring other branches which do not bear this kind of fruit, to this class.

IV. CHERRY-PART.

A Cherry-part is a part which yields cherries.

An adjective is a word added to a noun to express its quality; as,

1. He is a *good* boy.
2. They are *fine* children.

In considering this definition, it seems important to make a remark or two upon the word, *add*.

To *add*, says the dictionary, "is to join something to that which was *before*." This is not only the language of the dictionary, but that of sound sense, and universal usage. We cannot even think of adding any thing unless there is something *already* placed, to which we may add. No man talks about building an *additional* house unless he has one *already* up. Under this view of the subject, let me inquire which are the added words in the following assemblages:

1. "He is a good boy."
2. "They are fine children."

In the vocal, as well as in the *written* formation, of the above sentences, *is*, *a*, *good*, and *boy* would be *added* words—because, they must be introduced in addition to *he*, the first word spoken, or written.

In the second sentence also, the words, when spoken, or written in the formation of the sentence, must be divided into added, and unadded. *They* is the unadded word, while *are*, *fine*, and *children* are the *added* ones.

But as the words of a printed sentence, are all presented at the same point of time, a printed sentence can have no adjective! What, can one of two houses which have been erected at the same time be denominated an *additional* house? It cannot be; the distinction is without sense.

The word, *added*, not only indicates a state; but it implies the manner in which the state is produced. When the state of connection is produced in any manner different from that which the word, *add*, indicates the state is expressed, not by *add*, but by some other word; as, *junction*, *conjunction*, *connection*, *conjection*, &c.

Hence, when the right hand is put upon the left, the right hand is the added one. And this state of connection may be denominated adjection. But, when both hands start from given points, and approximate till they come in contact, the state of connection thus produced, cannot be denominated adjection.

Small apples.

The only proof that *small* is an adjective, is derived from juxtaposition, nearness. And is not the word, *apple*, as near to the word *small*, as *small* is to *apple*? If then, juxtaposition constitutes *small*, an *adjective*, both words are adjectives. As both words are presented at the same time, and one is as near to the other as the other is to it, what is it which can render one an *added* word more than the other? Is it replied that *small* is more an adjective than *apple* because *small* expresses a quality? The answer is that *small* does not fall within the *first* part of the definition of an adjective; for *small* is not an *added* word—hence, unless the mere fact of expressing quality, renders a word an adjective; how can *small* be an adjective? And if a word is an adjective merely from the fact of expressing *quality*, then the italic nouns in the following instances, are all *adjectives*:

1. He is a man of *virtue*.
2. This is a man of great *strength*.
3. The *roundness* of the ball.
4. The *smoothness* of the paper.

Does not the noun, *virtue*, express a quality of the man? Does not *strength* also denote a quality

of the man? Does not *roundness* denote a quality of the ball? And does not *smoothness* signify a quality of the paper? What, then, becomes of that definition of an adjective, which is founded upon the expression of a quality?

Watts, who has written much upon the subject of qualities, says: "Motion, (yes, *action*,) shape, quantity, weight, &c., &c., are properties or modes of bodies, and that *wit*, *folly*, *love*, *doubting*, *judging*, &c., &c., are modes, or qualities of the mind."

Again says Watts: "The term, *mode*, extends to all attributes whatever, including the most essential, and inward properties, and reaches even to *actions* themselves as well as to the *manner* of action."

A quality is defined by Watts, and others, in the following manner:

"A mode or quality is that property which cannot exist in, and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and as subsisting by the help of some substance which, for this reason is called its subject."

Thus the words, *solidity*, *brightness*, *similarity*, *roundness*, *softness*, *accuracy*, *action*, *thinking*, *thought*, to *think*, *motion*, &c., all denote qualities, of some subject, upon which they depend for their existence.

But, let it be conceded that *small*, in the phrase, *small apple*, comes within the first part of the definition of an adjective. That is, grant that *small* is an added word: and what follows? why, that all words which are added to nouns to express qualities, are adjectives. Now, all *verbs* are as much added to nouns as *is small*, or any other adjective—*verbs* in general too express quality—therefore by virtue of this definition of an adjective, *verbs* in general are adjectives!

Blair, in speaking of the verb, says:

"The verb is so far of the same nature with the adjective, that it expresses, like the adjective, an attribute or property of some person, or thing—thus, when I say the sun shines, *shining* is the attribute ascribed to the sun."—*Blair's Lectures*.

The same doctrine is taught by Beattie—who says: "The verb, and adjective agree in this, both express qualities, or attributes."

Thus it is asserted by these British oracles in English Philology, that *verbs* do express *qualities*, and that they are in this respect perfect adjectives.

Nor is Murray himself less clear in his expression of this doctrine. For in Etymology, he tells us that an adjective expresses the quality of a noun; and, in his Syntax he informs us that the verb expresses a quality of the noun:

"The principal parts of a simple sentence, are the *attribute*, and the *object*; as, a wise man, *governs* his passions. Here, a *wise man* is the

subject; governs the attribute; and his passions, the object." MURRAY.

The only difference between the definition of an adjective, and that of a verb, arises from generalizing in one case, and particularizing in the other. In defining an adjective, grammarians make it express all qualities; as, *good, bad, high, run, walk, &c. &c.*

But in defining a verb, they particularize *being, action, and suffering*, and that too in a way which interdicts the idea that *being, action, and passion* are qualities? Thus, after including all animals in one definition, they define a horse in a way which indicates that a horse is not an animal of any kind!

Having included all qualities in the definition of an adjective, the proper course for the *old school* grammar makers, and grammar menders seems to be this:

A verb is an adjective added to a *noun*, to express the quality of *being, action, or suffering*.

As the foregoing chapters are designed to show the absurdity of the old grammar, in THEORY, the following ones are intended to demonstrate the inutility of it in practice.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

STYLE.

STYLE is the distinguishing *turn, cast, air*, or trait in the character of the sentence.

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Style is divided into | | 15. Nervous. |
| 1. Affected. | 8. Feeble. | 16. Negligent. |
| 2. Bombastic. | 9. Florid. | 17. Obscure. |
| 3. Concise. | 10. Flowing. | 18. Perspicuous. |
| 4. Diffuse. | 11. Harsh. | 19. Simple. |
| 5. Easy. | 12. Lofty. | 20. Stiff. |
| 6. Elegant. | 13. Loose. | 21. Tumid. |
| 7. Epistolary. | 14. Neat, or Terse. | 22. Verbose. |

I. AFFECTED STYLE.

An *affected* style is that turn, that trait, which is properly denominated *artificial, unnatural, assumed, false show*; as,

1. The antiquarian too, and the traveller of every description, are lending their aid, to light up the lamp of English philology in the East, the West, the North, and the South; and we anticipate its universal use to be no farther distant than the glorious millennium. *B. F. Ells's Grammar.*

2. The circumstances under which it was prepared are simply these:

Having recently resigned the general superintendence of a seminary where many different branches of education were taught, and entered upon a sphere of duty where my whole attention is directed to the subject of English Belles Lettres, I felt more sensibly than I had ever done before, the want of an elementary book of instruc-

tion in Composition, suitable for beginners. *Preface to John Frost's Easy Exercises in Composition.*

It is hardly necessary to say that the *Affected* style mars the sentence. As *affected* airs do not beautify a lady, or gentleman, so an *affected* style does not embellish a sentence.

II. BOMBASTIC STYLE.

A *bombastic* style is that turn, that trait, which springs from a serious attempt to raise a low, or a familiar subject above its just rank, by high sounding words; as,

1. The English language is about thirteen hundred years old. It was the last formed language in the world, and without doubt will continue to be the last, till time shall have been lost in the vortex of eternity. It is a language sublimer in magnitude, more splendid in diction, and richer in variety of expression than any other language in the world: Behold it spreading its ample arms, embracing every continent, and grasping in the isles of the sea. *B. F. Ells's Gram.*

2. The author is free to acknowledge, that since this treatise first ventured on the wave of public opinion, the gales of patronage which have wafted it along, have been far more favorable than he had reason to anticipate. *Preface to Kirkham's Grammar.*

3. Grammar is a leading branch of that learning which alone is capable of unfolding, and maturing the mental powers, and of elevating man to his proper rank in the scale of intellectual existence; of that learning which lifts the soul from earth, and enables it to hold converse with a thousand worlds. *Preface to Kirkham's Gram.*

4. Why did you cling with such pertinacious tenacity to this same *anchor*, to save your own new-born bark, from the random waves of Mr. Webster's tempestuous philological sea. *B. F. Ells's Eng. Gram.*

The author of a sentence which is marred by a *bombastic* style, may be assimilated to a parent who makes a serious attempt to raise a *clownish son* to the rank of a *gentleman*, by gaudy apparel. The striking contrast between the *son*, and his *wardrobe* converts the attempt of the father into the *ridiculous*.

III. CONCISE STYLE.

A *concise* style is that trait, that turn, in the character of a sentence, which springs from the expression of much in a few words; as,

1. "God is love."
2. "Man is mortal."
3. "John is needy: Howard is benevolent."

In each of these sentences there is much said in a few words.

IV. DIFFUSE STYLE.

A *diffuse*, or *verbose* style is that trait, that

turn, in the character of a sentence which springs from the use of many words in the expression of a few ideas; as,

1. They are incapable themselves of imparting a satisfactory knowledge of the subject; and yet it often happens, perhaps even in a majority of cases, that those who have commenced with the "introduction" have neither the time nor the means to get beyond it; and besides unless the "introduction" be constructed on the same principle of arrangement and expression with the one which is intended to succeed, it will probably be found worse than useless; for when a particular arrangement and phraseology have become familiar to the mind, there is great difficulty in studying another work on the same subject, in which the arrangement and expression are materially different. (109 words.) *Preface to Bul-lions's English Gram.*

2. For, whatever we may think in relation to its origin, whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry,—a natural endowment, or an artificial invention,—certain it is, that, in the present state of things, our knowledge of it depends, in a great measure, if not entirely on the voluntary exercise of our faculties, and on the helps and opportunities afforded us. (68 words.) *Preface to Gould Brown's Grammar.*

3. The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition of these Exercises in fifteen days after the publication of the first, and the notification at the close of a month, that the first three thousand copies were sold, and a considerable part of the second edition ordered, afford a presumption that the work has met with the approbation of the public in its original shape. (71 words.) *Preface to John Frost's Easy Exercises in Composition.*

The first sentence comprises one hundred and nine words. But the number which is actually necessary to express all which the author is justified in saying, is far short of this.

1. The first idea is that *Introductions, Abridgements*, are not sufficient.

2. The second is the inability of many to avail themselves of the advantages of a full work.

3. The third is that the *Introduction*, and the large work should be constructed upon the same principle.

4. The fourth is that the pupil meets with much inconvenience in studying a large Grammar which differs from the abridged one in arrangement, and phraseology.

These four ideas are all which the author is justified in attempting to express.

That these can be expressed in fewer words than one hundred and nine, may be seen from the following sentence:

The insufficiency of *Introductions*, the inability of many to avail themselves of the advantages of a full work, the want of analogy in plan, and expression between the Epitome, and the Large work, render Abridgements comparatively useless. (37 words.) 37 from 109, leaves 72 redundant words.

A substitute for Gould Brown's sentence.

2. For our knowledge of it depends much upon the proper use of the means which we possess for acquiring it. (20 words.) 48 redundant words. Hence the diffuse style which mars Mr. Gould Brown's sentence, consists of forty-eight useless words.

It may be said, however, that the substitute for this author's sentence, does not contain as much as his own period. True, but the substitute contains all that is relevant. Diffuseness mainly consists of wasting words upon things which have no legitimate connection with the subject.

Substitute for J. Frost's sentence.

The orders for a considerable part of the second edition, which, fifteen days from the first, my publishers requested me to prepare, show that the work is acceptable in its original form. (32 words.) 39 redundant words which constitute the *diffuse* style.

A diffuse style is a great blemish.

A diffuse style is found in the periods of the writers who *presume* that the reader not only wishes to learn that the person crossed the stream in *safety*, but to acquire a minute knowledge of *all* that exists within a conceivable distance of the place at which he crossed. Hence they are careful to enumerate the *number*, and *kind of pebbles* exposed to the eye—the number, and kind of them which are hid,—the number, and kind of them concealed by the mud,—the number and kind of them concealed by the sand,—and the number, and kind of them hidden by the stream itself. Nor are they indifferent respecting the relative size and shape of each pebble. Neither will they neglect to make particular mention that pebbles, in a *philosophic* respect, are minerals distinguished from *flints* by their variety of colors. To this they are careful to add that pebbles are composed of crystalline matter, debased by earths of different sorts, and in different degrees. Equally particular are they to mention in detail that pebbles are beautified with veins, clouds, and numerous other variegations. To this they are sure to subjoin that, although, in general, pebbles are formed by *incrustation* round a *central nucleus*—some are formed by *simple concretion*. And that nothing which has any bearing upon the fact that the person *crossed* the stream safely, may go untouched, they affix that pebbles are considerably used for paving streets!!

V. EASY STYLE.

An *easy style* is the *smooth flowing* turn of a sentence; as,

1. "In the beginning was the word; and the word was with God; and the word was God."

2. "In him was life; and the life was the light of men."

3. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have eternal life."

This style is an important attribute; and, though few sentences have it, none should be without it.

The simplicity of the subject, is very favourable to this style; as,

1. "There cometh a woman of Samaria to draw water."

2. "Jesus said unto her, Give me to drink."

But, although the complexity of a subject, is not favourable to the *Easy style*, *care*, and *skill* can grace almost every sentence with more, or less of it.

"The woman saith unto him, Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep: from whence then hast thou that living water!

This sentence is stiff, formal. But even with this, and several other faults, it is better than a majority of the periods which grace, or rather *disgrace*, our English Grammars. The *affected* style which now mars it, may be made to give place to the *easy* style, which would improve it:

The woman replied, The well is deep, Sir; and thou hast nothing *with which* to draw: whence, then, hast thou that living water?

VI. ELEGANT STYLE.

An *elegant style* is the turn, the trait, which consists, not only of the *polish*, *richness*, and *purity* of a sentence, but of the just *formation*, *proportion*, and *distribution* of its several parts; as,

1. Shall we suffer this man to break into our folds,—to bind our shepherds, and to take possession of our flocks?

2. Forgiveness is the *odour* of the flower on which we tread.

3. "Homer was the greater genius; Virgil, the better artist: in the one we most admire the man; in the other, the work. Homer hurries us with a commanding impetuosity; Virgil leads us with an attractive majesty. Homer scatters with a generous profusion; Virgil bestows with a careful magnificence." *Preface to Pope's Homer.*

That these sentences are *elegant*, can not be questioned. But they are not more elegant than the following:

"In the beginning, was the word; and the word was with God; and the word was God."

In this sentence, there is brevity, purity, force, propriety of arrangement, and embellishment. It contains a beautiful climax:

The word is first represented to be in the very

beginning,—coetaneous with God. It is next represented to be *with* God; and is finally represented to be God.

"In the beginning was the word; and the word was with God; and the word was God."

VII. EPISTOLARY STYLE.

An *epistolary style* is the familiar, conversational turn of a sentence, which is suited to letters, and correspondence by letters; as,

1. "Only Luke is with me. Take Mark, and bring him with thee; for he is profitable to me for the ministry."

"The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee, and the books, but especially the parchment." *Paul to Timothy.*

Although the epistolary style is a familiar, conversational turn of the sentence, it does not follow that the sentence must be marred with errors. The improprieties in each of these sentences, may be corrected without any diminution of the epistolary style.

1. Luke only, is with me. Bring Mark with thee; for he would be profitable to me in the ministry.

2. Bring the cloak which I left with Carpus. Especially, bring the parchment, and the books if convenient.

VIII. FEEBLE STYLE.

A *feeble style* is that trait of character, which consists of *weakness*, or a destitution of much force, strength; as,

A new Grammar of the English language, will, often without examination, be pronounced, by the superficial grammarian, a mere compilation; but those who are acquainted with modern philology, and those who understand the discrepancy between the present state of the science of practical grammar, and the most approved methods of instruction, are prepared to expect something more from an author whom they judge capable of availing himself of the facilities offered, and of adapting them to the interests of education. (30 words.) *Preface to Frazee's Gram.*

Although almost every blemish in a sentence, is unfavourable to force, strength, perhaps none is more so than a distinct mention of facts, and circumstances which a clear expression of the main things would readily suggest. The sentence which follows, has more strength, and brevity than that by Mr. Frazee:

Many are disposed to pronounce a new grammar a mere compilation without regard to the state of the science, or the capability of the author. (25 words.)

The interruptions produced by the constant introduction of unimportant matter, tend to enfeeble a sentence:

"A new Grammar of the English language, will, often, without examination, be pronounced, by the superficial grammarian, a mere compilation."

The reader is too much jolted by the *ups*, and *downs* of his vehicle, to receive a very deep impression of the scenery which he passes.

Or in a different figure:

His sight is too often intercepted by the interjection of minors, to allow him to get a clear view of the major.

Words, and monos which are rendered redundant by any circumstance whatever, exert a great influence in weakening a sentence:

A new Grammar of the English language.

As the mono, "*of the English language*," is on the title page, it is useless in this sentence.

IX. FLORID STYLE.

A *florid* style is the lively turn, the rich brilliant trait which springs from the flowers of rhetoric; as,

"I am the true vine; and my Father is the husbandman."

2. "O thou that rollest above, round as the shield of my fathers! Whence are thy beams, O sun! thy everlasting light? When the world is dark with tempests, when thunders roll and lightnings fly, thou lookest in thy beauty from the clouds, and laughest at the storm. But to Ossian, thou lookest in vain; for he beholds thy beams no more, whether thy yellow hair flows on the eastern clouds, or thou tremblest at the gates of the west. But thou art, perhaps, like me, for a season: thy years will have an end. Thou wilt sleep in thy clouds, careless of the voice of the morning."

3. "Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt; thou hast cast out the heathen, and planted it. The hills were covered with the shadow of it; and the boughs thereof were like the goodly cedars. She sent out her boughs unto the sea, and her branches unto the river."

X. FLOWING STYLE.

A *flowing* style is the trait of smoothness with which the words of a sentence strike the ear; as,

1. "He that receiveth you, receiveth me: and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me."

2. "The head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman, is the man; and the head of Christ is God."

3. "Add to your faith, virtue; to your virtue,

knowledge; to your knowledge, temperance; to your temperance, patience; to your patience, godliness; to your godliness, brotherly kindness, and to your brotherly kindness, love."

In the following construction, this style is somewhat increased:

To your faith, add virtue; to your virtue, knowledge; to your knowledge, temperance, &c.

4. And the young men arose, wound him up, carried him out, and buried him.

5. We shall conduct you to a hill-side, laborious indeed at the first ascent; but else, so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects, and melodious sounds on every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not more charming."

XI. HARSH STYLE.

A *harsh* style is the harsh, jarring, grating, trait in the character of a sentence; as,

1. "Henry is a young fine man."

2. "He lives in that brick new house."

3. The work now offered to the public, is claimed as an improvement in the following features, among others. *Preface to Frazee's Grammar.*

4. "The verb is the second part of speech treated." *Same Preface.*

The flowing style respects melody; the harsh, a want of it.

The flowing is derived from the position of words in respect to each other, and from the ease with which they can be uttered.

Vowels impart softness; consonants, strength, to sound. The flowing style requires a just proportion of each.

Short words are not so flowing as long ones; and long ones which have an intermixture of long, and short syllables, are more flowing than they that are composed entirely of either.

But, although the style denominated *flowing*, depends much upon the *medium* length of the words, and upon a just proportion of long, and short syllables composed of a just intermixture of vowels, and consonants, it depends greatly upon a just disposition of them in the frame-work of a mono.

1. "Henry is a *young fine* man."

Henry is a *fine young* man.

2. "He lives in the *brick new* house"

He lives in the *new brick* house.

3. The work now offered to the public, is claimed as an improvement upon the grammars

in use, in the following features, among others.*—*Frazee's Grammar*.

That which renders this sentence particularly harsh, is the subjunction of the mono, "*among others*." Had the author omitted this mono, he would have conferred a great favour upon the ears of the reader! Was this mono amputated, which could be done with the loss of little blood, (for I do not believe there is a vein, or an artery in it,) I could apply the language of its author to the remaining part of the syllabane:

"The sentence now offered to its author, is claimed as an improvement upon that now in his Preface, in the loss of the following feature,—"*among others*!"

4. "The verb is the second part of speech treated." *Frazee's Grammar*.

The use of "*treated*" is not less offensive to the palate of the temperance man than to the ear of the good scholar. To exclude the idea of *Bacchus*, of should follow *treated*—*treated of*. And to bring a smile of approbation from the lips of Apollo, the sentence should read as follows:

The second subject in Etymology, is the verb. Or,

The first subject in Etymology, is the noun,—the second, is the verb.

XII. LOFTY STYLE.

A lofty style is the elevated, dignified, stately, sublime, trait of character; as,

1. "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light."

2. "I will shake the heavens; and the earth shall move out of her place."

3. "The stars of heaven, and the constellations thereof, shall not give their light; the sun shall

*The numerous errors which deform this sentence, say distinctly, that its author is altogether incompetent to write a grammar.

What! is "*The work now offered to the public, is claimed as an improvement*," English!?

1. The man who is now before the public, is claimed as a good man!

2. The horse which is in that stall, is claimed as a black one!!

3. This horse is claimed as a stronger animal than that!!

The following is common, and good:

"I claim this book as my property." But, I claim this book as an improvement upon that, is both extremely rare, and shamefully bad.

I offer this book as an improvement upon that, is English.

A Substitute.

This Grammar is offered as an improvement upon similar works now in use.

"The work now offered to the public, is claimed as an improvement upon the grammars in use, in the following features, among others."

Was the work a face, its author might speak of its features. But, as it has no head, it can have no face; and, as it has no face, how can it have features!?

"In the following" particulars.

be darkened, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine."

XIII. LOOSE STYLE.

A loose style is a laxity in the texture of the sentence; as,

1. Most grammarians call *names*, *nouns*, but *noun* is a technical word, which means *name*, and therefore we will use the word *name* more generally than the word *noun*, especially in the first part of this work; for every body understands what the *name* means, which is not the case with the word *noun*. *Frazee's Gram*.

When two words express ideas which have no bearing one upon the other, the words will not cohere; as, in *in—the rapidly—hence whence*.

The words, "*hence whence*," will not interweave, they express nothing which gives them a texture, a connection. The following words, however, have a close texture: *Very high—High trees—Good Leather—Leather shoes*.

When two, or more, monos express ideas which do not cohere, the syllabanes themselves can not cohere, can not have a texture, a connection; as,

I. *New York city is much improved, My horse is yet in the lot, His son could not learn the old grammar*.

As there is no relation among the ideas of these three syllabanes, there is no texture among the syllabanes themselves.

Now, as words which stand together may have no texture, so they which stand together, may have a loose texture.

"For every body understands what the word *name* means, (*which is not*) (*the case*) (*with the word*) (*noun*)."

The connection between the monoized, and the unmonoized part, is very loose, very slender. And this loose texture is a loose style.

What is not the case with the word, *noun*?

Answer—It is not the case with the word, *noun*, that "every body understands what the word *name* means!!"

If we say, the word, *imagination*, has eleven letters, *which is not the case with the word, noun*, the two syllabanes have a close texture.

What is not the case with the word, *noun*? Answer—It is not the case with the word, *noun*, that it has eleven letters.

For every body understands what the word, *name*, means, *which is not the case with the word, noun*!!"

A Substitute.

For every body understands what the word, *name* means, *whereas but few understand what the word, noun, signifies*.

XIV. NEAT, OR TERSE STYLE.

A neat, or terse style is that degree of excellence which a sentence derives from a close ob-

servance of all the *Rules* in SYNTAX, that can be applied to the sentence; as,

1. The sight is the most delightful of all our senses.

2. Our sight is the most perfect, and the most delightful of all our senses. ADDISON.

The use of *most* is a violation of RULE XLVII. p. 333.

2. "Our sight is *perfect*, and the most delightful of all our senses."

While the omission of "*most*," rids the sentence of one solecism, it mars it with another: the writer does not intend to say that our sight is *perfect*. Hence the use of *perfect* is a violation of RULE XLVII.

To render the leading trait in the character of this sentence, a *terse* style, it must be resolved into the first sentence under this definition:

"The sight is more delightful than any other of the senses."

XVI. NEGLIGENT STYLE.

A *negligent* style is the degree of *disorder*, that gives the sentence the same appearance which *neglect* in a housekeeper, gives her house; as,

1. The vowel sounds are produced with the organs open and without changing their position. *Frazee's Grammar*.

That is, these sounds are produced with the tongue open, with the palate open, with the nose open, and with the teeth open!!!

"The vowel sounds are produced with the organs open and without changing their position."

As the mouth is one of these organs, Mr. Frazee implies that the mouth may change its position. But is it possible to move the mouth from the front to the side, or to the back of the head!!

"And without changing their position."

As the name of the agents of this action, *changing*, is not within the reach of the word, "*changing*," *changing* should give place to *change*, or *variation*; and without any *change* in their position.

A Substitute.

The vowel sounds are produced by a continued effusion of the breath, with the mouth in one particular form, and without a motion from any of the organs of speech.

2. The power of connecting sounds by articulations or joints, is a peculiar characteristic and privilege of man above the mere animal creation. *Frazee's Gram.*

"The power of connecting sounds by articulations or joints."

1. The word, *articulation*, is rarely, if ever plused.*

2. The word, *articulation*, cannot be applied to the means of connecting.

* This word may, perhaps, be plused when applied to the joints, or nodes, of maize, cane, &c.

In *anatomy*, articulation is the *joining*, or *juncture* of the bones. The articulation between some bones, is produced by *enarthrosis* which is the ball, and socket joint.

3. In *botany*, articulation is the connection between the parts of a plant.

3. In the formation of words, articulation is a distinct utterance.

As articulation is the connection itself, the true sense of this sentence is *non-sense*.

"The power of connecting sounds by articulations."

That is, the power of connecting sounds by the connection of sounds!!

"The power of connecting sounds by articulations or joints, is a peculiar characteristic and privilege of man above the mere animal creation."

The word, *privilege*, is not applicable to mere physical faculty, or strength. An incarcerated man may have the power to walk miles: but he may not have the *privilege*.

The members of our legislatures have the privilege of exemption from arrest in certain cases.

"The powers of a banking company are the privileges granted by the legislature."

Here the word, *power*, is plused, *powers*, and is applied, not to physical ability, but to a mere legislative liberty to do, or to a mere exemption from penalty for not doing.

"The power of connecting sounds by articulations or joints, is a peculiar characteristic and privilege of man above the mere animal creation."

"The power is a peculiar characteristic of man above the mere animal creation."

What is it which is here said to be above the mere animal creation: Is it the characteristic of man?

"The power is a peculiar characteristic above the mere animal creation."

If this is the idea, the sentence is as much below many parts of the mere animal creation as man is above them.

And, if the idea is that man is raised by this characteristic above the mere animal part of the universe, Mr. Frazee is degraded to the lowest rank of writers.

"The power of connecting sounds by articulations, is a peculiar characteristic and privilege of man above the mere animal creation."

"The power is a peculiar characteristic and privilege of man above the mere animal creation."

Perhaps the author's meaning expressed in *English*, is this:

The power is a peculiar characteristic and privilege which raises man above the mere animal.

A SUBSTITUTE.

The power, and the privilege of forming articulate sounds, raises man above the mere animal.

If this power raises man above the members of the mere animal kingdom, it must be peculiar to man. Hence there is no propriety in the use of *peculiar characteristic*. Besides, *characteristic* means what is peculiar!

XVII. OBSCURE STYLE.

An obscure style is the *abstruseness* of a sentence; as,

1. The literature of a nation cannot fail to contain within itself that which has made the nation what it is. First sentence in the Preface of, "*Class Book, of Poetry*," by JOHN S. HART.

This sentence evidently does not convey the author's ideas. Surely Mr. Hart meant to say something more than,

The literature of a nation cannot fail to contain itself within itself!

"*The literature of a nation cannot fail to contain within itself that which has made the nation what it is.*"

Well, what is it which makes a nation what it is? Why, it is its *literature*. Hence the reader, although not a member of the American Philosophical Society, must be philosopher enough to see that the following is the only meaning which the sentence conveys:

The literature of a nation must contain itself within itself!!! That is, the value of a dollar must contain itself within itself.

As it is not in my power to *understand* what Mr. Hart wished to express, I shall not attempt to say what change should be made in his period to enable the reader to comprehend its *true* meaning. But, as I am fully satisfied that the sentence, like some *societies*, is encumbered with *redundant members*, I should feel justified in serving a *Writ of Quo Warranto* upon its *learned* author, requiring him to show by what authority he uses certain words in it.

The literature of a nation must contain that which has made it what it is. (*not, fail, to, within, itself, the.*)

That "*the nation*" should give place to "*it*," is obvious from the use of *him* for the words, *a man*, in the following:

The learning of a man must contain that which has made *him* (*not, the man*), what he is.

2. Those great ideas, which in the course of centuries, have been gradually developed by its master minds, are the moving springs, which have set the nation onward in the career of civilization. (*Second sentence, same preface.*)

It is not easy to see whether Mr. Hart means that the moving springs are made of ideas which are in the process of development for centuries, or of those which are developed at different times for centuries.

If he means the former, the language should be as follows—

The great ideas which it required centuries to develop.

If he intends the latter, the first part of the sentence might be as follows:

The great ideas, developed for centuries.

1. *The great ideas which it has required centuries to develop*, are the moving springs of a nation in its career of civilization.

(Redundant words—*which, course, in, the, of, gradually, have, set, that, onward, by, its, master, minds*, 14.)

2. The great ideas developed for centuries are the moving springs of a nation in its career of civilization.

(Redundant words—*which, course, in, the, of, gradually, have, set, that, onward, by, its, master, mind*, 14.)

"Unity of a Sentence."

There must always be some leading principle to form a chain of connection between the component parts of every composition, and there must be the same-connecting principle among the parts. *John Frost's Exercises in Composition*.

But what has this sentence to do with the *unity* of a sentence!? Indeed, does it concern any thing that *man* can comprehend? True, one may form opinions respecting the meaning of the *first* part of it—but he cannot decide which of his various conjectures, is right. The first part—

1. "There must always be some leading principle to form a *chain of connection* between the component parts of every composition."

The second part—

"And there must be the same *connecting principle* among the *parts*."

That is, the connecting principle which is among the *parts*, must be the same with the *chain* of connection that exists among the *component parts*!

4. "The rising tomb a lofty column bore."

Did the *tomb* bear the *column*; or the *column*, the *tomb*?

5. "And thus the *son* the fervent sire addressed."

Did the *son* address the *sire*; or the *sire* the *son*?

XVIII. PERSPICUOUS STYLE.

A *perspicuous* style is *distinctness* of expression.

1. The rising tomb bore a lofty column.

2. A lofty column bore a rising tomb.

These ideas are *distinctly* expressed. In the first, it is clearly expressed that the *tomb* bore the *column*. In the second, it is clearly expressed that the *column* bore the *tomb*.

The *perspicuous* style may belong to the sentence which expresses an absurdity as well as to that which expresses a consistency. If the sentence expresses the absurdity *distinctly*, it has the *perspicuous* style; as,

1. An *absurd* man is one who acts in exact

accordance with the clear dictates of reason, and sound judgment.

2. A *square* block is *round*.

Each sentence expresses what is absurd—but as it expresses the absurdity with *perfect distinctness*, each is distinguished by its perspicuity.

XIX. SIMPLE STYLE.

A *simple* style is the trait of character, which springs from a *want* of every thing like ornament, embellishment; as,

1. "A good man enjoys comfort in the midst of adversity."

The same sentiment, in a sentence of the *Florid* style.

"To the upright, there ariseth light in darkness."

2. We cannot find out the Lord fully.

The Florid :

Can we find out the Lord fully?

XX. STIFF STYLE.

A *stiff* style is the constrained, formal, trait of character; as,

1. In the Anglo-Saxon race, from the days of Alfred until now, men of superior genius, the original thinkers in each successive generation, have given birth to ennobling thoughts, which continue to endure, and are perpetuated not only in the language, but in the race itself. (46 words.)
John S. Hart's Class Book of Poetry.

Perhaps the following construction will rid the sentence of the *stiff* turn :

1. From the time of Alfred, the original thinkers of Anglo-Saxon blood, have given birth to many ennobling thoughts which will never cease to distinguish the language, and benefit the race.

Or,

From the time of Alfred, the thoughts of many of Anglo-Saxon blood, have enriched, and ennobled the race.

XXI. TUMID STYLE.

A *tumid* style is a *swelling*, *puffy*, trait of character; as,

1. Englishmen, and Americans of the present day are living exponents of the thoughts and truths elaborated by the illustrious dead. *Hart's Class Book of Poetry.*

Do the *dead* think?

How then can they have *thoughts*?

If the *dead* have no thoughts, how can either Englishmen, or Americans be living *exponents* of them!? I can easily understand in what way the living may be exponents, indexes, *pointers*, to the dead. But I cannot conceive how any thing can be an index to the *thoughts* of what does not *think*! Of imports springing from,—Do thoughts spring from the *dead*?

The use of *exponent*, and *elaborated*, gives the sentence a *puffy*, a *tumid*, cast. One is very

learned—the other is almost exclusively *technical*.

A distinguished writer on English philology says—'Avoid the use of *technical* terms, except where they are necessary in treating of a particular art, or science.

Another still more distinguished, says, Avoid the *injudicious use* of technicals. "Foreign, and *learned* words unless where necessity requires them, should never be admitted into our composition."

It may be well to give the sentence which precedes the one under consideration.

"We are what preceding generations have made us." "Englishmen, and Americans of the present day are living exponents of the thoughts, and truths elaborated by the illustrious dead." (28 words.)

Why this change from *we* to *Englishmen*, and *Americans*?!*

A SUBSTITUTE.

We are what preceding generations have made us,—lively, bold, impressions of the thoughts, originated, and matured by our illustrious *ancestors*. (21 words.)

XXII. VERBOSE STYLE.

The *verbose* style consists in the use of more words than are necessary for the expression of the writer's ideas.

NEW BOOKS.—Mr. Leary, southwest corner of Second and New street, has recently published an edition of Mr. James Brown's English Grammar, a work that bears testimony to its author's deep, and successful research, and to his ability as a grammarian. We have used more than one occasion to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments; and though we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature, we do justice to his abilities, and to the results at which he arrives. *United States Gazette*, 1847, edited by JOSEPH R. CHANDLER, Esq.

[Seventy-nine words.]

Corrected. NEW BOOKS.—Mr. James Brown's English Grammar. (Leary southwest corner of Second, and New street.)

We think well of the Philological attainments of Mr. Brown, and verily believe that his works afford evidence of deep research; but we do not like his nomenclature. [Forty-three words.]

As the difference between *forty-three*, and *seventy-nine*, is thirty-six, and as the substitute is

* Is it to embellish the sentence with the error of going from the first *person* to the third *person*?

the same in substance with the original, the verbosity of Mr. Chandler consists of *thirty-six redundant* words:!

CHAPTER XXXIV.

ONE MUST LEARN THE TRUE RELATION OF IDEAS, OR BE INCAPABLE OF EXPRESSING THEM PROPERLY.

THE study of grammar by the new system, is an excellent discipline for the mind: the student is here constantly *comparing, contrasting, reasoning, and judging*. In these exercises, he is unremittingly examining the *relation* of ideas. And, as this relation is the true basis of all just conclusions, whatever tends to *fix* the attention upon it, must hold a high rank as a means of maturing the mind.

To one who desires to become thoroughly acquainted with the true relation of ideas, the study of the new system is interesting, and invaluable. But, to him who has no wish to become deeply skilled in this *relation*, the beauties of the new system are mere colors to the *blind* man.

In the study of the new system, the attention of the pupil is given, not so much to the mere *framework relation* of *word* with *word*, and *mono* with *mono*, as to the *rhetorical*, and *logical* connection of idea with idea. Hence the new system, not only begets a taste for the study of Language, but it gives a capacity to *understand*, and to *use* it. It employs all the faculties of the mind to their full extent. And, while it may be clearly comprehended even by children, it is not unworthy of the close attention of men, of scholars, of philosophers. But the study of the new system, is not the work of a day. To become *familiar* with this system of Grammar, demands a practice induced by a philological affection which nothing but the new system can beget, nourish, and mature.

A capacity to distinguish the different parts of speech in English, the different *cases*, and *genders* of nouns, and the different *modes*, and tenses of verbs, never has enabled a man to use the English Language with propriety. The tenability of this position may be placed beyond all doubt by the many gross errors which all the old-school grammarians commit even in their studied productions. No man can use this Language *aright*, without a critical knowledge of the exact relation of ideas. And, as the new system is the only medium through which a critical knowledge of this relation can be acquired, the study of this system of Grammar, becomes important to all.

I have long been satisfied that the old MURRAY theory of English grammar, renders little, or no aid in the use of any Language. To prove this, I deem it my *duty* to embrace every opportunity to make exposures of the numerous solecisms which mar the writings of the most distinguished

old-school grammarians of this, and other countries. Under this impression, I embrace the opportunity afforded by the publication of this book, to make a few reflections upon some of the many errors which pervade the writings of the *best menders* of Murray.

I shall commence this task with a few reflections upon some of the writings of JOSEPH R. CHANDLER, Esq., late editor of the United States Gazette.

This gentleman is distinguished in *Philadelphia* for his knowledge of English *Grammars*. And, if I am not under a wrong impression, there are individuals among us, who verily believe that he is deeply skilled in English grammar itself. But while I freely admit that he is familiarly acquainted with many Grammar *books*, I feel constrained to deny that he has much knowledge of *grammar itself*. And to sustain this position, I have here exposed a few of the many errors which deform his writings.

Mr. Chandler is the author of the following notice:

"NEW BOOKS.—Mr. Leary, south-west corner of Second and New street, has recently published an edition of Mr. James Brown's English Grammar, a work that bears testimony to its author's deep and successful research, and to his ability as a grammarian. We have used more than one occasion to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments; and though we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature, we do justice to his abilities and to the *results* at which he arrives."—*United States Gazette*, 1847.

After a critical analysis of this notice, I have come to the conclusion that it exhibits much evidence of a want of capacity in Mr. Chandler to write with grammatical precision.

As Mr. Leary is not a *new* book why should he be treated of immediately after the head, "NEW BOOKS?" As Mr. Chandler does not intend to give a notice of Mr. *Leary*, but of a book published by him, why should he be made the first, and central object of attention? It does not seem to me that this arrangement is either grammatical, or logical. The following is something better:

NEW BOOKS.—James Brown's English Grammar has recently been published by Mr. *Leary*, South-west corner of Second and New street.

Under this arrangement, the Grammar has its proper place, and legitimate rank.

"a work that bears testimony to its author's deep and successful research, and to his ability as a grammarian."

"bears *testimony* to its author's deep and successful research, and to his *ability* as a grammarian."

"*Testimony*" is here improperly used for *evidence*. This is rendered quite obvious from the consideration that "*testimony*" is from the Latin, *testis*, a witness.

Where the subject is moral or intellectual, *evidence*, not *testimony*, should be used; as, "Of Swift's general habits of thinking, if his letters can be supposed to afford any *evidence*, he was not a man to be either loved or envied."—JOHNSON.

"All that our Saviour did and said were *testimonies* of his Divine character."—CRABB.

The substitution of *testimony* for *evidence* would be an obvious solecism:

All that our Saviour did and said were *testimonies* of his Divine character.

"bears testimony to its author's deep and successful research."

As there is nothing in *bear*, which demands *to*, this particle should give place to *of*. To *bear* testimony is to *show, exhibit, or utter* testimony. Hence the idea expressed by Mr. Chandler is this:

a work that shows, exhibits, or utters testimony to the author's research!!! The substitution of *of* for *to* will show that Mr. Chandler has worn the regal tinsure somewhat unworthily:

"a work which bears testimony of its author's deep research."

That is, which bears testimony in favour of its author's deep research."

"Hence a person makes another a present, or performs any other act of kindness as a testimony of (not *to*) his regard."—CRABB.

Persons or things personified, bear testimony in favour of persons.—CRABB.

"The same came for a witness to bear witness of the light." (not *to*.)

"He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light." (not *to*.)

But Mr. Chandler may attempt to justify this use of *to* by showing that other writers have committed the same error! I presume that the authority of Dryden himself may be found on the side of this solecism. But the sins of Dryden will never sanctify the iniquities of Mr. Chandler! If Mr. Chandler can show that to utter testimony *to* a person, is synonymous with, to utter it, of a person, he can justify the use of *to*, without the blunders of others.

"a work that bears testimony to its author's deep and successful research, and *to* his ability as a grammarian."

The use of *to* before *his*, is a repetition of the error which makes Mr. Chandler say that the testimony in favour of the research was addressed *to* the research!

The word "*ability*" is improperly used for *capacity*. *Capacity*, says Crabb, is a mental endowment, and always supposes something ready to receive or hold:

The object is too big for our *capacity* when we would comprehend the circumference of a world.—ADDISON.

We say an *able* commander—but a *capacious* mind.

A great *capacity* of thought.—CRABB.

Sir Francis Bacon's *capacity* (not *ability*) seemed to have grasped all that was in books before.—HUGHES.

That "*ability*" may be applied to the mind in the sense of *capacity*, is not denied. But when it is so applied, it should generally be *plural*:

"As for me, my *abilities*, if ever I had any, are not what they were."—ATTERBURY.

But I consider the clause, "*and to his ability as a grammarian*," a pleonasm.

"a work that bears *testimony* to its author's deep and successful research, and to his *ability* as a grammarian." (Nineteen words.)

Corrected, a work which affords evidence of deep grammatical research. (Nine words—ten redundant words.)

The next, which is the concluding part of this notice of my book, read as follows:

"We have *used* more than one occasion to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments; and though we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature, we do justice to his abilities, and to the results at which he arrives."

A want of space prevents me from making many comments. I shall confine my attention, therefore, to the mere correction of the several errors which render this sentence strikingly analogous to its predecessor.

"We have *used* more than one occasion."

Was the occasion *used* by these gentlemen? Who *used* the occasion? We *use* pens, dishes, money, &c. But we speak on occasions. The word, *occasion*, however, is improperly used for *opportunity*.

What Mr. Chandler intends to say, is,

We have *embraced* more than one *opportunity* to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments. But if Mr. Chandler is unwilling to exchange *occasion* for *opportunity*, the sentence may read as follows:

We have spoken of Mr. Brown's philological attainments *on* more than one occasion. Or, We have spoken, *on* more than one occasion, of Mr. Brown's philological attainments. It is a fact, then, that Mr. Chandler who has for years worn the *Royal* robes in the *kingdom* of grammar, employs "*used*" for *on*!! But the use of *occasion* is bombastic, and redundant. The sentence, therefore, may be improved by the omission of *on* and *occasion*:

We have spoken more than once of Mr. Brown's philological attainments.

And though we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature, we do justice to his abilities, and to the results at which he arrives.

We have used more than one occasion to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments; and we do justice to his abilities, and to the results at which he arrives!!

I am under the impression that all who wish to

comprehend the connection between these two members of this sentence will be compelled to seek the gratification of their desires through Mr. C.'s *late Grammar*!!! Is it possible that Mr. Chandler has undertaken to express in the preceding sentence, what is conveyed in the following:

We have used more than one occasion to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments, and *on each, we have* endeavored to do justice to his abilities, and to the results at which he arrives.

Mr. Chandler speaks of results as objects which can be approached like *trees, houses, rocks, ships, &c.* From his manner of speaking, no one who is ignorant of the *nature* of a result, would infer that a result is that which is produced by the exertions of him who, according to Mr. C. *arrives at* it! From this part of the sentence the reader must infer that the result is a thing which may be far ahead of him who produces it! Besides, the word, *result*, conveys the idea of a *termination*, a *final stop*—but *arrives at* imports a mere *temporary* pause!! By the use of "*arrives at*" in the following expression, the speaker indicates that his journey does not terminate at Philadelphia, and that he expects to continue it from this city:

"I *arrived at* Philadelphia last evening."

Now, if the word, *Philadelphia*, implied the termination of the speaker's journey, with what propriety could "*arrived at*" be used with this proper name?

"and we do justice to his abilities, and to the *results at which he arrives.*"

Corrected. and we do justice to his abilities, and to the results of his *labor*.

"though we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature."

Is not the nomenclature one of the results? Certainly. And Mr. Chandler does *justice* to this result by pronouncing against it, without conveying the slightest allusion to any defectiveness in it!!

"we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature."

This condemnation which is rendered *absolute* from its *source*, bears a striking analogy in its grammatical character, to the other parts of this notice. In it, the writer says that he cannot agree *in nomenclature*! Although this notice by Mr. Chandler, abounds with mistakes, the most striking one is found in the fact that the author of it should set himself up as a *judge of nomenclatures*. Even the very sentence in which he gives judgement against the technical terms of my system, demonstrates that he is totally incompetent to form a just opinion of any part of grammar. He says that he cannot *agree in nomenclature* with me. A common man would say,

We cannot agree with him *respecting* tea. But the Bashaw himself says,

We cannot agree with him *in* tea!!

We cannot agree with him *in* his nomenclature.

Corrected. We cannot agree with him *respecting* his nomenclature.

I. The notice in its original form.

"NEW BOOKS,—Mr. Leary, Southwest corner of Second and New street, has recently published an edition of Mr. James Brown's English Grammar, a work that bears testimony to its author's deep and successful research, and to his ability as a grammarian. We have used more than one occasion to speak of Mr. Brown's philological attainments; and though we cannot agree with him in his nomenclature, we do justice to his abilities, and to the *results at which he arrives.*" [Seventy-nine words.]

II. In its revised form.

NEW BOOKS.—Mr. James Brown's English Grammar. (Leary, South-west corner of Second and New street.)

We think well of the philological attainments of Mr. Brown, and verily believe that his works afford evidence of deep research; but we do not like his nomenclature. [Forty-three words.]

As the difference between seventy-nine, and forty-three, is *thirty-six*, and, as the notice in both forms is the same in substance, Mr. Chandler has employed *thirty-six redundant* words? What would Mr. C. think of a tailor, who, in making him a coat, should use *double* the quantity of cloth which his size requires? And what would Mr. C. do with this coat, if, while some of its parts should be made of *improper* materials, others should be placed in *improper* positions!? Would he refuse to accept of the garment, or would he receive it!? And, if he should take it, would he keep it as a *curiosity*, or would he wear it as an *ornament*!? Was such an article to fall into my hands, I readily admit that I should esteem it highly—I should wish to keep it for the *accuracy* with which it would portray the construction of hundreds of Mr. C.'s other paragraphs. But I should feel a greater interest in the tailor himself—I should endeavor to couple this *prince* of the shears with the *king* of grammar, and exhibit the two as a *brace* of phenomena in the climax of curiosities!

CHAPTER XXXV.

WITHIN a few years, several new works on English grammar have been published in this city. It has fallen to my lot to examine them all, and from the impression which they have left on my mind, I feel somewhat prepared to appreciate the paragraph which the editors of the Ledger apply

to the numerous compilers of English grammars.

"The grammarians of our language, some of whom know little, and others nothing of the philosophy of any language, divide *but* into two parts of speech, a *preposition* and a *conjunction*. They then define a preposition to be a *word*, without independent signification, placed before another *word*, showing some connection between it and some other word in the same sentence; and they define a conjunction to be a *word* without independent signification, used to denote some *relation* between two other *words* or members of a sentence. With these *lights* they leave their pupils to find their way; and considering the *brightness* of the *lights*, we need not wonder at the mistakes of the poor pupils."—*Ledger*.

A book has been placed in my hands, of which the following is the title page:

"*English Grammar: or an Exposition of the principles and usages of the English language*. By John S. Hart, A. M., Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and member of the American Philosophical Society. Philadelphia, published by E. H. Butler & Co., 1845."

That the Principal of the Philadelphia High School is embarrassed by the darkness which the *Ledger* ironically calls *light*, is obvious from the numerous errors which mar this title page.

As the phrase "*English Grammar*" is the name of the science itself, it should not be applied to the book which treats of this science. An *English Grammar* means a book; but "*English Grammar*" signifies, not the book, but the science on which the book treats.

"The principles and usages of the English Language."

Are not the usages of the English language its principles? "In language, *usage* is the foundation of all rules."—WEBSTER.

Does not the word *principles*, then, embrace as much as *principles*, and *usages*? Has Mr. Hart even attempted to show the difference between the *principles* and the *usages* of the English language? Perhaps by "*usages*" he intends to distinguish between the true principles of the English language and the manner in which *he* uses it! If so, the difference between *principles* and *usages* is strikingly illustrated through his whole book.

"An exposition of the principles and *usages* of the English language."

Can the word, *usage*, be applied to the thing used? Does the *usage* pertain to the instrument used, or to the agent that uses it? Can we speak of the *usages* of knives and forks?

MR. WEBSTER defines *usage* as follows:

"*Usage*, treatment, use, or long continued use; custom, practice."

The substitution of the word *practice*, for *usages*, will clearly show that Mr. Hart's use of *usages* is very ill *usage*!

"Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and member of the American Philosophical Society."

By the omission of *a* before *member*, Mr. Hart indicates that the relation which he bears to the American Philosophical Society is similar to that which he bears to the Philadelphia High School.

"Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and member of the American Philosophical Society."

As *principal* is without *a*, and imports an *official* relation, so *member*, when used without this particle, and in connection with *principal*, must express the same species of relation!

Principal of the High School, and *President* of the Philosophical Society.

Henry Clay was then *Secretary* of State, not a *Secretary*.

Principal of the High School, and *teacher* of the Model Grammar School.

Does not the omission of *a* before *teacher* clearly indicate that the Principal of the High School is the *only* teacher of the Model Grammar School? By the omission of *a*, then, before *member*, Mr. Hart has not only represented *himself* as an *officer* of the American Philosophical Society, but he has represented himself as the *only* member of the Society!!

"*English Grammar*, by John S. Hart—Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and member of the American Philosophical Society."

By the omission of *an* before *English*, Mr. Hart *unintentionally* makes himself the author of the very *science* of English Grammar—and by the omission of *a* before *member*, he makes the American Philosophical Society to consist solely of himself!! That these philological displays are not the true principles, but the mere *usages*, of the English language, cannot be doubted by any enlightened member of this community.

The following substitute is constructed according to the *principles*, not the *usages*, of the English language:

An English Grammar—by John S. Hart, A. M., Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and a member of the American Philosophical Society.

Are the numerous solecisms which pervade the periods of those who use the English language, ascribable to an ignorance of the old theory of English Grammar, or are they attributable to the unsoundness of the theory itself?

In Mr. Hart's "Exposition of the principles and *usages* of the English language," I find the following definition of Grammar:—

"Grammar is the science of language."

Now, if the old theory of English Grammar is a full development of the *science* of the English language, why do they who adopt this theory entirely disregard the true genius of the English language in their writings? The following is the

first sentence of the preface of Mr. Hart's English Grammar:

"Four kinds of type are used in the following pages to indicate the portions that are considered more or less elementary."

The ill arrangement of the several parts of this sentence, renders it clumsy. The following is something better:—

To indicate the portions that are considered more, or less elementary, four kinds of type are used.

"Four kinds of type are used in the following pages to indicate the portions that are considered more or less elementary.

The use of *indicate* indicates that Mr. Hart does not know the difference between the words *indicate*, and *distinguish*.

"To indicate is to point out, to show. Thus, fermentation *indicates* a certain degree of heat in a liquor. A heavy swell of the sea in calm weather, often *indicates* a storm at a distance."—WEBSTER.

But to *distinguish* is to separate one from another, or some from others: The farmer distinguishes his sheep by marking their ears.—WEBSTER.

But does the farmer *indicate* his sheep by marking their ears?

"Four kinds of type are used in the following pages, to indicate the portions that are considered more or less elementary."

The use of *portions* indicates that Mr. Hart does not distinguish between a *portion*, and a *part*.

"A page, a line, or a word, is a part of any book. *Portion*, and *share* are particular species of divisions, which are said of such matters as are assignable to individuals."—CRABB.

That *portion* is not synonymous with *part*, may be seen by a substitution of *portion* for *part* in the following instances:

1. The apple was divided into two *parts*.

2. The apple was divided into two *portions*!

1. "All the *parts* were formed into his mind into one harmonious body."—LOCKE.

2. All the *portions* were formed in his mind into one harmonious body!

1. "The component *parts* of a fossil,"

2. The component *portions* of a fossil!

1. The people stood at the nether *part* of the mount.—EX. XIX.

2. The people stood at the nether *portion* of the mount.

1. He visited various *parts* of America.

2. He visited various *portions* of America.

"Four kinds of type are used in the following pages to indicate the portions that are considered more or less elementary."

Four kinds of type are used to *distinguish* the parts which are considered more or less elementary.

In, the, following, pages—indicate, portions.

A substitute.—The parts which are considered more, or less elementary, are distinguished by different kinds of type.

The following is the second sentence of the same preface:

"The most important rules and definitions are *printed* in large type, italicised."

Do we print *in*, or *on* type? Do we *italicise* type!

The omission of "*printed*" would improve the sentence:

"The most important rules and definitions are in large type, italicised."

Italicise, to distinguish a word by printing it in Italic characters.—DR. PARR.—TODD'S JOHNSON.

The substitution of *characters* for *type*, will not only correct this gross error, but will demonstrate that Mr. Hart does not understand that science which he defines to be the *science* of language:

The most important rules and definitions are printed in large *characters*, italicised.

A substitute.—The most important rules and definitions are in large *italic characters*, (*printed, type, italicised*.)

From the same preface.

"By this arrangement the author has been enabled to enter more at length than is usually done, upon difficult and important points." Who is the author? John S. Hart, A. M. And who is John S. Hart, A. M.? He is the author of *English Grammar*, Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and Member of the American Philological Society!

As Mr. Hart is all this—and, as he understands not only the principles but the *usages* of the English language, I presume that he may be asked to parse the word "*is*," which follows "*than*!"

"By this arrangement the author has been enabled to enter more at length *than* is usually done, upon difficult and important points." The nominative to "*is*" can be found neither in nor out of this sentence! The nominative case to "*is*," is not—it does not exist! This use of "*is*," is one of the *usages* of the English language!! If the old theory of English grammar is good for any thing, why does not its worth appear in the writings of those who understand it? That Mr Hart understands this old theory cannot be doubted for a moment. What! the *author* of a science not understand it? It cannot be. A sculptor in Lisbon was visited in his dying moments by a monk, to confess him. As the monk held the crucifix before the dying sculptor's eyes, he exclaimed, "See, *here* is God, whom you have so often offended—do you *know him*?" "O, yes," replied the sculptor, "for I made him *myself*!"

Had I the strength of him who bore away the gates of Gaza, I would exert it, not to harm Mr. Hart, but to benefit my fellow men. I am satisfied that the old theory of English grammar is a preventive against the acquisition of the true con-

structive principles of the English language. To sustain this position I have undertaken to demonstrate that they who understand this theory *best*, write the *worst*. A man writes well in proportion to the degree of attention which he has given to the *true structure* of the language in which he writes. That Mr. Hart has given much more attention to the old theory of English grammar than to the *true structure* of the English language is obvious from his incapacity to use this language with grammatical propriety. In the following sentence there are several errors which no one who understands the true constructive genius of our language would be liable to commit, and which no one who understands the old theory of English grammar only, is able to correct:—

"The distinction here insisted on is as old as Aristotle, and should not be lost sight of."

To rid this sentence of its unnecessary prolixity, this should be substituted for "*the* :"

This distinction is as old as Aristotle, and should not be lost sight of.

(Redundant words—*here, insisted, and on.*)

The next solecism which I shall notice, lies in connecting *should* with *is* :

"The distinction *here insisted on* is as old as Aristotle, and *should* not be lost sight of."

To repair this infraction nothing is necessary but to give the sentence a natural construction :

This distinction, which is as old as Aristotle, should not be lost sight of.

"The distinction *here insisted on, is* as old as Aristotle, and *should* not be lost sight of."

The main proposition is, *the distinction should not be lost sight of*. But Mr. Hart, although "*member of the American Philosophical Society,*" so constructs the sentence that the *main* proposition is degraded to a mere minor, and a mere minor is promoted to the major !

The distinction *here insisted on, is* as old as Aristotle, and *should* not be lost sight of."

The phrases, "*here insisted on,*" and "*lost sight of,*" are prominent blemishes. That is bombast ; this is contortion. Perhaps the following sentence, although not a paragon of excellence, is quite as good as that under consideration :—

Of this distinction, which is as old as Aristotle, the grammarian should never lose sight.

Or,

The grammarian should never lose sight of this distinction, which is as old as Aristotle himself,

"The distinction *here insisted on, is* as old as Aristotle, and *should* not be lost sight of."

"The distinction is as *old* as Aristotle."

The expression of *was* after "*Aristotle,*" must somewhat diminish the pleasure which the advocates of Hart's Grammar feel in recommending this work to popular favor :

The distinction here insisted on, is as *old* as Aristotle *was* !!

I presume that the Aristotle of whom mention is here made, must be he who was a disciple of Plato, and who founded the sect of *Peripatetics*. This distinguished philosopher was born 384 years before Christ. He died at the age of 63. This distinction, therefore, which Mr. Hart thinks he has represented to be as ancient as the days of Aristotle, turns out, by the use of *old* for *ancient*, to be but 63 years of age ! The distinction, then, was first made in 1782 ! This important "*distinction,*" consequently, is not quite so hoary as the *author* of English grammar has attempted to make it !

"The distinction here insisted on, is as *old* as Aristotle (*was,*) and should not be lost sight of."

A *Substitute*.—Of this distinction, which is as *ancient* as Aristotle, the grammarian should never lose sight.

This sentence, which is a ray of light from the very top of the High School, is sufficient to show every man his duty. Words are artful things—to prevent them from playing off their tricks upon him who uses them, they must be watched with great care and *skill*. They have hoaxed even the Principal of the High School in his very *title page*—they have deceived him in every sentence of his Preface—and even in the very paragraph before me, these hypocrites, if I may so call them, have, by concealing their *real characters*, trifled with his learning, his philosophy, and even his station, with the utmost impunity. I apprehend that the words in the English language will continue to be edge tools in the hands of children, till some one who is thoroughly acquainted with the "*usages*" of them shall have invented what, for the want of a name, I must call a *Logrometer*, by which their real characters can be *measured* with exactness.

It has long been a contested point whether language is a *human* production, or a *Divine* revelation. And, although I do not pretend to know which side has the preponderance, either of numbers, or logic, yet I prefer to range myself with the advocates of the doctrine, that language is an emanation from men. Was language an emanation from God, nothing but an ignorance of this fact, could expiate the crime of sacrilege, which Mr. Hart would commit in the following sentence :

"What is the difference of meaning between the short and long forms of this word ?"

The following construction will show that "*of*" before "*meaning*" is improperly used :

What is the difference between the short and long forms of this word, *of* meaning ? !

The use of *in* for *of*, would expurgate this noxious part of the sentence :

What is the difference *in* meaning between the short and long forms of this word ?

That *in* is the proper word for this place, is rendered clear by the construction which proves that *of* is an improper one:

What is the difference between the short and long forms of the word, *in meaning*?

Now, if language is a direct emanation from the Divine Being, what a gross infraction is this philological blemish? But language has little of the sacredness which it would have, was it a direct gift from God to man. Language may be abused—and Mr. Hart, although the author of "*English Grammar*," seems made to abuse it!

"What is the difference of meaning between the short and long forms of this word?"

"The short and long forms."

By the omission of the before *long*, Mr. Hart has made each form both *short* and *long*!!

This may be illustrated so clearly that even Mr. Hart himself can comprehend it:

1. The black and white ox.

Here there is but one ox.

2. The black. and the white ox.

Here there are two—one is black—the other white.

The seven black, and white oxen.

Here each ox is partially black, and partially white.

But, if we say—The seven black, and the white oxen, we have seven which are entirely black, and two, or more which are entirely white.

1. The seven black, and white oxen.

2. The seven black, and the white oxen are sold.

The old and new testament.

That is, the testament which is *both*, *old* and *new*.

He has read the old, and the new testament.

Here there are two testaments—one is old—the other, new.

"What is the difference of meaning between the short and long forms of this word?"

1. "The short and long forms."

2. The black and white oxen.

1. The black and white ox.

2. The short and long form!!

That an ox can be *black* and *white*, is quite generally admitted—but that the same form can be both *short* and *long*, is not so generally conceded!! To one who is not member of a Philosophical society, the *rationale* of this phenomenon, is not so obvious.

"What is the difference of meaning between the short and long forms of this word?"

A Substitute.

What is the difference *in* meaning between the short, and the long form of this word.

Under the same page I find the following:

"In course of time it became abbreviated *into* its present form."

"In course of time it," &c.

Is this English? If so, the following is English:

In *course* of a year, he became ill!

I do not think that the use of *the* before *course* would be contrary to any of the *principles* of the English Language—but I am somewhat apprehensive that it might contravene some of the *usages* of it!

In the course of time it became abbreviated *into* its present form.

"It became abbreviated *into* its present form.

To speak of abbreviating a thing *into*, *form*, is to employ language in a very singular form!

Would it not be somewhat better to say—In the course of time *one* became *a*.

Or,

In the course of time it *assumed* its present form!

Under the same page I find the following:

"One expresses the idea of unity with emphasis." "A expresses the same idea, *only* without emphasis."

I should be much pleased to see a technical disposition of the word, *only*! What can this word be called? It is not an adverb. Under page 90, Mr. Hart gives the following definition of an adverb:

"An adverb is a word used to qualify *a* verb, adjective, or adverb."

But does *only* qualify a verb, an adjective, or an adverb!? He that can parse the word, *only*, as here used, deserves a medal for his meed!

"One expresses the idea of unity with emphasis." "A expresses the same idea, *only* without emphasis!"

The following is something better:

One expresses unity with emphasis; *but a* expresses it without emphasis.

Let me now say a word, or two upon the doctrine of these periods.

"One expresses the idea of unity with emphasis." "A expresses the same idea, *only* without emphasis."

1. "One man followed me several miles."

2. "A man followed me several miles."

In the first, the idea is that *one* man only, followed me. In the second, the idea is that a *man*, not a *dog*, not a *lion*, not a *bear*, followed me.

In the first, the leading idea is the *number* of animals that followed—in the second, the leading idea is the *kind* of animal that followed.

That *a* has no reference to unity, is obvious from the answer to the following question:

How many hats have you, John?

I have *a* hat!!

When the idea in the question turns upon the *number*, *one* must be used in the answer.

How many hats have you?

I have *one* hat.

But where the idea in the question, turns upon the kind of thing, *a* must be used in the answer; as, What have you in this case? I have a hat.

"The difference (between *one* and *a*) is this."
"One expresses the idea of unity with emphasis. *A* expresses it, *only* without emphasis!!"

"Could one man carry this weight? No—but a man could carry it!"

In the first, says Mr. Hart, there is *unity with emphasis*.—In the second, there is *unity without emphasis*!! This, says he, is the difference between *a* and *one*!!!

Could one man carry this weight? No—but a horse could.

A is so entirely destitute of number, that where unity is found in the major part of the sentence, *a* can not be used in the minor.

This is obvious from the incongruity that is produced by the use of *one*, and *a* in the above sentence which should be as follows:

Can one man carry this weight? No—but *two* can.

Or,

Can *a* man carry this weight? No—but a horse can.

I have already attempted to make a partial exposition of the several errors which have found their way into the following sentence:

"What is the difference of meaning between the short and long forms of this word?"

I shall now undertake to expose the few solecisms that appear more occult than they of which I have already relieved this sentence.

"What is the difference of meaning between the short, and the long form, of this word?"

"The short and long forms."

The word, *form*, as here used, means shape. Hence a substitution of *shape* for *form*, will have a tendency to show the eccentricity of the idea which MR. HART here expresses:

The short and long shape!

The notion of a *short shape*, is certainly *sui generis*! Nor do I know to what species, or genius, that of a *long shape*, belongs! Had MR. HART employed *primitive*, and *derivative*, instead of *short* and *long*, he would have used words which have some relation to forms:

What is the difference of meaning between the *primitive*, and *derivative* forms of this word?

That a *short shape* is a singular one, must be obvious to all. But whether men, in general, can so readily see that "*one*" is a *form* of *a*, is not so clear! On page 32, Mr. Hart, says,

"*A* or *an* was originally *ae*, *ane* or *one*. These words, *ae*, *ane* and *one* are the long form of *a*. And *a* is the short form of *ae*, *ane* and *one*!"

MR. HART wishes to express the *parent* relation which *ae*, *one* and *one* bear to *a*. But can this relation be expressed by the word, "*form*!"? Does the word, *form*, convey any allusion to the relation which a mother, *as such*, bears to her off-

spring!? MR. HART is not speaking of the *forms*, but of the *etymology*, of *a*. The word, *a*, has two forms—One is *a*; the other is *an*.

Can we speak of the Latin, *verbum*, as a form of the English word, *verb*? Can it be said that "*verbum*" is the long form of "*verb*"—and that "*verb*" is the short form of *verbum*!!? A scholar would say that "*verbum*" is the *etymon* of "*verb*." But would a scholar say that *one* is the long form of *a*!!? As well may it be said that an *ox* is the large form of a calf—and that a *calf* is the small form of an ox!!

"What is the difference of meaning between the short and long forms of this word?"

A Substitute.

What is the difference in meaning between the *etymon* of *a*, and *a* itself? Or—wherein does the meaning of *a* differ from that of its *etymon*?

The following is the title page of another work by Mr. Hart.

"Class Book of Poetry, consisting of selections from distinguished English and American Poets from Chaucer to the present Day. By John S. Hart, A. M., Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and member of the American Philosophical Society," (1845.)

"From Chaucer to the present Day."

I have read of Chaucer; and I have some knowledge of his works—but of Mr. Day I am totally ignorant!

That he and his works exist somewhere is obvious from the fact that Mr. Hart mentions him in connection with Chaucer himself! Still in Mr. Hart's whole Book, I have not been able to find a line in prose, or verse, written by this honored individual!!

"From Chaucer to the present Day."

It may be that the Mr. Day whom Mr. Hart has here placed by the side of Chaucer, is he who generally passes by the title of *Monday, Wednesday, Age, Century, &c.*

If so, Mr. Hart is a *Grammarian* indeed!

Upon the possibility that this is what the author wished to say, I offer the following *Emendation*:

From the time of Chaucer to the present.

"Principal of the Philadelphia High School, and member of the American Philosophical Society."

As Mr. Hart is the whole of this society, the reader can judge from the following sentence, how much philosophy belongs to this Institution.

Preface. (First sentence.)

The literature of a nation cannot fail to contain within itself that which has made the nation what it is. "*Class Book of Poetry*, by JOHN S. HART."

Well, what is it which makes a nation what it is? Why, it is its *literature*. Hence the reader, although not member of the American Philosoph-

ical Society, must be philosopher enough to see that the following is the only meaning which the sentence conveys :

The literature of a nation must contain itself within itself!! That is, the value of a dollar must contain itself within itself! Mr. Hart says that he is *member* of the American *Philosophical Society*—and *who* can doubt it!!?

As it is not in my power to *understand* what Mr. Hart wished to express, I shall not attempt to say what change should be made in his period to enable the reader to comprehend its *true* meaning.

The literature of a nation must contain that which has made it what it is. (Redundant words, *not, fail, to, within, itself, the.*

That "*the nation*" should give place to "*it*," is obvious from the use of *him* for *a man*, in the following :

The learning of a man must contain that which has made *him* (not, *the man*,) what he is.

"2. Those great ideas, which in the course of centuries, have been gradually developed by its master minds, are the moving springs, which have set the nation onward in the career of civilization. (Second sentence, same preface.)

It is not easy to see whether Mr. Hart means that the moving springs are made of ideas which are in the process of development for centuries, or of those which are developed at different times for centuries.

If he means the former, the language should be as follows :

The great ideas which it required centuries to develope.

If he intends the latter, the first part of the sentence might be as follows :

The great ideas developed for centuries.

1. *The great ideas which it has required centuries to develope*, are the moving springs of a nation in its career of civilization.

(Redundant words—*which, course, in, the, of, gradually, have, set, that, onward, by, its, master, minds.* 14.)

"In the Anglo-Saxon race, from the days of Alfred until now, men of superior genius, the original thinkers in each successive generation, have given birth to ennobling thoughts, which continue to endure, and are perpetuated not only in the language but in the race itself." (45 words.) *John S. Hart's Class Book of Poetry.*

A SUBSTITUTE.

From the time of Alfred, the original thinkers of Anglo-Saxon blood have given birth to

many ennobling thoughts which will never cease to enrich the language, and benefit the race. (30 words.) (15 Redundant words.)

Or,

From the time of Alfred, the thoughts of many of Anglo-Saxon blood, have enriched, and ennobled the race. (18 words.) 27 Redundant words.)

"Englishmen, and Americans of the present day are living exponents of the thoughts, and truths of the illustrious dead. *Hart's Class Book of Poetry.*"

Do the *dead* think?

How then can they have *thoughts*?

If the *dead* have no thoughts, how can either Englishmen or Americans be living *exponents* of them!? I can easily understand in what way the living may be exponents, indexes, *pointers*, to the dead. But I cannot conceive how any thing can be an index to the *thoughts* of what does not *think*! *Of* imports springing from. Do thoughts spring from the *dead*?

The use of *exponent*, and *elaborated*, gives the sentence a *puffy*, a *tumid*, cast. One is very *learned*—the other is almost exclusively *technical*.

A distinguished writer upon English philology says—"Avoid the use of *technical* terms, except where they are necessary in treating of a particular art, or science."

Another still more distinguished, says, Avoid the *injudicious* use of technicals. "Foreign, and *learned* words, unless where necessity requires them, should never be admitted into our composition."

It may be well to give the reader the sentence which precedes the one under consideration.

"We are what preceding generations have made us," "Englishmen, and Americans of the present day are living exponents of the thoughts, and truths elaborated by the illustrious dead." (29 words.)

Why this change from *we* to *Englishmen*, and *Americans*!?

Is it to embellish the sentence with the error of going from *person* to *person*? from the first to the third.

A SUBSTITUTE.

We are what preceding generations have made us,—lively, bold, impressions of the thoughts, originated, and matured by our illustrious *ancestors* (21 words.)

CHAPTER XXXVI.

IN this country, the subject of education, has become the central point of individual, and collective, action. Indeed, so much has recently been done to place a sound education within the reach of all, that the present may be styled the *educational epoch*. To determine to what this change in the degree of interest, which all seem to manifest in the advancement of mind, is to be ascribed, is beyond the inductive powers of the most sagacious among us. Whether the social duties of men, are more clearly apprehended—whether the incompetency of the illiterate man to discharge these duties, is more firmly established—or whether this spirit for the general diffusion of knowledge, is an innate one which the numerous recent bequeathments for eleemosynary schools, have enabled Americans to exemplify, is a subject upon which there is room for diversity of opinion. It is sufficient, however, that this spirit has been recently born among us: it is more important to train it to manhood than to trace out its exact pedigree.

Under its influence, we have already erected numerous temples, and dedicated them to the great work of finishing the mind. Many of them, however, may be without those instruments which are indispensable to success in this God-like work. Every educational house may abound with curators; and every room, with professors; and every professor, with rare pretensions. Still, as the process of sculpturing the mind, requires the skill of a Phidias, or a Praxiteles, in the marble, it becomes important to employ the best artists and to use the best instruments, that the country affords. To procure these, the powers of the nation, must be rallied: men, and implements, must be called into sight, and undergo a rigid inspection. Degree of skill in the artist, and excellence in the implement, should control the selection to be made. The number of years through which a particular theory has been in use, should exert no influence over the minds of the men who are entrusted with the important work of selecting the ministry of our school institutions. Nor should even the image of him whose name happens to grace the title page of a work, be allowed to flit across the minds of the men. The length of time through which a theory has been extant, can make it neither true, nor false. Nor can the *standing* of the man who has formed it, render it either good, or bad.

As every tree is *known* by its fruit, so let every tree be *judged* of by its fruit. According to this rule of judging, of what value is that theory of numbers, which does not enable those who study it, to make numeral calculations with a higher degree of accuracy than those who study no theory whatever? For instance—D. who has

acquired a thorough knowledge of this theory of Arithmetic, gives 306 as the correct answer to the following question.

If 868 Dollars are divided among seven men, how many dollars will each man have?

operation by D.

$$\begin{array}{r} 7) 868 \text{ (306} \\ \underline{41} \\ 04 \\ \underline{0} \\ 38 \\ \underline{38} \\ 30 \end{array}$$

Of what value is that theory of Arithmetic, which does not enable those who study it, to work in numbers with greater skill than is exhibited by D. in the preceding operation? And, of what value is that theory of English Grammar, which does not enable those who learn it, to exhibit greater skill in forming sentences than D. has done in working this sum?

In the title page of John Frost's English Grammar, I find the following syllabane—

"Exercises in orthography."

In another part of this work, I find the following—

"Exercises in prosody."

If the use of *in* is right, that of *on*, must be wrong. But can one decide by any English Grammar, which is right?

On the third page of the same book, I find these words—

"And it is precisely for the purpose of remedying the evil and giving a more practical character to grammatical instruction that the *following* work has been prepared."

Does not D. exhibit as much skill in the science of numbers, as does Mr. Frost in the science of language? By the improper use of the word, *following*, Mr. Frost throws away three pages of his book! It may be said however, that the error which Mr. Frost has here committed, should not be ascribed to any defects in the old theory of English Grammar.

That the old theory should have a particular rule for the use of this, and all other similar words, I will not attempt to prove. But it should certainly have an exercise in which the pupil could be so drilled that he would instantly perceive that all similar applications are bad. That Mr. Frost has never been thoroughly drilled in the science of the English Language, is obvious from his blunders. But I do not think that he stands alone. Nor do I believe that his want of that degree of skill in the constructive principles of the English language, which is necessary to

constitute him an English grammarian, is his own fault. The theory from which he has been taught, is incapable of making him a grammarian. Nor is his own theory better calculated to make grammarians than that by which his teachers tried in vain to make him one. Mr. Frost seems to be under the impression that nothing but the pulp of quinces, or a confection of plums, *well-sugared*, is capable of interesting the learner of grammar. Hence, he attempts to tickle *youth into studious habits with pictures!* But has a man with a gun aimed at a wolf, the power to fix the eye, and the mind, of a pupil upon the subject of grammar? That these pictures may catch the eye of a child for a moment, or two, is almost certain. But that there is any thing in them, calculated to enrich the mind with the exact, full, constructive, genius of the English Language, I seriously doubt.

Knowledge must be acquired before it can be reduced to practice. He who writes without an acquaintance with the grammar of the Language in which he writes, wastes much precious time, and becomes confirmed in his habits of error. The child that understands the grammar of his language well, is free to *think*—hence he may write without that restraint, and trepidation, which must necessarily spring from an exertion to get something to say, and from an ignorance of the mode in which to say it. The child who is encumbered with the double task of studying *what* to say, and *how* to say, at the same time, will soon become disgusted with all attempts at writing. If the attention of the child is called to the construction of those sentences which he is made to parse, he will make much greater proficiency in grammar than by writing upon pictures. But the old theory of English Grammar, has not the means of calling the attention of the pupil to the *construction* of the sentences which it requires him to parse. True, says Mr. Frost—but this defect in the old theory, must be supplied by *oral* instruction from the teacher. I should not like to depend upon the oral *instruction* of men who have nothing upon which they themselves can depend!

Under page 112, Mr. Frost says,

"A sentence is a number of words so arranged as to form a complete *proposition*."

"In 1417, it required all the eloquence of the famous Gershon to prevail upon the council of Constance to condemn this *proposition*, that there are some cases in which assassination is a virtue more meritorious in a knight than in a squire."

ROBERTSON.

That is, according to Mr. Frost, it required all the eloquence of Gershon to prevail upon this council to condemn this sentence, "*that there are some cases in which assassination is more meritorious in a knight than in a squire!*" Is that Grammar worthy of adoption, which does not teach the difference between a sentence, and *propo-*

sition? And has the man who confounds a *sentence* in grammar, with a *proposition* in logic, ever been made a grammarian?

"I can not agree to the *proposition* of that gentleman."

That is, I can not agree to the *sentence* of that gentleman!!

The following is the first sentence in the preface of Mr. Frost's Grammar,—

"In the title page, this book is called *A practical English Grammar*."

"*In the title page*" is a pleonasm. Still, no one who decides questions in grammar by the old theory, would be likely to reject this mono as a redundancy; nor would any one whose mind has been thoroughly drilled in the genius of the English tongue, use this mono as a necessary part of the sentence which it deforms.

As the place to which allusion is made, is the common place for the display of the title, would it not be sufficient to say,

This book is called a practical English Grammar.

The second sentence in this author's preface, reads as follows,

"*The author has endeavored to give it a just claim to this title, by rendering it strictly practical throughout.*"

The second is succeeded by the following,

"He has observed that most of the Grammars now in use appear to consider the English Language as having been formed not for the purpose of being spoken and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*."

This sentence is burdened with numerous pleonasm.

"*He has observed that*" is a redundancy which even the ear would reject. The repetition of the sentence without this mono, is sufficient to establish this position.

"Most of the Grammars now in use, appear to consider the English Language as having been formed not for the purpose of being spoken and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*."

The next pleonasm with which this sentence is encumbered, is the words, "*appear to*." That these words are pleonastic, will be rendered clear by omitting them.

Most of the Grammars now in use, consider the English Language as having been formed not for the purpose of being spoken and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*."

But I may be told that the omission of "*appear to*," produces a slight change in the sense of the sentence. Mr. Frost intends to say that English Grammars, in general, consider the English Language formed for the mere purpose of being *parsed*; or, that they do not do this, although they appear to do it. If he intends the former, why does he use the word, *appear*; and, if he means

the latter, why does he speak of these works as though he meant the former? That he means to say that these works do consider that the English Language is formed for the mere purpose of being parsed, is clearly shown in the fourth sentence of his preface—

"Accordingly, parsing is made the grand object of grammatical instruction, and it is considered that if a boy can parse correctly, and fluently, he is a good grammarian."

"Most of the Grammars *now* in use consider the English Language as having been formed, not for the purpose of being spoken and written, but merely for the purpose of being parsed."

The use of "*now*" makes the author say what he does not mean.

Mr. Frost does not intend to convey the idea that there has been a time when Grammars in general, did not treat the English Language as though it had been formed for no purpose but that of being parsed. Yet the word, *now*, compels him to say this.

He is *now* in my employ. That is, he has not always been in it.

"Most of the Grammars in use *consider* the English Language as having been formed not for the purpose of being spoken and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*."

I *consider* John as having been well taught, is not English. I consider that John has been well taught, is *English*. The syllabane, as *having*, in the preceding sentence, is offensive even to the ear. The following is something better—

Most of the Grammars in use, consider *that* the English Language *has been* formed.

But "*consider*" is the wrong word. Let it be exchanged for *treat* :

Most of the Grammars in use treat of the English Language *as though* it had been formed, not for the purpose of being spoken and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*.

But, who, without the aid of this sentence, would have conceived the idea that the *mode* of using a language, is the object for which it is formed!? According to Mr. Frost, the English Language is a medium which has been formed for the simple purpose of being *spoken*, and *written* !!

My own opinion respecting the purpose for which the English Language has been formed, is very different from that of Mr. Frost. I am inclined to the belief that to communicate our thoughts, is the *purpose* for which Language is formed.

"He has observed that *most of the Grammars now in use*, appear to consider the English Language as having been formed not for the purpose of being spoken, and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*."

That is, the *Greek* Grammars, the *Latin* Grammars, the *French* Grammars, the *Spanish* Gram-

mars, and the *English* Grammars, "*now in use*, appear to consider the *English* Language as *having been formed* not for the purpose of being spoken, and written, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed* !"

A grammarian would say,

"Most of the" *English* Grammars appear to consider our Language &c.

"He has observed that most of the Grammars *now in use* appear to consider the English Language as *having been* formed not for the purpose of being *spoken* and *written*, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*." (38 words.)

Most *English* Grammars, treat our Language as though it had been formed, neither to be spoken nor written, but merely to be *parsed*. (23 words.)

38

23

—

15

No fewer than fifteen *redundant* words !

But this exuberance in pleonasm is not the only fault which mars this singular sentence : it is deformed by gross infractions of some of the laws of Rhetoric. Mr. Frost is writing, not upon the *purpose* of the English Language, but upon the *grammar* of it. And, in the first two sentences of the paragraph of which the sentence under consideration, is the third, the *grammar* is his theme.

In the third sentence the author has a confused notion of a *purpose*—and this he ascribes to the language instead of the *grammar* of it—

"To consider the *English* Language as *having been formed* not for the purpose of being *spoken* and *written*, but merely for the purpose of being *parsed*."

To restore the unity which is lost by the confusion of the author, I would suggest the following—

Writers in general, upon this subject, seem to consider that the object of grammar, is not so much to enable the pupil to speak, and write with propriety, as to enable him to parse with accuracy.

The purpose of language is to express our ideas—but the *purpose* of *grammar*, is to express them with propriety,

Before leaving the Grammar, compiled by Mr. Frost, it may be proper to say that no ill feeling toward him, has induced me to make his errors the subject of critical reflections. My position is that no person can be made a grammarian by the old British system of English Grammar. And, to sustain this position, I have been compelled to demonstrate the inability of those who have learned it, and written by it, to express their ideas with propriety. I have taken the writings of Mr. Frost because his notoriety as an author, and his late station in the *High School* as a professor, have made an impression upon the public mind alto-

gether favourable to his abilities as a *grammarian*, and *rhetorician*. I have examined his Grammar with care—and, although it comprises 204 duodecimo pages, I have not found one correctly formed sentence in it! And I challenge any one to demonstrate that there is a sentence in the whole work, comprising as many as seven words, which is so formed.

The next errors upon which I intend to comment, deform a work, entitled,

"Easy Exercises in composition: designed for the use of beginners. By JOHN FROST, A. M., Professor of Belles Lettres in the High School of Philadelphia. Fifth Edition—Stereotyped."

This work is a treatise upon *Rhetoric*. And, considering the high rank which *Rhetoric* holds in the science of English philology, it is not unreasonable to presume that *professor Frost* has acquitted himself in this work with a better grace than he has done in his Grammar.

I have made no reflections upon the numerous errors in the title page of the Grammar of Mr. Frost. And I am somewhat inclined to say nothing of those in the title page of his *Rhetoric*. But duty requires that I should not gratify this inclination.

"Easy Exercises in composition."

Could Mr. Frost presume that the word, *composition*, unaided by any other word, would restrict itself to the idea of forming *sentences*? Does Mr. Frost teach that a word may be employed in its *generic* sense when the idea to be expressed, is a *specific* one? Has the word, *composition*, the innate power to abandon the numerous other species of composition to which it is applicable, and to confine itself exclusively to the formation of sentences?

The title of a book is that part which specifies the particular subject on which the work treats. Any want of perspicuity in this portion of a book, strongly implies that the author is hardly adequate to the task of writing *Grammars*, and *Rhetorics*!

"Title, the inscription in the beginning of a book, specifying the subject of the work." WEBSTER.

Does the word, *composition*, define the subject of the book under consideration? "This word is derived from *compose* which means to form a compound, or one entire body, or thing, by uniting two, or more things, parts, or individuals; as, to compose an army of raw soldiers, the parliament of Great Britain, is composed of two houses, Lords, and Commons, The senate of the United States, is composed of two senators from each state." WEBSTER.

"*Composition*, in a general sense,—the act of composing, or that which is composed. We speak of the composition of medicines by mixing divers ingredients, and call the whole mixture a *composition*."—WEBSTER.

1. "A *composition* of sand and clay."
2. "Heat, and vivacity in age, is an excellent *composition* for business."
3. "*Composition* which looks like marble."
4. "*Composition*," the act or art of forming tunes."
5. "Contemplate things first in their simple natures, then view them in their *compositions*."
6. "*Composition*, the disposition, or arrangement of figures in a picture."
7. "Ben Johnson speaks of the *composition* of gesture."
8. "The *composition* of motion, &c., in a speaker."
9. "*Composition*, mutual agreement to terms."
10. "A bankrupt is cleared by *composition* with his creditors."—WEBSTER.

The word *composition* is frequently applied in *law*, *music*, *elocution*, *logic*, *chemistry*, *painting*, &c.

The title page upon which I am commenting is "*Easy Exercises in Composition: Designed for the use of Beginners*." Beginners in what? beginners in *chemistry*, beginners in *music*, beginners in *elocution*, beginners in *logic*, or beginners in *painting*! Had Dr. Webster given the following as the title page of his late Dictionary, the world would have made no call for the second edition:

A Dictionary of Language:

Who would not see a destructive defect in this title? *Language* is a word which applies to one language as much as to another? And does not the word *composition* apply to one *composition* as much as to another. And is there not as much reason for specifying the particular *composition* of which Mr. Frost attempts to speak as there is for designating the particular language which Mr. Webster attempts to develop?

The book to which these reflections relate, is designed to furnish the tyro in the construction of English sentences, with a variety of subjects for his pen. The method which the author has adopted for the accomplishment of this object, is the bringing of various things, and sceneries, before the pupil's eye through the medium of *pictures*. The objects, and sceneries are intended to be *described* by the learner. This remark upon the design, and methods of the book, will enable the reader to determine which of the two following syllabanes is the true title of the work.

1. "*Easy Exercises in composition, designed for the use of beginners*."

2. *Easy Exercises in the description of simple objects, and scenes, designed for the use of beginners in English composition*.

I have proceeded thus far upon the ground that the book which is the subject of these comments, is made up of *Exercises*. As the work, however,

is *not* composed of exercises in description, but of objects for description, where is the principle, either in grammar, or *belles-lettres*, that sustains the use of the words, "*Easy Exercises!*" A rule which is universal in its application, is that the words employed, should be called for by the *ideas* to be communicated. Had Professor Frost the ideas which demand the use of the words, "*Easy Exercises?*" If so, he had in his mind, ideas which he did not put into his book! There are no exercises in his book which he denominates "*Easy Exercises in composition:*" his work is a book of *subjects*, (objects and scenes) for description! What! Is the *picture* of a *greyhound* an exercise!!! Is an *alligator* an exercise!!! I feel confident that there is no pupil, either in *High*, or *Low* schools, who will say with this *worthy Professor*, that either the exercise which is demominated *greyhound*, or *alligator*, is of *easy* performance!!

1. "*Easy Exercises in Composition, Designed for the use of Beginners.*"

THE SUBSTITUTE.

2. "*Appropriate objects, and scenes for description by Beginners in English Composition,*" by John Frost, Professor of *Belles-Lettres* in the High School of Philadelphia."

Who, from the first of the above titles, would ever dream that the work is a book of *butterflies*, *greyhounds*, *alligators*, &c.? And, who, on learning the true character of this book, from the second of the above titles, cannot see that the calling of it, "*Easy Exercises,*" is a shameful misnomer, equalled only, by that of styling its author, "*Professor of Belles-Lettres?*"

"Preface to the first edition."

"Few words of apology are required for the publication of this little volume. The circumstances under which it was prepared, are simply these:"

(A statement of the circumstances, follows this colon.)

Who that does not write by the old theory of English Grammar, as improved by John Frost, Samuel Kirkham, Gould Brown, or some other *novus homo*, would presume that the two periods in the above paragraph, bear any relation one to the other? This paragraph reminds me of the following period—

"Ships move John is a pupil New York market is out of repair!"

What has the motion of ships to do with the pupillage of John; or what has the delapsed condition of the New York market house to do either with the pupillage of John, or with the motion of ships? And what have the *circumstances* under which a book is written, to do with the *apology* for publishing it!?

Is it to be presumed that the *means* by which *D. murders S. and T.* is an *apology* for murdering them!? I admit, however, that the circumstances stated by Mr. Frost, are an apology for publishing the book. But the error of this L. L. D. professor, lies in calling them the *circumstances under which the book was written!*

"Few words of apology are required for the publication of this little volume. The circumstances under which it was prepared are simply these:"

With the permission of Doctor Frost, I would offer the following amendment:

The circumstances which induced me to publish it are these.

Few words of *apology* are required from Doctor Frost for the error which he has here committed: he writes by the *old theory* which, he says, he desires "*to leave untouched!*"

"Few words of apology are required for the publication of this little volume. The circumstances under which it was prepared are simply these."—(23 words.)

Few words of apology are required for the publication of this little volume. The circumstances which induced me to publish it, are these:

The *misnomer*, however, in the second sentence of the paragraph, is but one of the many defects with which the paragraph abounds. The tenses are wrong—indeed all is wrong. What Doctor Frost wished to express, can be communicated in one short sentence:

The following circumstances are the apology for the appearance of this little volume: (13 words.)

"Having recently resigned the general superintendence of a seminary where many different branches of education were taught, and entered upon a sphere of duty where my whole attention is directed to the subject of *English Belles Lettres*, I felt more than ever &c.

(This sentence is also a curiosity, but a want of space prevents me from touching it now.)

"Preface to the second edition."

The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition of these Exercises in fifteen days after the publication of the first, and the notification which I received at the end of a month, that the first three thousand copies were sold, and a considerable part of a second edition ordered, afford a presumption that the work has met the approbation of the public in its original shape."

I shall not stop to express any doubts which I may entertain respecting the *truth* of the statement, made in this strangely constructed sentence.

"The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition."

There is certainly a good degree of formality in the phrase, *my being called upon by the publishers*,—perhaps the whole is too *state'y*, and *authoritative* for the occasion. The syllabane, *called upon*, seems to imply that the publishers were *officers*. This idea is much strengthened from the fact that they *demand*ed according to the *language* of the sentence, a preparation of a second edition in *fifteen days*!

"The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition of these exercises in *fifteen days*!"

What is Mr. Frost required to do in fifteen days?

To prepare a second edition of these exercises.

This is what Mr. Frost says, but, not what he meant to say. The *learned* professor intended to say that his publishers called upon him in *fifteen days* from the time of the publication of the first edition. Perhaps the following would express Mr. Frost's ideas:

The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers in *fifteen days after the publication of the first edition*, to prepare a second, affords &c.

I must invite close attention to the sentence as constructed by Mr. Frost:

"The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition of these exercises in *fifteen days after the publication of the first*, affords a presumption that the work has met the approbation of the public in its original shape."

Here, in attempting to say that his publishers called upon him fifteen days after the publication of the first edition, to ask him to prepare a second, he makes himself affirm by a gross error in construction, that *they wish him to prepare a second edition within fifteen days from the time of the publication of the first*! And this Professor of *Belles-Lettres*, is still under the impression that he does say that in fifteen days from the time of the first publication of his work, he was spoken to by his publishers to prepare a second edition!

The old theory of grammar, then, has taught professor Frost, that, to specify the time when a person is spoken to to do a piece of work, the writer must place the *mono*, denoting the time, in juxtaposition with that which specifies what is to be done! If, therefore, I wish to inform *D.* at what particular time *S.* and *P.* spoke to me to write a deed, I must construct the sentence as follows—

1. I was spoken to by *S.* and *P.* to draw them a deed in fifteen days after the sale of the land!?

I wish to introduce a Grammar which will teach professor Frost to construct the sentence in this way:

2. I was spoken to by *S.* and *P.* in *fifteen days after the sale of the land*, to draw them a deed.

Does it appear that professor Frost is better in grammar, and rhetoric, than *D.* is in arithmetic?

The sentence under consideration, is introduced as a *puff*. There are three things which, in the opinion of its author, would exert a salutary influence in giving him money, and fame. These are the *premature* call of his publishers, the *information* that the first three thousand copies were sold, and a *part* of a second edition *ordered*.

One of two things is certain: either the *learned* professor was too much elated with a little brief success; or he found, from the burden of the shelves of his publishers, that his book was a *mere drug*. From the intelligence of this community, I am inclined to believe that the latter was the case. The author, out of a praise worthy pity to the *oppressed* shelves, enters into a system of management. He felt for these boards which had long been groaning under the burden of all the first yield of his plates! "These three thousand copies, replete with the *nimblest*, *strongest*, *finest*, animals that ever graced wood, or dale,—a perfect *menagerie*, must remain no longer an *eating ulcer* in the form of *rent*, and *interest*!" I must have a *new* page. This must be incorporated with each copy in a way which will justify the *pretension* that a *second* edition is demanded. This page must commence with,

"The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a *second* edition of these Exercises in *fifteen days* after the publication of the first, and the *notification* which I received at the end of a month, that the *first three thousand copies were sold*, and a *considerable part* of the *second edition ordered*, afford a presumption that the work has met the approbation of the public in its *original shape*!!"

This sentence shows the *doctor* to be *nimble-witted* indeed—it bespeaks skill in plans—but ignorance in language!

The sentence comprises *seventy* words, and is marred by thirty gross errors in grammar, and rhetoric! These obliquities I shall not attempt to expose at this time. I hold myself bound, however, to demonstrate their existence whenever it may please Mr. Frost, and his friends, to demand the proof.

Before leaving the sentence, I will place it in juxtaposition with the one which I offer as a substitute.

1. "The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition of these Exercises in fifteen days after the publication of the first, and the notification at the end of a month, that the first three thousand copies were sold, and a considerable part of the second edition ordered, afford a presumption that the work has met the approbation of the public in its original shape." (70 words.)

2. The sale of the first three thousand copies, and a call for a considerable part of a second edition which, fifteen days after the first, my publishers requested me to prepare, show that the work is acceptable in its original form. (41 words.)

70

41

29 *redundant* words!!

But Mr. Frost's ideas may be communicated in fewer words still.

The sale of the *first* edition, and the orders for a considerable part of a second which, fifteen days after the first, my publishers requested me to prepare, show that the work is acceptable in its original form. (37 words.)

70

37

33 *redundant* words!

The sentence may still be abridged. The words *the, sale, of, the, first, edition,* and *and,* are pleonastic: the sale of the *first* edition is *implied* from the orders for a part of the second.

The orders for a considerable part of the second edition which, fifteen days from the first, my publishers requested me to prepare, show that the work is acceptable in its original form. (32 words.)

70

32

38 *redundant* words!!

Under page 104, I find the following Rule:

"RULE I. A sentence ought to be *divested* of all *redundant* words!"

"Some of the pupils at the High School, have occasionally made a copy of the picture at the head of the Exercises; and on one or two occasions I have thus received drawings with the lead-pencil or pen, very cleverly executed." (*Same Preface.*)

"And on one or two occasions I have thus received drawings with the lead-pencil or pen."

An *occasion* is an occurrence, casualty, incident,—something distinct from the ordinary course or regular order of things. WEBSTER.

Now, what occurrence, distinct from the ordinary course of things, at the High School, constituted the occasion on which Mr. Frost received these drawings? Was the occurrence which constituted this occasion, an *unusual* examination of pictures, which was made at the High School? Was the occurrence which constituted this occasion, a singularly violent *storm* which disturbed the High School to an uncommon degree? In short, was there *any* occasion on which the *learned professor of Rhetoric* received these drawings of which he speaks? None! Mr. Frost does not mean what he says! He intends to say that he received one, or two drawings. In attempting to

say this, however, he has from a culpable ignorance of the word, *occasion*, made himself affirm that there were some particular events which happened in the High School, that were the occasions on which he received these drawings!!

I will now reject this redundancy:

"Some of the pupils at the High School, have occasionally made a copy of the picture at the head of the Exercises; and I have *thus* received one, or two, drawings with the lead-pencil or pen, very cleverly executed."

If there is any authority which will justify the use of "*thus*," as employed above, I know nothing of it. And I am at a loss also for authority, high, or low, for using *copy*, and *picture* in the singular!

"Some of the pupils at the High School have occasionally made a *copy* of the *picture* at the head of the exercises."

Was there a plurality of boys engaged in making the *same copy*? Nothing like it.

"*The picture* at the head of *the Exercises*."

The use of *the*, before *picture*, makes Mr. Frost say that the same picture is placed at the head of all the Exercises! By the use of *the*, Mr. Frost affirms that there is but one picture! I will illustrate this:

Call the servant of Mr. Jones.

This language implies that Mr. Jones has but one servant.

Would not the following suit the nature of the subject on which the *professor* is speaking, much better?

A few of the pupils at the High School, have occasionally made *copies* of *some* of the *pictures* at the head of the Exercises.

"*Picture* at the head of *the Exercises*."

Not only can no picture be found at the head of an exercise in the book; but no *exercises* can be found in it! I would submit the following substitute to the consideration of the *professor*:

A few pupils of the High School, have occasionally copied some of the pictures which represent the subjects for beginners in English composition.

While Mr. Frost is deciding upon the propriety of adopting this sentence as a substitute for the first part of his, I will call the attention of the reader to the last part.

"Some of the pupils at the High School, have occasionally made a *copy* of the *picture* at the head of the *exercises*; and on one or two occasions I have *thus* received drawings with the lead-pencil or pen, very cleverly executed."

Here, in attempting to say that the pencil, or pen, was the instrument by which the pupils made the drawings, he makes himself affirm by a gross blunder in grammar, that the pencil, or pen, was the instrument by which *he* received the drawings from them!! I have thus *received drawings*

with the lead-pencil or pen, very cleverly executed!!!!

What this *doctor* thinks he has said, is this—

I have thus received drawings *which have been* very cleverly *executed with* a lead-pencil, or pen.

Another sense in which this sentence may be taken, is that Mr. Frost received the *lead-pencil*, or *pen*, as well as the drawings. This construction presents the *pencil*, or *pen*, as “*very cleverly executed!*”

Is this the result of the old system of English Grammar upon the head of *Professor John Frost!*?

One of the thirty obvious errors which disfigure the first sentence of this Preface, is similar to this. There, in attempting to say that his publishers called upon him fifteen days after the publication of the first edition, to ask him to prepare a second, he makes himself affirm, by adhering to *Murray*, of course, that they wished him to prepare a second edition in *fifteen days* from the time of the first publication!! And here, *by following the same system*, he wrests the instruments with which the pupils executed the drawings, from their hands, and makes them the means by which he *received* the drawings!!

I shall now consign this sentence to the reader. This consignment, however, will not deprive me of curiosities. For, as I turn over the pages of this rare work, I find Rhetorical phenomena of which I had not the slightest conception. Although the whole book abounds with them, I think that which should become the successor in the order of discussion, to the one that I have just made over to the reader, is the following, which I find under page 104.

“STRENGTH.”

“*The strength of a sentence consists in such a disposition of its several words and clauses as shall tend most powerfully to impress the mind of the reader with the meaning which the author intends to convey.*”

A grammarian would say that the strength of a sentence is *derived* from such a disposition of its several words. But a *Doctor of Laws* begs leave to be *unique*: he must say that the cider *consists* of the apples! To say that the wine is *derived* from the grapes, would be altogether contrary to the old theory of grammar, and to the new system of metaphysics. To say that the wine is *derived* from the grape, would seem to this *Doctor of Laws*, to favor the doctrine of *metempsychosis*!!

“The strength of a sentence consists in such a disposition of its several words and clauses as shall tend most powerfully to impress the mind of the reader with the meaning which the author intends to convey.”

That a *Doctor of Laws* should never hit right, is somewhat singular. One would presume that *chance* would now, and then, give him a well formed sentence. But she is as treacherous as his theory of Grammar is erroneous! In this sentence,

he attempts to qualify the word, *impress*, with the phrase, “*most powerfully.*” But he has so placed this syllabane that it qualifies “*tend?*” “*As shall tend most powerfully!*” Is there no difference between saying,

“*As shall tend most powerfully to impress the mind,*” and, as shall tend to impress the mind *most powerfully!*?

“The strength of a sentence consists in such a disposition of its several words,” &c.

That is, if you wish to qualify a particular word, you should so place the qualifying phrase that it will qualify another!!

The *Doctor* may reply, however, that he has succeeded in communicating his thoughts. True—I understood him. I am indebted, however not to the *accuracy* of his language for my right apprehension of his meaning, but to the *nature* of his subject! When a child says, “*me wants an apple,*” he is clearly understood. But does it follow that, because he is understood, he is able to write *Grammars*, and *Rhetorics*!?

I would recommend the *Doctor* to pay more attention to the difference between *shall*, and *will*. “Such a disposition as *shall* tend,” might be much improved by substituting *will* for *shall*. Such a disposition as *will* tend.

“The strength of a sentence consists in such a disposition of its several words and clauses as *shall* tend most powerfully to impress the mind of the reader with the meaning which the author intends to convey.”—(37 words.)

The strength of a sentence is that *power* which it exerts in making a deep impression of the writer’s ideas, upon the reader’s mind. (24 words.) Difference, 13 words!

The strength of a sentence is derived from placing every sub as near its own super as the idea to be expressed, will allow, and on that side of it, which perspicuity and euphony demand.

The following is the second sentence in the paragraph—

“*To attain this quality, it is necessary to pay attention to the following rules.*”

“**RULE 1.** A sentence ought to be *divested* of all redundant words and clauses.”

This is a rule indeed! This declaration, that a sentence is under *moral* obligation to be stripped “*of all redundant words and clauses*” is called a *rule*! And to acquire a knowledge of that strength which “*consists in such a disposition*” of the words and clauses of a sentence “*as shall tend most powerfully,*” the student *must* pay attention to this rule!

“**RULE I.** A sentence *ought* to be *divested* of all redundant words and clauses!”

How is this possible? Can those redundant words which do *not belong* to a sentence, be *taken away from* it? For instance—Can the redundant words in the sentences of Mr. Bache be taken from the pleonastic sentences of Mr. Frost? Let this idea be illustrated:

"Besides this class whose duties in and out of school have been stated, there is *another* class of boys."—REPORT ON EDUCATION IN EUROPE, by ALEX. DALLAS BACHE, L. L. D.

The word *another*, is redundant. And the sentence which it mars, can be divested of it. But can the following sentence be divested of this redundant word?

"The circumstance of my being called upon by the publishers to prepare a second edition of these Exercises in fifteen days after the publication of the first, and the notification at the close of a month, that the first three thousand copies were sold, and a considerable part of the second edition ordered, afford a presumption that the work has met with the approbation of the public in its original shape."

I have proved already, that this sentence may be divested of thirty-eight redundant words. But I should not like to undertake to show that the redundant word, *another*, of which the sentence by Mr. Bache, may be divested, could be taken from this!

"RULE. I. A sentence ought to be divested of all redundant words, and clauses."

From this use of the word, *divest*, one is compelled to believe even against the force of *station*, and *titles*, that Mr. Frost is not acquainted with the meaning of words! That he has used this word in the sense of *contain*, *comprise*, or *have*, is obvious from the omission of *its* after *all*. The substitution of *contain*, *comprise*, or *have*, would render the rule under consideration, a reasonable proposition.

RULE. I. A sentence must *contain* neither redundant words, nor clauses.

That is, all words, which, if incorporated, would be redundant, must be omitted.

But how is it possible to strip a sentence of those redundant words, and clauses, which are not incorporated with it?

Had not Mr. Frost been ignorant of the import of the word, *divest*, he would have used *its* after *all*—

RULE. I. A sentence ought to be divested of all its redundant words, and clauses.

In defining the word, *divest*, WEBSTER says,

1. To *divest* is to deprive; as, to *strip* of clothes, of arms, or equipage.

But does he say to strip one of *all* clothes, of *all* arms, of *all* equipage? How can he, on whom all clothes in existence, are not found, be divested of *all* clothes?

Had Mr. Webster used the word, *one*, in his first attempt to illustrate his definition of "*divest*," he would have employed the word, *his*, in the same way in which he has used this word in his second attempt; and, in the same way in which Mr. Frost would have used the word, *its* after *all*, had he not taken *divest* to be synonymous with *comprise*!

I will repeat Mr. Webster's first attempt to illustrate the meaning of *divest*—in the repetition, I will use "*one*."

1. To *divest* is to strip; as, to *divest* one of his clothes, of his arms, or his equipage.

2. To *divest* is to deprive; as, to *divest* one of his privileges, or rights, to *divest* one of his titles, or property.

3. To deprive, or strip of any thing which covers, surrounds, or attends; as, to *divest* one of his glory to *divest* a subject of deceptive appearances or false ornaments. WEBSTER.

Had Mr. Webster used *all*, he would have employed *its*; as, to divest a subject of all its deceptive appearances.

The Doctor's presumption that *divest* is synonymous with *comprise*, is the only rational ground upon which this shameful obliquity can be placed.

Here is a Doctor of Laws, who, in attempting to give a rule by which the parts of a garment may be properly put together, simply affirms that every useless coat which a person has upon his back, should be stripped off! Is there no difference between a rule for the construction of a tree, and a mere declaration that a tree already formed, should be divested of its redundant branches!?

Under page 100, I find the following:—

"CLEARNESS AND PRECISION."

"Every degree of ambiguity arising from a want of *clearness* and *precision* should be avoided with the greatest care."

Was a sentence a living creature, and errors in grammar, *diseases*, what an unhappy being this paragraph must be! But, fortunate for its author, sentences are dead. Was it not so, the ghost of this period would plead for relief in such sad, and stridulous accents as would "*repent* its author that he ever made it!"

"Every degree of *ambiguity* arising from a want of *clearness* should be avoided."

That is, that *darkness* which arises from a *destitution* of *light*, should be avoided!

"Every degree of ambiguity arising from a want of *clearness* and *precision*, should be avoided with the greatest care."

Is it not important to avoid that ambiguity which does not spring from a want of *clearness*, and *precision*? The language of Mr. Frost implies that there is a species of ambiguity, which does not arise from either of the sources, mentioned in the sentence under consideration!!

"Should be avoided with the greatest care."

This Doctor of Laws presumes that to *avoid* is synonymous with to *guard against*! To *avoid* is an *absolute* act—"to *avoid*" signifies the accomplishment of the object in view. "To *guard against*" signifies an *exertion* to accomplish, which may, and may not, be successful. The following injunction may be very wise—

John, *guard against* being taken with the greatest expense.

But the following can never be wise—

John, *avoid* being taken with the greatest expense.

Does not he that avoids errors *without any care*, write as properly as he who avoids them *with care*!?

The *professor of Belles-Lettres* means to say this—

Be *careful* to avoid every degree of ambiguity, which arises from a want of clearness and precision.

But is there no difference between the two commands—

1. Avoid the errors *with the greatest care*.

2. Be *careful* to avoid these errors.

Is there no difference between saying,

John, *eat with the greatest care*—and, John, *be careful* to eat!?

The old theory, then, has taught Mr. Frost to express the injunction that a person must surely eat, as follows,

John, *eat with the greatest care*!!

I wish to introduce a theory which will teach him to express this injunction as follows,

John, *be careful* to eat.

"CLEARNESS AND PRECISION."

"Every degree of ambiguity arising from a want of *clearness* and *precision* should be avoided with the greatest care."

From this head one would presume, that this *Doctor of Laws* would predicate something of *clearness* and *precision*. Instead of this, however, we find him dividing ambiguity into different degrees, and informing the pupil that he should avoid every degree which arises from a *want* of clearness, with all his *might*!

CLEARNESS.

The *CLEARNESS* of a sentence, is the *distinctness* with which the writer's ideas are expressed.

The *CLEARNESS* of a sentence, is derived from *appropriate* words, *properly* placed; as,

Be *careful* to avoid every degree of ambiguity which may arise, either from using improper words, or from giving proper ones, a wrong position. Not,

Avoid with the greatest care, &c.

I have taken the following from page 102.

"UNITY."

"There must always be some leading principle to form a chain of connection between the component parts of every composition, and there must be the same connecting principle among the parts."

It appears to me that there is a striking want of analogy between the *head*, and the sentence

under it. Should not the *head*, and the proposition, under it, be *homogeneous*? Does the word, *unity*, convey any allusion to the idea of a *chain of connection* in the component parts of a composition? The word, *unity*, as used above, is calculated to lead the reader to look for a distinct definition of the *unity* of a sentence, in the first proposition. But, instead of finding any attempt at a definition of this attribute, he finds the following sentence which speaks of nothing that belongs to the subject of the *unity* of a sentence:

"There must always be some leading principle to form a chain of connection between the component parts of every composition, and there must be the same connecting principle among the parts!"

"UNITY."

The *UNITY* of a sentence, is a *oneness* of theme.

The *UNITY* of a sentence, is derived from such a construction as renders the same thing the theme wherever it is mentioned in the sentence; as,

"Having come to anchor, *I* was put on shore where *I* was welcomed by all my friends; and received with the greatest kindness."

I was put; *I* was welcomed; and *I* was received.

In the following the same ideas are expressed, but without that *unity of theme*, which exists in the preceding sentence:

Having come to anchor, *they* put me on shore where *I* was welcomed by all my friends *who* received me with the greatest kindness:

In this sentence, there are three distinct themes, namely, *they*, *I*, and *who*. In this, there is not *unity*, but *disunity* of theme. The same things, however, are spoken of in both sentences.—When they are spoken of in the first, they are mentioned as having a particular relation to one another—and, when they are spoken of in the second, they are mentioned as having the same relation.

What then, has the *connection* of things to do with the *unity* of the sentence in which they are mentioned!? Above are two sentences, both founded upon things which are the same in *identity*, and the same in *connection*. Yet in one there is *unity*, while in the other there is *disunity*! What, then, I repeat, has the *connection* of things to do with the *unity* of a sentence!? Either *unity*, or *disunity* may belong to that sentence which is founded upon two *brothers*! Does the relation, then, between the things exert any influence over the sentence in giving it *unity*, or *disunity*!?

There must always be a leading principle to form a *chain* of connection between the component parts of every composition, and there must be the same connecting principle among the parts!"

Was *professor Frost* a *farmer*, a *chain* might be useful to him. But as he is a *teacher* of *Rhetoric*,

how can he employ a *chain* to any advantage? I am somewhat surprised to find the *doctor* lugging a whole chain into his service, when *one link* would answer his purpose so much better! Is not a link more strikingly adapted to the formation of a connection between any two parts than the whole chain!?

"*Link* of connection,"—WEBSTER.

"There must always be some leading principle to form a *chain*."

Is the fact that a leading principle is necessary to the formation of a *chain*, so remarkable that it need be stated in this formal manner? There is a leading principle in the formation of a *pen*, and of every other thing.

But, says the *professor*, this is a *chain of connection*."

The whole idea of *connection*, is expressed in the word, *chain*. The word, *connection*, then is a *pleonasm*. Mr. Frost does not mean a *chain of connection*. He means a *chain of ideas*, a series of connected thoughts, or things.

1. "*Chain*, a series of things linked together; as a chain of causes, of ideas, or of events."

2. "*Chain*, a range or line of things, connected; as a *chain* of mountains, a chain of being."—WEBSTER.

What an *adroit* Rhetorician must he be, who employs the *literal*, with the *figurative*, means, in expressing the same idea!? Mr. Frost attempts to express the idea of connection—for this purpose, he uses the word *chain* in its figurative sense. But lest there should be found a degree, or two, of that ambiguity which arises from a *want of clearness*, he subjoins the word, *connection*, itself!

A *chain of connection*!

If the word, *chain*, as here used, does not mean *connection*, what does it mean?

One moment's attention to the literal import of the word, *chain*, may shed a little light upon this subject.

1. "*Chain*, a series of links, or rings, connected, or fitted into one another."—WEBSTER.

"There must always be some leading principle to form a *chain of connection* between the component parts of every composition."

That is, there must always be some leading principle to *fit* the component parts of every composition "*into one another*."

The word, *chain*, may also be used in the sense of the word, *bond*. But, surely there is no analogy between a *bond* which holds two, or more, things together, and the *unity* of a sentence!

I do not believe that any one but a *doctor of laws*, can either form, or understand, sentences like that under consideration. True—one may form opinions respecting the meaning of the first part of the sentence—but he can not decide which of his various conjectures, is right. But it would be pre-

sumption in any one but a *Professor of Belles-Lettres*, or a *Doctor of Laws*, to attempt to comprehend even the first part when it is taken in connection with the second.

The first part—"There must always be some leading principle to form a *chain of connection* between the component parts of every composition."

If the reader can see that this language has any thing to do with the *unity of a sentence*, he deserves to be made an L. L. D.!

2. The second part—"and there must be the same connecting principle among the parts."

3. Both parts—"There must always be some leading principle to form a *chain of connection* between the component parts of every composition, and there must be the same connecting principle among the parts."

"Between the component parts," "and among the parts," are parts which must baffle a man of the brightest parts!

In writing this sentence, I do not think that Mr. Frost has avoided with the greatest care, every degree of ambiguity which arises from a *want of clearness and precision*!! At any rate, it does not seem to me that such a *disposition* is made of its several words and clauses, as shall tend most powerfully, to impress the mind of the reader with the meaning which the author intends to convey!!!! I feel quite anxious to remove the degrees of ambiguity, which I presume must arise from a *want of clearness*; for I think that it is very likely that the sentence contains some latent principles which might be invaluable to beginners in *composition*! I am the more inclined to this belief from the mention which is made of *composition* in the sentence itself!!

The following is from page 103.

"My horse was saddled, and I took a short ride, may be changed to—My horse having been saddled I took a short ride."

If I have said, or done, any thing in these reflections, which has exerted an influence upon the mind of the reader, unfavourable to the *ability* of Mr. Frost, I am sorry for it. My object in making these reflections, is, not to demonstrate that *Doctor Frost* is incapable of learning the old theory of English Grammar, but to establish the position that this theory is useless *when learned*.

And justice to the *Doctor*, requires that I should here say that I do not think his writings would be a fair scale upon which to graduate his reasoning powers! In his writings, these faculties appear to be unemployed! That this is the case is obvious from the above quotation which is a fair specimen of his numerous productions.

"My horse was saddled, and I took a short ride, may be changed to—My horse having been saddled I took a short ride." (Page 103.)

This change, says this *doctor of laws*, gives the sentence a greater *unity*!

1. "My horse was saddled, and I took a short ride."

2. My horse *having been* saddled, I took a short ride.

Here, the reader perceives that Mr. Frost is so entirely indifferent as to the display of mind, that he does not hesitate to consider these two sentences *synonymous*! In the first, the speaker affirms that his horse was saddled, and that he took a short ride. But he does not say *why* he took a short ride. In the second, however, the speaker not only affirms that his horse was saddled, and that he took a short ride, but he gives the reason why he took this ride!

The reader will see at once that great injustice would be done to *Professor Frost* in measuring his intellect by his writings!! The place in which he figures to advantage is in the business of *selling* his books by securing places of *profit*, and titles of honor!!

"My horse was saddled, and I took a short ride" is synonymous with "My horse *having been* saddled I took a short ride!!!"

It is somewhat surprising, however, that this *doctor of laws* breeds errors in grammar with such a remarkable fecundity! Wherever he *breathes*, he *spawns* them: and to divest his verbal concretions of them, would be to eject them from their *vernacular matrix*!

"My horse *was* saddled, and I took a short ride."

In attempting to augment the *unity* of this sentence, he not only forms one different in *sense*, but makes it a *kenel* for a *pack* of those *cater-wauling* tribes which I have chased from so many of his periods, and which are so *rampant* within the walls of one of our public schools! He uses *having been saddled* for *being saddled*!!

"My horse *having been then* saddled, I took a short ride!"

My horse *being then* saddled, I took a short ride.

I shall say nothing more, at this time upon the compilations of *Doctor Frost*! If what I have said, should subserve the cause of education, I shall never regret the pains which I have taken to expose the errors that pervade, and deform them. And while my primary wish is that these reflections may promote the interest of letters, my secondary one is that they may serve as a kind of monument to his profound erudition! A man who has *earned* so many rarely bestowed distinctions, should not be allowed to drop into the grave with nothing but these *titular* mementos to his rare worth! Too many distinguished scholars decay, and crumble from the memory of future ages for want of suitable means to perpetuate their greatness! It is the province of "L. L. D.," to *help* a man *through* life—but, it is the function of his works to embalm his memory after death.

I shall now spend a short time with Professor Bache.

I regret that I have not the learning which is necessary to qualify me to understand, and the taste, and particular views, requisite to enable me, to appreciate the writings of this great scholar. I have read, however, a few of his *Reports*—and in all that I have perused, the author seems to betray that remarkable proneness to commit errors in grammar which so eminently distinguishes *Professor Frost*.

As I do not wish to engage in any *difficult* task, I shall not attempt to show that Mr. Bache is a *profound* reasoner. I shall content myself with observing that there are numerous large *bumps* in many of his *periods*—but they seem not to spring from the *intellectual* region of his cranium!

That he has *LANGUAGE large*, is obvious from the size of the work which he has ushered into the world under the following inscription—

"*Report on education in Europe, to the Trustees of the Girard College for orphans. By ALEXANDER DALLAS BACHE, L. L. D., President of the College.*"

From the *slight* incongruity between this title, and the subjects on which the volume treats, I am inclined to think that the *Doctor's ORDER* is not large!

The deficiency in his *ORDER*, however, is nearly, if not entirely made up from the *magnitude* of his *IDEALITY*! No one will doubt this who considers that the college over which he represents himself as *presiding*, had never existed except in *imagination*!! The reader can well judge of the powers of an organ that can fancy into being, collegiate buildings, procreate three hundred orphan children, and install its subject *president* of the whole!! Whatever deficiency there may be in the *Doctor's ORDER*, must be amply supplied in the rare powers which nature has bestowed upon his *IDEALITY*!

That there is a slight incongruity between the title, and the subject of the volume, may be seen not only from perusing the book, but from a short examination of the instructions which were given to the *Doctor* before he had embarked for Europe. In 1837 Mr. Bache was sent to particular parts in Europe to learn something of the statistics of the European Institutions resembling the *contemplated* Girard College in America. This is obvious from the following extract, taken from the instructions which had been given him by the trustees of this contemplated College before he embarked for these places.

"Accordingly, all institutions in each of those countries, resembling the Girard College, or any others which promise to afford useful information in organizing it, you will see and examine."

But is the title which Mr. Bache has given to his book, indicative of any such purpose as that for which he was sent to examine these schools?

"REPORT ON education IN EUROPE!"

Mr. Bache was sent to these places to learn the methods of *teaching, governing, lodging, clothing, and feeding*, children, in such schools as resemble this *imaginary* institution, the Girard College! Had he been sent to Europe to convoke all the learned men of that country, and examine them upon the subject of their *education, their knowledge* of the arts, and sciences, the marvel would be whence the right to make this convocation! The question would arise instantler—has this *imaginary* College granted any *chartered* privileges to the *literati* of Europe, which they enjoy by the tenure of the degree of their scientific attainments? If not, why is the *President* of this *nonentity* clothed with that authority which is indicated by the title page of his book?

Was the author of this gross misnomer, sent to Europe to examine, even the *state* of education in that country? He was sent there to examine the *pantaloons, the shoes, and stockings*, which certain children wear, the *meat* which they eat, the *rooms* in which they sleep, the *methods* in which they are taught, and the *means* by which they are *flogged*!!

The following extracts taken from the body of the work, clearly show the impropriety of the language, employed upon the title page.

"In both the French, and Prussian institutions the highest officer, the provisor or director, administers the discipline, and the *tone* of it depends upon his character." p. 514.

"The professors and teachers in the French colleges in Paris, live out of the *institution*, and have nothing to do with the discipline out of recitation hours."

How does the following extract comport with the title, Report on *Education* in Europe?

"*Discipline.* The discipline of the school is thoroughly military."

TABLES OF DIET.

SCOTLAND

Institution.	Kind of food.	Meal which it is intended for.	Quantity.	Remarks.
Heriot's Hospital. (Edinburgh.)	Oatmeal.	Breakfast.	For each meal.	Once a week
	"	Supper.	8 oz.	potatoe soup,
	"	" at 11.	16 oz.	19.72 oz. po-
	"	" at 4.	2½ oz.	tatoes, and 5
	Beef.	Dinner.	7½ oz.	oz. of bread,
Potatoes.	Barley.	Dinner.	6.22 oz.	each.
		"	9.86 oz.	Once a week
		"	1.33 oz.	pea soup, (3.
				66 oz. peas,) and 5 oz. of bread.

"Report on education in Europe, to the trustees of the Girard College for orphans. By ALEX. DALLAS BACHE, L. L. D., *President of the College.*"

The Substitute;

A Report of the statistics of those schools in Europe, which resemble the contemplated Girard College in America. By ALEX. DALLAS BACHE.

"The master is *expected* to be so fully *imbued* with his *subject*, and expert in his art as to be able to impart knowledge *principally orally* to his pupils, and in such a way *as to adapt* it to each individual."

We *expect* what is *yet* to come—not what is already here! The master is *presumed* to be so fully *imbued* with his *subject*.

A subject is that of which one speaks. If, then, a person can be *imbued* with his *subject*, he may be *imbued* with a *brick* or with a *brick house*!

The master is *presumed* to be so fully *acquainted* with his *subject*,

"The master is *expected* to be so fully *imbued* with his *subject*, and so expert in his art *as to be able* to impart knowledge to his pupils *principally, orally, and* in such a way as to adapt it to each individual."

The words, *as, to, be*, should be exchanged for *that he is*. And so expert in this art, "*that he is*" able to impart knowledge to his pupils *principally orally*.

As "*principally orally*" are somewhat harsh, I would exchange *principally* for *the most part*, which I would place after *that*:

And so expert in his art that, *for the most part*, he is able to impart knowledge to his pupils *orally*, and in such a way as to adapt it to each individual.

"And," after *orally*, should be rejected:

And so expert in his art that for the most part, he is able to impart knowledge to his pupils *orally in* such a way as to adapt it to each individual.

The word, *orally*, signifies the way in which he imparts knowledge. But by the use of *and*, Mr. Bache denies that *orally* conveys any allusion to the way in which the teacher imparts knowledge!

He is able to impart knowledge to his pupils *orally, and* in such a *way as to adapt* it to each individual!

"As," in the above instance, is a relative pronoun, having the noun, *way*, for its antecedent. But in *what case* is this relative? There is nothing to govern it in the *objective*; nor is there any verb to which it can be in the *nominative*!! True, it precedes a verb in the infinitive mode—but, as a verb in this mode, can have no nominative, *Doctor Bache* will be compelled to procure the aid of *Doctor Frost* to furnish a suitable *case* for this relative!

"As to *adapt it to each individual.*"

This is hardly good sense,—much less is it good English! To say that knowledge is *adapted* to

an individual, betrays a great want of knowledge! Knowledge, if by the word *knowledge*, is meant instruction, principle, may be adapted to the *capacity* of an individual—but I believe it can not be said with any degree of propriety, that knowledge is adapted to him, to her, &c.

1. "The master is *expected* to be so fully imbued with his *subject*, and so expert in his art as to be able to impart knowledge to his pupils *principally orally*, and in such a way as to *adapt* it to each individual!" (42 words.)

The Substitute.

It is presumed that the master is able to instruct his pupils principally without the use of books. (18 words.) 24 *redundant words*!!

"Report to the committee of controllers of the public schools, on the High School for Girls."

"Philadelphia, October 5, 1840.

Gentlemen :

In compliance with the request of the committee, I submit to *them* a plan for a High School for Girls, and of a Seminary for Female Teachers, to be attached to the present Model School, and intended to carry out more fully than is now done, the directions of the Act of the Assembly in reference to that School."

"Gentlemen :

In compliance with the request of the committee, I submit to *them*."

Corrected.

Gentlemen of the committee ;

In compliance with your request, I submit to *you* a plan, &c.

"A plan for a High School for Girls, and of a Seminary for Female Teachers."

I submit to you "a plan of a seminary."

"A plan of a building" is very different from a plan for a building. "A plan of a house" is a plan of a building already erected—but "a plan for a house" is a plan of one to be erected!

"A plan for a High School for Girls, and of a Seminary for Female Teachers!

Besides the improper use of *of* for *for*, there is a "degree," or two of *ambiguity* in this language. "A plan for a High School for Girls, and of a Seminary for Female Teachers" does not decide whether there is one plan only, or whether there are two. Mr. Bache says that he has presented a plan for two schools. Has he presented two plans—or are both schools to be formed upon the one plan? I have satisfied myself from the context of this Report that Mr. Bache has presented two plans! The language of this *doctor of laws*, then, may be corrected by substituting *for* for *of*, and by adding one after and :

"A plan for a High School for Girls, and one for a Seminary for Female Teachers."

I would recommend Mr. Bache to "avoid every

degree of ambiguity arising from a want of *clearness with the greatest care*!!"

"To be attached to the present Model School, and intended to carry out *more fully* than is now done."

"*More fully*." Can one thing be fuller than another!? If one measure is *fully* carried out, can another be carried beyond it!?

"To be attached to the present MODEL SCHOOL."

What is it which is to be attached? From the construction of the sentence, the *plan* is to be attached to the Model School.

I present you with a *picture* of Henry Clay, and John Q. Adams, to be hung up in the Philadelphia Museum.

What is to be hung up? Are these men, or their pictures to be hung up in the Philadelphia Museum!? According to Mr. Bache the *men themselves* are to be hung up!!!

Reader, examine his sentence :

Gentlemen :

In compliance with the request of the committee I submit to *them* a plan for a High School for Girls, and of a Seminary for Female Teachers, to be attached to the present Model School.

A plan of a school to be attached to.

A picture of Henry Clay to be hung up.

If the school is to be attached, Henry Clay is to be hung up. If the picture is to be hung up, the plan is to be attached!!!

"Intended to carry out *more fully* than is now done the directions of the Act of the Assembly in reference to that school."

What is intended to carry out *more fully*? Why the *plan* which is to be attached to the school!

I present to you the picture of Henry Clay, to be hung up in the Philadelphia museum, intended to gratify those who have never seen the man himself!

But what is this *plan* which is to be attached to the present Model School? Let the following sentence reply—

Hear, hear—"In order to the *execution* and *development* of this *plan* I would propose, at least for the present, to act as *inspector* of these schools!!!!"

This was a *plan* indeed! It was a *trick* to attach himself to the present Model School that he might attach another salary to the *three thousand Dollars* which he had managed to get for *inspecting* the High School!

"I would propose, at least at present, to act as inspector of these schools!!!"

Why, why, "in order to their execution and development!"

What! a man that can neither *speak*, nor write the English Language with any degree of propriety, be the *inspector* of High Schools in the county, ah, in the very city of Philadelphia!?!!

Look at the sentence which I have just quoted—

"I would propose, *at least for the present*, to act as inspector of these schools!"

Here, in attempting to say that he would propose to *act for the present*, as inspector of these schools, he affirms that he would *propose* for the *present*!!

I would *propose, at least for the present*, that the money should be paid in 1849.

Does this mean that I would *propose* that the money should be paid *at least* in 1849?

"Gentlemen:

In compliance with the request of the committee, I submit to *them* a plan for a High School for Girls, and of a Seminary for Female Teachers, *to be attached* to the present Model School, and intended to carry out *more fully* than is now done, the directions of the Act of the Assembly in reference to that school."

The Substitute:

Gentlemen of the committee,

In compliance with your request, I submit to *you* a plan for a High School for Girls, and *one for* a Seminary for Female Teachers.

The portion of the sentence, which commences with "to be attached," is *premature*: it has no connection with that part for which I have given a substitute. This long *trail*, therefore, in which Mr. Bache, in attempting to say that these contemplated institutions should be attached to the Model School, declares that his *plan* for them, should be incorporated with that school, forms no *natural* part of the paragraph. This part of his plan naturally belongs to the subject of the buildings with which he has in truth treated it!

Under page 7, he says,

"The *superintendence* of the courses should be *vested* in a principal, to serve as the immediate organ of the committee *in* the school, and to report, minutely, in relation to the progress of the establishment, *at least, once during* a year."

"The *superintendence* should be *vested*," is replete with eccentricity! One could say with as much propriety, I am *vested* with the *instruction* of the school!! "To serve as the immediate organ of the committee *in* the school," is somewhat unique! (*of*.)

The Dutchman, in attempting to say that he had had three wives within ten years, declared by the use of *during* for *within*, that he was guilty of *bigamy*. He was accordingly tried for this offence. He was acquitted, however, upon the ground that he did not mean what he said! It was fortunate for him that Mr. Bache did not figure at the time of this notable trial. Had the authority of a *doctor of laws* been cited to show that *during* means *within*, the innocent Dutchman must have paid the penalty of incarceration for his ignorance!

Under the head of *ADMISSION* I find the following—

"To be *admitted* the candidates should be twelve years of age; *have passed* at least six months in regular attendance upon one of the public schools, and show satisfactory attainments in reading, writing, arithmetic, (to the rule of three inclusive,) grammar, and geography."

Would not a girl thus far advanced, know the difference between saying—

"I have had three wives *during* ten years," and "I have had three wives *within* ten years!?" If so, would she not be likely to know more *grammar* than the gentleman in whom the *superintendence* was to be *vested*!?

Would she not be likely to know better than to say, "To be *admitted* the candidates must be twelve years of age!?" I think she would say—To be a *candidate* the girl must be *twelve years* of age!

She might also avoid the error of connecting "*should be*," and "*have passed*!?"

And I somewhat think that it would be just to reprimand her, if she committed the error of placing "*at least*" after *passed* instead of after *months*!!

I am inclined to believe that she would see the obvious difference between saying,

Have *passed* at least six months, and have *passed six months at least*! Have *passed at least* is one thing—*Six months at least* is another.

I should be much surprised if she could not see something wrong in the syllabane, "in regular *attendance upon* one of the public schools!" To attend *upon*, is to serve in the capacity of a *menial*! I think, therefore, that a girl with the attainments which Mr. Bache has specified as a qualification for admission into this High School, would say in regular attendance at one of the public schools.

Nor can I believe that she would be very likely to commit the error of using "*one of*" for *a*. She would see at once that the use of "*one of*" would require the pupil to attend six months at the *same* public school! This would exclude a candidate who had spent three months at one, and three at another public school! Would she not be very likely to prevent this error by saying, in regular attendance at *a* public school?

"The details of the course of studies, the text books to be used, and the distribution of time *had better be* left for arrangement subsequent to the organization of the school, *between* the professors, the inspector, and the committee."

"*Had be* left!?" "*Between* the professors, the inspector, and the committee!?"

How does the use of *be*, and *between*, comport with the following?—

"In order to the execution and development of this plan I would propose, *at least for the present*, to act as *inspector* of these schools!!!"

"In order to the execution and development of this plan," is anomalous indeed!

"In order to the execution!"

"In order to the *execution and development*!"

What is the difference between the *execution*, and the *development*, of this plan?

"Lessons on common objects of nature and art."

This use of *of* for *in*, is highly complimentary to Mr. Bache. Objects of nature! *in* nature.

"The pupils of the High School should be admitted on examination, from the other public schools."

"The pupils of the High School should be admitted from the other public schools!"

What does this language mean!? I do not ask what Mr. Bache *intends* to express—I know, from the *nature* of the subject, on which he writes, what he *wishes* to say. I ask what does this *language* mean!?

"The pupils of the High School should be admitted?"

Admitted *where*? If they are pupils of the High School, are they not already admitted!!!

"The pupils of the High School for Girls should be admitted on examination, from the other public schools, the number to be admitted at each examination, being previously determined by the committee having charge of the school, and the candidates who pass the best examination, having the preference!!!"

That is, the number should be previously determined by the committee and *by* the candidates having the preference!!

This is the exact sense of the language of this *Doctor of Laws*!! Determined by the committee, and the candidates. Or—Determined by the committee having charge of the school, and the candidates having the preference!!!

"In order to the execution and development of this plan I would propose at least for the present, to act as *inspector* of these schools!!!!"

Allow me to repeat the above sentence—

"The pupils of the High School for Girls should be admitted on examination, from the other public schools, the number to be admitted at each examination being previously determined by the committee having charge of the school, and the candidates who pass the best examination, having the preference!"

That is, the pupils of the High School for Girls, should be admitted on examination, from the other public schools, *because* the number to be admitted at each examination, is to be previously determined by the committee having charge of the school!!

I gave him a receipt in full, the demand being paid.

That is, I gave him a receipt in full *because* the demand had been paid.

The substitute:

The candidates for admission into this institution, must come from other public schools, and must show on examination, a satisfactory know-

ledge of reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and English Grammar.

The committee of the school, shall publish, three weeks before the examination of the candidates, how many may be admitted. And, should the number of applicants, exceed the numeral restriction of the committee, all shall be examined; and the complement selected from the whole, according to the *attainments* of each. But should the applicants at the general examination not equal the number fixed by the committee, the deficiency may be supplied as soon as subsequent applicants can be found from *examination*, to be worthy of admission.

"Marks for recitation, and places in the class, provided they are employed in the right spirit, will be useful."

That is, marks to be *recited*! Or does Mr. Bache mean marks to *induce* the pupil to *recite*!

Perhaps he wishes to say—Marks of *merit* in recitation.

"Provided they are employed in the right spirit."

Does not Mr. Bache here express *improperly* what is properly expressed in the following—

Provided they are *justly* given. (It is common for a teacher to say—I will give you three *bad* marks.)

The substitute:

Marks of *merit* in recitation, and *standing* in the class, provided they are given justly, will be useful.

"*Selfemulation* and a desire to obtain the esteem of teachers and companions, and to add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated, and of the school, are much more noble motives than mere *rivalry* for place; but emulation in youth, when not unduly excited, is usually a generous feeling."

"*Selfemulation*, and a desire to obtain the esteem of teachers,"

Selfemulation is not a word!! Nor will this alphabetic concretion ever be a word! There is nothing in existence of which it can be the name. Men form words for the expression of those things, facts, and circumstances, of which they have ideas.

"*Emulate*, to strive to *equal*, or excel in qualities, or actions."

"*Emulation*, the act of attempting to equal, or excel in qualities or actions, rivalry, desire of superiority attended with effort to attain to it."

WEBSTER.

Do individuals attempt to *equal themselves*!? Where is the man that has ever attempted to *excel himself*!? Was *selfemulation* a word, it would signify the *means* which a man employs to make himself *equal himself*—the means which a man employs to make *himself excel himself*!!

"And a desire to obtain the esteem of teachers."

Was *esteem* an article of dress, or furniture, as a *hat*, or *clock*, one might speak of *obtaining* it.

We may merit, secure, or have, the esteem of others.

"To add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated."

This man is associated with a good reputation! Is it English—Is it sense?

"To add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated, and of the school!"

What does and connect? What are the ideas which Mr. Bache wishes to express?

In general the nature of the writer's subject, will serve as a commentary upon any abstruse portion of his language. But, in this case, the reader derives no such aid. If there is any subject, it is enveloped in a *cloud of words*, which can neither be penetrated, nor dispersed. I have never found an instance where *selfemulation* has been so necessary to enable me to understand a writer as in this case: I must here *excel myself* to comprehend Mr. Bache!!

"To add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated, and of the school!"

"In order to the development of this" sentence "*I would propose*" that Mr. Bache should act as inspector of its plan!

"To add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated, and of the school.

I can have nothing to do with the *ideas* which Mr. Bache wishes to express: *I can not* comprehend him. To add to the reputation of the pupil, and of the school, is language which I can understand. I can understand also the following—To add to the reputation with which the pupil, and the school are associated.

But I understand it to be *nonsense*!

And, although the syllabane, "*to add to the reputation of the pupil, and of the school,*" does express sense, I can not decide whether it expresses a sense which has any thing to do with the ideas expressed in the preceeding part of the sentence, or not.

"Selfemulation and a desire to obtain the esteem of teachers, and companions, and to add to the reputation of the pupil, and of the school, are much more noble motives than mere rivalry for place."

If this is the sense which Mr. Bache wishes to express, why has he substituted, "*with which the pupil is associated,*" for, *of the pupil*!?

"I have come for the hat of John, is English. But I have come for the hat "*with which John is associated,*" is neither sense, nor English!

"*Much more noble motives,*" would be much improved by giving motives a pre-position.

Motives, much more noble.

"Selfemulation, and a desire to obtain the esteem of teachers, and companions, and to add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated, and of the school, are much more noble motives than mere rivalry for place!"

Is rivalry a motive!? "*Selfemulation* and a desire to obtain the esteem of teachers, are much

more noble motives than mere rivalry for place!"

That is, John is a much better boy than Sarah!!

"Than mere rivalry for place."

I presume Mr. Bache means "than rivalry for mere place!"

Selfemulation and a desire to obtain the esteem of teacher and companions, and to add to the reputation with which the pupil is associated, and of the school are much more noble motives than mere rivalry for place; but emulation in youth, when not unduly excited, is usually a generous feeling.

"Whence, and what art thou, execrable shape!"

This sentence is indeed the work of deformity—it is the offspring of the two tribes of pests, which all the old school grammarians, and rhetoricians, have laboured in vain to control! Yes, in this one paragraph, these two tribes of scaly lizards, in despite of the *persuasion, advice, rules, exceptions, notes, remarks, laws, and comments*, of all the old school grammarians, from Aristotle to John Frost, sport with the erudition of Alexander Dallas Bache with as much impunity as they would with the learning of one who had neither been made a committee to report on EDUCATION in EUROPE, nor acting principal of the Central High School for boys,—who had neither been made President of the Girard College for Orphans, nor doctor of laws!!

I should be glad to continue my reflections upon the writings of this rare scholar. The task certainly exerts a salutary influence upon my mind—and I regret that I am compelled to leave it before it is finished. To me there is something bewitching in the works of those who have sat in judgment upon the education of nations, who have emitted their rays of genius through the numerous compartments of High Schools, and who have shed a glorious lustre over collegiate buildings, which vies in brightness with that radiant blaze with which the morning star ushers in the light of day!

CHAPTER XXXVII.

WHOEVER has reflected upon the present state of the English Grammar, has arrived at the conclusion that great improvements may yet be made in this science. This conclusion may aid the public in accounting for the multiplicity of new Grammars.

To ascertain the true principles of English grammar, and present them in a form adapted to the capacity of youth, has been long the object of many in the United States.

In this undertaking, the people have felt considerable interest—and it seems high time that they should know whether this important object has been accomplished. And it seems to devolve upon me, incapable as I am, to give as far as I can collect the facts, the exact state of this literary

enterprise. In discharging this duty, I shall aim at being just to all,—and especially to the authors of the works of which I shall speak.

Compassion to them, however, must not prevent me from being faithful to the public. While my love of science prompts me to declare the whole truth, my regard for those who have devoted their time, and attention to improve it, shall ensure them the mildest course which can be pursued.

I have examined with care, nearly all the publications which have been proposed as improvements on Mr. Murray's system; and I am sorry to say, that his work, had it been written *after* these attempted simplifications, and with reference to them, would be considered an important improvement upon all the recent systems which I have perused. In principle, they are not superior to Mr. Murray's system; and in perspicuity of expression, purity of style, propriety of language, and precision of words they fall far below it. In exemplification of this truth, I shall select a few of the many improprieties that pervade the works which are presented as striking improvements upon Mr. Murray.

GOOLD BROWN'S GRAMMAR.

It is but a few years since this production has been presented to the world. To what extent the work has received an introduction into schools, is beyond my power to say. And as this is not a point which can even aid in deciding upon its superiority I may safely concede what common report declares. There are two things which must guide my decision upon all works of this kind; namely, *truth*, and the *manner* of presenting truth. He who attempts to carry the mind from an incapable to a capable state, should understand well the powers of mental *reception*, and mental *retention*. There is a particular part of every science that now flourishes upon the *figurative hill*, which is designed by juvenility itself for the promotion of mental growth. And he who knows what this part is, and the proper mode of presenting it to the intellectual babe, is a valuable nurse in the house of instruction.

Mr. Goold Brown's book is founded upon principles which I have demonstrated to be altogether insufficient to sustain the British system of English Grammar which has been presented by Mr. L. Murray. True in many instances, Mr. Goold Brown has varied the phraseology of Mr. Murray; and in a few cases he has even substituted new language for that of his polar star in the sphere of grammar. But these are the *base tricks* of which they are guilty, who have no *conscience* to feel, and no powers to invent! One case is a sufficient illustration:

"ENGLISH GRAMMAR."

"English grammar is the art of speaking and

writing the English language with propriety."—MURRAY.

"English grammar is the art of speaking and writing the English language *correctly*!"—G. BROWN.

I presume that all the real improvements which Mr. G. Brown has here made, consists in concluding his sentence with an *adverb* instead of a noun!!

The author styles his book, which is now before me—

"THE INSTITUTES OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR."

From this *Roman* title, one unacquainted with Mr. Murray's works on this subject, might presume that Mr. G. Brown is an *institutist*! Not so, however—he has not *written* elementary rules, and doctrines—he has *copied* them from others! But although with respect to the principles of his book, he is not an *institutist*, yet with respect to the preface of it, he is certainly an *institutor*,—or he has written entirely without *rules*!

"Language is the principal vehicle of thought."

Now, as in speaking of the purpose of a vehicle, *for* is generally employed. Mr. G. Brown has used *of* without rule,—or he has become the *institutor* of a new rule! In speaking of the purpose of a building, one would hardly say—A house of corn! I am inclined to think that all, except grammar compilers, would say—A house *for* corn!

Mr. G. Brown's sentence would be somewhat improved by enlarging it with, *for the communication, or expression*—

Language is the principal vehicle *for the communication* of thought.

Was the author here speaking of language as a kind of *vessel* containing thought, *of* might be used with propriety. But that he does not mean to present language under the character of a *bottle*, is obvious from two facts. First, he makes language the *principal*, the *chief*. But as a *container* of ideas, the *mind* would rank higher than language! Secondly, he makes language a *vehicle*—and as a vehicle is not a vessel, it will be quite difficult for him to say, that he means to present language as a sort of *jug*!!

The third sentence of the author's preface is as follows—

"For whatever we may think in relation to its origin—whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry—a natural endowment, or an artificial invention—certain it is, that in the present state of things, our knowledge of it depends in a great measure, if not entirely, on the voluntary exercise of our faculties, and on the helps and opportunities afforded us."

In this sentence, Mr. G. Brown speaks of an *artificial* invention! I do not pretend to know what an *artificial* invention is, unless it is "a re

hicle of thought!" If the author is right in the use of *artificial*, then, indeed, there must be *natural* arts, and *artificial* arts!

"Whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry—a *natural endowment*, or an *artificial invention*."

Here, too the author has adopted a new rule for one which is well known, and closely followed by writers in general. It is this—

"When analogous ideas are in contiguous sentences or parts of a sentence, they should be expressed in similar language:" Or,

"When things themselves correspond to each other we naturally expect to find a similar correspondence in the words."

1. "From heaven,"
2. Of industry,
3. A natural endowment,
4. An artificial invention.

Had Mr. G. Brown followed the obvious principle of constructing a sentence of this kind, he would have framed the last two monos like the first two.

1. A special gift "from heaven,"
2. An acquisition of industry,
3. An endowment of nature,
4. An invention of art.

Let me now attempt to correct this *teacher's* sentence:

Whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry—an endowment of *nature*, or an invention of *art*, certain it is that, &c.

So much for the *frame-work* improprieties of the *instructor's* sentence.

Let me now substitute *production* for *invention*, in order to correct an error which the author has committed in the choice of words.

Whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry—an endowment of nature, or a *production* of art, certain it is that, &c.

But this sentence is not less remarkable for its *pleonastic* character than for its *irregular* construction. Of this even the author himself will be perfectly satisfied if he will attempt to show the utility of the italic words:

"For, *whatever we may think in relation to its origin*,—whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry,—a natural endowment, or an artificial invention, certain it is that, &c." (35 words.)

For whether we consider it a special gift from heaven, or an acquisition of industry—an endowment of nature, or an artificial invention, certain it is that. (35.)

27

8 redundant words

The fourth sentence, under this curious page, reads thus—

"One may indeed acquire, by mere imitation, *such* a knowledge of words, *as to enjoy* the ordinary advantages of speech."

In this sentence the author is not only seen to be an institutor, but a bold *innovator*—"such a knowledge of words *as to enjoy*!"

Here the relative pronoun, *as*, is made the nominative to *enjoy*! Yes, such is the frame-work of this *grammar mender's* sentence, that *as* becomes the nominative to this verb, in the infinitive mood!!

Will any grammarian attempt to question this? *As*, after *such*, *much*, *same*, and *many*, is a pronoun—and it must have either the nominative, or the objective case; *as*,

"He has *as much* fruit, *as* will answer his purpose."

"He shall have *as many* apples *as* he wants."

"He has the *same* kind *as* I have."

The philosophy of the thing, is this—when *such* is used for *that*, *this*, *those*, *these*, or *the*, *as* is substituted for *which*; *as*, "He has *such* fruit *as* I want."

That is, He has *that kind* of fruit *which* I want.

Here, *which* is a relative, representing *kind*, third person singular, in the objective case, governed by *want*.

"One may indeed acquire, by mere imitation *such* a knowledge of words, *as to enjoy* the ordinary advantages of speech."

To illustrate the ill construction of this frame-work of words, it may be well to substitute "*that*" for *such*, and *which* for *as*:

One may indeed acquire, by mere imitation *that* knowledge of words, *which to enjoy* the ordinary advantages of speech!!

Mr. G. Brown certainly must enjoy advantages of speech much greater than *ordinary*—but whether he will *enjoy himself* after finding *what his book* is, may be doubted!

Corrected.—One may indeed acquire by mere imitation, a knowledge of words, *which will give him* the ordinary advantages of speech. (*Will give him*—) *as to enjoy*!

"He *speaks* fluently."

Let us now see what sort of English is employed by the author in teaching children to parse.

"*Speaks* is an irregular active intransitive verb, from *speak*, *spake*, *speaking*, *spoken*; found in the indicative mood, present tense, third person singular."

That this *mender* of Murray is a profound *etymologist*, is obvious from the manner in which he derives the verb, *speaks*:

"*Speaks* is an irregular active intransitive verb, from *speak*, *spake*, *speaking*, and *spoken*!"

That *is*, *speaks* is a verb derived from *speak*, from *spake*, from *speaking*, and from *spoken*!!

Speaks has almost as many *parents* as *Murray's Grammar* has *authors*!!

Mr. G. Brown has certainly made a wonderful discovery in *verbal pedigree*! He has found out, by some means or other, that the *parents* descend from their children!! "*Speaks*," he says, "is from *spake*, from *speaking*, and from *spoken*!!" Grammarians, in general, would rather say that *spake*, *speaking*, and *spoken*, are from *speaks*, or *speak*!

"THE INSTITUTES" however, may find some apology for not having all that precision in grammatical structure, which the rigid rules of the science seem to demand. The great work of the mind has occupied the author's entire *attention*: of this all must be satisfied, who have feasted upon the sumptuous meals afforded in his masterly definitions. These clearly show that the learned *mender* has not consented to barter the brilliancy of intellect for the tinsel show of mere phraseology. If the horizon of grammar has been exceeded, or enlarged, it has been for the noble display of the author's expansive intellection. Verbal etiquette, and syntactical discipline, have waived their claims, to feast upon a rare exhibition of patient and accurate research,—to gaze on the coruscant flashes of genius, whose torrent course prostrates all the difficulties in grammatical solution, takes up the march of the conqueror, and fixes upon itself the plaudits of victory!

The British grammarians have said much—their extravagance dampens the spirit of the pupil, at the very threshold of his study; and their incongruities, and palpable contradictions force him from the sound, and sober exercise of his *judgment*. They have, as a uniform course, either founded their system upon false principles, or *irrelevant* ones. This surely is a matter of surprise, and regret. But it is matter of astonishment, and of lamentation to find so many Americans labouring to improve these *radical* defects by varying the *size*, *style*, and *mode* of the British essays. The great pretensions of these *enders*, that their varied modifications of *Murray's errors*, destroy the *fundamental rottenness* of the British system, is lamentable as the sure proof of unsound minds. And inasmuch as these *overgrown* pretensions influence the credulous, and unwary, they are hostile to the advancement of science, and destructive as a bane to public utility. Did I, could I believe these men *meritorious*, I would bid them God speed. But knowing, as I do, that these new modellers are engaged in an enterprise which even the angels of heaven could not prosecute with any degree of success, I should rejoice to witness the spire of their fame crumble into dust, and the schools of our country liberated from the mental bonds which these men, in their rage to become *authors*, have laboured to rivet upon American children.

JOHN COMLY'S GRAMMAR.

"English Grammar, made easy to the teacher and pupil—originally compiled for the use of West-Town Boarding School, by John COMLY."

In the first clause of this title page, I find *to* is used in the place of *for*. It is easy to me to learn, is certainly not *English*—yet Mr. Comly, with all his talents, learning, and experience, writes thus upon the very title page of an *English Grammar*?

From the omission of *an* before "*English Grammar*," it seems that the author has concluded that this phrase, even without an article, means the book; yet it certainly can mean nothing but the science itself! Mr. Comly has declared, then, that the science of English grammar was originally compiled for the sole use of *West-Town Boarding School*—yea, more—he has unintentionally said that he himself is the *author* of this science! Nor does the paradox stop here—for from the omission of *an*, it certainly seems that the very science of English grammar is a *compilation*—hence it appears that *sciences* as well as books, are *compiled*!!

"RULE 29."

"In the use of *prepositions*, and words that depend upon each other, *particular* care should be taken to express relations by *appropriate* words, and to maintain a *regular* and *clear* construction throughout."—COMLY'S GRAMMAR.

To say any thing upon the inutility of this rule, is not necessary—this is demonstrated from the little influence which it has exerted over the pen of its own author. But to reject its redundant words, and to express its spirit in *appropriate* terms, may be of some service to a few of my readers.

Particular care should be taken to express our *ideas* by appropriate words, and in properly constructed sentences. Or—

Particular care should be taken to express our *ideas properly*.

The next Grammar from which I shall select a few of the numerous improprieties, is that compiled by *Mr. Kirkham*. To render this work worthy of public patronage, every thing has been done which has lain within the power of its *learned* author to accomplish! Whatever defects, therefore, may diminish the merits of the production, no want of *attention* can be imputed to its author. The edition from which the following sentences have been taken, was printed in 1823.

"The author does not wish, like a vain pedant, to inveigh against his predecessors; but he is very sanguine in the belief that public opinion will support him in pronouncing a great majority of our authors defective, at least, in manner, if they are not in matter."

As *vanity* is a prominent trait in the character of a pedant, the adjective "*vain*" is redundant; and as the word "*pedant*" conveys no idea of a *reproachful* disposition, it is difficult to conceive any propriety in the use of "*inveigh*."

The word "*sanguine*," is not well used—indeed, the phrase, "*but he is sanguine in the belief*," is burdensome—the same idea may be expressed in one word:

"But he is *satisfied* that public opinion will support him in pronouncing a majority of our authors defective, at least in manner, if they are not in matter."

"A majority of our authors defective, *at least*, in manner, if *they* are not in matter."

By the phrase, "*at least*," Mr. Kirkham intends to suggest that a majority of our authors are defective in something besides *manner*—but by an error in the *position* of the phrase, he not only fails in this attempt, but implies that they may be *entirely wrong* both in manner, and matter!

They are defective *at least*—that is, they are certainly defective, and may be entirely wrong.

The phrase, *at least*, has a bearing upon what precedes it—as,

He *at least*, joined that party.

That is, *he*, even if no other one, joined.

2. He joined *at least*, that party.

That is, he *joined*, although he might not have continued.

3. He joined that party *at least*.

That is, he joined that party, if he did not this, or some others.

"And yet they are receiving their completion in part *at least*, at the present day."—BISHOP NEWTON.

"But he is *sanguine in the belief* that public opinion will support him in pronouncing a great majority of our authors *defective*, at least in manner, if *they* are not in matter."

"*They*" and "*are*" are redundant.

"But he is *satisfied* that public opinion will support him in pronouncing a majority of our authors defective in manner *at least*, if not in matter."

From the words *support*, and *pronouncing*, one would very naturally conclude that Mr. Kirkham has been constituted a kind of *literary tribunal*, before whom the greater part of the authors in his *district* had been arraigned, and put upon their trial for the crime of *defect*; and that after a patient investigation, he had *pronounced* them guilty upon the testimony of public opinion! To do away this authoritative appearance, the sentence should read in this way:

"But he is *satisfied* that the public have long been convinced that a great majority of our authors is defective in manner *at least*, if not in matter."

"And if your ambition should not aspire at eminence," &c.

Better thus:

And if your ambition should not *lead you to* aspire, &c.

The act of aspiring belongs not to the ambition, but to the individual who, under the influence of ambition, performs it.

"And if your ambition should not aspire *at* eminence," &c.

I should be sorry to say that this sentence violates Mr. Kirkham's *own rules*—but we verily believe that it is not in all respects in unison with Mr. Comly's 29th Rule!!

"In the use of prepositions, and words that depend on each other, particular care should be taken to express relations by *appropriate* words."

Now, had Mr. Kirkham learned the use of prepositions by this rule, he certainly would have used *to* instead of *at*. So it is, one *author will not* learn from another—it is easier for him to bear the burden consequent upon *ignorance* than to bring his mind to the slavish task of acquiring knowledge from any of his fellow-craft!

Under page 6 may be found the following sentence:

"The author considers it a duty devolving upon himself, to express his gratitude to those friends of literature who *have* so liberally patronized his work *anterior* to its publication."

That the author has been placed under *strong obligations* to those who have recommended his work, cannot be doubted by any acquainted with its *merits*; and that he has felt the weight of these obligations is obvious from the profuse and emphatic manner in which he expresses his thanks in the preceding sentence. That he was entirely devoted to his patrons, is evident from the *deformity* of the *shrine* upon which the oblation is offered up.

"The author considers it a duty devolving upon *himself* to express his gratitude," &c.

The word, "*himself*," is happily used for the author is the only one in the community, who ought to feel grateful to those who have been instrumental in procuring the introduction of his Grammar into our schools!

I am pleased to find that the author's language, and style are so well adapted to the solemnity of the occasion. The gravity and emphasis of the first line give a tone, and dignity to the subject, which nearly equal his precision, and beauty in his use of the *tenses of verbs*:

"The author considers it a duty devolving upon *himself* to express his gratitude to those friends of literature who *have* so liberally patronized his work *anterior* to its publication."

A little school Miss, in addressing her friends, says,—"*I wrote* anterior to the arrival of my brother."

Another one says—"I *had written* before the arrival of my brother."

But an *author* of an English Grammar, designed to teach school children *accuracy* in the use of their language, says—I “*have*” written *before* the arrival of my brother!!

There is something very seductive in the idea of living among men, after death, upon a *fixed, formal title page*!

Alas! if these grammar *menders* could get a mere glimpse of themselves as they figure upon their *title pages*, I think they would be as anxious for seclusion of life, and brevity of existence, as they now are for notoriety of person, and perpetuity of being! I have room to exhibit one of these pages only,—but I hardly know which to take—for where there is no difference, it is hard to choose. *Kirkham* lies before me—his fate is the result of mere *chance*—I prefer no one—all I desire is to give a fair *sample* of the whole.

ENGLISH GRAMMAR in FAMILIAR LECTURES; accompanied by a COMPENDIUM, EMBRACING A NEW SYSTEMATIC ORDER OF PARSING, A NEW SYSTEM OF PUNCTUATION, *Exercises in False Syntax*, AND A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR, IN NOTES. BY SAMUEL KIRKHAM.”

The use of “*accompanied by*,” gives *legs* to the author’s COMPENDIUM—it is made, by this phrase, to *travel* about with the book! John was here, *accompanied by* his brother! English Grammar, in Familiar Lectures, *accompanied!* by a Compendium!

That is, They purchased the horse *accompanied by his saddle and bridle*!!

They purchased the horse *with* his saddle and bridle.

Now, as Mr. Kirkham’s Compendium would take up *less room* without *legs*, I would advise him to amputate them by the use of *with* for “*accompanied by*!!” I will just take them off, that its *author* may see how the creature will appear *snake fashion*?

“English Grammar, in Familiar Lectures, *with* a Compendium—*Embracing a New Systematic Order of Parsing, a New System of Punctuation, Exercises in False Syntax, and a System of Philosophical Grammar, in Notes.*”

The author means to say, that his Philosophic Grammar only, is in Notes—but by rendering this page plenary, all, except himself, can see that he has said that his *whole* book is in Notes!

Let me now exhibit Mr. Kirkham as he has presented himself:

English Grammar, in Familiar Lectures, *accompanied by* a Compendium, embracing a New Systematic Order of Parsing in Notes, a new System of Punctuation in Notes, Exercises in False Syntax in Notes, and a System of Philosophic Grammar in Notes!!

I have had the curiosity to examine this book of Notes; and I must admit that I have found many *qucer notes*; and I think that the author’s note upon the meaning of the word *again*, should

certainly be ranked among them. This note may be found under page 87.

“My friend has returned *again*; but his health is not very good. *Again* is an adverb of time indefinite—it expresses a *period of time* not precisely defined!!!”

Who that has not seen Mr. S. Kirkham’s book of Notes, has ever known that “*again*” means a *period of time*!?

“*To put the learner in possession of a brief and comprehensive system of grammar, which will more rapidly facilitate his progress than those in general use, is the design of the author in presenting this little treatise to the public.*”

This sentence, with all its *novelty*, is not pleasing. The phrase, “*to put the learner in possession*,” is not happy. The sentence is improper in the *position* of its several members also. As they now stand, the reader must either begin at the *close* of the period, and read backwards, or be held in suspense till he nearly approaches the end of the sentence. The following arrangement may relieve the reader, though it does not fully correct the sentence:

The author’s design in this little treatise, is to furnish the learner with a grammar, which will more rapidly facilitate his progress than those in general use.

“*If it have the desired effect, no other apology will be necessary.*”

The second sentence should be incorporated with the first—and, instead of commencing with *if*, it should begin with *and*.

The word, *have*, is not so good as *produce*. “*This*” should be substituted for *the*, and *desired*.

“The author’s design in this little treatise, is to furnish the learner with a grammar, which will more readily facilitate his progress than those in general use—and, if it produces *this* effect, no other apology will be necessary.”

The last clause, however, which constitutes the author’s second sentence, is useless, and should be omitted.

A shame to the age in which we live, that every upstart who can raise and fall the *eight notes*, should undertake to construct a *Gamut*—and, to the disgrace of our country be it spoken, that many teachers will listen to these towering pretensions, hymn the impious jargon of the *sciologist*, and hush the heaven-born music of Zorahn.

MR. CARDELL’S GRAMMAR.

Mr. Cardell has declared to the world, that the present popular system of English grammar is founded entirely in error. He has, in a number of essays upon this science, treated with great severity all those who had written upon it, before he raised his pen in opposition to the course which they have pursued.

To sustain his position, he has taken different

grounds; and, among them may be found an alleged inability on the part of those who use the English language, to use it with propriety. Therefore it may be proper to employ the superior excellence of Mr. Cardell's own composition, as a criterion for ascertaining the superiority of his so much vaunted system of grammar. The author's introduction commences thus:

"Reason is the distinguishing excellence of man, and language *the* means by which its operations are performed."

This sentence supposes that reason remained perfectly inactive till language was formed! Yet Mr. Cardell's whole system proceeds upon the ground that language is a *human* production! Perhaps the learned author has not meant to say, that language is the *only* means by which reason operates—if so, he should have used *a* instead of *the*!

Reason is the distinguishing excellence of man, and language *a* means by which its operations are performed.

The third sentence of the author's introduction reads thus:

"*The learning, talents, and means of research possessed by many who have spent the labour of their lives in the same field, are not to be depreciated or denied.*"

That is, the *learning of research*, the *talents of research*, and the *means of research*.

The *means* of research is proper—but the *learning* of research is not correct; and the *talents* of research, is *shamefully bad*!

It cannot be pleaded in this case, that *of* subjoins *research* to *means* only: for wherever *of* is used, it must subjoin its object to each of the preceding subjects. Hence, when it is said that Messrs. Johnson, Stevenson, and Jones of Boston, are in Philadelphia, the meaning is, that Mr. Johnson of Boston, Mr. Stevenson of Boston, and Mr. Jones of Boston, are in Philadelphia. But if *of* subjoined, *Boston* to *Jones* only, then, indeed, it would follow, that Mr. Jones only is in Philadelphia!!

Corrected:

The *means, talents, and learning*, possessed by many who have spent the labour of their lives in the same field, are not to be depreciated or denied. ("Of research") (the labour of,")

The fourth sentence in the author's introduction reads thus:

"*The remarkable difference of writers from each other, even in the same language, and still more the evident variance from philosophic truth showed that there must be something very defective in the manner of conducting the inquiry.*"

Yes, and among all the truths which can be brought to show "*that something must be wrong in the manner of conducting the inquiry,*" none

are more to the point than the defects of this very sentence!

"The remarkable difference of writers."

"Of writers," should be *among* writers!

"Variance from philosophic truth,"

"*Variance*" does not signify a *departure* from, but rather an *approximation* of the agents under a spirit of contention. We say, he is at *variance* with his brother—but not, he is at *variance* from his brother!! Had Mr. Cardell said, John contends *from* his brother, he would have been just as much within "*the laws of matter and thought,*" as he is in the expression, *variance* from each other!

The words, "*from each other,*" are redundant; and in attempting to correct the sentence I shall omit them.

The remarkable difference *among* writers, even in the same language, and still more the *various opinions upon* philosophic truths, *have shown* that something is very defective in the manner of conducting the inquiry.

MR. GREENLEAF'S GRAMMAR.

"As it is considered that grammar *simplified* has arrived at the summit of improvement, it is put into stereotype."

Finding this triumphal arch raised upon the outside of Mr. Greenleaf's book, I have a little curiosity to see what is in the inside of this work. The system is replete with philological phenomena—but I shall confine my remarks to the few which are presented in the first sentence of the author's *Preface*.

"*Notwithstanding the numerous publications upon English grammar, and the ability with which many of them are written, it is a fact which I believe few will deny, that this science has never been so simplified, as to render the study of it at once concise, easy and inviting.*"

This sentence not only presents two words that cannot be parsed, but exhibits a fair specimen of the work from which it has been taken. I allude to the words, *publications* and *ability*. These nouns which occupy so conspicuous a place in the sentence, are neither in the nominative, possessive, nor objective case! I will now attempt to correct the author's sentence, the ill construction of which, clearly shows that he should *learn* English grammar before he undertakes to *simplify* Mr. MURRAY!

Notwithstanding the publications on English grammar are numerous, and the ability with which many of them are written, highly respectable, it is a fact, which I believe few will deny, that this science has never yet been so simplified as to render it at once concise, easy, and inviting.

In this construction "*publications*" is in the nominative case to *are*, expressed; and "*ability*" to *is* understood.

But it may be contended that "*notwithstanding*" is a preposition, and that "*publications*" and "*ability*" are in the objective case, and governed by "*notwithstanding*."

In Grammar Simplified, I find the word given as a conjunction, without the least intimation that it can ever be a preposition. That *notwithstanding* is not a preposition, is proved from the fact, that it never can refer to any of the *objective* pronouns; as, *notwithstanding them, notwithstanding him.*

This word, however, may be used in connection with *he, they, I, she, &c.*, with perfect propriety.

All prepositions can be used with the objective case; as, of *him*, with *them, &c.*

"*Notwithstanding*" cannot be used with the objective case; therefore it can *not* be a preposition.

1. I will go *notwithstanding him*!
2. I shall return, *notwithstanding them*!

This word is ever a conjunction, and subjoins a mono; as, I will go *notwithstanding* he forbids it, I shall return *notwithstanding* they are against it.

"*Notwithstanding*" is frequently used in monos which are elliptical; as, I shall return *notwithstanding* your commands.

That is, *notwithstanding* your commands are that I shall *not*—or, *notwithstanding* your commands are *against* it.

In a work entitled "*Johnson's English Dictionary, as improved by Todd,*" &c., I have found the following account of "*notwithstanding*."

"*Notwithstanding*, not-with-stand-ing, *conj.* [This word is properly a participial adjective, as it is compounded of *not* and *withstanding*, and answers exactly to the Latin *non obstante,*] *without* hindrance or obstruction from."

The reason which is here offered for calling "*notwithstanding*" a *participial* adjective, is not sound: and the position with respect to the meaning of "*notwithstanding*," is without the least plausibility. Indeed, the signification of this word is the very *reverse* of that which is presented in the above quotation: for, instead of denoting that there is *no* obstruction, it always indicates that there *is* an obstruction, and implies that it may be overcome or removed; as, He will return *notwithstanding* your commands; He will pay his debts *notwithstanding* his poverty; I shall go *notwithstanding* I am sick.

That is, although your commands may *obstruct*, yet I shall return.

Although his poverty produces a great obstruction to the paying of his debts, yet he will pay them.

Although my illness is an obstacle to my being there, yet I shall go.

Notwithstanding the publications upon English grammar are numerous, and the ability with which many of them are written, highly respectable, it is

a fact, that this science has never yet been so simplified as to render the study of it at once concise, easy and inviting.

That is, although the numerous publications, and the great ability, oppose the position taken in the concluding clause of the above sentence, yet this obstruction may be overcome, and the position "*that this science has never yet been so simplified,*" &c. sustained.

Much has been said by a few of the learned respecting the *merits* of "*GRAMMAR SIMPLIFIED.*"—They have all stated that its superiority consists in that simplification which arises from presenting the subject of grammar to the *eye*. And, indeed, the title of the work is—*AN OCULAR ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.*"

Now, if I show that the *blind* can learn from Mr. Greenleaf's Ocular Grammar, as fast as those who can see, I trust that all will conclude, that the principle for which his work has been so highly extolled, and to which his title page so forcibly alludes, cannot be found in his Grammar!

Mr. Mathews says:

"It has reduced the elementary principles of grammar into the form of a *chart*—and thus not only aids the memory of the pupil, but makes him, at one view, *see the bearing.*"

Mr. Ross, with others, speaks as follows:

"Mr. Greenleaf's method possesses one peculiarity, which affords singular advantages; the ear as well as the *eye* is continually, and yet agreeably impressed by the subject. A surprising exemplification of the foregoing remarks was presented in the case of a pupil of Mr. Greenleaf, who was *blind*. The knowledge of etymology and syntax, evinced in the examination of this interesting pupil, who had attended the *usual* course of lessons, was, in the estimation of many spectators, an ample *demonstration* of the superior advantages of Mr. Greenleaf's plan!"

JAMES ROSS, A. M.

Author of *Ross' Greek and Latin Grammar, Vocabulary, &c.*

REV. DR. THOMAS DUNN,
REV. JAMES SMITH,
REV. WILLIAM SMITH,
DR. CHARLES W. PARISH.

Philadelphia, April 2, 1822.

And how, pray, is it proved that the *eye* is continually, and agreeably impressed by this *Ocular Grammar*? Why, by the astonishing progress of a *blind* boy!! Does not the case cited by those distinguished gentlemen, afford an *ample demonstration*, that Grammar Simplified is not an *ocular* analysis of the English language?"—and that the principle ascribed to this system by those who have recommended the work, forms no part of Greenleaf's method!

I shall do Mr. Greenleaf the favor of instructing those who have not seen his work, respecting its

mysterious simplicity. As a general remark I would observe, that the simplicity of his system consists in *confusing* the mind by presenting upon the *same*, page, almost the whole of this *abstruse* work. Yes, upon the ninth page of "GRAMMAR SIMPLIFIED," I find *etymology*, and *syntax*, inseparably leagued against all the powers of conception of which the human intellect is master. Yes, strange as it may appear, upon the ninth page of this work, the parts of speech, the various divisions of nouns, pronouns, numbers, persons, declensions, cases, moods, tenses, lists of adjectives, minutiae, and exceptions, with the different rules of syntax, are arrayed in SMALL Brevier type! And to add to the simplicity of this *technical* group, or *grammatical* assemblage, the superficies of the *paper* plane is cut up into right angles which form *cells*, calculated to separate and confine the various branches of this wisely *huddled* convention of terminology.

If these compartments are necessary in order to aid the *eye* in dividing matter from matter, subject from subject, sign from sign &c., does it appear that the *mind* can separate this consolidated *package*, so as to understand the *massive* science here presented? Who, before the publication of "GRAMMAR SIMPLIFIED," ever heard that *method*, that *simplicity*, consists in burdening the tender mind with *ALL* the principles, *ALL* the technicality, *ALL* the exceptions, *ALL* the rules, divisions, subdivisions, with *ALL* the forms, windings, courses, and attitudes of an extensive *abstruse* science, at the same time!

What says the immortal Locke? "The mind can successfully attend to but one thing at the same time."

And what is the verdict of the imperishable Johnson? "There is no other method of teaching that of which any one is ignorant, than by means of something already known."

To the correctness of this sentiment every philosopher, and every *mechanic* can attest. Does he who learns a trade grasp the whole at once? or does he begin at the simple preparatory steps, and move on as his faculties become ripened, and his judgment matured by practice?

PICKET'S GRAMMAR.

The following is the title page of this work:

"*Analytical School Grammar. Picket's Grammar of the English Language, comprising its principles and rules: adapted to the business of instruction in Primary Schools. By A. Picket, author of the American School class books, the Juvenile Spelling Book, &c., &c.*"

"*The most certain method of rendering a people free and happy is to establish a correct method of education.*"

"*Analytical School Grammar.*"

As English grammars are usually written for schools, it is not easy to account for the use of this

inceptive phrase, "*Analytical School Grammar!*" Has this phrase been used to *aid* the following clause in showing that the author's grammar is designed for schools? "*adapted to the business of instruction in primary schools!*"

"Picket's Grammar of the English Language, comprising its principles and rules."

The clause comprising its principles, and rules, is as redundant as the first phrase is improper, useless, and *queer*! If it is a grammar of the English language, does it not follow, of course, that it comprises its principles?

Nor can the just critic stop here—for in this redundant clause, there are two redundant words:

"Comprising its principles *and* rules."

What *new* idea does the word *rules*, express?

"Picket's Grammar of the English Language, comprising its principles and rules, adapted to the business of instruction in primary schools."

Improved:

"Picket's Grammar of the English language, adapted to the business of instruction in primary schools."

"Adapted to the business of instruction in primary schools."

The use of the word, *business*, proves pretty conclusively that Mr. Picket does not understand the business of making *Grammars*! The learned author, and *experienced teacher*, has appropriated his book exclusively to the *instructor*. It is adapted to the business of *instruction*. Who gives the instruction? Does the pupil, or the teacher give it? But even if there is no error in this respect, there is a great want of taste in another point of view. The commonness of the word, *business*, has made it too *foul* to be used in the title page of a *school* book—instead, therefore, of employing the word, *business*, which is besmeared with the filth of commonality, I would find some *clean* word, expressive of the true idea; namely, that the book is designed for both teacher, and pupil—

Picket's Grammar of the English Language, adapted to the *use* of primary schools.

"*Of instruction in*" is a useless part, and it should be omitted.

"The most certain method of rendering a people free and happy, is to establish a correct method of education."

While I cheerfully respond to this sentiment, I am sorry to condemn the manner in which it is expressed. That a period so just in idea, and so deformed in structure, should be found in print, is not singular. But that a *professed Philologist* should select such a one as the motto for a *Grammar*, is both singular, and unfortunate!

The period speaks of a highly dignified subject; namely, the *most* sure means for setting an *enslaved* people free, and rendering them happy. And I verily believe that when Mr. Picket shall have acquired a just philological taste, he will

condemn the words, *certain*, and *method*, as too feeble, and common to hold a place in the motto of his Grammar! Perhaps the words, *sure*, and *means*, would answer as well as *certain* and *method*—

"The most *sure means* of rendering a people free and happy, is, to establish a correct method of education."

In speaking of rendering a people *free*, the sentence clearly alludes to a nation, or a country that is in a state of slavery. But, prisoners, and slaves are not *rendered* free—they are *set free*! We may speak of *rendering* a people *happy*—though not of *rendering* them *free*! The prayer of the coloured man was not, *render* me free, but "*set me free*."

Therefore I would recommend Mr. Picket to adopt the language of this sable petitioner, which will not only partially correct, but greatly beautify his motto:

The most *sure means* of *setting* a people free, and rendering *them* happy, is, a correct *method* of education.

ANALYTICAL SCHOOL GRAMMAR.

"*Picket's Grammar of the English Language, comprising its principles and rules: adapted to the business of instruction in Primary Schools. By A. Picket, author of the American School class books, the Juvenile Spelling Book, &c. &c.*"

"The most *certain method* of rendering a people free and happy, is, to establish a correct *method* of education."

Was it not that Mr. Picket has sanctioned this sentence by giving it a place upon the very title page of a GRAMMAR, I should venture to say that the phrase, "*correct method of education*," is nearly as *incorrect* as the present *system* of education is inefficient!

Partially corrected:

Picket's Grammar of the English Language, adapted to the use of primary schools, by A. Picket, author of the American school class books, the juvenile spelling book, &c. &c.

The most *sure means* of *setting* a people free, and rendering *them* happy, is to establish a correct *system* of education.

Fully corrected:

An English Grammar, adapted to the use of primary schools: by A. Picket, author of the American school class books, the juvenile spelling book, &c. &c.

The *sure means* for preserving the freedom, and happiness of a people, is to *discourage* that *quackery* which renders art hateful to youth, and science loathsome to adults.

"Grammar, says Dr. Adam, is founded on common sense."

The above is the first sentence, in Mr. Picket's Grammar.

The following is the second:

"*Every sentiment expressed by words exemplifies its rules, and the ignorant observe them as well as the learned.*"

I would ask Mr. Picket whether *in*, as used in the fourth sentence of the preface of his Grammar, exemplifies any rule in the science of grammar:

"Children discover their capacity for understanding the rules of grammar by putting them *in* practice."

As *put* requires *into*, this sentence appears to me to exemplify a violation of a rule in grammar!

1. He put his hand, not *in*, but *into* his pocket. Is the bread put, not *in*, but *into* the oven?

In the same preface I find the following:

"Grammar is nothing *else than* a delineation of those rules which we observe in every expression of thought by words."

If the sentiment of this sentence is true, whence does Mr. Picket derive authority for the use of "*than*?"

"He is nothing *else than* a man," is as good as Mr. Picket's, "grammar is nothing *else than* a delineation," &c.

Grammar is nothing *more than* a delineation, is English!—so also is this—grammar is nothing *but* a delineation.

I would here observe to Mr. Picket, notwithstanding his attempt to overthrow my theory, is a high recommendation of his profound learning, that *than* cannot be used without an adjective in the comparative degree; as, he is more *vain than* learned.

"Grammar is nothing *else than* a delineation of those rules which we observe in every expression of thought by words."

The reader will observe that this *literary Ajax*, is quite emphatic—grammar is nothing *else than* a delineation of those rules which we observe in every expression of thought.

Let me now see whether Mr. Picket has delineated *grammar* in every expression in the following sentence:

"I have collected, from the most authentic sources, such materials, and endeavoured to *modify* and *arrange* them *into such forms*," &c.

For a grammarian to speak of *modifying* a thing *into* a form, is laughable—and for an *author* of a grammar to tell of *arranging* things *into form*, is "*preposterously absurd*."*

If I am not deceived in my ideas of grammar, the following alterations will much improve, if not entirely correct Mr. Picket:

I have collected, from the most authentic sources, such materials, and endeavoured to modify, and arrange them *in a way which*, in my judgment, the nature of the subject, and the business of instruction require.

* For the accuracy of the phrase, *preposterously absurd*, or in other words, *absurdly absurd*, I give Mr. Picket himself!!

To modify them into a form!

To arrange them into a form!

ROSSELL C. SMITH'S GRAMMAR.

"If any one should take up this work with the impression that he has met with another Murray's Grammar, &c."

That is, should any one take up this work under the *prevalence*, under the *influence*, of the *impression* that he has met with another Murray's Grammar, &c.

Perhaps the use of *under*, would be better than that of *with*, in this particular case. *With*, aided by the context, seems to carry the idea that the impression under whose *prevalence* the act is done, is in fact the instrument with which it is done. "If any one should take up this work with the *impression*," &c.

The *impression*, when connected with the act of *taking up*, seems to resemble an instrument rather than a *cause*. We take up books with the hand. I do not think, however, that the use of *with* in the above instance, is a very great impropriety. But, from the errors which pervade the rest of the sentence, I am disposed to attribute the propriety in this case of *with* more to *chance* than to *knowledge*.

"If any one should take up this work with the impression that he has met with *another Murray's Grammar*, he is respectfully requested to suspend his judgment, &c."

Mr. Smith intends to say another *Grammar*—but he has not only failed in this attempt; but he has actually *created a second Murray!* Says Mr. Smith, you have not found the *well known Lindley Murray's Grammar* in the work which you have just taken up, but a *Grammar of another Murray!* I presume that this other Murray is *Roswell C. Smith Murray!*

1. Another *boy's* book.

3. Another *man's* hat.

3. Another *Murray's Grammar*.

Corrected.—Should any one take up this book under the impression that he has found *another Grammar by Mr. Murray*, he is respectfully requested to suspend his judgment till a careful perusal of its contents has furnished some data upon which to predicate a just, and candid opinion of its merits.

1. *Upon* should be exchanged for *of*: we cannot say, predicate *on*, or *upon*.

2. The words, *its*, *contents*, *some*, *data*, *upon*, *which*, *to*, *predicate*, *a*, *just*, *and*, *candid*, *opinion*, and *of*, are redundant!!

3. "*Has* furnished" should be exchanged for *shall* have furnished.

4. *If* should be rejected; and *should* should be the *first* word in the sentence.

5. If any man should take up this work with the impression that he has met with another *Murray's Grammar*, &c.

Now, a man, who is under *this impression*, would not be very likely to take up Mr. Smith's book at all! What, pray, could induce any one to take it up? Mr. Smith says that the impression that it is another Murray's Grammar induces him to take it up. If any one should take up this book *with the impression* that it is, &c.

Now, it appears to me that this impression would rather induce one to *lay it down* than to take it up! Indeed does not Mr. Smith himself mean this?

From a slight glance, some may be under the impression, that this work is nothing but *Murray's Grammar*.

Or,

From a slight glance, some may *lay down* this work, under the impression that it is nothing but another edition of *Murray's Grammar*.

What a grammarian must he be, who by a blunder in syntax, gives that as the cause for *taking up*, which he intends as the cause for *laying down!* Things seems strangely inverted by grammarians: "*taking up*" is used for *throwing down*, and "*throwing down*" for *taking up*, so that Mr. Smith will hardly know whether I have taken *him up*, or *thrown him down!* But should he find much difficulty in settling this point, I would commend his ease to the teachers of our public schools, who, from a long familiarity with his work, must be able to give him prompt relief! In the mean time I must be excused for putting Mr. Smith's *old* wine into a *new* bottle.

Those, who, from a slight glance at this work, are under the impression that it is *Murray's Grammar*, are invited to correct their error by a *full* examination. (28 words.)

"If any one should take up this work with the impression that he has met with another Murray's Grammar, he is respectfully requested to suspend his judgment till a careful perusal of its contents has furnished some data upon which to predicate a just and candid opinion of its merits. (50 words.) (22 redundant words.)

JOAB BRACE'S GRAMMAR.

(The following sentence is from a grammar by *Joab Brace*. The few reflections which I have made upon some of the improprieties that pervade it, may be ascribed to the attempt of him, and his brother to turn public opinion against my works, while they were preparing theirs!)

"*Its author was a teacher of age, of experience in teaching, and of uncommon professional fact.*"

"Of Age."

This is a very common mono: we often hear it said, The son is *of age*. And in one instance in the New Testament, this very mono is used to express a competency to act for one's self: "he is *of age*—ask him." But as used by Mr. Brace, this mono seems to indicate an inferiority in *age*,

or in something else, which renders him incompetent to act for others in the cause of education.

"*Lennie's Grammar was published some years since in Edinburgh. Its author was a teacher of age.*"

Had Mr. Brace said, Its author is of *age*, he would have been understood to mean that its author was *capable, competent*. He affirms, however, that its author was a *teacher of age*, and from the *context*, seems to wish to mean a teacher *well stricken in years!*

"*In its general outline, in the arrangement of the several parts, and in the manner of presenting each, it does indeed correspond in some degree with Lennie's Grammar.*"

1. "*Correspond with*" imports reciprocation in action—but Mr. Brace uses it to express *similarity, likeness!*

2. "*Of age*" means old enough to act for oneself—but Mr. Brace employs it to express the idea of being too old to act for oneself! I know as little of Mr. Brace as he seems to know of English grammar. As a man, he may be of *age*. But as an *author*, he is certainly a *minor!*

Should what is here said, be considered by him as an attack upon his book, I should be glad to correspond *with* him upon the subject; and I will now pledge myself to demonstrate even to himself, that his book does not correspond either in *PRINCIPLES, or STYLE* to the grammar of the English Language.

"Its author was a teacher of *age, of experience, in teaching, and of uncommon professional tact.*"

In the second uncorrodictive clad, of *experience* of is well used: but the whole *mono* is *redundant*. "*A teacher of age*" is intended to signify a *teacher of experience*; hence the *mono*, "*of experience*," is nothing but a correct way of expressing what Mr. Brace had already expressed in an *incorrect way!*

"*In teaching*" is as redundant as is the *mono*, "*of experience*,"—hence as useless in this sentence, as is his Grammar in the world.

[Its author was a teacher] (of experience) (*in teaching*.) Is there any thing more in the above *three monos*, than there is in the following two?

"Its author was a *teacher of experience.*

and of uncommon *professional tact.*"

This is the conclusion of the above sentence, and is no doubt intended to impart a *finish*, a garnishing, to the whole. But of what essential service is the word, *professional*? Is it not as important to insert "*professional*" before *experience*, as it is to put it before *tact*.

Its author was a *teacher of professional experience.*

The word *teacher*, shows that the experience intended, is an experience in the *profession of teaching*. And would not the noun, *teacher*, show also that the *tact* intended by Mr. BRACE, is *tact in the same profession?*

Its author was a *teacher* of much *tact*.

Is it necessary to add the *mono, in teaching?*

Its author was a *teacher of much tact in teaching.*

The use of *professional* is *pedantic*, and *pleonastic*, and reminds me of the following encomium:

"My brother is a broom-maker, of uncommon *broom-making skill!*"

"Its author is a *teacher of age*, of experience *in teaching*, and of uncommon *professional tact.*" That is,

My brother is an *old broom-maker*, of experience *in making brooms*, and of uncommon *broom-making tact!*

Now, in these days of *retrenchment*, would not the following be more acceptable?

My brother is a *broom-maker* of experience, and uncommon *skill.*

This principle of *retrenchment* applied to the sentence of Mr. Brace, would greatly diminish his engine, without any subtraction from its *burden, or powers.*

Its author was a teacher of experience, and uncommon *tact.*

The redundant parts, then, are—of *age, in teaching, of, and professional!* What a waste of matter, and a crush of words!

Under page 5, is the following:

"This the author is ready to acknowledge, and he would express a hope that by an approval of the present arrangement, the *public* may show *themselves* prepared for the full development of the perfect plan."

From this sentence, it seems that the book already published by Mr. Brace, is only the *first ray* of that luminary which is to wind up the catastrophe of illustration, after this mere gleam shall have prepared the benighted vision of the "*public themselves*" for the blazing beams "*of his perfect plan!*"

The British English grammarians have said much—their extravagance dampens the spirits of the pupil at the very threshold of his study; and their *incongruities*, and palpable contradictions force him from the sound, and sober exercise of his judgment. They have founded their system upon principles which have been demonstrated false. This is certainly a matter of regret. But it is matter of astonishment, and lamentation, to find so many *Americans* labouring to improve these *radical* defects by varying the *size, style, and mode* of the British essays.

Mr. Brace says, that his system is built upon the *basis* of Lennie's.

"It has been already stated that this Grammar is arranged on the *basis* of Lennie's Grammar.

Had Mr. Brace erected a superstructure upon the basis of Lennie's work, he would have furnished another instance of building upon *sand!* But he has not only not built upon Lennie's foundation, *but he has not built upon any foundation!* He is without a *basis*; and he may be swept off

by a single puff of the critic's breath! He is not only without a foundation, but without a superstructure also—his title page is a *door* without a *temple*, without a hinge upon which to turn, or a beam on which to hang. What he *calls* his *system*, is *condemned* matter, abstruse beyond the powers of illustration, and tangled beyond the skill of human method—*benumbing* to the *judgment*, and *enslaving* to the *memory* of the pupil. But, then, Mr. *Brace* is yet in a state of *incubation*—order is yet to be brought out of *chaos*; in a word, "*the perfect plan*" is to come forth: the author has promised, and it would be infidelity not to believe! *Chasms* are yet to be filled; and *crooked* is to be made *straight*. There is, then, a day of triumph for *English Grammar*. Let it come—I long to see *error* exchanged for *truth*, *confusion* for *method*, *contradiction* for *harmony*, *absurdity* for *consistency*, and *foolishness* for *wisdom*. But when I consider that this great work is to be accomplished by the author of the following sentence, I feel guilty of the *sin* of *unbelief*.

"Its author was a *teacher of age*, of experience in *teaching*, and of uncommon *professional* tact."

PETER BULLIONS' ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

"As an art grammar teaches the right method of applying these principles to a particular language, so as *thereby* to express our thoughts in a *correct*, and *proper* manner according to established usage."

This sentence is certainly a curiosity. Short as it is, it comprises *seventeen redundant* words. The sentence has *thirty-three* words—and every idea which is expressed by the thirty-three, is expressed by the following sixteen:

"As an art, it, (*grammar*) teaches the *right* method of applying these principles to a particular language."

"So as thereby to express our thoughts in a *correct*, and *proper* manner, according to established usage!

The syllabane, *the right method* of applying these principles to language, exhausts the subject of accuracy.

"So as thereby to express our thoughts in a *correct* and *proper* manner."

What is gained by the use of *proper*? Do not *correct* and *proper* mean the same thing!? And as *grammar* is *established usage* with reference to language, what good results from the syllabane "*according to established usage*?"

The sentence is substantially this:

As an art *grammar* teaches the *right* method of applying the principles of *grammar* to a particular language, so as thereby to express our thoughts in a *correct* and *proper* manner, according to the *established principles of grammar*!!!


Having given a specimen of the manner in which they who *mend* Mr. *Murray*, employ the English language, it may not be amiss to show in what way they who teach by his system, use it.

MR. ROCHE'S LECTURE ON GRAMMAR.

EXPLANATION.

At the time the following notice appeared in some of the Philadelphia papers, I made the critical remarks that follow it. These were published in the form of a circular entitled the "*HEARER'S BRIEF*" which was distributed among the ladies and gentlemen, assembled to hear the lecture. And lest some of my readers should not be so *acute* as to discern my motive for giving them a place in this work, it may be well to state, that I have thought that his advertisement is a production which merits a perpetuity that a common advertising, decaying newspaper, or even the "*HEARER'S BRIEF*," is ill calculated to afford. I should be glad to give the *lecture itself*—but I presume that as the papers of *great* men are rarely published before their death, very few of the present generation will be benefitted by that rare emanation of learning, and wit! His *style of writing* may be learned from his public notice; and his manner of *reasoning* may be seen from the following specimen. To show that the author of the new theory is wrong in asserting that there is no difference in meaning between the two following phrases—"a *virtuous person*, a *person of virtue*," he proceeds as follows:

"Now it is confidently asserted by Mr. Brown, that there is no difference between a man of virtue, and a virtuous man—but as there is a difference between a *horse chesnut*, and a *chesnut horse*, so also is there between a man of virtue, and a virtuous man!!"

" MARTIN ROCHE will deliver a lecture on Friday evening next, the 19th instant, in the Franklin Institute, on the subject of *ENGLISH GRAMMAR*, embracing a comparative review of *Murray's* principles, and those of Mr. James Brown's *Grammar*. To commence at seven o'clock.

"All persons feeling interested are respectfully invited to attend. Free admission."—*American Daily Advertiser*.

"*Post factum nullum concilium.*"

That Mr. Roche is very capable of discussing this subject, is evident from the *taste*, and *skill* which he discovers in the above notice. In a few particulars, however, the gentleman is somewhat faulty; and, although I have but a moment to devote to this subject, I trust that I shall be able to point out as many defects as will excite his feelings of gratitude, yet not as many as will lessen the *confidence* which he has in *himself*!

I believe it is universally conceded, that in the construction of a sentence, the central point of

thought, the main thing, should occupy a conspicuous place. This principle rests upon two things, viz.—that any other position would not only ill comport with the dignity of that upon which the whole sentence turns, but would hold the reader in *suspense* longer than is agreeable, or necessary.

“**M** MARTIN ROCHE will deliver a lecture on Friday evening next, the 19th instant, in the Franklin Institute.”

But on what is Mr. Roche to lecture? Ah! of this the reader is still ignorant! When I first read this advertisement, I was under the impression that the *would-be-lecturer* had selected *Friday evening* as the *subject*, instead of the *time* of his contemplated lecture!

“**M** MARTIN ROCHE will deliver a lecture on *Friday evening!*”

Upon a second reading, however, I learned that he intends lecturing on *English Grammar*—and upon this discovery, I arranged the parts of the first clause of his sentence, as follows:

MARTIN ROCHE will deliver a *lecture* on *ENGLISH GRAMMAR*, in the Franklin Institute, Friday evening, the 19th instant, “embracing a comparative review of Murray’s principles, and those of Mr. James Brown’s Grammar.”

It is a fundamental principle, that when analogous ideas are in contiguous sentences, or monos of a sentence, they should be expressed in analogous language, and in analogous construction.

“For (says Mr. Murray,) when things themselves correspond to each other, we naturally expect to find a similar correspondence in the words.”

1. “Murray’s principles”—

2. “And those of Mr. James Brown’s Grammar.”

The second clause is entirely different in *language* and *construction*, from the first. Had Mr. Roche written according to the rules of the system which he uses in his school, he would have constructed the above clause in the following manner:

Of Murray’s, and of Brown’s principles.

Or thus:

The principles of Murray’s Grammar, and those of Brown’s.

“Embracing a comparative review of Murray’s, and of Brown’s principles.”

“Embracing a *comparative* review of Murray’s principles, and those of Mr. James Brown’s Grammar, with a view to *eligibility*.”

The use of “*comparative*,” and “*eligibility*” discovers a *fine taste*, and a *profound philological* research. At the word, “*comparative*,” the lecturer attempts in vain to express a particular idea—and, after stumbling through the rickety clause that follows the classic ground on which this essay is made, he renews the attempt in the word. “*eligibility*,” again *fails*, and *closes the scene!*

The object that the lecturer has so eagerly pursued, and which he would have seized with so much avidity, is the *comparative merits* of the two systems of grammar, to which he alludes in that finely constructed clause, which fully retrieves the literary character lost in these unfortunate attempts!

The word “*eligible*,” has no comparative allusion whatever—nor has “*eligibility*.” “What is *eligible* is desirable in itself; what is preferable is more desirable than another. There may be eligible situations, out of which there may be but one which is preferable.”

CRABB.

When it is said that a man is *eligible* to an office, the idea is, not that he is *preferable* to another—but simply, that he is *worthy* of the office. There may be a *preference* where there is no *eligibility*. For instance—neither of two certain men, who may be candidates for any particular office, may be eligible to the office; yet, if one *must* be elected, there may be a preference.

The sentence, with my attempted corrections, reads thus:

MARTIN ROCHE will deliver a *LECTURE* on *ENGLISH GRAMMAR*, in the Franklin Institute, Friday Evening, the 19th instant; embracing an *examination* of Murray’s and Brown’s principles, with a view to *show the comparative merits of the two systems*.

“All persons feeling *interested* are particularly invited to attend.”

This sentence is chargeable with unjustifiable *pleonasm* and *enallage*. “*PERSONS*” and “*FEELING*” are useless.

All interested are particularly invited to attend.

In this quotation, the word “*interested*,” is so used that it cannot be parsed! “*Feeling*” is an active participle, and must have some objective word—hence an *interest* must be substituted for “*interested!*!”

All feeling an *interest*, are particularly invited to attend.

But Mr. Roche will appear on the defensive with the plea that “*feeling interested*” is a common phrase! It is *her*, who have you seen, I have wrote a letter, &c. &c., are quite common. But are these to be made into a calash to hide this man’s face from the public gaze?

And is it possible that he, who has been a teacher in this city, the capital of the *American* republic of letters, for thirty years, has written this notice? And is this the gentleman who has invited all persons *feeling interested*, to his lecture, embracing a *comparative* review of *Murray’s principles* and *those of Mr. James Brown’s Grammar*, with a view to *eligibility!*!

“*Sic transit gloria mundi.*”

“*Lower Dublin Academy, situated one mile above Holmsburg, and ten from Philadelphia.*”

“In this seminary, young gentlemen are boarded and carefully instructed in the useful branches of a

polite education; and expeditiously qualified to enter any college in the United States.

"Terms, payable quarterly, in advance. For board, washing and tuition in the customary branches of an English education, thirty dollars per quarter."

A very just and plain rule in writing, is that the construction of the sentence, and the nature of the subject, should accord one with the other; as, John was boarded and educated in the house of his uncle."

Here, the construction clearly indicates that John was boarded in his uncle's house; and the nature of the subject is obviously consistent with this indication: for it is very possible for one to be *boarded* and *taught* under the *same* roof.

"In this seminary, young gentlemen are boarded and carefully instructed," is correct English. But, when to this, it is subjoined that they are *boarded* and *taught* in the usual branches of English education, the above rule is violated.

Here it is as clearly intimated that the pupil is *boarded* in the *branches* of education, as it is in the first that John was boarded in the house of his uncle. But as the branches of an English education can hardly be converted into a *boarding house*, the construction of the sentence is opposed to the nature of that sentence upon which it is founded.

A more striking violation of the above rule may be found in the following sentence:

"For board washing and tuition in the customary branches of an English education, thirty dollars."

That is, for board in the branches of an English education, for *washing* in the customary *branches*, of an English education, as well as for *tuition* in the customary branches of an English education! Thus the construction of this sentence first calls upon the *branches* of an English education to become a *boarding house*; secondly, to become a *wash tub*; and, thirdly, a *counting house*!

"Terms, payable quarterly in advance."

What is payable in advance? why the terms—a very curious sort of coin indeed! Better thus:

At this seminary young gentlemen are carefully instructed in the usual branches of a polite education, and expeditiously qualified to enter any college in the United States.

TERMS—Tuition for the customary branches of an English education, with board and washing, thirty dollars, payable quarterly, in advance.

IN CONCLUSION, may I not express a hope that American children will learn grammar as it is in *truth*, not as it is in *error*. But it may be said that children are not able to perceive truth in grammar. Let children, then, attend to those branches which depend more upon the *memory* than upon the *judgment*.

On the ground, however, that children can attend to nothing to greater advantage than to grammar, it is far better that they should attend to it as it is in *truth*, or *philosophy*, than as it is in *error*. Will any pretend that *error* can be better understood by children, than *truth*, and *philosophy*?

What is English grammar, but philosophy of the English language? He, therefore, that studies grammar, studies a part of the *constructive* philosophy of the English language. And in the study of a grammatical system, grammar is attended to no further than that system is founded on the *philosophy* of the language.

True, the child that is quite young, and unaccustomed to reflection, can not receive the philosophy of the language in all the love of the adult philologist: but, as his habits become studious, and his mind advances to manhood, he will perceive the philosophy, the grammar of his language, with delight and affection.

Before closing these Reflections, I deem it a duty to make a few remarks upon the subject of *education*. And, for the good of children, I would ask parents to give these remarks a hearty consideration.

EDUCATION.

To educate youth is to qualify persons to discharge with despatch and accuracy, those duties which arise from the relations of reciprocally dependent beings. Such a qualification may be considered an *education*. And as the prosperity of individuals, as well as the happiness of society, depends very much upon this, there are few things to which parents should be more attentive than to the means employed for the instruction of their children. But among the numerous objects which share the attention of parents, education is rarely found; and the *plan* of instruction never, perhaps receives one *sound*, *sober* thought. Upon this subject much might be said; in this place, however, I shall honestly notice a few of the many points to which parents should be more attentive.

All parents who desire to place their children at school should propose the following questions to themselves, before they select a teacher:

1. Has the teacher himself that knowledge which we desire our children to acquire?
2. Has the teacher the *faculty of communicating* his own knowledge to others—and especially, to *children*?
3. Does the teacher instruct because he *likes* to *teach*, or because he can get *nothing* else to do?
4. Has the teacher talents to make just *rules*, and judgment to apply them in a manner which will produce that order in his school that facilitates the progress of his pupils?
5. Can the teacher *speak* the English language with *propriety*?

Much importance should be attached to the teacher's skill in his own language. The instructor who is without a critical acquaintance with the English language, is without that knowledge which every child should acquire at school. It is hoped that the time will soon come, when no one will be encouraged as a teacher of American youth, who does not even in his daily conversation, speak the English language with propriety. Every teacher should articulate distinctly, and pronounce according to the sanctioned standard of orthoepy. He should select his words by the rules of rhetoric, and form them into sentences by the laws of grammar. As the teacher of youth sets examples in speech, which his pupils will generally follow, how important it becomes to encourage those persons only, who use the language with grammatical precision, and rhetorical purity.

THE NEW SYSTEM DEFENDED AGAINST THE RECENT
ATTACK OF THE REV. DR. ROBERT J. BRECKIN-
RIDGE, OF BALTIMORE.

"AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM."

(HEAR BOTH SIDES.)

To the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, Baltimore.

DEAR SIR,—A friend has just put into my hand, the August number of the "BALTIMORE LITERARY AND RELIGIOUS MAGAZINE," adorned externally, with your own untitled name, and enriched internally, with your own rare learning, wit, and piety.

In the production which commences under page 380, you appear to great advantage. The scene is one of deep interest: the affair opens with the abrupt entrance of a *grammar* lecturer, by whom a book is presented to you, which, in your own inimitable style, *inculcates* the system on which this philological magician had been performing a few of his *necromantic* feats in your own city! The *binding* of the book is brilliant, and *morocco*; and the advocates of it, numerous and potent. The lecturer attempts to expound some of the mysteries of the system; and his first puff throws you into a *Chinese puzzle*! He makes a second attempt, and you exclaim—a *Freezeland* that has *backed* into life! And, like another Don Quixotte, you fall upon this Freezeland chicken; and in a few short minutes almost three pages of the Baltimore Magazine are covered with the blood, plumage, and bones of grammar! Of the lecturer himself, you give no account—but certain it is, that he was not immolated upon the same altar upon which you offered up his system! But, although you have not mingled his *blood* with the sacrifice, you have not withheld *your own*! Yes, sir, from the same altar from which rises the

smoke of the victim, ascends that of the priest who ministered at it.

The following is your first sentence;

"A volume handsomely bound in red morocco with the foregoing title was put into our hands, with a request to examine it by the gentleman who has been lecturing in our city on the system inculcated by the book."

In this sentence, the general reader will find every thing correct—the critical one, every thing wrong. And to see which is right, it will be necessary to examine its circumstances, and its construction. Had you made this sentence the *introduction* of the American Grammar to the notice of your readers, and, had you intended by your examination to *increase* the demand for the work, you would have plausible ground for that formality of style, and pleonasm of circumstance, which in the absence of those two facts indicate a want of that taste, judgment, and knowledge, which should be found in the *conductor* of a *Literary Magazine*!

You call the attention of the reader to the new system by giving him the full title:

"BROWN'S AMERICAN GRAMMAR."

"The American System of English Syntax, developing the constructive principles of the English Phrenod, or Language, and impressing them on the memory by pictorial and scenical demonstration; thus enabling the adult at home, and the child at school, to acquire in a few months, a better knowledge of Syntax by the American system than they can ever acquire by the British. By James Brown. Philadelphia: published by J. Blackmarr—1837. 12mo. pp. 442.

"A VOLUME handsomely bound in red morocco, with the foregoing title *was* put into our hands, with a request to *examine* it, by the gentleman who has been lecturing in our city, on the system inculcated by the book." (39 words.)

The gentleman who has been lecturing in our city on this system, has left us a copy of *this* work for examination. (22 words.)

39

22

17!!

But, sir, as I presume you have an inclination to learn, I will extend my reflections upon this sentence. And allow me to say, that in the following repetition of it, you will find the parts on which I can lecture to the best advantage to yourself, in italic characters:

"A volume handsomely bound in red morocco, with the foregoing title *was* put into our hands, with a request to *examine* it, by the gentleman who has been lecturing in our city on the system inculcated by the book."

How would you like to exchange *was* for *has been*—this exchange would not only give you *two*

for *one*, but would correct the shameful error which the use of *was* makes in the sense of the verb.

It is obvious that you were requested to examine the book. This idea, however, is derived from the *nature* of the *scene*; and not from the language with which you attempt to describe it.

"A volume handsomely bound in red morocco with the foregoing title, was put into our hands, with a request to examine it, by the gentleman," &c.

Let me employ the same construction where the nature of the case is not able to decide which of the two is to *examine*:

The son put an apple into the hands of his father with a request to *eat* it.

Is the father requested to eat—or is he requested to permit the son to eat?

If the author of the sentence means to show that the *father* is requested to eat the apple, he should construct it as follows:

The son put an apple into the hands of his father with a request that he *should* eat it. But, if he wishes to express that the father is requested to permit the *son* to eat it, he should construct the sentence as follows:

The son put an apple into the hands of his father with a request that he *might* eat it. If the author of the sentence, however, wishes to leave it uncertain whether the father is requested to *eat*, or to *permit* the son to eat, he should construct his sentence by that of the Reverend Doctor Robert J. Breckinridge, the conductor of the Baltimore *Literary Magazine*!

"On the system *inculcated* by the book."

I presume, sir, from this use of the word, *inculcated*, and from the mention which you make of Professor Stewart's Hebrew Grammar, that you are better acquainted with the Hebrew than with the *Latin*! With the utmost respect, sir, for your ardent love of the Greek verb as presented by Thiersch, and with no wish whatever to cast even the shade of a censure upon your modest veto of Professor Stewart's Hebrew Grammar, I would recommend your attention to the Latin word, *inculco*! In the mean time you will allow me to give you the meaning of its derivative, *inculcate*, to show you with what fidelity the offspring follows its parent in signification:

To *INCULCATE*, to *impress* with frequent *admonitions*; to *enforce* by constant repetition. JOHNSON. *Incultated, impressed, or enforced* by frequent *admonitions*. WEBSTER.

Admonition, in church discipline, private or public reproof to reclaim an offender. WEBSTER.

I would now, sir, *inculcate* upon you under the *admonition* of the error which you have here committed, to accept of *imparted* for *inculcated*:

"On the system *imparted* by the book, or on the system *taught*, or *presented* in the book."

Having, I presume, persuaded you to exchange *inculcated* for *imparted*, *taught*, or *presented*, par-

don me for employing one moment in an attempt to persuade you to give up the three words, "*by the book*," for two letters—*i* and *t*. These two letters, properly united, will make you a *snug* little substitute for the unwieldy trail which now drags your whole sentence out of form! Allow me, then, sir, to repeat your sentence with the substitution of *it*, for the words, "*by the book*."

"A volume handsomely bound in red morocco, with the foregoing title, was put into our hands for examination by the gentleman who has been lecturing in our city on the system *imparted* by it."

It is the province of the pronoun, in many instances, not only to prevent the repetition of the first noun, but to interdict a second, in recurring to the same thing denoted by the first. For instance, it is not English to use *the boy* in the following paragraph:

"She called her *son*: but *the boy* did not hear." She called her *son*; but he did not hear.

The panegyric which this sentence passes upon your knowledge of grammar, is an ample voucher for your competency in this department, to conduct a *Literary Magazine*! And surely, he who has read the following *exornation*, and still suspects a *want* of classic lore in you to grace the pages of such a work, passes no very high eulogium upon himself:

"*If ever an envious Juno sat cross-legged over the nativity of any intellectual offspring, we should hazard the conjecture of such a woful fate to this!*"

This is certainly a *Chinese puzzle*! Who, without the aid of this flourish in Heathen Mythology, could ever conceive that that *excellence* which makes Juno *envious*, is a *woful fate*! If ever a Juno was strung up for giving birth to special *ill shape*, and general *distortion*, I "*should hazard the conjecture of such a woful fate to*" yourself. Minerva, incensed as she must be, may still *Lynch* you—she may in her rage for revenge, wrest the magnetic pulleys from the grasp of old Vulcan, and you be raised higher for your *bad deeds*, than you ever will for your *good ones*!

Under page 380, you say:

"The whole affair exhibits one of the most extraordinary *vagaries* of the human mind, which has ever fallen under our notice."

"Mr. Brown indeed, sets out for a fundamental revolution in the science of Grammar—both in principles, and terminology; confining himself indeed to our language for the present, but ultimately subverting all, if his system can conquer, rather *massacre*."

"It is impossible to impart to the reader an accurate idea of his principles and methods, in the limits to which these observations are confined. We will, therefore, content ourselves with a few brief citations of his *principles, terms, and representations*, taken from various parts of the book."

Here follows a sentence which you tell the reader you have taken out of the *book*:

"A sentence is an assemblage of two, or more words containing a *condiction*!"

Now, sir, although you give the reader the very page from which you say you have quoted this paragraph, I must inform him that neither the *language* nor the *sentiment* of this sentence, can be found in the book!! But you *proceed* to inform the reader, that to illustrate the doctrine, the principle, of this sentence, there "*are cuts of a watch, a figure of interrogation, a crown, a man in a posture of supplication, and a rainbow.*" In this, however, there is no truth! The book makes no attempt to illustrate the principle of that sentence; for the sentence is not in the book!

You tell the reader that these figures represent the five *conditions*. Yet the book from which you profess to make these extracts, speaks of no *conditions* whatever!! I can readily see how you have formed the word, *condiction*. I presume you have made it from *con*, together, and *dico*, to say. But, then, the application of this word in a system of *Grammar* is certainly, as you yourself say, a *Chinese puzzle*!

You conclude your chapter of *conditions* as follows:

"It is asserted that no words, by their dictionary meaning, can express any of these five *conditions*!"

To this conclusion you subjoin the following paragraph:

"By this time we trust our readers have a clear notion of what a *sentence* is. If not, they will find the subject illustrated through 35 closely printed pages, by the aid of many cuts, and most prodigious terms!!"

You commence your next chapter by citing the divisions of the subject as found in the book.

"Part II. Illustration 1, p. 70.. There are two parts of speech, viz. *cormos*, and *ramus*."

"And this grand idea is illustrated through a large portion of the book, and with *pictures* and *terms*, never paralleled, we venture to say!"

What is the grand idea illustrated? Why, that in the *frame-work* of a sentence, the words, from their *trunk*, and *branch* relation, are divided into *cormos*, and *ramus* families. (*Cormos*, trunk, *Ramus*, a branch.)

"And with *pictures*, and *terms*, never paralleled we venture to say!"

One of the pictures employed is that of the *trunk* of a tree; the other is that of a branch!! They are under page 72.

One of the terms is *cormos*; the other is *ramus*!!

You have made the pretence to review my book, the occasion to distort and misrepresent it. You first cite the title of the work. You then say that you have been presented with a copy for your examination. To this you subjoin the fact,

that he from whom you received the copy, gave you the leading principles of the system with some of its technical terms, and some of its pictorial demonstrations. And yet, in your attempted review of this work, you have not presented your reader with *one* of its principles! Nor do you mention one of its terms, till after you make a *bluster against* them! And, to render this *tornado* effectual in sustaining the impressions which you labour to make by it, you give your reader, under the pretence of quoting from the *Grammar itself*, terms which had never been printed before they graced the pages of the Baltimore literary and Religious Magazine!! From the paragraphs which constitute this preliminary trick, as well as from those which are fabricated to consummate it, I have already quoted.

"The whole affair exhibits one of the most extraordinary *vagaries* of the human mind, which has ever fallen under our notice."

Now, to sustain yourself in this judgment, you contrive to make *me* say:

"A sentence is an assemblage of two or more words, containing a *condiction*!!"

You had already pronounced the work a *Chinese puzzle*—and to verify your assertion, you contrive to *make* it one! You devote more than half of your feigned attempt to quote from my book, to my exposition of a sentence. And in every instance you substitute *your own* technicality for mine!!

To your *farce* of pretending to quote me on a sentence, you add the following after-piece which is so much like your prologue, that it can be understood without comment:

"By this time we trust our readers have a clear notion of what a sentence is! If not, they will find the subject illustrated through 35 closely printed pages by the aid of many cuts, and most prodigious terms!"

The subject of a sentence is discussed within the limits of eleven pages!

You now commence *de novo*.

"P. 70. There are two parts of speech, viz. *cormos*, and *ra-mus*. The former he tells us, page 435, answers to the noun, pronoun, and interjection—which are the fundamental parts of speech; the latter, to all the others, which are accessory only. And this grand idea is illustrated through a large portion of the book, and with pictures and terms, never paralleled, we venture to say!"

The great difference between 35 and 11, as found between the truth, and your averment, makes *examination* in this, necessary to *faith*!

The idea that *nouns*, *pronouns*, and *interjections* are the fundamental parts of *speech*, is not only not illustrated through a large portion of the book, but it is not even advanced in any part of it. Nor is the subject of the *comparative importance* of words as parts of *speech*, as the *means* of *speech*.

agitated in it any farther than the full expression of the doctrine, that by the aid of the noun and verb, a *sentence, speech*, can be formed! It is on this principle that the book divides words into *sentensic*, and *insentensic*.

An Example. "There was a marriage."

There, a word of the *insentensic* order.

Was, a word of the *sentensic* order.

A, a word of the *insentensic* order.

Marriage, a word of the *sentensic* order.

Your course, sir, is any thing but honourable, any thing but pardonable. I presume that *you* think that these moral blotches may be healed by the sacredness of your station. But prudence and justice protest against a cure from such a source. Thus cured, they would be likely to break out anew, under an aggravated form; perhaps, beyond the reach of what is now a sovereign remedy. What! shall a Rev. Dr. offend, and harmlessly burrow within the gravity of his rank; and thus draw his earthly protection from the mere dignity of his heavenly commission? Had the review in question been the momentary emanation of a political partizan, or the puny effusions of a sarcastic scribbler, fed by the scintillations of his wit, and the distortions of truth, the offence might find some palliation in its source, necessity, and commonness. Or had it been thrown into existence by a youth whose heat had intoxicated his brain, the assault might find some assuagement from its proximity to the cradle! But the attack is the production of a man advanced in age, and matured from experience; one *professedly*, a Christian minister—one who labours to become the earthly head of that church whose heavenly Plinth frowns upon his deeds of slander. You, however, in extenuation of your offence, will tell this community that you have intended nothing like mean revengeful misrepresentation—not genuine falsehood, created without nobleness of purpose; but that your deep, your affectionate, regard for the flowers upon the hill of science, is the cause of your blasting the lilies in the vineyard of your Master. But was the interposition of *your* strong arm necessary to prevent the adoption of such a work as you have represented the American Grammar?!

"A Chinese puzzle,—the most extraordinary vagaries of the human mind—if his system can conquer, rather *massacre* ours,—if ever a book came *backwards* into life,"—a "*Freezeland chicken*!"

Now, sir, is that part of this enlightened community that is concerned with the republic of letters, to be degraded by the insane supposition that the *studied*, deliberate attack by any pen, becomes important as a preventive against their adopting a *Chinese puzzle*, or a *Freezeland chicken*, as an English Grammar!? Had you represented the work in question as *imposing* in appearance; in-

geniously contrived, *skillfully* executed, and well calculated to attract, and secure the attention of the grammarians of our country, you would appear more gracious in your attack! But the spirit of *slander* which prompted you to the assault, would not permit you to give the work that merit which was actually necessary to make your attack wear even the *appearance of necessity*, or *justice*. You have described this work as a production *vague* in its principles, *crazy* in its parts, *blind* in its diction, and *laughable* in its pretensions! And, yet, *incredible* as it may appear, this is the work which you, the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, have stepped forward to put *down*! Yes—against this night-hag, this formidable shape, this grisly substance,

("If shape it might be call'd that shape hath none
Distinguishable in member, joint or limb;
Or substance might be call'd that shadow seem'd.")

you, to prevent the *pride*, the *beauty*, and the *taste* of your country from being entangled in *Hymen's bands*, "*shook a dreadful dart*!"

Sir, when I find a messenger of *peace* measuring his steps by the book which he preaches, and directing his course by the spire upon his sacred dome—when I behold him like the moon, rolling in his orb of grace, and reflecting upon this world the light of the other,—when I see him throwing the rays of his Lord through the clouds which gather to conceal his glories, I revere him as a secondary means of *truth*, and *life*. But, sir, when I find him trampling upon this book, stabbing with this spire, excluding this light, and diverting these rays from their legitimate course, I hate him as "a serpent armed with mortal sting."

J. BROWN.

ELLS'S GRAMMAR.

Within a few days a book has fallen into my hands, entitled, "*BOOK INSTRUCTOR, Designed to teach the science of English Grammar without a teacher.*" By B. F. Ells.

I have cast my eye over several pages of the work; and I might say that I have been considerably amused with their contents. In fumbling over its leaves, I have met with a few things which are not quite so clear to me as I should like to have them. For instance—the book *teaches*; hence I cannot clearly see why it is not a *teacher*. As the science is taught by an *instructor*, is it taught without a *teacher*!?

The import of the title page seems to be this—

An *instructor*, designed to teach the science of English Grammar without an *instructor*!!! It *teaching* can be done without a *teacher*, *eating* can be done without an *eater*!!!

BOOK INSTRUCTOR, Designed to teach the science of English Grammar without an *Instructor*!!!

Thus much for the obscurity in the *name* of this *Instructor*. The next thing which is somewhat

unintelligible, is in the following feature of his truly Grecian face.

"The English language is about thirteen hundred years old."

I cannot understand why a language should be spoken of as though it is an animal whose age is told by the condition of the teeth, or by the number of orbicular lines upon the horns!!

But the most mysterious lineament in the whole of this Instructor's face is the following:

"It was the last formed language in the world, and without doubt will continue to be the last, till time shall have been lost in the vortex of eternity!"

"It was and will be."

It is surprising to me how an Instructor can teach the science of grammar, while he is so ignorant of it that he actually connects the imperfect and the future tense!!

"It was the last formed language in the world."

Here is an obvious intimation that there has been a language formed out of the world since the English was formed in it!!!! That the father of this Instructor should ascertain the probable length of time which has elapsed since the formation of the English Language, is not so very remarkable. But that he should be so familiar with external operations, that he is able to say that there has been a language formed outside of this universe since the English was formed inside of it, is almost incredible!!

What herald has communicated to him that there is a work-shop out of this universe, in which there have been languages formed since the construction of the English in this world!!!

"Till time shall have been lost in the vortex of eternity."

I "wonder" if these languages of which the above sentence gives the first intimation, can be made instrumental in ascertaining what is meant by *"the vortex of eternity!!!"*

I first thought that the father of this hopeful offspring, may mean the *"tempestuous philological sea,"* portrayed upon another member of this bantling!

"It was the last formed language in the world, and without doubt will continue to be the last, till time shall have been lost in the vortex of eternity!"

That is, till time shall have been lost in the whirlpool of eternity!!

What! Is eternity to be melted down in the crucible of the universe, and made to whirl in its liquid state to the destruction of time!!!!

One would think that there must have been a vortex of the brain just about the time of the formation of the "BOOK INSTRUCTOR!!"

"Because it (language) is the only medium which renders your mind accessible to the other sciences."

As the medium is the language itself, it is difficult for me to see a propriety in the use of *other!* Was language a science, the use of *other* would be proper. But as it is not a science, why should a teacher of grammar intimate that it is!?

"Because it is the only medium which renders your mind accessible to the other sciences."

Here, in an attempt to say that Language is the only medium which renders sciences accessible to the mind, this modern destructionist affirms that it is the only medium which renders the mind accessible to the sciences! That is, the mind may be approached by the sciences!! Grammarians, in general, talk the other way: They say, the sciences may be approached by the mind.

"Besides the above, there are others of the same character, but this list will serve as a specimen,"

The word, others, is as unimportant as the *"Book Instructor"* is useless!

"And nothing difficult is placed before him until he is prepared by previous lessons to comprehend it."

"Nothing is placed before him until he is prepared to comprehend it!"

That is, nothing is placed before him till he is prepared to understand *nothing!*

I should be glad to know through what process the pupil must pass to qualify him to comprehend *nothing!*

I feel perfectly satisfied that the "BOOK INSTRUCTOR" will enable any pupil to understand *nothing!* Hence I must advise every one who understands his true interest to let it alone.

Until the appearance of the BOOK INSTRUCTOR, the wonders of the world, were confined to the Egyptian Pyramids, the Mausoleum, erected by Artemisia, the Temple of Diana, at Ephesus, the Walls, and Hanging Gardens of Babylon, the Colossus at Rhodes, the Statue of Jupiter Olympius, and the Pharos, or watch tower of Alexandria.

This accession to the seven wonders should surely be the commencement of a new era!!

The BOOK INSTRUCTOR which constitutes the eighth wonder of the world, is designed "to benefit the following classes:"

1. "Those whose advanced age prevents their attending to this science in the ordinary way."

2. "Young merchants, mechanics, and other young persons just commencing business for themselves, whose time is so devoted, as to preclude the possibility of their attending to this study in the ordinary way."

3. "Apprentices whose time is so circumscribed by contract, as to prevent their attending to the study in the ordinary way."

4. "Those who do not enjoy the advantage of competent teachers of this science!"

5. "Those, though they reside in the vicinity of good teachers, are too poor to attend to its study in the ordinary way."

Yet-strange as it may appear, more than *three-fourths* of the *BOOK INSTRUCTOR* are devoted to an attempt to confute the doctrine advanced by a speculative writer upon the subject of *case, mood, tense, definition of pronouns, &c., a, as an article, &c., &c.* The following paragraphs will serve as a specimen of the *litigious spirit* and the *grammatical knowledge*, of the father of the *Book Instructor*:

"How says Mr. Brown and others that there are but two degrees of comparison?"

Mr. Brown and others says !!!

"I esteem the writings of Mr. B., on *English philology*, as of no ordinary character; yet I believe him deficient in many things." "To say that we have but two degrees of comparison in relation to *Adjectives*, is to manifest a weakness, entirely inconsistent with the *philological character of Mr. B.*" What is comparison but the placing of one thing beside another, and telling the difference between them?"

I have always understood that we *compare* to ascertain the *agreement* of one thing with another, or the *likeness* of one thing to another!

We *contrast* one thing with another to get the difference between them!

"But if I place a *positively sweet apple* beside a *positively sour* one by way of showing the difference between them, that difference is not a degree according to Mr. B.'s system!"

Here is a Grammarian who prates about *comparing* two things entirely different!

This sweet apple is *sweeter* than that *sour* one!!! That is, this black horse is *blacker* than that *white* one!!!!

"But we shall leave this subject, believing that enough has been said to prove our position, which is *none* other than the position of the immortal Murray!!!"

Before I leave this page of the *BOOK INSTRUCTOR*, I wish to give a specimen of the power of its author in defining words:

"What is the definition of the word *good*?" "It is a term that *implies no evil*!!!"

The word, *lamp*, then, signifies *good*—"lamp" does not imply any evil!

The word, *ice*, means *good*—"ice" implies *no evil*!!

"This machine is ingenious—it is an *engine* powerful in operation, and useful in effect."—BROWN'S APPEAL.

"In this example Mr. B., has attempted to show that Mr. Murray's definition of a pronoun, is fallible; because says he it makes *engine* a *pronoun* inasmuch as it is used in the place of the noun *machine*." But Mr. B. should have looked farther ahead, and he would have seen the sad predicament into which he has drawn his own definition by this same example; for if *engine* convey the

same idea that machine does, it not only stands in the place of *machine*, but is also a complete representative of it."

"Brown's—A pronoun is the *representative* of a noun."

"Murray's—A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun."

It is obvious that the father of the *BOOK INSTRUCTOR* which is *no teacher*, can not comprehend either of these definitions. Brown says that the pronoun is not the *name*, not the *representative*, of the *thing*, but of the *name* of the thing.

Murray says a pronoun is a word used instead of a *noun*. The following instance illustrates Brown's definition:

1. "John lost his knife, and *he* found it."

The word *it*, is not the name, not the representative, of the real knife, but of the word, *knife*. And the word, *he*, is not the representative of the real person, but of the word *John*.

In the following, the word, *engine*, is a perfect illustration of Murray's definition:

"This machine is ingenious,—it is an *engine* powerful in operation, and useful in effect."

The word, *engine*, does not represent the word, *machine*—"engine" represents the real machine. More,—"*engine*" is used in the place of the word, *machine*, to represent the real machine—hence engine is a *pronoun*.

"First, he (*Brown*) attempts to prove that *a* is an article, from the fact that it was used as such in a few instances in the language from which it was derived." (Page 145.)

This statement shows a willingness in the father of the *BOOK INSTRUCTOR* to violate the ninth commandment! There is no excuse for Mr. Ellis—there is nothing in the works of JAMES BROWN, which bears the slightest analogy to this statement! Let this man learn the *grammar* of the *Bible* before he attempts to teach that of the language in which he tramples that sacred book under his feet. The following is the language of Mr. BROWN:

"If *un* always means *one*, we ask how it happens that the acute philologists of France, denominate *un*, in one expression, an *article*, and in another, a numeral adjective." APPEAL.

Is here the least intimation that BROWN attempts to prove that *a* is an article upon any principle!

"Now, we are led to believe that Mr. B. is *inconsistent* and *unfair* in his manner of reasoning; for,—First, he attempts to prove that *a* is an article from the fact that it was used as such in a few instances in the language from which it was derived."

Second, when we take the same ground to prove that English nouns have *case*, Mr. B. spurns the idea; and lastly, when Mr. B. would appear more formidable than ever, he tells us that,

"*Case* does not signify *situation* in general, in the Latin; and therefore it cannot be adopted, in general, in the English."

Here is another base infraction of "*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.*" Where can this *novus homo* find that JAMES BROWN has taken any such position as is here ascribed to him?

"He tells us that *case* does not signify *situation*, in general, in the Latin; and therefore it cannot be adopted in general, in the English!!"

If any thing in the works of Mr. BROWN could be found which even by *contortion*, could be made to bear the least resemblance to this language, either in *sentiment*, or *phraseology*, this second Ananias might find some calash to hide his shame-covered face from the gaze of the world.

"Here, then, it appears that Mr. B. has discovered that the French *un* or *une* from which our indefinite article was derived, does not always signify *une* or *unity*, but is sometimes used as an *article*, and sometimes as an adjective; therefore, he reasonably concludes that, it can be used as an article in our language, and as such we have adopted it!"

Really—"therefore he (Mr. B.) reasonably concludes that, it can be used as an article in our language!!!"

What can reimburse this man for the loss of character which his total disregard to truth must occasion.

"Therefore let us hear Mr. B. acknowledging the fact that termination in Latin does not always determine the case."

"It is possible, however, that the caseless condition of a few nouns in Latin, may be resorted to, to justify the use of *case* in English."—APPEAL.

The BOOK INSTRUCTOR which professes to teach *English Grammar*, was published in Indiana, in 1834. About this time several of the works by Mr. BROWN were considerably read in that country. Among them was his APPEAL from the *old theory of English Grammar to common sense*. In these books the *erudite* Mr. Ells has found matter out of which to make his BOOK INSTRUCTOR. And from the APPEAL he has taken the sentence which is given below:

"It is possible, however, that the caseless condition of a few nouns in Latin, may be resorted to, to justify the use of *case* in English."

The learned father of the BOOK INSTRUCTOR, finding that the works of Mr. BROWN, had called the attention of the people to the subject of English grammar, came to the conclusion to publish a book on this science. But, believing that, unless the doctrine of the APPEAL could be confuted, there would be little demand for a new book on the *old plan*, and feeling that the *copy-right law* would protect *Brown's* books, he found that he must either lose the opportunity of gratifying the propensity of a miser by a complete abandonment

of his project, or make room for his contemplated book by an overthrow of *Brown's* principles. Finding it utterly impossible to overthrow any of these, he becomes reckless of every thing which the laws of God, and man required him to be! While, to enable him to overthrow *Brown*, he fills the books of *Brown* with language, and sentiments of which *Brown* would be ashamed, he filches both language, and sentiments from them to enable him to form his own! To support the idea of *case* he found it important to diminish the confidence which he knew the people felt in the soundness of *Brown's* exposition of the inutility, and inapplicability of this part of the old theory. And to diminish this confidence he absolutely ascribes to *Brown* language which *Brown* has never uttered, and doctrine which he has never advocated in any way whatever. Is the reader unable to see the motive for this base trick? Mr. Ells, finding the doctrine advanced by *Brown* impregnable, and finding it all important to his own success as a *book mender*, to shake the confidence which the people felt in *Brown*, compels *Brown* to advance things which, he in patching up a book, could confute. For instance, to show that *Brown's* position in relation to the ground upon which the old school grammarian may attempt to sustain the use of *case* in English, is not only untenable, but actually opposed to *Brown's* position in relation to *a*, Ells does not hesitate to declare that *Brown* "attempts to prove that *a* is an article, from the fact, that it was used as such, in a few instances in the language from which it was derived." Mr. Ells intended this as the *fulcrum* on which to sustain the following lever:

"If the fact that the use of *un* or *une* as an article in some cases in its native language, gives strength to the idea, that its offspring *a* is always an article, so does the fact, that *case* means *situation* in some instances in the Latin, give strength to the idea, that *case* means *situation* in most cases in English." BOOK INSTRUCTOR, page 144.

But Mr. BROWN not only does not say that *a* should be called an article in English because it is used in its parent language in a few instances as such, but he does not say that *a* should be called an article in any language on any account whatever.

"Is it possible Mr. B.!" "Yes, it is." "And so you deprecate the idea of *case* meaning Termination or Condition in English, and yet you allow the Latins to distinguish the cases of some of their nouns by this same deprecated rule."

Mr. BROWN does not advance the idea that the case of any nouns in the Latin, or in any other language, is determined by their situation. He says that there are nouns in the Latin, which have no case:

"It is possible that the caseless condition of a few nouns in the Latin, may be resorted to, to justify the use of *case* in English."—APPEAL.

In taking leave of Mr. *Ells*, I deem it proper to state that the following compliment is no compensation for the depredations which he has committed upon Mr. *Brown's* books:

"A. I will; and in doing so, I cannot subserve the cause in which I am embarked better, than by extracting a few articles from Mr. *Brown* on this subject, whom I acknowledged to be the author of the principal part of my information on this subject. Mr. *B's* illustration of the characters of prepositions, is by far the best and most useful production of his pen; and deserves the patronage of every lover of this science, No grammarian should consider his library complete while wanting the works of JAMES BROWN on English philology."—(BOOK INSTRUCTOR, p. 184.)

While Mr. *Ells* presumes that he can catch enough by *stealthy angling* without detection, to answer his purpose, every *fish* in the whole sea is a *toad*—but, when he finds that he needs more than he presumes he can catch by *stealthy angling* without exposure, every *toad* is a *fine fish*! For instance,—under page 90, he *clandestinely* takes Mr. *Brown's* monology:

"EXERCISES,"

1. "The Lord shall prepare my pasture;"
2. "And he shall feed me."
3. "With a shepherd's care:"
4. "His presence shall supply my wants,"
5. "and it shall guard me"
6. "with a watchful eye."

"A man like B. F. *Ells*, should be guarded with a watchful eye!"

The ninetyeth page in the BOOK INSTRUCTOR, is a memorable leaf: it deserves to be *nine* times told that the *first* sentence which is divided into

monos by *filched* principles, is one consecrated to that cause which Mr. *Ells* professes to honor, and to love!

EXERCISES.

1. "The Lord shall prepare my pasture."

Why does not the paper page itself, the offspring of rags, exude from its fibres, a tearful drop over this act of desecration?

This Mr. *Ells* is not only a gross plagiarist, but a most consummate hypocrite. These *Exercises* which commence with the above mono, are introduced without one word of comment! Not even the fact that the sentences are *monoized*, is mentioned!! In another part of his book he introduces *Brown's Sentence* parsing. But he has made considerable alteration in the process! Here he explains *lustily*! But the change which he has made cannot conceal his *tricks*.

In two thirds of his whole book he can be distinctly seen employing *Brown's* principles or forms, piecemeal, in some way, or other. At last when he finds that he must have more than he presumes he can procure in this way without detection, he becomes the great admirer of *Brown*!

What! is a man to be misrepresented, abused, by his enemies till they need his *aid* to support them; and then positively submit to robbery, because the *marauders* bestow a little *fulsome* praise upon his *property*! From the beginning to the end of this BOOK INSTRUCTOR, the compiler is a *plagiarist*. He presumes that he has concealed the source of his ideas by the language in which he expresses them. But this is not the case. And I now apprise him, and other *grammar patchers*, that although their *ignorance* may excuse them for their *numerous*, and *flagrant* infractions upon the laws of grammar, it can not be pleaded as an apology for their violation of the laws of the land.

THE QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED.

1. Is the old theory of English Grammar, as compiled by L. Murray, and changed, (not improved,) by others, sound enough to be tolerated?
2. Is the new system of English Grammar by James Brown, perfectly sound?
3. Will the advantage resulting from the introduction of the new system, compensate for the inconvenience of adopting it?







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